CHAPTER I

FORMATION OF THE SUPPORT FORCE

When the harbingers of the European war clouds began to loom over the Atlantic horizon in 1939 and 1940 in the form of expanding Axis submarine operations they found the United States not totally unprepared for the storm. During the summer of 1940 the Germans had made several attempts to establish weather stations in Northeast Greenland and to meet this threat to the Western Hemisphere the United States Government began formulating plans for the establishment of bases in the North Atlantic. Commander E. H. Smith, USCG, who had charge of the Coast Guard iceberg and weather patrols in the Greenland area, and who knew more about this section of the world than almost anyone else, was instrumental in providing much needed information.

In August of 1940 the Government had under consideration the establishment of United States Bases in Newfoundland, and on the 2nd of September Great Britain granted the United States the use of the Avalon Peninsula for this purpose. Permission was granted in the form of a note from Lord Lothian to Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. The note states, "His Majesty's Government will secure the grant freely, and without consideration of the lease, for entrance thereto, and the operation and protection thereof

on the Avalon Peninsula and on the Southern Coast of Newfoundland ."

On 10 September 1940 Admiral Greenslade, as head of a Presidential Investigating Committee, arrived in St. John's Newfoundland aboard the cruiser USS ST. LOUIS, and from there proceeded to a town called Argentia, located on the Western part of the Avalon Peninsula. The Admiral and his party hired a car from a man living in the nearby village of Placentia, and toured the surrounding countryside. Afterwards it was stated by the driver of the car that he believed the Admiral had decided to establish a base at Argentia. In reality, after the initial decision was made to set up a Newfoundland Base, little other deciding was necessary, as Argentia was the only logical spot on the Avalon Peninsula. It was the only location connected to St. John's by both road and rail, having a harbor suitable for a fleet anchorage that was ice free the year around.

During December of 1940 the United States Navy's "brains" in the War Plans Division came out with a plan to meet the Axis more than half way. On the assumption that sooner or later we would go to war against the Axis, and this obviated the fact that we would be sending an increasingly large number of ships and supplies to Great

Britain, Captain H. W. Hill and Commander F. P. Sherman submitted a memorandum to the Director of the War Plans Division outlining en escort-of-convoy system. The Hill-Sherman assumptions provided a basis for preliminary planning and stated that the United States would assume responsibilities for (1) the protection of all trans-oceanic shipping and (2) the protection of the approaches to Northwest Scotland.¹ They also anticipated the possibility of operating naval forces from advanced bases in Scotland, Ireland, and other localities in the North Atlantic.

The last week in December of 1940 Mr. E. E. Davis, representative of the civilian contractors,² arrived at Argentia to make preliminary arrangements for construction, and work actually started on the 29th of December, 1940. About 9 January, 1941, the SS RICHARD PECK, a former Long Island steamer, arrived in Argentia from New York with contractor's workmen on board. She tied up at a pier and

became the central quarters for the workmen and construction work on the Argentia base really got under way.

On 25 January, 1941, the Marine detachment of the Third Provisional Company arrived at Argentia aboard the USS NIBLACK. This company³ was quartered on RICHARD PECK until 19 June when their barracks on the base were completed. Records show that some of the marines even had their families aboard RICHARD PECK, and for quite some time the ship was used to serve as barracks for both service and civilian personnel until more serviceable quarters could be built on the beach. Several weeks after their arrival the Marines put up a monument in commemoration of their landing. The inscription on it reads as follows:

"On this site on 13 February, 1941, a detachment of U.S. Marines, under the Command of Major H. E. Dunkelberger, USMC, raised the first U.S. Flag over a Lend-Lease Base acquired from the Government of Great Britain. Argentia was occupied by this detachment on 25 January, 1941."

During the latter part of 1940 and first few months of 1941 the Navy "big-wigs" in Washington mulled over proposed ideas and projected plans, and gradually things began to take shape. In working out a war plan, still on the assumption that the United States was to protect all trans-oceanic shipping and the approaches to Northwest Scotland,

the force that was to assume the latter task was referred to as the "British Isles Detachment." However, it was changed for security purposes, and became known instead as the "Support Force."

On 10 February, Admiral Turner, Director of War Plans Division, proposed that as required under War Plan 46 (WPL-46), "If the Navy is to be ready, if required, to despatch promptly an effective force to operate from bases overseas in connection with the protection of shipping, the force must be equipped, assembled, and trained." He recommended that there be established in the Atlantic Fleet, not later than l March, 1941, a Task Force⁴ to meet this necessity. Five days later Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, directed that the necessary steps be taken to establish what was to become known as the Support Force. He said:

For the present, the employment of units of this force will be limited to preparation and training for anti-submarine warfare, the protection of shipping and self defense against submarine and air attack. In order to compensate somewhat for the withdrawal of these units from the neutrality patrols, CinClant will be authorized to use for neutrality patrol duty in the Caribbean, two squadrons from Patrol Wing Three, and all inshore squadrons which may be placed in commission.

