Chapter VI. Logistics

From: Commander Amphibious Group Two (CTF 53 and CTG 51.21)

A careful study was made of both the eastern and western beaches of Iwo Jim and plans were prepared for the landing on either side as the weather might dictate. It was apparent that the beaches and beach areas were of extremely soft and shifting sand, which, coupled with their steep gradient and high banks just inshore, indicated that considerable difficulty would be experienced in landing vehicles.

In anticipation of this trouble a large number of runner sleds were provided. In addition the shore party developed and tested a means of hinging marston matting and assembled it in 50-foot units "accordion pleated." Altogether more than 8 miles of this matting were prepared and loaded on sleds in such a manner as to make it available for quick use on the beaches. This proved to be a lifesaver and was responsible to a large degree for the early rapid supply of assault requirements.

At the beach our troubles began. Many of the LVT's and LVT(A)'s temporarily bogged down in the soft sand and were swamped by a steep, quick-breaking single line of breakers about 4 feet high. Some tanks stripped their tracks while trying to make a turn in this soft sand after debarkation from LSM's. LCVP's and LCM's, although beaching initially without difficulty, were swamped either by a large wave breaking over their sterns or by a heavy backwash of surf rushing in over their ramps. These boats broached and by the end of Dog-Day the beaches were almost completely blocked by various types of craft.

The ordinary salvage facilities provided by LCPR's were completely inadequate to take care of this situation and the subsequent clearing of the beaches was made extremely difficult by the fact that the surf quickly filled these boats with sand and also built a bar of sand around them. (See pictorial record pages 8 and 9.)

SMALL BOAT CONTROL

Having experienced difficulty in previous operations with small boats left in the area at night during the assault period, after parent ships had retired, a Small Craft Group was organized to administer and care for miscellaneous small craft. Boats left in the area by retiring ships were directed to the Small Craft Group Commander for securing and berthing and messing of crews, for which two LST(M)'s were available after Dog-Day. This system proved highly satisfactory and is recommended for future operations.

EVACUATION OF CASUALTIES

The evacuation of casualties during this operation showed a marked improvement over any previous operations of this group. Great care had been taken in thoroughly briefing all medical personnel involved before the operation commenced and in providing special medical equipment such as whole blood, which was used here for the first time. Four LST's were outfitted for use as casualty evacuation ships and a large medical staff placed on board. Shortly after How-Hour these vessels each launched one 3x12 barge and secured it alongside and moved to a position close to the control vessel off each regimental beach. Casualties coming from the beach, principally in DUKW's and LVT's, were taken aboard the barge and thence by crane to the LST where they were given early medical treatment and then evacuated to transports by LCVP's. During the operation these four vessels handled an approximate total of 6,136 casualties and unquestionably contributed materially to saving many lives. The Ozark (LCV 1) proved her worth in handling of casualties. Prior to the operation extra medical personnel had been placed aboard her and on her departure she evacuated a total of 407 casualties.

The lack of hospital facilities ashore was a source of constant concern because of the possibility of bad weather prohibiting embarkation of casualties. It is recommended that every effort be made, particularly in a situation such as this where no suitable harbor was available, to establish hospital facilities ashore at the earliest practicable time.

Transfer during darkness of casualties from the

evacuation control LST's to designated APA's created difficulties which require further solution. LCVP's used for this purpose in many instances had great difficulty in locating the vessel to which directed. Ships designated to receive casualties should display distinctive light groups for this purpose at all times except when danger of air raid or enemy gunfire exists. Transport Squadron Commanders must take positive steps to assure that evacuation control LST's are kept fully informed regarding the designation of ships allocated for receiving casualties. As a general rule night transfers should be reduced to a minimum.

There were a few instances reported of transports refusing to receive casualties from LCVP's after these craft were given orders by evacuation control officers of LST(H)'s to unload their casualties to these ships. Reasons given were that the transports were overtaxed or were not the ships designated as casualty receivers. This condition must not occur.

The boats returning from the beach during the early stages of the assault were found to be inadequate for the evacuation of casualties from the LST(H)'s to the transports, and it was necessary for the TransRon commanders to detail more boats to each LST(H) for this service.

