CHAPTER V

WAR: BRISTOL'S BASES, ESCORTS, AND PATROLS

After the flurry of excitement and confusion which naturally accompanied the outbreak of the war had cleared, Admiral Bristol found himself faced with an escort problem. During December it had become increasingly apparent that Canadian escort strength was mostly "on paper" and they were having difficulty in maintaining adequate numbers in each escort group. He pointed out to Admiral King that at that time they (the Canadians) were returning from Iceland to the United Kingdom on all of the even numbered ON convoys which gave them an advantageous break, but on the Iceland end it was often tight. This might have resulted at any time in their missing an even convoy and reverting to the odd numbers. Bristol felt that this difficulty was caused principally by the inadequacy of their maintenance ideas and facilities. Because of this Bristol advocated using Londonderry as an alternative if it could be worked out smoothly, despite the fact that he foresaw difficulties on the other end. Furthermore, he realized the necessity for the closest understanding between Iceland and Londonderry, as well as keeping control on this side.¹

About the first of the year Admiral Bristol had a

military inspection of the Iceland Air Detachment conducted. He found that it left something, to be desired, and in a letter to Captain Mullinnix (Commander Patrol Wing Seven), he stated that the general appearance of the base was poor. However, he further stated, he realized this was partially because of inadequate facilities for building, and maintenance and adverse operating conditions, but in comparison with other bases he felt that it was possible to achieve better results. They especially failed to measure up to the required standards and the Wing Commander was ordered to take immediate corrective action. But there was a redeeming feature:

As compared with the stated performance of the RAF, the flying-hours-per-plane of the Iceland Air Detachment is gratifying . . . This detachment maintained a greater percentage of planes ready to fly than was accomplished by either the Army or the RAF operating under the better conditions and with better facilities incident to land plane operations.²

On 5 January 1942 a Joint Army-Navy directive was sent out averring that United States Marine and British Forces in Iceland and Northern Ireland were to be relieved by United States Army troops. Eight thousand of these troops were to leave for Iceland during January and another force was to leave for Northern Ireland as soon as was practicable to release First Marine Brigade (Provisional) for service elsewhere. Also on this same date Commander Task Force Four

promulgated his first movement order of the year, No. 1-42. This said, in accordance with a directive sent out by the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, that Minesweep Division 25, under Lt. Comdr. McCaleb, was to investigate Mal Bay and St. Mary's Harbor, Newfoundland, to determine if these places were suitable for fleet anchorages. Information concerning such points as ice conditions, security or anchorages from swells and high winds, character of holding ground, practicability of laying anti-torpedo nets, etc. was to be obtained.

On the 8th of the month, Admiral Bristol wrote his first letter to Admiral Ingersoll, who had relieved Admiral King as Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet. He said that in the past he had been writing personal letters to Admiral King and receiving from him personal letters on various matters connected with escort-of-convoy.

The reason and purpose behind such letters was a general discussion of problems which either existed or could be foreseen and which, at that time, were not sufficiently developed to be handily covered by official correspondence ... I don't know whether King left his file or such correspondence with you, but I hope that you will approve the continuing of the practice.³

This practice, as has been noted before, was one of the factors which greatly contributed to the smooth running of Bristol's organization. In order that there might be a more complete understanding between the two admirals, the letter continues by expounding Bristol's ideas on such

matters related to the escort-of-convoys as: number of escorts, number of ships per group, composition of a group, overhaul, escort cycles and weather. In discussing the above subjects he indicated to Admiral Ingersoll that he was operating on a very tight schedule, but he still had an "Ace-in-the-hole" that had not been taken into consideration, i.e. the time interval between convoys. At that time he was operating on a six day sailing interval between convoys which were composed of between thirty to fifty ships. By increasing the interval to seven days, a week could be gained ever the present escort cycle, and this would only increase the ships in the convoy by approximately eight. Bristol said that although he was not advancing the idea at that moment, he would appreciate it if Admiral Ingersoll would think it over.

