United States Army in World War II
The War Department
Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Operations
byMark Skinner Watson
Contents
Foreword ix Preface ix Chapter Page I. Introductory 1 The Influence of Two Decades 3 The Large Influence of President Roosevelt 5 The Chief of Staff and Congress 7 Controlling Decisions on War Policy 9 Training of the Individual and the Team 13 II. Prewar Sentiment and Its Effect on the Army 15 Deterioration of the Army Between Wars 23 A More Realistic Planning Basis 26 Scant Funds Allowed for New Weapons 31 The Accepted Policy of Arming Solely for Defense 35 The Psychological Effect of Repression 36 The Quest for New Types of Weapons 38 The 1936 Paradox--a Halt in Research Expenditures 42 The Air Corps Breaks Through Earlier Restrictions 44 Protests Against Methods of Fiscal Control 47 The Chief of Staff and the Research Effort 50 III. The General Staff: Its Origins and Powers 57 The General Staff's Changing Pattern 59 Changes After World War I 62 The Chief of Staff's Powers 64 The Deputies' Powers 69 The Secretary of the General Staff 71 Duties of the Five Assistant Chiefs of Staff 72 All-Inclusiveness of the Chief of Staff's Responsibility 75 How Staff Divisions Functioned 76 The "Joint Board" of Army and Navy 79 Was the Prewar Staff Effective? 81 IV. Foreign Policy and the Armed Forces 85 Army Planners' Advance from Principles of Passive Defense 87 Secretary Hull Provides the Initiative 89 A Start at Combined Planning with Britain 92 Hemisphere Defense a Factor in Rearming 94 The Role of the Joint Army and Navy board 97 The Growing Strategic Importance of the Airplane 100 Revised Interest in Ground Force Development 101 V. Rearming Begins: A Confusion of Aims 126 The October 1938 Impulse to American Rearming 131 The Army Begins Revising Its Ordnance Planning 134 The Momentous White House Meeting of 14 November 1938 136 The Army Plans a Balanced Development 139 The Effort to Accomplish Too Many Objectives 143 The Obstacles to Thorough Planning 145 VI. Rearming Gets Under Way 148 April 1939 Anticipation of War 152 War Planning in August 1939 155 The September 1939 Troop Increase: Only 17,000 Men 156 Restraint in Requests for Funds 161 Isolation Sentiment Still Strong in Early 1940 164 Congressional Sentiment Begins a Marked Shift 166 General Marshall Warns of Further Needs 168 Plans for a Rapidly Increasing Army--and a Draft 171 Advance Planning for 4,000,000 Men 172 Discouraging Discovery of Production barriers 177 VII. Troop-Training Problems of 1940 183 Draft or Volunteers for Prewar Recruitment? 184 The Regular Army's Role in Training 187 Civilian Leadership in Draft Legislation 189 Urgent New Reasons for Early Draft Legislation 192 Costliness of the Delay in 1940 Draft Legislation 196 The Question of How Best to Use Trained Units 197 Mid-1940 Aids to Matériel Production 201 Difficulties in Planning Amid Uncertainties 204 Training Entrusted to GHQ 206 The Obstacles to Training 208 Summer Maneuvers of 1940 209 General Marshall's Attention to Training Program 210 The Timing of Troop Inductions 212 Extension of Service Term Is Considered 214 Marshall Asks for Retention of Guard, Reserves, and Draft Troops 218 The Fierce Fight on Draft Extension 220 General Marshall's Role in the Legislative Battle 222 Attention to Soldier Morale 231 Last and Largest Maneuvers of the Prewar Period 237 VIII. Officer Selection, Promotion, and Rejection 241 Precautions Against Discriminatory Treatment of Reserve Components 244 Expediting Promotion of the Specially Deserving 247 A New Bill for Selective Promotion 249 Policy Determining Selection and Promotion 253 Efforts to Stimulate Promotion of National Guard Officers 258 A Halt in Promotions to Attain Uniformity 263 Attention to Complaints from Within the Service 264 Declaration of War Brings a New Promotion Policy 266 Controlling the Inflow of Young Officers 269 Special Attention to Important Personnel Assignments 272 IX. The Movement Toward Air Autonomy 278 Attitude of the New Chief of Staff in 1939 280 The Slow Progress Toward Air Autonomy 282 General Arnold Advises Against Haste 286 An Unsuccessful Compromise in October 1940 289 General Marshall's Move of March 1941 Toward Solution 291 The First Step: Consolidating the Air Elements 292 Command Responsibility Requires a New Arrangement 295 No Autonomy, But Great Progress Toward It 297 X. Aid to Britain versus Rearming of America 299 Sharing "Secret" Weapons with Other Nations 300 The Army Declines to Endorse Further Exports 303 Foreign Shipments Provoke a Departmental Crisis 304 German Victories of May 1940 Accentuate Disagreements 305 European Pressure for