It is recommended that TransDiv commanders maintain close liaison with their assigned LST(H)'s and assign additional LCVP's as circumstances require.

LSV Ozark, serving as an emergency hospital ship during the night and when transports left the objective, rendered invaluable service, and a greater number could well be used in future operations.

Recommend that medical personnel of landing force hospitals and garrison hospitals be temporarily detailed to this type of ship to augment their medical complement until such time as their services are required ashore.

From: Commanding General Expeditionary Troops (CTF-56)

HOSPITAL LST's

Four of these ships had been given additional medical personnel, equipment, and supplies to prepare them to receive casualties and act as Evacuation Control Ships. They also had a few structural changes made and carried a pontoon barge for transferring casualties. One of the four had reefer boxes, a flake ice machine and the personnel assigned to operate the blood bank. It was stocked with whole blood and acted as a floating blood bank until the blood bank was established ashore on D-plus-8. All of these ships, however, brought LVT's to the target and were converted for casualty use after these were unloaded.

The design of these ships makes it difficult to care for casualties when empty and after being unloaded they were covered with dirt and grease. the illumination in the tank deck is very poor and the operating facilities are entirely inadequate. The medical personnel assigned to them was not sufficient to care for the very large number of casualties passing through them in spite of heroic effort on their part. On D-day from 0900 to 1530 there had been 1,230 casualties evacuated through these LST's. This was slightly more than three casualties per minute. After a few days and nights of this the medical officers and corpsmen were exhausted.

The barges alongside for transferring casualties were usually violently unstable. At times the barges would rise on the swell to the level of the LST deck and on one occasion the barges had to be cut loose. However, the transfer of casualties to transports from LVT's was equally difficult, if not impossible at times, and some means of transferring casualties from LVT's to LCVP's was needed since the LCVP's could be hoisted on the davits to the deck level of the transport and casualties brought aboard this way. LVT's and DUKW's cannot be hoisted in this manner. It is easier to handle casualties in a DUKW than in an LVT, apparently due to the ease of handling the DUKW in a seaway. It has more freeboard, steers easier, and is very roomy. One LST served one beach and evacuated casualties to its transport division or to the hospital ship. With the establishment of hospitals ashore the LST's were withdrawn and at that time more DUKW's were available to facilitate the movement of casualties seaward.

It is believed that the Evacuation Control LST's served a very useful purpose, but if they are used for the care of casualties they should not be used for anything else and must be adequately staffed and equipped for this very important job. They must also have several structural alterations to allow for easy passage of the casualties from the

tank deck to the operating rooms and should have permanent installations for the care of casualties on the tank deck.

Casualties among corpsmen were very high, especially among front line units. In moving about to care for the wounded, they were subject to intense enemy fire and frequently were shot down alongside the man they were caring for. For this operation, each division was assigned approximately 5 percent additional corpsmen before the operation; however, the losses among corpsmen in one Marine Division (4th Mar. Div.) were approximately 38 percent and a little less in the others so that there was need for additional replacements and medical companies were levied on to furnish these. In one division this was carried to such an extent that by D-plus-Eight-Day, one medical company had been reduced to three Medical Officers and a few Marines and was completely inoperative as an organization. This is contrary to established doctrine and greatly hinders the care of the wounded. The hospital sections of the medical companies must not be disrupted to furnish replacements for front line units or there will be no one to care for the wounded after they are evacuated from the front lines.

From: Commander Amphibious Group Two (CTF 53 and CTG 51.21)

SALVAGE ORGANIZATIONS

The rough weather and treacherous beach conditions created a beach salvage problem which far exceeded the capacity of the usual organization set up to handle it.

As our operations progress toward the Japanese homeland, rough weather conditions will generally prevail and immediate steps should be taken to perfect and expand our beach salvage organization.

A special beach salvage group should be organized. Vessels of that group should include small tugs, YTB's, LCI types, and specially equipped LCM's carrying pumps, shallow water diving units, and underwater burning outfit. This organization would be augmented during the assault phase by LCP(L)'s or LCPR's provided by Transport Squadron Commanders for minor salvage work on their own beaches.