This letter was followed three days later, on the 11th, by the issuance of Admiral Bristol's first operation plan of the year. From the task organization of this plan it can be seen that Task Force Four was continuing to expand.⁴

This differs from the previous plan 14-41 in that Admiral Reichmuth has been made Commander Task Force 9 and Admiral Carpender now had the Home Base Group; task groups 4.7 and 4.8, previously reserved, had now become Task Force 4 - Escort Control United Kingdom and The Greenland Patrol respectively. (This definitely establishes the latter as no longer being under the Northern Patrol, Task Group 6.1, commanded by Admiral Andrews, where it had previously been for several months.) Also, Patrol Squadrons 82 and 83 had replaced Patrol Squadrons 72 and 71, then on temporary duty with Commander Task Force 8, Rear Admiral McWhorter. The Patrol Squadron set up of Patrol Wing 7 now were allocated as follows: Commander Patrol Squadron 73 (Iceland), Commander Patrol Squadron 74 (Naval Air Station, Norfolk), Commander Patrol Squadron 81 (Naval Air Station, Argentia), and Commander Patrol Squadron 8 (Naval Air Station, Norfolk). This plan was later cancelled and superseded by Operation Plan 3-42 (Revised).

As was noted on the previous Operation Plan, allowance had been made for an Escort Control Station in the United Kingdom and in connection with this Commander W. A. Buck, Support Force Supply Officer, made the following notation in a memorandum to Commander Task Force 4. He said:

Lacking definite information on a number of questions concerning the use of Base One as a convoy escort terminal complete plans cannot be made now with

respect to the logistics requirements of this project. Assuming as a basic principle that in general all material requirements are to be supplied by U. S. sources and that the MELVILLE is the only tender likely to be available the considerations involved are outlined, etc.⁵

And in a memo to Captain W. A. Corn in Naval Operations the same subject, Bristol's Chief of Staff, now Captain Carney, had this to say:

The possibility of full occupation of Base One has been discussed. Immediate use of Base A is not contemplated and if American air is to go over in the spring, steps will be initiated by Commander Task Force FOUR early in the game to put Base A on a proper footing to receive our aircraft and to do a creditable job from the time they arrive. No action is required at the moment but the Admiral does not intend to have a haphazard development such as occurred in Iceland and he will demand vigorous action as soon as he knows for certain that our planes are to operate from Loch Erne.

Returning to the subject of Base One - "If the whole Atlantic escort effort is pooled (U. S. and Canadians) there may be upward of 130 ships making Londonderry at the eastern end.⁶

On the 11th of January Captain Carney had written Captain L. H. Thebaud, Commander Task Group 4.6, in Iceland concerning the Londonderry project, stating:

The Big Wigs (U. S. and British) are scheduled to commence a palaver on the 20th of January in Washington to work out the details of the Londonderry scheme. I am going to attend as one of the fleet representatives. The trans-oceanic escort idea is one which I worked out in detail last summer including the substitution of U.K. escorts for our short leggers during the last few hundred miles of the East bound trip; the idea did not

meet with much favor at the time, but the geometry and arithmetic of the proposition are difficult to contravert, so I think something of the sort will go through.

The degree of U. S. occupation of Londonderry is still a matter of conjecture; however, if the British turn the entire job over to the U. S. and Canadians, they can withdraw for other purposes a sizeable number of ships now employed on escort duty. If such a development should take place Londonderry may assume the importance of its original conception and be occupied by our people in a big way. You will know the answer to that as soon as I do.

I am sending the MELVILLE to the eastward with HX-171 with Iceland as her ostensible destination; if the Londonderry project is suddenly approved, the MELVILLE will be in the right locality and can be diverted there at once. Otherwise she can relieve the VULCAN if the CinC adheres to his idea of sending the VULCAN back to Philadelphia for a couple of weeks.⁷

Admiral Bristol in writing to Rear Admiral Murray, Royal Canadian Navy, in St. John's, Newfoundland, on 15 January requested permission to use that harbor and Halifax, Nova Scotia, as supply bases for United States weather observation vessels then operating in the North Atlantic. These weather ships were very important because the information that they supplied determined the movement of ships and forces and it was necessary for them to continue operating in a routine manner. Despite this importance Admiral Murray said in his reply of a few days later,

I must say that the prospect appalls me, though I do not wish to disappoint an Ally. St. John's harbor at the present time is so full of broken down merchant ships awaiting repairs, that I have been forced to send

some of them to the exposed anchorage of Bay Bulls in order to find room for the more valuable ships and cargoes inside St. John's itself.⁸

He felt that these ships would only add to the already "badly congested conditions and he further added that St. John's was "not much on recreation and has very bad liquor."