On 24 February 1941 Admiral R. E. Ingersoll, USN, sent out a general announcement mentioning Rear Admiral A. L.

Bristol, USN, as Commander of the Support Force, and the same day the Chief of Naval Operations sent out a secret letter, saying that as of l March, 1941, the Support Force of the Atlantic Fleet was established.

Since this Force may be engaged on distant service beyond the scope of normal supply and maintenance lines, it is desired that it be fully supplied and equipped as is practicable at the earliest practicable date. The special requirements are being studied and will be communicated by the Chief of Naval Operations through normal channels to the various bureaus concerned, as rapidly as they can be determined. Likewise, the location of future bases and points of assembly of materials will be decided upon in the immediate future. The addressees are desired to initiate at once such action as can be foreseen and to confer freely with the Force Commander and his Staff on details. This project is classified as urgent. Priority, as regards personnel, material, and logistic requirements, will be directed by the CNO as necessary.⁵

It is to be noted that the Force was comprised almost entirely of destroyers and patrol planes, that there were no battleships, carriers, or cruisers.

On the 26th of February Admiral Bristol received his orders from the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and they read as follows:

l. When directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, you will regard yourself detached from duty in Naval Operations, Navy Department, and from such other duty as may have been assigned you; you will proceed to the port in which the Flagship of Commander, Support Force, Atlantic Fleet may be, and on March l, 1941,

report to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, if present, otherwise by despatch, for duty involving flying as Commander, Support Force, Atlantic Fleet.

2. These orders constitute your assignment to duty in part of the Aeronautic Organization of the Navy and your existing detail to duty involving flying continues in effect.

/s/ C. W. NIMITZ.

The same day Admiral King, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, sent out a letter to all Type Commanders, modifying the existing Task Organization of the Atlantic Fleet as of l March, 1941,⁶ and on 28 February Bristol received an official letter from Admiral King which read to the effect that he was designated as Commander Support Force. It further stated:

You will take all necessary steps to ensure at the earliest practicable date the complete material readiness of the Support Force, dealing with the Department where such action will expedite matters in hand. Submarine Squadron Twenty, comprises a group of submarines to be prepared for distant service. By copy of this letter, Commander Submarines is directed to confer with you regarding training operations which will be mutually beneficial to the Support Force and Submarine Squadron Twenty.⁷

As ordered, the Support Force came into being as a part of the United States Atlantic Fleet on the first of March; on the third Admiral Bristol broke his flag as Force Commander on board the USS PRAIRIE in Norfolk, Va. He remained in Norfolk until the latter part of the month and while there he sent out his first Operation Plan, 1-41. In this he lists Commander H. M. Mullinnix as Commander Patrol Wing Support Force. This plan, which in reality is a tentative operation order, stated the "IRIS" shipping in the Fifth Naval District waters should be seized. "Iris" is a collective expression referring to Germany, Italy, Japan, France, and Denmark, and although the seizure of shipping was ordered, the plan was never carried out. Later, on March 18th, the Task Organization of the Atlantic Fleet was promulgated, showing the Task Organization of the Support Force, which was designated as Task Force 6. The Northern Patrol, of which Admiral Bristol was also in charge, is listed here under the Support Force.⁸

The operation order stated that the Support Force was to intensify all practicable readiness for anti-air, anti-submarine warfare, and protection of shipping; also to prepare for distant service in high altitudes. The Northern Patrol was to be ready to investigate reports of potential enemy vessels and other non-American activities in the North Atlantic. Operating bases were designated at Norfolk, Bermuda, Narragansett Bay, and in due course, Argentia, Newfoundland. About the end of the month the Admiral shifted his operating base from Norfolk to Newport, Rhode Island, and began in earnest the intensive training program he had outlined for the Support Force. During the time Bristol was in Washington and Norfolk he had been picking and assembling his Staff,⁹ and that he was a good

judge of people is evidenced by the excellent job they did under him and later on in the war.

The formation of the Support Force was given a high priority, and this gave the Admiral the chance to select a group of very able men to serve on his Staff. Notable among them were Captain Denfeld and Pennoyer, and Commanders Mullinnix, Carney, and Wooldridge. Bristol's Staff, after it was organized, was a very smooth running outfit, and this was largely due to the selection of personnel, the way in which he handled them, and his contacts in Washington. Bristol had friends in Washington with whom he was closely affiliated, and who knew his problems and the way in which he liked them handled. These people were usually in key positions, and a good example of this is the way in which he was able to accomplish things in Naval Operations through Captain Corn and Commander Gallery. He also carried on a great deal of business by personal correspondence, and in this way anticipated his desires for other people, which in turn facilitated the smooth running of his organization.