In addition to the above, each assault transport should provide a mobile repair unit capable of above-water welding and minor hell and engine repair to landing craft afloat.

PREVENTION OF ALONGSIDE DAMAGE

In the rough sea conditions prevailing at Iwo Jima the LST's, LSM's, LCT's, and smaller craft suffered extensive damage while alongside larger vessels. All available fenders were soon carried away and makeshift fenders proved inadequate. Cane fenders themselves caused considerable damage because of their small pressure area. Mounting lugs for causeways and pontoon barges on the sides of LST's were a particular source of damage to vessels and smaller craft alongside. In future operations it is most important that each large ship and LST be provided with suitable fenders or smal camels.

Unloading of assault shipping on Dog-Day and Dog-plus-One-Day was confined to LST's and LSM's, except for a floating reserve of LCVP's and LCM's maintained at each control vessel, loaded with ammunition, water, rations and medical supplies. Surf conditions soon proved it useless to try landing supplies by small boats and by Dog-plus-One-Afternoon al unloading of transports was confined to LCT's and LSM's. APA's and AKA's were restricted to unloading "On Call" from Dog-plus-One to Dog-plus-Five. When shipping availability permits, APA's should carry ammunition, emergency rations, water, medical supplies, and vehicles only. All organizational gear should be loaded on the AKA's. Ordinarily the beach is never ready to receive on Dog-Day anything but this type of cargo. APA's loaded in this manner could completely unload immediately and retire from the area. As other types of supplies are needed and wanted on the beach the AKA's can supply it faster than the beach parties can handle.

The loading into LCT's and LSM's must be more carefully supervised by the commanding officers of transports. Many transports overloaded the smaller craft, or dumped the supplies into them giving no thought to the difficulties of unloading on the beach. In some cases large heavy boxes were loaded on top of an already overloaded LCT causing hours of delay on the beach in unloading.

The preloading of LST's again proved highly satisfactory, the only error being in loading of B rations. The preloaded supplies must be confined to supplies needed on the beach early in the operation.

LSM's should be preloaded with supplies in a

like manner as LST's to take advantage of the tonnage they can carry.

The loading of garrison assault units in assault troop shipping should be discontinued if practicable. Garrison assault units should be loaded in their own ships so they can be unloaded when needed without having to retain several partially loaded assault ships in the area.

Garrison echelons coming into hostile areas prior to the securing of the areas, must be prepared to start unloading immediately on arrival. They must be equipped to take care of themselves. Messing of unloading crews must be arranged for prior to departure. Rear echelons should see that ships of this class are properly prepared and fitted out before they sail. This is especially true when they are part of the assault shipping.

Two resupply ammunition ships had to be called into the area early in the operation. The first ship, Columbia Victory, arriving Dog-plus-Six. The ammunition needed was primarily mortar and artillery. The 155-mm. ammunition was all stowed in one hatch and the 105-mm stowed in two hatches, one of these being the same hatch as the 155-mm. The ammunition needed primarily by the troops being 155-mm. and 105-mm., it meant working only two hatches. This did not allow the ship to be worked at the required rate as if the different types of ammunition had been spread throughout the five hatches. The loading of the Joliet Victory was the same as the Columbia Victory, with all artillery ammunition in two hatches.

For future operations where the beaching of LST's is possible, it is recommended that LST's be loaded with about 1,000 tons of high priority ammunition. Experience has taught that only three or four types of ammunition is required by the troops in addition to the initial supply. If the LST's are not capable of beaching or unloading at a causeway, larger ships must be loaded so that all priority types of ammunition are available from all hatches.

PONTOON BARGES AND CAUSEWAYS

The difficulty with pontoon barges and causeways have been discussed elsewhere. In future operations the following instructions should govern:

1. They should not be launched in rough sea conditions.

2. If any doubt exists, a few should be launched at a time until operating conditions are definitely determined.

3. Procedure should be developed for assuring that engines are in operating condition prior to launching.

4. A towing bridle should be provided. The sharp edges of pontoon sections quickly chafe through ordinary towing gear.

5. All barges and causeways should have their numbers clearly painted on both sides and on the deck for identification in case of break-down and subsequent salvaging.