On the 25th of January the situation regarding the proposed use of Londonderry as an escort terminal was still up in the air and Admiral Bristol says in a letter to Admiral J. H. Towers of the Bureau of Aeronautics, "I recognize that the Support Force situation as originally set up is out. On the other hand, recent indications in change of convoy plans may mean forces, both surface and air in our bases in Ireland and Scotland.⁹ With the exception of this uncertainty of a pending move to the British Isles, the month of January concluded with nothing more unusual to offer than numerous escort orders as the escort-of-convoy tempo livened.

On 2 February Commander Task Unit 4.2.9 pointed out a situation which convoy escort captains might well take into account. Because of poor operational conditions during the winter months there were often many ships that straggled from their convoy. These ships were frequently slow in answering the necessary recognition signals thereby wasting a lot of time. Since merchant type raiders sent out by the enemy had an appearance similar to stragglers from convoys,

a real danger existed when a ship did not answer signals promptly. Boarding these vessels in stormy weather was, of course, impractical, and if a ship was not promptly identified, a disguised raider might inadvertently slip through. It was therefore suggested that where doubt existed in the mind of the commanding officer of an escorting vessel he should fire a shot across the bow of the ship dilatory in answering signals. This would put merchantmen on their guard for fear of further attack or would tend to disclose the character of disguised raiders. This eventually became a standard operating procedure and the problems of identification diminished rapidly.

Admiral Ingersoll (Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet) considering the importance of cryolite to the aluminum industry wrote the Chief of Naval Operations on 3 February regarding a proposed plan for its transportation.¹⁰ Since the loss of a three thousand ton cargo of cryolite approximately equaled the loss of one hundred and twenty tons of aluminum, and since the possibilities of the loss of such cargoes were increasing due to heightened enemy submarine activity and inadequate numbers of escort vessels to escort cryolite cargoes directly to the States, the Admiral proposed that cryolite ships be routed directly to ports in the Northeast United States. From there their cargoes could be shipped to Philadelphia to which point they had previously been

transported by ship. This would cut down on the hazard of a long trip, relieve the strain on necessary escorts, and increase the chances of the safe arrival of the cryolite at its destination.

The escort schedule at this time was apparently presenting a rather grim picture for there are continued references to the need for rehabilitation of both men and ships. On 3 February Bristol, who always had this problem in mind, said in a personal letter to Admiral Carpender, "The spirit is willing - but they simply have not any physical surplus left to draw on . . . Unless the ships are ready and the crews refreshed and keen to go, they are of no use to me."¹¹ On 5 February a conference was held on board the USS PRAIRIE in connection with material and maintenance for the new system of Providing Ocean Escorts. This was intended to alleviate some of the pressure of the extant escort schedules. There was to be a Mid-Ocean group of 143 escorts based on Newfoundland and a Western Local Group of 47 escorts based at Halifax; both of these groups being composed of United States, Royal Navy, and Royal Canadian Navy ships. It was decided to consider the Newfoundland area as a single location, including St. John's and Argentia; other bases at Londonderry and Halifax.¹² Ships based at Newfoundland (only 15 of this

group were U.S. DDs) would be free to enter either at Argentia or St. John's, but for the immediate present only the 15 United States destroyers would be assigned to Argentia. If St. John's was unable to take care of the work load as it developed, ships would be diverted to Argentia --- ships which required only straight repairs within the capacity of the PRAIRIE or the other facilities to be made available at Argentia. The British or Canadians were to furnish an officer to the PRAIRIE in connection with work an Royal Navy and Royal Canadian Navy ships.

Londonderry was established by the Secretary of the Navy as a Naval Operating Base on 5 February, 1942. Base One had finally come into its own, but in a rather different status from the one for which it had originally been intended. When Admiral Bristol straightened out the schedule from the MOMP to Londonderry instead of to Iceland it was not the Northwest Escort Force, but just an ordinary escort-of-convoy force that carried it out. After this "unbending" of the escort route Bristol's destroyers used Londonderry as their turn-around, but actually they were based in Canadian and Newfoundland ports, only stopping in Iceland or Londonderry temporarily.

Admiral Bristol's letter of 9 February to Admiral Ingersoll indicated one of the few examples of friction within his organization. He complained of what he called his

"Anomalous" position in the Atlantic Fleet Organization. "Under present and prospective conditions, I am actually only a task force commander in a special job. All of my force belongs to someone's else type command. It's working so there is nothing to say, except that there are occasional awkward situations."¹³ He also said in this same letter, drawing a comparison between the British escort units and ours, "We maintain the same coach for the team and they're trying to keep the same team together without a coach." Obviously he felt that the latter was a poor system.