Bristol says, in a letter written on March 23rd, that

Present information leads to the conclusion that in the event of distant operations by this Force from advanced bases, PRAIRIE will base at Belfast, and that additional repair facilities will be required at other points. 'Alongside' facilities are being considered for Londonderry and in the Clyde Area. In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that repair and maintenance facilities equivalent to two tenders of the MELVILLE type be immediately assembled, and at the earliest practicable moment shipped, and installed at the locations finally determined. Finally, it is recommended that the repair and maintenance facilities for Londonderry be approved now, that the second shore repair unit be determined on the return of Captain Denfeld, and that both projects be lumped together under a request for the highest priority.¹⁰

There was not the problem of reconnaissance in connection with the choice of bases in the British Isles that there was in the North Atlantic, but there was still a problem of selection. Admiral Bristol had suggested Loch Erne as the principal base for United States Patrol plane squadrons in Northern Ireland.¹¹ Loch Erne had railroad and road connections with both Belfast and Londonderry, and Bristol said that, although at that time there are no existing base facilities there, the British were building a ramp for seaplanes. The British considered this a good "Big Boat" operating area, but were themselves operating principally from Oban and Loch Ryan at the south end of the Clyde. Admiral Bristol recommended that the United States take as rapid steps as possible in preparing Loch

Erne as a base from which to operate a minimum of four patrol squadrons before we became actively engaged in the war. [Carney] Bristol's acting Chief of Staff, while Captain Denfeld was in the British Isles inspecting advance base sites, advised all possible use of training facilities during a two week period of fleet mobilization in order to facilitate coordination when it came time to move into these bases. Commander Carney also referred to a British despatch (ALUSNA 151700) which noted the following facilities: "minor repair base Londonderry; large tender location Belfast; MELVILLE or shore facilities Londonderry; ODD docking facilities Londonderry; and floating drydock for 1500 tonners at Belfast." Loch Erne was noted as No. 1 location for planes and Loch Foyle as a secondary base to the former. Oban would be available for half of the planes at a later date. He said, "we must bring all ground equipage with us and ground facilities must arrive first. Planes can be hauled out of water now at Oban, but not at Loch Erne. Ample living and eating quarters available at Loch Erne and runway being started."¹²

On the same day, 2l March, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent out a letter in which he assumed that the United States would go to war and, as a result, these bases

would be necessary. He described two bases which are apparently Londonderry and Loch Erne, although he does not mention them by name. He also ordered the assembly of Support Force material and personnel, the latter at Atlantic Coast Air Stations, and the former was to be drawn out of what had already been ordered. Material which could not be drawn was to be contracted for, final contracts deferred until provisions of the lend-lease bill became effective. Finally, he stated that the strictest secrecy must be maintained with regard to this project.¹³

Faced with the problem of operating from advanced bases there were several factors which Admiral Bristol had to take into consideration. One of these was logistics. This was partially taken care of by the Naval Supply Depot at Quonset, Rhode Island, as here were assembled many of the things that he would need, especially for advanced air bases. Here again, is an example of Bristol's putting one of his men in the key position. Lieutenant Boundy, (SC) USN, a member of the Admiral's Staff and who knew the set-up, was on the spot. He retained materials on hand and ordered what would be needed; later, when the Support Force needed them, they were available when they could not be obtained elsewhere on the East Coast. However, despite the

Quonset arrangement Commander W. A. Buck, support Force, Supply Officer, informed Admiral Bristol, "it is practically certain that a cargo ship should accompany the Force when proceeding to the area of advanced operation. Special material and aviation material considerably in excess capacity is being requested continually." In this connection, since it became more and more obvious that a great quantity of equipment would need to be transported, Admiral Bristol wrote to the Commander Train, Atlantic Fleet, advising him as to approximately what would be needed in the way of facilities for advanced bases.

Another problem was that of hospitalization for Support Force personnel. Bristol saw fit to write to the Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery,

The Navy Department has accepted the principle of establishing an air base overseas for the use of units of the Support Force and is now lining up material for shipment. Personnel for the base, including the Commanding Officer, are being selected. It also appears probable that one destroyer base will be established, and secondary air bases may become necessary. It is recommended that a comprehensive hospitalization plan be developed, based on the principles of the early establishment of a base hospital or hospitals to care for the sick or battle casualties to be expected in an original force of approximately 7,000 men.¹⁴

Bristol's first mention of Argentia, Newfoundland, comes about l3 March, 1941, in a letter to Admiral King concerning Support Force advanced bases. In it he

conjectured that if the movement of the Force was ordered after the lst of May, plane take-off would be on or after the l5th of May. By then the northern route would be available; there would be no difficulties because of plane radius.

The only problem involved is the establishment of an adequate base in the Newfoundland area, presumably Argentia. None of the facilities of this base now under construction will be available before late summer, and all plane services will have to be by tender.