6. Plans should prescribe a definite anchorage and beach area for these structures.

From: Commander Task Unit 53.4.2 (Commander LSM Group Fourteen)

On D-day the wind and sea were from the northeast; wind, force 6 knots; sea, slight swell; surf on the beach moderate. The LSM's carrying tanks experienced difficulty in landing their loads because the tanks bogged down off the end of the ramp, blocking the unloading. This necessitated many beachings. Also the wreckage on the beach, plus the marines pinned down at the water's edge left little space to land. These ships encountered severe mortar, artillery, and small arms fire. Later, when the shore party equipment LSM's landed, the beach was almost totally blocked with wrecked LCVP's, LVT's, LCM's, and tanks. These LSM's on first beachings landed only bulldozers and beach-matting; both items were sorely needed. It was impossible for wheeled vehicles to get any traction in the soft sand. Much of the shore party equipment was destroyed shortly after being landed.

The entire port side of all LSM's have been structurally weakened with seams split and frames and longitudinals buckled, bent, and broken. All equipment on the port superstructure deck has been damaged or carried away. This includes the 50-caliber and 20-mm. machine guns, ventilators, wherrys, fire fighting equipment, gun tubs, davits, stanchions, life rafts, etc.

The port sides have been pushed in from 6 to 10 inches, buckling decks, breaking piping and wiring, damaging equipment, and springing the watertight doors so that they cannot be closed. Holes were punctured above and below the water line by submerged wreckage, broaching landing craft, and loose pontoon barges.

All propellers were bent or damaged; several stern anchors were lost. Cargo nets fouled the screws of over half the LSM's operating.

It is recommended that adequate camels 40 to 50 feet long and 4 feet wide be used in this type unloading. These would tend to spread the strain of impact over a large area and lessen the damage.

The bough fenders used by the transports smashed huge dents in the sides between the frames.

Too much emphasis cannot be placed on the need for efficient salvage operation and clearing the wreckage off the beaches. The loose causeways and pontoon barges were a deadly hazard and should be kept under control. Moreover, a great effort should be made to keep cargo nets and lines out of the water.

From: Commanding Officer U.S.S. "Fayette" (APA-43)

Palletized cargo, where it can be handled as planned in LCM's and LCVP's has distinct advantages. Unfortunately, several difficulties arose which made it necessary to break the vast majority of pallets on this ship before unloading them. The first difficulty was that the loading plans of the ship did not anticipate pallet loading so a certain amount of the pallets had to be broken in order to get all the cargo on board. The remaining pallets were stowed under and around the squares of the hatches where they could be reached by the cargo hook. The pallets that were loaded into LCM's were handled on the beach quickly and efficiently. However, only a small part of the bulk cargo was unloaded into LCM's. Most of it was loaded into an LST, an LSM, and an LCT. All the pallets loaded into these craft had to be broken and handled by cargo nets, resulting in delays and increased labor.

Cargo or "trip" tickets. The requirement that each net load of cargo be accompanied by a signed mimeographed form filled out in triplicate showing exactly what was in the net, was a source of constant delay and irritation. The plan was to retain one copy on board, deliver one copy to the control officer, and one to the beachmaster. The system finally broke down under its own weight. It is recommended that "trip tickets" be abolished in future operations.

The boat control system was so complex and rigid that boat coxswains had difficulty getting through to discharge their cargo even when all beach conditions were favorable. By the time the coxswain had delivered trip tickets and received orders from the various control officers to "wait" he was very nearly discouraged. When a ship has its own assigned beach, its own beachmaster, its own boat group commander, it is recommended that the boat group commander be allowed to send in his boats as they arrive and beach conditions permit. This is the system that has worked in an efficient, simple, and speedy manner in previous operations.

From: Commanding Officer U.S.S. "Talladega" (APA-208)

The "Hot Cargo" pool of LCVP's while considered an excellent scheme under suitable conditions, did not work out well in this operation due to the nature of the beach and bad surf conditions. A large proportion of cargo loaded into "Hot Cargo" boats had to be loaded back aboard ship and sent ashore in larger craft.