Also on 9 February Commander Task Force 4 sent Commander Greenland Patrol a letter with reference to the operation of the Greenland Patrol in which he said that the latter was definitely to operate under Task Force 4; also to support the basic Joint Plan for the Defense of Greenland. "The escort of shipping to and from Greenland will be provided and arranged by Commander Greenland Patrol keeping Commander Task Force 4 informed; when practicable, Greenland shipping will be escorted by units of the Greenland Patrol in the area between Greenland and Cape Cod."¹⁴ From this last it is evident that to date nothing had been done about shipping cryolite cargoes by rail from Northeast United States Ports.

11 February found Admiral Bristol writing the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, in connection with escort problems.

The difficulties in making contact with the convoy at MOMP are inherent in long range control of this point. Some of these difficulties should disappear with the establishment of U.S. Escort Control, Londonderry. Basically, however, a chief cause for difficulties in meeting at MOMP lies in the fact that the Admiralty does not always promulgate early information concerning correct position of west-bound convoys, when ahead of or behind schedule. Strong representations should be made to the Admiralty on this point.¹⁵

United States Escort skippers had a strong dislike for sailing out to pick up a convoy before they had been informed as to the location of the MOMP, and this was especially true of those based in Iceland. In further connection with convoy problems Bristol wrote Admiral Murray concerning the loan of the MAC LEISH to the latter for convoy duty.¹⁶ The United States Navy, the Royal Navy and Royal Canadian Navy had always worked on the principle of seniority and since this was universally accepted there were never any problems. However, in this instance Bristol suggested that even if the MAC LEISH'S skipper were the senior escort commander he would rather Murray designate his own Royal Navy or Royal Canadian Navy skipper who was more familiar with the setup. This practice, although somewhat unconventional, undoubtedly went a long way towards preventing confusion.

On 19 February Commander Task Force 4 wrote the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, on the outcome of Minesweeps Division 25's exploration of Mal Bay and St. Mary's Harbor. It was found that neither of these places provided protection from winds and swells and even though it was practicable to lay torpedo nets, the anchorages at Argentia were considered far superior. As a result of this investigation neither of these places were recommended as suitable fleet anchorages.¹⁷

The upshot of the meeting in Washington of the United States and British "Bigwigs" on 20 January 1942 was the new ocean escort plan. The organization for this came out one month later in Commander Task Force 4's Operation Plan No. 2-42 for Western North Atlantic Escort-of-Convoys. The task organization is given without designators; Commander Task Force 4 in the PRAIRIE at Argentia.¹⁸

On the following day, 21 February, Admiral Bristol sent out the following information to the Commanders Mid-Ocean groups A1-A5 on the subject of escort training:

Under the new escort-of-convoy system Groups A1-A3 will be composed of U.S. DDs and Canadian corvettes; groups A4-A5 will be composed of U.S. DDs and British corvettes . . . Group training and indoctrination are of vital importance; the ingenuity, industry, and professional attainments of the group commanders will be taxed to achieve, in a limited time, the necessary team work in these mixed groups. Every opportunity must be seized at Argentia, Londonderry, and at sea, to promote

training in escort tactics, A/S and A/A warfare, and communications.

LANTFLT 9A governs: the U.S., British, and Canadian escort and attack methods are basically similar, all being derived from North Atlantic experience. However, thought and energy will be required to weld the different types of ships and different internal procedures into closely-knit combat teams . . . Toward that end that effective joint training methods may be developed, group commanders will confer with CTF 4 and CTG 4.7 on the occasion of each visit to Argentia and to Londonderry respectively.¹⁹

About this time an event occurred which was not only disheartening in itself, but it put a further crimp in an already binding escort system. This was the loss by grounding of the United States destroyers TRUXTUN and POLLUX. Admiral Bristol gives a very colorful account of this incident in a letter to Captain J. L. Kauffman, Commandant of Naval Operating Base, Iceland.