Bristol's studies so far indicated the advisability of having all tenders, namely the ALBEMARLE, BELKNAP, and BADGER available on the other side when the planes arrived. If this was done it would mean tender services from outside the Force. He said:

I will know more concerning this when Denfeld returns from London. It appears that the minimum which will be required to base a squadron at a time in Argentia would be one AVD plus a tanker for additional general service and probably additional gasoline. If it is shown to be practicable to hold one of my own small tenders on this side until after the flight, I will need only a tanker from outside sources. I am discarding entirely the CURTISS from my calculations, as presumably she will be in the Navy Yard by the time any Northern flight is practicable.¹⁵

A mailgram from the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, on 18 April directed the Commander Support Force to make ready a minimum of six patrol planes and one tender to

proceed and base at Argentia if called for, and include a plan for effecting transit to Argentia. It assumed that the Task Organization would support certain Task Forces of the Atlantic Fleet or augment the Atlantic Fleet Patrol organization. These planes were to remain in readiness to proceed to Argentia and operate from there as directed.

As far as the Support Force Patrol Wing was concerned, Commander Mullinnix did not have much with which to work at the start because of the four squadrons ordered to the Support Force, only one was available, and this one was "seriously deficient in training and lacking items of equipment." Therefore it was decided by the Chief of Naval Operations that this squadron, VP-52, be concentrated for correcting defects. The Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, was authorized by the former to discontinue the neutrality patrol from Quonset, Rhode Island, until adequate numbers of planes became available. Except for emergencies, the Support Force was to concentrate its efforts on training and preparation.

Admiral Bristol's plans to operate planes from the British Isles obviated the necessity for trans-Atlantic facilities. He informed Admiral King,

Preliminary plans for trans-Atlantic flights by the patrol squadrons of the Support Force include a stop-over at Argentia. It is considered desirable to have

all aircraft tender facilities of this Force stationed in the distant area before planes take off from Argentia. In order to accomplish the foregoing, it will be necessary to have tender facilities and sufficient fuel for stopping off at Argentia, and it is requested that the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet designate the vessel or vessels to provide such facilities. In the event that no additional vessels can be provided, Commander Support Force intends to leave one AVD at Argentia. This alternative plan will necessitate a tanker to be stationed at Argentia for stowage of reserve fuel and to assist in accommodating personnel.¹⁶

Also about this time United States Naval Observers in the British Isles, accompanied by British authorities, were inspecting various sites for United States bases in the United Kingdom. On the 5th of April, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations wrote the Senior Naval Observer in London concerning the establishment, operation, and maintenance of advanced air and destroyer bases in Northern Ireland and Scotland.

On commencement of operations overseas Commander Support Force proposes to operate destroyers from Londonderry and Belfast in North Ireland, and patrol planes from Loch Erne and Loch Foyle in North Ireland, and from Oban in Scotland.

It is proposed to commence construction immediately of two advance air bases, one at Loch Erne and the other at Loch Ryan (Stranraer) and on two destroyer bases, one at Londonderry, and the other at Gare Loch, Scotland.

As soon as the construction of these bases is sufficiently advanced to permit operations from them, even to a limited extent, it is proposed to operate

patrol planes, shore based, from Loch Erne and Loch Ryan and destroyers from Londonderry and Gare Loch.

The 24th of April found Admiral Bristol and the PRAIRIE back in Norfolk again and at this time he sent out his Operation Plan No. 1-41. This is not to be confused with his previous Plan 1-41 which had to do with the seizure of "Iris" shipping in the Fifth Naval District waters. It is to be noted that in this plan the Support Force is now Task Force 4, and is made up of three Task Groups.¹⁷

About the first of May the Chief of Naval Operations sent a letter to the Chief of Staff, United States Army, which was concerned with protection by the Army of Naval Bases in Ireland and Scotland. In this letter he reminded the Chief of Staff that the Navy was building four bases in Ireland and Scotland. The material that was ready and about 1,000 key men were to be transported about the end of May and the four bases were to be established as follows: Destroyer bases at Londonderry, Ireland, and Gare Loch, Scotland; air bases at Loch Erne, Ireland, and Loch Ryan, Scotland. (These later were referred to as bases 1, 2, A, and B, respectively.) Admiral Stark stated that,

Rear Admiral A. L. Bristol, U.S. Navy, has been assigned to command the naval forces which will use these bases. Recently several members of his staff visited the United Kingdom, and in collaboration with British officials, spent some time in inspecting and selecting the base sites. Captain L. E. Denfeld, USN, Rear Admiral Bristol's Chief of Staff, is now on duty in the Navy Department in connection with the preparation of the expedition and construction of the bases. He is, therefore, available for consultation by Army Officers on questions relating to the defense of the bases. It is assumed that the Army will plan to establish ground and air forces for the protection of these bases. It is recommended that the Army make a study of the necessary defenses and inform the CNO as to what defenses will be provided, and when, in view of the probability that Axis forces would probably attack our Naval Forces as soon as possible after their arrival. Present plans contemplate the dispatch of the Naval Forces to the British Isles on 10 M. It would be very important that the Army Defense Units sail at the same time.¹⁸