From: Commanding Officer U.S.S. "Sibley" (APA-206)

It was plainly evident that carrying life rafts over the side abreast No. 4 hatch or anywhere else below the main deck level is impractical when handling LSM's or LCT's alongside. These rafts have been removed and stowage found for them inboard clear of the side.

From: Commander Transport Division Forty-five

The value derived from submitting cargo unloading reports every 2 hours is questioned. With few LCT's and LSM's available and the impossibility of discharging cargo on the beaches using ship's boats, the transports often went hours without unloading. The cargo unloading reports in those cases did not change. It is believed that three cargo unloading reports a day would suffice to present an accurate picture. Any reduction in routine reports required will reduce the communication load and permit priority messages getting through more rapidly.

From: Commanding Officer LCT(6) Group 48 (CTU 53.7.5)

UNDERWATER HULL DAMAGE

The amount of underwater damage is best illustrated by the fact that before the assault was

over, each LCT had been drydocked in an LSD at least once, five of them twice. The causes were three: First, failure to remove pad-eyes welded on sides of LCT's to secure launching ways; second, submerged wrecks on beach; and third, collisions at beach with other craft. All three combined to produce an unusually large number of holes in voids, patching of which required the cutting away of whole sections of underwater plating. The first cause could easily be eliminated, either by countersinking the pad-eyes, making them removable, or by adding extra plating behind them. The second cause was a natural part of the operation, as was the third. Heavy surf caused ships to swing into one another while on the beach. Holes in the bottom were relatively few, but those in generator rooms caused much trouble. Vibration of generators created cracks in deck. Damage to shafts was not widespread, but there was much operational time lost due to fouled screws, arising from debris on beach. LCT(6) 1154 twice lost its starboard screw due to improper size of shaft. Due to necessity of continuing operations, no attempt to repair ships was made during the first 2 weeks except as ships became inoperable. Repair facilities were inadequate, but only because of the excessive amount of damage suffered. At the end of 2 weeks, extensive repairs were begun and are continuing.

From: Commanding General, Headquarters Fourth Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force

The tactical loading of assault elements in LST's was necessarily different for the Iwo Jima operation than in previous ones in which the division had participated. For the Saipan operation, at least 8 LST's had been provided for each assault RCT, allowing 4 for each assault BLT in which 3 rifle companies, BLT support elements, and a proportional part of the LVT(A)'s were embarked. The LVT(A)'s were distributed equally throughout the 16 LST's assigned assault RCT's. Because of the limited number available to the division for the Iwo Jima operation, only 7 LST's could be allotted to each assault RCT while 5 were assigned to the artillery regiment. Each assault RCT in turn assigned 3 to each assault BLT and embarked LVT(A)'s of its Armored Amphibian Company in the remaining 1 (a hospital LST). This plan did not provide equitable distribution of personnel, LST's embarking assault companies being overloaded beyond the capacity limit assigned by higher echelon, particularly those carrying radar and pontoon barge personnel. LST's with armored amphibians were loaded to less than one-third capacity in personnel. It is believed that in the future assignment of LST's for an operation, consideration should be given to recommendations submitted by the division which bases its requirements on the tactical plan, involving the maintenance of tactical unity, rather than upon a mathematical solution arrived at by dividing the number of LVT's and LVT(A)'s to be lifted by the capacity of an LST.

From: Commander Amphibious Forces, United States Pacific Fleet (Commander Joint Expeditionary Forces)

Distribution of troop personnel and matériel

IWO JIMA ASSAULT FORCES

Unit	Officers	Enlisted	Short tons (including vehicles)	MT (including vehicles)	Number of vehicles
Fourth Marine Division:
APA's-AKA's	1,105	16,601	13,632	32,436	1,194
LST's-LSM's	254	6,582	9,585	28,764	687
Total	1,269	23,183	23,217	61,200	1,881
Fifth Marine Division:
APA's-AKA's	979	17,271	13,110	36,791	1,221
LST-LSM's	322	7,216	9,574	30,101	611
LSD	6	90	589	750	18
Total	1,307	24,577	23,273	67,641	1,850
Third Marine Division:
APA's-AKA's	1,081	17,925	14,155	33,465	1,438
LST-LSM's	37	497	1,623	2,125	54
LSV	7	50	279	1,241	50
Total	1,125	18,472	16,057	36,831	1,542
Corps (and attached garrison):
APA's-AKA's	398	4,573	10,425	29,137	1,028
LST-LSM's	270	5,444	11,818	34,205	1,010
Total	668	10,017	22,243	63,342	2,038
Total assault force	4,369	76,249	84,790	229,014	7,311