The scene of the accident was on the western shore at the very tip of Newfoundland as you enter Placentia Bay. Two miles further to the south on the course they were on would have taken them clear. It happened at a place called Lawn Head, just around the Corner from St. Lawrence, and in as wild a bit of country as Newfoundland has to show. Deep water up to the face of the cliffs and the cliffs are 100 to 200 feet high. I could draw you no better picture than to say that the temperature was around 25, heavy driving snow, and winds up to about 35 and 40. The actual scene was about seven miles cross-country from St. Lawrence and no road. The last of the survivors was not hauled up the cliff until 24 hours after the grounding. Both vessels began to break up quickly and the TRUXTUN shortly turned over on her side. The loss of life was appalling - more than half - and the only reason that anyone was saved is due to the magnificently heroic work of the people of St. Lawrence. Our own rescue party reached the spot about 10 hours after the grounding, but could not have done a thing if the St. Lawrence people had not been there already.

In this letter he also commented on the fact that submarine activity was increasing in the area adjacent to Argentia. Bristol believed that several days previously they had destroyed a submarine about two miles north of ship harbor, which is not very far from Argentia.

One of the destroyers depth charged him four times and there was oil evidence just before night set in. By morning it was blowing six of a kind and we could do little further about it. At about the same time two of our planes each got one a little way off Cape Race. In one case there was no visible result, except that the depth bombs landed accurately just after the periscope had disappeared. In the other case, the bombs landed alongside with the periscope still showing. The conning tower was lifted out of the water by the explosion and then sank . . . The sub activity is raising hell with us as you have undoubtedly gathered.²⁰

The 26th of February Bristol wrote the Secretary of the Navy and proposed that a memorial hospital be given the people of St. Lawrence, Newfoundland, in memory of the crews of the TRUXTUN and POLLUX. His praise f or the work done by the people of this town was very high, and he thought it only fitting that some token of gratitude be given them.

Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox replied to Admiral Bristol's letter of a few days before concerning the memorial hospital on the 4th of March. Knox thought it was an excellent idea and said that if he could not find some benefactor he would try to get a Congressional Appropriation.²¹ (Since then, the money for this hospital has been allocated,

but because of the shortage of labor and materials it has not as yet been built.)

Also on 4 March Commander Task Force 4 sent out a report on Convoy HC-169 to Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet.²² Although this escort-of-convoy operation was conducted without incident it is important in that this was the first unit to enter Base One - Londonderry.

The next day, 5 March, Bristol again wrote the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, making some suggestions on what to do with the advanced bases in the British Isles.

The Support Force was originally formed and organized for the purpose of carrying out the part of Rainbow 5 having to do with the Northwest Escort Force of the U. S. Naval Forces, North Europe... War developments resulted in deviating from the original plans and the position of Commander Support Force appears now to have crystallized as that of the commander of an operating task force of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet with certain special operational responsibilities in connection with North Atlantic escort-of-convoy. As a corollary the status of the projected United Kingdom bases has changed; although Base ONE, (Londonderry) is now justifying its existence, and Base A may yet come into the picture, it appears that their place in the Navy scheme will not be different from that of other operating bases...

With reference to the subject of advanced bases, a special instruction exists and a special treatment appears to be indicated; Captain W. A. Corn, USN has from the beginning, been intimately associated with every detail of the development of the Support Force advanced bases, and his experience and knowledge coupled with his ability, will be impossible to replace quickly. For the over-all benefit of the Navy's advanced base problems it would seem logical and most desirable to:

1. Set up in OpNav a section for advanced base projects.
2. Place special base and supply units, and all advance base material under that section, and,

3. To establish Captain Corn as Director of Advanced Bases in OpNav.²³

In accordance with previous instructions from Admiral Ingersoll on 6 March, 1942, Admiral Bristol sent out a despatch to the effect that he was now Commander Task Force 24 and from now on all Force Group and Unit designators would be accordingly preceded by the correct new numerical designator. Also Operation Plan No. 2-42 was to be changed to agree with these new designations.²⁴ On the 7th of March the Iceland Escort Detachment was organized in accordance with verbal instructions from NOBI. This task unit (24.6.2) was organized for the purpose of escorting shipping from Iceland to join westbound ONS convoys, and from eastbound SC convoys to Iceland.²⁵

Admiral Bristol's first Operation Plan as Commander Task Force 24 came out on the 10th of March and was numbered 3-42. With the exception of several items and the change in designators, this plan was to all intents and purposes very similar to its predecessor.²⁶