About the middle of May, Bristol, aboard the PRAIRIE and having returned to Newport, sent out Modification No. 2 to Operation Plan 1-41. (Modification No. 1 stated that the Chief of Naval Operations would transmit known location of Axis forces and told Support Force ships to stay clear of British Naval Forces and convoys. It also provided the stationing of Coast Guard weather reporting and ice patrol ships, but in no way changed the Task Organization.)¹⁹ However, Modification No. 2²⁰ was important in that it added to the existing Task Organization by designating an Argentia Group. This was composed of one of Captain Kauffman's destroyer divisions and one of Commander Mullinnix's patrol squadrons and a tender. This was a supplementary order in accordance with the Hemisphere Defense Plan, about which Op Plan 1-41 has this to say:

The possible early intensification of the limited national emergency requires the maintenance of material and personnel in appropriate readiness. Entrance into the Western Hemisphere by naval vessels and aircraft of belligerent powers, other than of those powers which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere Territory, is to be viewed as actuated by possible unfriendly intent toward territory or shipping within the Western Hemisphere.

Acting Chief of Staff, Commander Carney, remarked in notes on a trip to Washington, "The Hemisphere Defense Plan is in effect. Under this plan the Support Force remains in readiness to support the operations of other Task Groups, continuing intensive training in the meantime as at present."²¹ Also, about the middle of the month Denfeld wrote the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation and, based on the supposition that the advanced bases would be formed should the national emergency intensify, he deemed it advisable to set up officer complements for them as early as possible.²² Toward the end of the month Bristol, in a secret memo to the Chief of Naval Operations, had this to say:

The project --- the coordination, construction, and operation of advanced bases in the British Isles --- presents an entirely new departure in the history of our Navy, inasmuch as the construction of the bases is to be started in a belligerent country, while the United States is still at peace. It is anticipated that before the bases are completed, their use in a partial state of readiness will be required for our combatant forces. Four advanced bases, one combined destroyer and submarine, one destroyer, and two aviation are to be constructed at selected sites in the British Isles for the use of U. S. forces upon the entry of the U. S. into war.²³

Bases were being constructed prior to the United States' entry into the war for several reasons: British operations in the Northwest Approaches to Scotland for the protection of convoys during the past year suffered by reason of inadequate shore facilities for both planes and ships; United States forces were trained to operate with tenders and this was disadvantageous with regard to heavy modern aerial warfare; and lastly, shore facilities were especially needed during the winter. The indefiniteness of "M" day made long range planning impossible so Bristol suggested that advanced bases be formed of Support Force personnel where possible and these would be replaced at a later date by personnel permanently designated by bureaus concerned.

Provisions were made for the inception of the Northwest Escort Force in WPL-46, better known as Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5. The original of this was promulgated in May of 1941 in which it stated that the Northwest Escort Force and Submarine Force Three would be under the jurisdiction of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, until actually operating in Europe, at which time they would be assigned to the Commander of United States Naval Forces, North Europe. The Northwest Escort Force was to proceed from bases in the United States to bases in the United Kingdom,

and British Home Waters Area when directed by the Chief of Naval Operations. Rainbow No. 5 stated that:

Outline operating plans for the employment of the U.S. Naval Forces, North Europe, will be prepared by the prospective Commander of the Northwest Escort Force, and submitted to the prospective Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, North Europe, for review by the British Commander in Chief, Western Approaches. After review and acceptance, copies of this plan will be furnished the Chief of Naval Operations.²⁴

It also said:

Commencing on M-Day, and before if directed, the SHORE ESTABLISHMENT will prepare for war services those vessels and units of the OPERATING FORCES and SERVICES which are not then in condition of readiness for war service, by placing them in material condition and providing them with personnel to perform their war tasks.²⁵

As previously noted, Admiral Bristol had been given the responsibility for the forces using these bases, and on 29 May he wrote what is apparently his first letter with reference to the Northwest Escort Force to the Chief of Naval Operations.²⁶ He wrote it as Commander Support Force requesting a logistic liaison agency in the States for the Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, North Europe, because at that time the agency existed only for Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. And on the 3rd day of June Admiral Bristol, then in Norfolk,

wrote to Commander Submarines, Atlantic, saying that "reference 'a' (Rainbow No. 5) requires the prospective Commander Northwest Escort Force (Commander Support Force, United States Atlantic Fleet) to prepare outline operating plans for the employment of U.S. Naval Forces, North Europe."²⁷ He enclosed the outline, which incorporated features pertinent to the operations of Submarine Force Three, for the guidance and approval of Commander Submarines, Atlantic, so that they might confer before Bristol wrote his final draft of the plan. On the 8th of June he submitted the outline plan to Admiral King and in the heading of this letter he designated himself as Commander Support Force (PCO Northwest Escort Force).