Measurement tons per man

Fourth Marine Division	2.50
Fifth Marine Division	2.61
Third Marine Division	1.89
Corps	5.93
Assault force	2.84

STANDARD LST LOAD No. 1

The following articles will be stowed at the after end of the tank deck of each LST receiving this load:

AMMUNITION

No.	Article	Rounds	Boxes	Cube	Weight Pounds
1	.30-caliber carbine, M1	90,000	30	30	3,030
2	.30-caliber ball (5 rounds)	61,500	41	61	4,592
3	.30-caliber ball (8 rounds)	72,296	59	88	6,372
4	.30-caliber tracer (8 rounds)	36,000	24	36	2,640
5	.30-caliber AP and tracer (belted 4-1)	152,000	152	134	12,160
6	.45-caliber ball	4,000	2	2	220
7	.50-caliber AP and tracer (belted 2-2-1)	11,340	54	104	4,320
8	12-gauge No. 00 buckshot	1,500	3	3	198
9	37-mm. cannister M-2	140	7	15	714
10	37-mm. HE, N63 w/f BD, M58	260	13	27	1,183
11	37-mm. APC N51, w/tracer	260	13	30	1,300
12	60-mm. mortar, HE M49A2, w/f PD M52	2,872	359	438	18,237
13	75-mm. gun, HE, M48 (SC) A1	147	49	83	3,920
14	75-mm. gun, HE, M48 (NC) w/f PD M54	147	49	83	3,920
15	75-mm. gun, APC M61, M66 A and tracer	369	123	227	9,963
16	81-mm. mortar HE, M43A1, w/f PD, M52	490	82	158	5,986
17	81-mm. mortar, M56	392	196	208	8,310
18	Rocket AT, 2.36" M6-H3	200	10	33	1,270
19	Grenade, hand, frag. Mk. II w/f N10A3	1,625	65	82	3,705
20	Grenade, adapter, M1	1,008	21	36	922
21	Grenade, adapter, T-2	48	1	2	40
22	Grenade, hand illum.	200	8	10	463
23	Grenade, hand inc., frag	48	4	5	180
24	Grenade, rifle, AT M9A1	940	94	94	3,008
25	Cartridge, gren, carbine M61
	Total cube and weight			1,769	90,921

Item	Quantity (bbls, cases, etc.)	Cubic feet	Weight Pounds
Emergency rations:
C-rations	100	100	4,500
D-rations	27	27	1,080
K-rations	100	138	2,800
Total	227	265	8,380
Water (5-gallon cans) 4,000 gallons	800	720	44,000
Automatic supplies:
Toilet paper--1 case (100 rolls)
Laundry soap--2 cases (120 bars)
Salt water soap--2 cases (40 bars)
Wire: 50 rolls, concertina		150	2,750
LVT maintenance:
Distilled water (5-gallon can)	1	1	50
Rags (2 bales)	2	3	50

1. One box on each of 2 LST's. Not included in standard load.

2. The following articles will be secured to the main deck as far forward as possible on each LST receiving this load:

Item	Quantity (bbls, cases, etc.)	Cubic feet	Weight Pounds
Petroleum:
Gasoline, 100-octane	20	200	10,000
Gasoline, 80-Octane	20	200	10,000
Cleaning solvent	1	11	500
Gasoline unloaded	1	11	500
Oil (SAE 50, detergent)	5	55	2,500
Oil (SAE 30, detergent)	1	11	500
Grease, No. 2 type (cane)	8	8	572
Rust preventative (drums)	2	22	1,000
Total		518	25,272

3. The following articles will receive special stowage in accordance with current safety regulations as directed by AdComPhibsPac.:

No.	Article	Rounds	Boxes	Cube	Weight Pounds
1	2-inch mortar, M3 bomb smoke, M14M2	306	17	19	765
2	60-mm. mortar, illum. M83	320	40	49	2,032
3	60-mm. mortar, smoke, W.P. T6	144	18	22	914
4	60-mm. mortar, smoke, H.C. T8	136	17	21	864
5	75-mm. gun, smoke, W.P. Mk. II	74	25	44	2,019
6	81-mm. mortar, smoke, W.P. M57	99	33	56	1,650
7	Rocket AT, smoke W.P.	96	8	19	680
8	Grenade, smoke, H.C. M8	200	8	14	480
9	Grenade, smoke, W.P. M15	850	34	61	2,482
10	Grenade, rifle, smoke, W.P.	40	4	5	144
11	Grenade, hand, colored assorted	150	6	9	288
12	Grenade, colored t8E1 assorted	40	4	4	128
13	Grenade signal colored smoke assorted	100	(1)	(1)	(1)
14	Light signal Very--Green Star, Red Star, White Star	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)
15	Signal ground assorted	144	3	7	276
16	Flare trip, M-48	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)
17	Flare trip, M-49	250	10	18	590

1. Packing unknown.
2. 1 box assorted in each of 3 LST's.
3. 121 per LST--packing not known.

CASUALTIES SCREENED BY LST(H)'s

Day	Date	LST(H) 929	LST(H) 930	LST(H) 931	LST(H) 1033	Daily total
D-day	19 Feb	281	398	88	218	985
D-plus-1	20 Feb	168	248	249	151	816
D-plus-2	21 Feb	31	230	220	223	704
D-plus-3	22 Feb	26	40	37	118	221
D-plus-4	23 Feb	200	279	46	96	621
D-plus-5	24 Feb	93	309	96	209	707
D-plus-6	25 Feb	26	132	225	56	439
D-plus-7	26 Feb	46	574	226	30	876
D-plus-8	27 Feb	45	324	136	87	592
D-plus-9	28 Feb	0	175	0	0	175
		916	2,709	1,323	1,188	6,136

SUMMARY OF NAVAL BATTLE CASUALTIES

	KIA1	WIA1	MIA1
Transports, Group Able (53.1)	12	19	39
Beach parties, Group Able	0	3	1
Transports, Group Baker (53.2)	3	77	15
Beach parties, Group Baker	4	44	11
Transports, Reserve Group (51.1.1)	4	2	0
Beach parties, Reserve Group	0	0	0
Cruisers	17	120	0
Carriers and support carriers	25	87	362
DD's, APD's, and DMS's	31	55	9
Support planes (CTF 51, 24 planes)	13	4	13
LST's	9	28	0
LSM's	4	30	2
LCT's	2	10	0
Small craft groups	0	1	0
UDT groups	17	22	0
Mortar support groups	0	4	0
Pontoon barge and LCT group	0	1	0
Gunboat support group	17	58	0
Net and buoy unit	17	44	0
Seaplane base group (AV)	0	8	0
Survey ship	1	2	0
Ammo ship	0	1	0
Ditched plane 46V609	0	6	0
Total	176	626	452