Several days later on 12 March Bristol commented in a letter to Ingersoll upon the various allied ships in the harbor at Argentia. Besides the regular U.S., British, and Canadian escort vessels there were also Free French, Polish, and Norwegian manned corvettes. Operations were now really "combined" in a big way. The Admiral also referred to the termination of the Support Force --- he said,

The abolition of the Support Force has left several tag ends. I am waiting on the assumption that the Department will do the necessary. If not, I will list and make recommendation. One small item, for example, which I had expected to be caught immediately is the fact that I have no mail address in accordance with instructions that Task Force Commanders will not be addressed as such by mail on the cover envelope.²⁷

On 13 March Admiral Bristol received the following communication:

Sir:

The title of the Task Force Four, Atlantic Fleet, having been changed to Task Force Twenty-four, Atlantic Fleet, your designation dated February 27, 1942, will be considered as modified accordingly. Your present date of precedence as a Vice Admiral will continue in effect.

Respectfully,
/s/ Franklin D. Roosevelt.

This letter from the President was followed several days later on the 17th by a similar letter from Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox. There was now no question in the minds of anyone as to just who Commander Task Force 24 was.

in a letter to Admiral Murray dated 27 March Bristol discusses the question of peeling off escorts for the salvage of torpedoed ships. He considered it a serious problem and felt that it was up to the man on the spot to make the decision. "The escort numbers are already at a minimum and if the decision to attempt salvage results in disproportionate future losses, the decision is unsound."²⁸ This letter also shows the excellent attitude of cooperation that existed between the two forces. Bristol said to Murray:

I do not want you to feel that we were thinking along different lines and for God's sake don't hold back on the initiative. If it happens that we work at cross purposes for a moment it is too bad, but we will quickly straighten it out and at least we will be taking action. I believe that I appreciate fully your line of thought and procedure and I assume that you do the same with me. In the final analysis it has been working splendidly and still is. So again I say, don't hold back.

This reference to initiative and holding back had to do both with orders concerning the policy of routing convoys, which had become a trifle confused at that time, and orders to escorts having had ships of their convoy torpedoed. The escort of convoys and its ancillary problems were, naturally, Bristol's biggest headache, and March, like the preceding months, had been full of them.

On the first of April Commander Task Force 24 put out his revised Operation Plan 3-42 in which the over-all task organization remains the same with the exception that Captain Sallada had relieved Captain Mullinnix as Commander Task Group 24.3 (Air Group). However there were several additions and revisions to the main body of the plan.²⁹

In order that there might be no mistakes made, on 3 April Bristol sent out a letter to the Task Force on the subject of Instructions for the Escort-of-Convoys. In this he said:

In the conduct of escort of convoys in the North Atlantic, it has been necessary to issue certain operational instructions to implement my current Operating Plan. In order that these may be readily identified and that there be a standard method for reference purposes, all such instructions of permanent or semi-permanent nature will here-after be assigned serial numbers and will be referred to as Task Force TWENTY-FOUR Operational Instructions (Short title F.O.I.) . . . In order to insure ready reference to these instructions, all 30 units of this force will maintain a separate F.O.I. file.³⁰

As had been noted earlier, there had been some friction in the command set up of the Plan for the Defense of Newfoundland between the five forces that were supposed to carry it out. This was mainly because the commanders of the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Canadian Army in Newfoundland did not have the complete authority to make on-the-spot decision without having first consulted higher authority located elsewhere outside of Newfoundland. Admiral Bristol offered some suggestions on this point and on the 4th of April received a letter referring to this from Admiral Ingersoll.

It appears that your statement before the 'Coordinating Committee for the Defense of Newfoundland' points the way toward enabling the 'pentagon' you described to effect closer cooperation, particularly if the Commanders listed in paragraph 12 of ABC-22, who are not present in Newfoundland, will designate 'duly authorized representatives' in Newfoundland to act for them.

I am concerned over the situation - not with respect to your ability to obtain continued support and cooperation which may be necessary for the proper execution of your major tasks - but as to the general situation. As you know, the closest cooperation between the various services, with elimination of needless duplication of effort is essential.³¹

This situation hung fire for quite some time and was not completely squared away until some time later on in the year.