This plan was based on the already existing WPL-46 (Rainbow No. 5), and was designated "to accomplish early movement in maximum strength, but has also been drawn to permit accommodation without changes in basic principles, to changes in situations and forces imposed by necessity or by superior authority."²⁸

On "M" plus 10 days 7000 troops were to embark from New York for England and 8000 for Ireland.

"The Commander Support Force, as Prospective Commander Northwest Escort Force, commands the movements of the Northwest Escort Force and the 10M convoy to England-Ireland. The Commander support Force reports to Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet until passing longitude 30° west, at which time as Commander Northwest Escort Force, he comes under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, North Europe."²⁹

The same day, 9 June 1941, Admiral Bristol, then in Newport, notified his staff in a memo that Admiral Stark had tentatively approved of the idea of having a logistic liaison officer in Washington for the logistic requirements of United States Naval Forces in North Europe after M-Day.³⁰

Captain William A. Corn, USN, was appointed for the job and the business of the Support Force was to transpire through him.

From the foregoing it can be seen that the job of the Support Force embraced not only its own problems, but the prospective problems of the Northwest Escort Force and at that time they were tentatively intra-acting organizations. This becomes more apparent after studying the proposed composition of the Northwest Escort Force which contained Destroyer Squadrons 7, 30, and 31; Patrol Wing 7 and various other units which belonged to the Support Force. The destroyers and tenders were to proceed to the British Isles on "M" plus 10 Day at which time they would become part of the United States Naval Forces in Northern Europe. These were to be followed by squadrons of patrol planes which were to go to Loch Erne and Loch Foyle followed by transports loaded with Army and Marine personnel and supplies.³¹

On 7 July 1941, Captain Denfeld notified Admiral Bristol in a memorandum that an Advanced Detachment consisting of two DDs from Destroyer Squadron 7 would leave on M-Day, or as soon thereafter as the ships were ready. He proposed a

tentative organization of personnel for the Detachment,³² and stated:

"The detachment will proceed to Londonderry at best speed. All personnel, except the Chief of Staff, Ass't Operations Officer, and the Flag Secretary will remain at Londonderry and prepare Command Headquarters and Advanced Bases 1 and A to receive Force on arrival. The Chief of Staff, Ass't Operations Officer, and the Flag Secretary, after necessary contacts have been made at Londonderry and Loch Erne, will proceed to Liverpool to Headquarters of Western Approaches. Ass't. Operations Officer and Flag Secretary will remain there for necessary indoctrination by British Naval Operations Unit and R.A.F. Coastal Command. Chief of Staff will proceed to London to get any instructions from Admiral Ghormley, returning to Liverpool to pick up Ass't Operations Officer and Flag Secretary, returning to Londonderry via Belfast in sufficient time to arrive well in advance of Support Force.

In a later memorandum to Commander Patrol Wing Support Force (Captain Mullinnix) Bristol said:

Base A will be established at Loch Erne with Commander Litch as Commanding Officer and Base B will be established at Loch Ryan with Commander Gallery as Commanding Officer. Each base will have an ultimate capacity of four (4) patrol plane squadrons with all the necessary shore facilities. At present, all priority in accomplishing readiness for operations is being given to the Loch Erne Base; all should be in readiness there by 1 November . . .

In the event that we are ordered across before the bases are ready we plan to operate some of the planes in a shore based status at Loch Erne, and the others in a tender based status from the Foyle, Loch Ryan, and Oban. Small tenders can anchor nicely in any of these places, and ship moorings for the ALBERMARLE are already laid in the Foyle. Seaplane moorings will be available at all of these points. It is quite probable that one detachment of planes will have to be used in Iceland . . .

We can expect no assistance from the Army until November at the very earliest; by that time four (4) complete AA regiments should be ready and at least one (1) pursuit group. However, there are 11 RAF fields in North Ireland and air protection for us should be adequate, using the RAF units already established there.³³

Bristol also mentioned repair units and hospitalization facilities that were being prepared for these two bases.