1. Total KIA, WIA, MIA, 1,254.

LANDING FORCE CASUALTIES

Day	Date	KIA	WIA	MIA	Cumulative total	Daily total
D-day	19 Feb	76	1,080	5	1,161	1,161
D plus 1	20 Feb	264	1,562	481	3,055	1,894
D plus 2	21 Feb	426	2,116	355	3,969	919
D plus 3 and 4	22,23 Feb	870	4,711	670	6,251	2,282
D plus 5	24 Feb	1,021	5,284	537	6,845	594
D plus 6	25 Feb	1,195	6,006	549	7,750	905
D plus 7	26 Feb	1,347	6,791	484	8,622	872
D plus 8	27 Feb	1,556	7,984	586	10,126	1,504
D plus 9	28 Feb	1,616	8,418	575	10,661	535
D plus 10	1 Mar	1,845	9,150	599	11,595	934
D plus 11	2 Mar	2,005	9,780	545	12,333	738
D plus 12	3 Mar	2,278	10,632	541	13,451	1,118
D plus 13	4 Mar	2,468	10,556	631	13,655	204
D plus 14	5 Mar	2,620	10,753	546	13,919	264
D plus 15	6 Mar	2,715	11,054	452	14,221	302
D plus 16	7 Mar	2,869	11,505	430	14,804	583
D plus 17	8 Mar	3,055	12,251	435	15,741	937
D plus 18	9 Mar	3,191	12,723	445	16,359	618
D plus 19	10 Mar	3,315	13,203	421	18,204	581
D plus 20	11 Mar	3,488	13,785	419	17,692	752
D plus 21	12 Mar	3,653	14,130	421	18,204	512
D plus 22	13 Mar	3,765	14,403	434	18,629	398
D plus 23	14 Mar	3,878	14,750	434	19,062	460
D plus 24	15 Mar	4,112	15,102	437	19,653	591
D plus 25	16 Mar	4,206	15,290	423	19,928	275
D plus 26	17 Mar	4,305	15,474	417	20,196	268
D plus 27	18 Mar	4,357	15,511	397	20,265	69
D plus 28	19 Mar	4,403	15,598	391	20,392	127
D plus 29	20 Mar	4,457	15,677	359	20,493	101
D plus 30	21 Mar	4,503	15,732	353	20,538	95
D plus 31	22 Mar	4,540	15,820	336	20,696	108
D plus 32	23 Mar	4,590	15,954	301	20,845	149
D plus 33	24 Mar	4,590	15,954	301	20,845	0
D plus 34	25 Mar	4,590	15,954	301	20,845	0
D plus 35	26 Mar	4,590	15,969	301	20,860	15

The Steep Beach Gradient, the Surf, and the Volcanic Sand Caused Numerous Small Craft To Broach--Note Flooding From backwash Over Ramp.

LST's and LSM's Are Force To Land Close Together Due to Wreckage and Lack of Exits Over Steep Terrace.

Though Broached, Prompt Action Saved the Supplies.

Unimproved Roads Impeded the Movement of Supplies.

Lack of Exits Caused Congestion of Supplies on Beaches.

Bulldozers Reduced the Terraces Making Exits to the Lateral Roads.

Preassembled Marston Matting and Runner Sleds were Laid on Roads and Beach Exits.

Handling Palletized 105-mm. Ammunition.

A General View of RED Beach Showing Matting on Roads.

Unloading of Pontoon Barge With an LVT.

Delivering Cargo on Runner Sleds--Note Casualty Evacuation station in Background.

Beach and Surf Conditions Wrecked Numerous barges. Uncollected Cargo Nets on the Beach Went Adrift and Fouled Propellers of Small Craft.

Dog-Day-Plus-Eleven. Opposites With the Same Fate.

The Marston Matting showed the Effects of Heavy Traffic but the Supplies Were Cleared From the Beaches.

LSD Renders Assistance to a Pontoon Barge.

LCT 1029 Broached on Dog-Day-Plus-Eleven and Eventually Had to Be Sunk at Sea.

Beach Scene, Beach YELLOW 2. Wrecked DUKW and AMTRACK--Jap Lugger, D-Plus-2-Day.

Beach Scene, Beaches GREEN, RED 1 and 2. Note Broached Pontoon Causeways, D-Plus-7-Day.

Slow Unloading--Each Carton of Rations Manhandled Twice. Apparently No Trucks or LVT's Loaded in the LSM, Being Used. Instead Roller Conveyors Are Used.

Little Space to Beach Among the Wreckage. Note the LSM Beach Mat in the Foreground. They Proved very Beneficial on D-Day.

Wrecked LVT's on YELLOW Beach, D-Plus-2-Day.

LST's Unloading. Note Marston Matting in Foreground, Beach RED 1, D-Plus-7-Day.

LST's and LSM's Unloading on GREEN and RED Beaches, Suribachi Mountain in Background, D-plus-5-Day.

View of Island Looking North. Unloading on Southeastern Beaches, D-plus-5-Day.

Dog-plus-Five Aerial View of Suribachi and the Transport Area.

The Southern Half of the East Beaches on the Afternoon of Dog-Plus-Five.

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