On 9 April Bristol wrote a letter to Admiral Murray in St. John's explaining why he had ordered some of the Western Local Escorts in to Argentia instead of sending them to St. John' s as they were accustomed. There were two reasons for this: One was that when there were no British escorts at Argentia there was not enough work for the tender PRAIRIE to do --- Bristol wanted to keep them busy; besides availing themselves of the maintenance facilities at Argentia, the other was that he wanted them to make contact with his operations office. And of course when the British groups were there, there was nothing that could be done for the Western Locals, but four out of every ten weeks they were out and the PRAIRIE was available. The mutual benefit derived by both the Western Locals and the PRAIRIE, plus relief of the congestion of St. John's harbor, made the proposition well worthwhile. Admiral Bristol also stated in this letter:

I note with considerable concern that I am going to have to sail two of the B-units with a total of one destroyer and three corvettes each; I am not going to be able to augment those units as I did in the case of the first turn-around, and will so inform CinCWA. I realize that CinCWA must be very hard pressed in view of the ships that he is sending to our Atlantic seaboard, so I am reluctant to put on any further pressure for additional ships. Nevertheless, that is a very weak escort and I will be relieved when they have passed through the danger zone.³²

In a letter to Captain Thebaud in Londonderry written the 10th of April Admiral Bristol stated that it was his conviction that the very minimum escort for a trans-Atlantic convoy must be the equivalent of two destroyers and four corvettes. This had been accepted in Washington and apparently in England, and in other despatches preceding the final agreement two destroyers and five corvettes had been specified. Bristol said, "So far, all of the British groups have been shy and, as you know, we beefed up the first eastward-bound sailing with American and Canadian ships." It was his belief that the British were having a difficult time because of the sudden starting of the system, but he had assumed that on the second cycle the British would be able to bring up their units to the required strength. Although the British had been hard pressed, he could not understand how this early in the game they could have made the commitments which they did and completely fail to keep up with them. "Without going into figures or checking, I doubt that we have heard the names of more than half of the Royal Navy corvettes, and also, destroyers which are supposed to be in the pool.³³

This was one of Admiral Bristol's very last letters, for shortly thereafter he was taken critically ill and eventually died. Three days before his death he received

from Admiral King what must have been a very gratifying despatch which read:

Since the organization of 3 March 1941 of the force you command it has accomplished:

1. conduct of an anti submarine training program
2. completion of advanced base projects
3. control of North Atlantic Escort of Convoy _ operations. Conduct of Cast has resulted in the escort of 60 odd trade convoys by United States forces with an average of about 40 ships per convoy and a total loss of 8 ships. All of above has been accomplished from small beginning and with much of the work done under arduous conditions with no complaints and wholly cheerful attitude. To you and your people well done and carry on.³⁴

Vice Admiral Bristol died aboard his flagship, the USS PRAIRIE, at Argentia, Newfoundland on 20 April, 1942. He was later buried in his home town of Charleston, South Carolina. For his services as Commander Support Force up through and after the time it became Task Force Twenty-Four he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal posthumously.