In the light of the foregoing discussion it can be seen that within approximately four and a half months after its inception, Admiral Bristol had the planning and organization of the Support Force well under way. However, it is to be noted that although the Support Force and the Northwest Escort were intra-acting organizations, and Bristol uses the titles interchangeably, a distinction must be drawn between the two. That is, the Northwest Escort Force

was what he was theoretically planning and training for, while the force with which he was actually operating and carrying out immediate orders was the Support Force. After the summer of 1941 there was a considerable lapse in references to the Northwest Escort Force in Support Force correspondence. This was because the operational exigencies of the moment weighed on the actual, pushing the theoretical aside. Although work continued on the bases in the British Isles they are over-shadowed by operations in the North Atlantic until after the cataclysmic attack on Pearl Harbor. The resulting effect on the Northwest Escort Force and advanced bases in the United Kingdom will be considered later on, and in the meanwhile personnel connected with carrying out specific concurrent plans concerned with the Northwest Escort Force and advanced bases worked towards and awaited the uncertain advent of M-Day.

FOOTNOTES

1.	Memo for Director War Plans Division, Sec. Doc. No. 27432, Op. File No. (SC) A16-1FF13, 6 February, 1941.
2.	George A. Fuller and Merritt-Chapman-Scott Co., operating as a joint venture. Initial work was authorized as an amendment to contract NOY 4175 for construction of aviation facilities NAS, Quonset, R.I. This expedited work until a new contract could be negotiated --- NOY 4631 on 28 January, 1941.
3.	This was composed of 108 enlisted men and 3 officers.
4.	This Task Force was to include 18 destroyers, 9 1500 ton destroyers, 1 AD, 42 VPBs, 1 AV, 2 AVDs and l AK.
5.	CNO sec. ltr. ser. 016923 of 24 February, 1941, to all Bureaus and Officers of the Navy Dept., Force Commanders; Admiral Bristol; DesFlot 8; PatWing 5 (VPBs 51, 52, 55, 56) PRAIRIE, CURTIS, GEORGE E. BADGER, BELKNAP.
6.	Present Support Group becomes Escort Force and other groups become forces. Constitute Support Force Commanded by Rear Admiral Bristol consisting of destroyers flotilla composed of PRAIRIE, Desrons 30, 31, 7 (less SAMPSON plus PLUNKETT), and nine patrol wings composed of ALBERMARLE, BELKNAP, GEORGE E BADGER, Patrons 51, 52, 55, 56 carry out intensive training for distant service. Rear Admiral Bristol assigned command Northern Patrol to which is detailed SupFor plus THRUSH.
7.	CinCLant conf. ltr. ser. 0132 to RAdm. Bristol, 28 Feb. 1941. SubSquad 20 was composed of SubDivs 11, 43, 41 (less R-18, R-19, R-20.)
8.	CinClant conf. ser. 0200 Op Order No. 2-41, 18 March, 1941. Task Organization: SUPPORT FORCE - RAdm. Bristol 6.1 DesFlot PRAIRIE DesRon 7 (less SAMPSON plus PLUNKETT) DesRons 30, 31 6.2 PatWing PatRons 51, 52. PatRons 55, 56. ALBERMARLE, BELKNAP, GEORGE E BADGER. NORTHERN PATROL 6.3 THRUSH, NOA, HAMILTON, DAHLGREN 6.3 ScoRons 2D1, 5D4
9.	SupFor personnel, according to LanFlt. Comp. Roster, Oct., 1941: RearAdm. A. L. Bristol Commander Support Force Capt. L. E. Denfeld Aide & Chief of Staff Capt. F .W. Pennoyer Material Officer Cdr. R. B. Carney Operations Officer Cdr. L. T. Haugen Force Constructor (At Navy Dept.) Cdr. E. T. Wooldridge Ass't Operations Officer Cdr. S. H. Ingersoll Ass't Operations Officer LtCdr. L. McKee Ship Maintenance Officer LtCdr. J. V. Carney Aircraft Engineer (NAS Norfolk) LtCdr. T. J. Raftery Aerol. (Albermarle) LtCdr. E. W. Rawlins Communications Officer LtCdr. H. B. Miller Aide & Flag Secretary LtCdr. (NR) R. Wanamaker Intelligence Officer LtCdr. M. B. Gurney Aircraft Maintenance Officer Lt. G. W. Ashford Aide & Flag Lieutenant Capt. (MC) J. W. Vann Medical Officer (Albermarle) Cdr. (SC) A. W. Buck Supply Officer Lt. (SC) J. W. Boundy Naval Air Station, Quonset Col. USMC S. A. Woods Jr. Marine Officer
10.	Bristol's sec. ltr. ser. 007 of 23 March, 1941 to CNO.
11.	ComSupFor sec. ltr. ser. op-12D-dre of 19 March, 1941 to CNO.
12.	Memo from C/S Carney (no serial) of 2l March, 1941 to ComSupFor.
13.	CNO sec. ser. 030912 of 21 March, 1941 to all Bureaus.