FOOTNOTES

1.	Admiral Bristol's personal letter (no serial) of 20 December 1941 to Admiral King.
2.	CTF 4 sec. ltr. serial 006 of 2 January 1942 to ComPatWing 7.
3.	Admiral Bristol's sec. ltr. serial 00401 on 8 January 1942 to Admiral Ingersoll.
4.	CTF 4 Op Plan 1-42 sec. ser. 0013, 11 January, 1942. 4.1 ESCORT UNITS --- Escort Commanders 4.2 DESTROYER FLOTILLAS 4.3 AIR GROUP --- Captain Mullinnix 4.4 HOME BASE GROUP --- Rear Admiral Carpender 4.5 TASK FORCE FOUR ADMINISTRATION 4.6 TASK FORCE FOUR ESCORT CONTROL ICELAND 4.7 TF 4 --- ESCORT CONTROL UNITED KINGDOM 4.8 GREENLAND PATROL --- Captain E. H. Smith 4.11 NEWFOUNDLAND ESCORT FORCE --- Rear Admiral Murray, RCN 4.19 U.S. AND CANADIAN ESCORT UNITS AT SEA
5.	Comdr. W. A. Buck (SC) (no serial) memo of 12 January 1942 to CTF 4.
6.	Bristol's C/S Capt. Carney Sec. ltr. serial 0020 memo 0f 12 January 1942 to Capt. W. A. Corn.
7.	Capt. Carney sec. personal ltr. (no serial) of 11 January 1942 to Capt. L. H. Thebaud.
8.	Admiral Murray, RCN, personal ltr, of 22 January 1942 to Admiral Bristol.
9.	Admiral Bristol's personal ltr. of 25 January 1942 to Admiral J. H. Towers.
10.	CinCLant sec. ltr. serial 0049 of 3 February 1942 to CNO.
11.	Personal ltr, of Adm. Bristol of 3 February, 1942 to Adm. Carpender.
12.	Sec. notes on conference held aboard USS PRAIRIE, of 5 February, 1942 (A1-A3).
13.	Admiral Bristol sec. ltr. ser. 001984 of 9 February, 1942 to Admiral Ingersoll.
14.	CTF 4 sec. ltr. ser. 0056 of 9 February 1942, to ComGreenPat.
15.	CTF 4 sec. ltr. ser. 0062 of 11 February, 1942 to CinClant.
16.	Admiral Bristol personal ltr (secret, no serial) of 15 February, 1942, to Admiral Murray.
17.	CTF 4 sec. ltr. ser. 0068 of 19 Feb., 1942, to CinClant.
18.	CTF 4 sec. ser. 0070 Op Plan No. 2-42. See Appendix "C" for Task Organization and pertinent data of this Op Plan.
19.	CTF 4 sec. ltr. serial 0071 of 21 February 1942 to Commanders Mid-Ocean Groups (A1-A5).
20.	Admiral Bristol personal ltr. (no serial) of 25 February 1942 to Capt. J. L. Kauffman.
21.	SecNav conf. ltr. serial 011400A of 4 March 1942 to Admiral Bristol.
22.	CTF 4 sec. ltr. serial 0093 of 4 March 1942 to CinCLant.
23.	CTF 4 sec. ltr. ser. 0099 of 5 March, 1942 to CinClant.
24.	CTF 24 conf. despatch ser. 060746 of March, 1942.
25.	CTU 24.6.2 sec. ltr. ser. S-15 of 7 March, 1942 to CTG 24.6. This was composed of five DDs, the DECATUR, and DesDiv 53 basing at Base "Cast" (Reykjavik).
26.	CTF 24 Op Plan 3-42 sec. ser. 00111 of 10 March, 1942. For Task Organization and related material of this plan see Appendix "D".
27.	Personal ltr. from Admiral Bristol of 12 March, 1942, to Admiral Ingersoll.
28.	Personal letter from Admiral Bristol of 27 March, 1942, to Admiral Murray, RCN.
29.	CTF 24 Op Plan No. 3-42 (revised) sec. ser. 00135 of 1 April, 1942. Some of the most Important of these are: Salvage operations in the Atlantic are a responsibility of the Shore Establishment, while rescue operations (for both ships and persons in distress) are a responsibility of the seagoing operating forces. As a general rule, initiation of rescue work in case of vessels more than 500 miles from the land of the Sea Frontiers is the responsibility of the CinClant; at distances of less than 500 miles, it is the responsibility of the Commanders, Sea Frontiers. (This was added). CinClant will transmit known locations of hostile and friendly forces. (This was formerly done by CNO). Task Force (Group) Commanders will initiate rescue operations in accordance with the general principles in paragraphs 1(r) and 3(x), but Task Unit Commanders and Commanding Officers will promptly take appropriate action in case of nearby vessels, informing the Force Commander of action taken. (This was added). In an emergency, convoys may be diverted by escort unit commanders from prescribed routes without prior approval of the Chief of Naval Operations, but only to the minimum extent necessary to avoid immediate danger. Report of any such emergency diversion will be made to the CNO in the WESTERN ATLANTIC and to CinCWA in the EASTERN ATLANTIC as soon as circumstances permit. Resumption of prescribed track and arrival at the assigned meeting points on schedule will continue to be essential. (This was not so completely stated in the previous Op Plan.)
30.	CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 362 of 3 April, 1942 to TF 24.
31.	Personal ltr. from Admiral Ingersoll (no serial) of 4 April, 1942 to Admiral Bristol.
32.	Personal ltr. from Admiral Bristol (no serial), 9 April 1942 to Admiral Murray.
33.	Personal ltr. from Admiral Bristol (no serial) of 10 April, 1942, to Captain Thebaud.
34.	Cominch sec. despatch ser. 3115 of 17 April, 1942, to CTF 24.

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