14.	ComSupFor sec. ltr. ser. 099 of 25 March, 1941, to ChBuMed.
15.	Bristol's personal letter of 13 March, 1941 to Admiral King.
16.	ComSupFor sec. ltr. ser. 006 of 23 March, 1941, to CinClant.
17.	SupFor Operation Plan No. 1-41 sec. ser. 00l9 of 24 April, 1941. TASK ORGANIZATION: 4.1 Destroyer Flotilla - Capt. J. L. Kauffman 4.2 Patrol Wing - Commander H. L. Mullinnix 4.3 Minesweeps - Lt. Comdr. W. R. McCaleb The Support Force (TF 4) will intensify all practicable readiness for anti-air, anti-submarine warfare, and protection of shipping. Prepare for distant service in high latitude. Maintain readiness to support Task Force One, Two, Three, Six, and Seven as may be directed. Destroyer Flotilla continue intensive training with due appreciation to maintenance of satisfactory material readiness. Base Narragansett Area. Devote special effort to training sound operators, A. A. look-outs, and perfecting escort tactics. Normal employment will provide for one-third gunnery, one-third tactical exercises, one-third mutual training exercises, and one-third upkeep. Patrol Wing intensify training and improvement of material readiness. Tender bases operations in Newport and Argentia areas as prescribed. Emphasize exercise in order of prescribed priority. Minesweeps devote major effort to improve material readiness. Collaborate with Commander Inshore Patrol, Fifth Naval District, in operational training. Base NOB Norfolk.
18.	CNO sec. ltr. ser. p48612 of 2 May, 1941 to C/S USA.
19.	ComSupFor sec. ltr. ser. 0021 to All Holders CTF 4's Op Plan 1-41, 2 May, 1941.
20.	ComSupFor sec. ltr. ser. 0027 to All Holders CTF 4's Op Plan 1-41, 15 May, 1941. 4.4 Argentia Group: One DesDiv from 4.1 One PatRon from 4.2 plus tender. Argentia Group conduct aircraft patrol and reconnaissance as may be directed. Be ready to take action against potential enemy vessels and other non-American activities in the vicinity of Newfoundland.
21.	SupFor sec. memo ser. 0017 of 24 April, 1941 to SupFor.
22.	ComSupFor sec. ltr. ser. 055192 of 12 May, 1941 to ChBuNav.
23.	SupFor sec. memo of 27 May, 1941 (Chron sec. file) to CNO.
24.	Rainbow No. 5 Part III, Chapt. IV, Sect. 1, para. 3415 of May, 1941.
25.	Rainbow No. 5 Part IV, Chapt. III, Sect. 1, para. 2311 of May, 1941.
26.	ComSupFor sec. ltr. ser. 0035 of 29 May, 1941 to CNO.
27.	ComSupFor sec. ltr. ser. 0039 of 3 June, 1941, to ComSubLant.
28.	Northwest Escort Force Movement Plan (Rainbow No. 5 o-3-A) P. 4 Introduction, June 1941. The following is the task organization by which the Northwest Escort Force Movement Plan was to be executed: Advanced Detachment under command of Commander Advanced Detachment. Main Body under command of Commander Northwest Escort Force. Overseas Advanced Tender Base Detachments under command of Commanders Advanced Tender Base Detachments. Argentia Advanced Detachment under command of Commander Argentia Advanced Base. Trans-Atlantic Flight Detachments under command of Detachment Commanders. Minesweepers, Northwest Escort Force under command of Commander Minesweepers, Northwest Escort Force. Augmenting Forces under command of officers designated by the Chief of Naval Operations or other competent authority. (The Ocean Escort, in accordance with CinClant directive, is not included in the Task Organization). (Ibid. Part I, Chapt. I, para. 1101, Mod. 1 of orig. June 1941).
29.	Ibid. Part V, Chapt. II para. 5201, original, June 1941.
30.	ComSupFor sec. memo ser. 0045 of 9 June, 1941, to Staff ComSupFor.
31.	Memo from ComSupFor's C/S Capt. Denfeld sec. ser. 0044 of 10 June, 1941 for Capt. W. A. Corn.
32.	Secret memo from ComSupFor's C/S, Capt. Denfeld, July 7, 1941 to ComSupFor. STAFF PERSONNEL Capt. L. E. Denfeld, USN - Chief of Staff - in command of detachment. Comdr. F. W. Pennoyer, USN - Material Officer Comdr. E. T. Wooldridge, USN - Ass't Operations Officer Lt. Comdr. E. W. Rawlins, USN - Communications Officer Lt. Comdr. H. B. Miller, USN - Flag Secretary Lt. J. W. Boundy (SC), USN - Ass't Supply Officer BASE PERSONNEL Capt. W. A. Corn, USN - Comdr. DesBase 1 (if not already at bases) Comdr. E. W. Litch, USN - Comdr. Air Base (if not already at bases) (Key Base Personnel)
33.	Memo s/S.H.I. sec. ser. 0063 of 14 July 1941, for ComPatWing SupFor.

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