Other Weapons 309 Search for Legal Authority for Sale of "Surplus" Arms 310 The Critical Shortage in Small-Arms Ammunition 312 Need for Allocations and Accurate Scheduling 314 Britain's Fruitful Proposals for Coordination of Effort 316 A Restatement of the Plan for Army Expansion 318 Lend-Lease Fails to Solve the Problem of Satisfactory Allocations 321 The Long-range Influence of Lend-Lease 325 A Basis Reached for Coordinated Supplies 327 Early Differences with the Soviet Union 329 XI. The Victory Program 331 Other Influences Calling for a Firm Statement of Objectives 333 WPD Suggests Action by Chief of Staff 335 President Roosevelt Orders a Survey 338 A Large Task Is Undertaken 342 The Method of Calculation Employed 343 The President Enlarges the Objective 346 Last-Minute Discussions with the Navy 349 A Restatement of National Policy 352 WPD Again Records Its Difference with the Navy 357 Isolationist Inquiry into the Administration's Intentions 358 Matériel and Personnel Programs Again in Conflict 360 Suggestions for Reducing the Army with Minimum Injury 363 Tentative Plan to Send Certain National Guard Units Home 365 XII. Coordination With Britain 367 Establishing the American Position Prior to the British Parley 370 The American-British Conversations of January 1941 374 The Agreements Reached at ABC 375 American Interpretations of the Agreement 380 Rapid Developments in the Atlantic War 382 The Start of Formal Military Cooperation of Britain and America 384 American Involvement Causes Anxiety 386 Proposals for Cooperation in the Pacific 391 American Objections to Helping Reinforce Singapore 393 Stark and Marshall Reject the Singapore Proposals 397 The Atlantic Conference, August 1941 400 U.S. Staff Criticisms of the British Suggestions 406 Effort to Harmonize Views on a Bombing Policy 408 XIII. Darkening Clouds in the Far East 411 Limitations of Planning for the Philippines 412 General Grunert's Pressure for Reinforcement 417 Evidence of a Changed Attitude in 1940 419 December 1940 Brings New Action 423 Geneeral MacArthur's Large Plan for Defense 425 General MacArthur Given a New Command 434 Factors in the 1941 Change of Attitude 438 Items in the 1941 Rearming of the Philippines 440 A Hopeful View of Philippine Defenses 445 Swift Developments of November 1941 446 XIV. The Nation's Outlying Defenses in 1941 453 The Situation in Alaska 454 The Panama Situation 458 United Command Becomes an Issue 462 The Situation in Hawaii 465 The June 1940 Alert in Hawaii 468 Change in the Hawaii Command 471 The Defense Establishment in Hawaii on 7 December 1941 474 The Air Commanders' Remarkable Prevision 475 The New Defensive Screen of Atlantic Bases 477 Priority for Newfoundland 479 Early Anxiety over Bermuda Security 481 The Dwindling Importance of Trinidad 482 Early Jamaica Plan Soon Abandoned 483 Minor Bases Planned for the Bahamas, Antigua, St. Lucia, and Guiana 484 Delay in Utilizing Greenland 485 The Situation in Iceland 487 In the Dutch Islands, Aruba and Curaçao 491 The Fixed Defense in Both Oceans 492 XV. The War Reaches America 494 Factors Contributing to the 7 December Surprise 496 Evidence of Japan's Southeast Asia Objectives 502 The Warnings of Late November 505 Attention Is Again Diverted 509 On the Eve of Pearl Harbor 512 A Fateful Series of Mischances 518 The End of Prewar Planning 519 Bibliographical Note 521 Glossary 527 Index 533 Tables No. Page 1. Strength of the United States Army: 1919-1941 16 2. Percentage Distribution of U.S. Army Strength by Component: 1940-1941 202 3. U.S. Army Personnel in Philippine Islands: 30 November 1941 449 4. Modern Combat Aircraft on Hand in the Philippines: 8 and 9 December 1941 449 5. Number of U.S. Army Aircraft on Hand in the Hawaiian Air Force Before and After the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor: 7 and 20 December 1941 474 Charts No. Page 1. Chief of Staff's Responsibilities: 1 December 1941 65 2. Chief of Staff's Command of the Field Forces as Exercised through GHQ: 1 December 1941 65 3. Exercise of the Chief of Staff's Command of the Army Air Forces: 1 December 1941 65 4. Exercise of the Chief of Staff's Command of Overseas Establishments, Including Department, Defense Commands, and Bases: 1 December 1941 65 Illustrations No. Page 1. General of the Army George Catlett Marshall Frontspiece 2. Civilian Authority Late in the Prewar Period 19 Henry L. Stimson 19 Robert P. Patterson 19 Harry H. Woodring 19 Louis Johnson 19 3. Chiefs of Staff, 1918-30 20 John J. Pershing 20 Peyton C. March 20 John L. Hines 20 Charles P. Summervall 20 4. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur 27 5. General Malin Craig 28 6. The Chief of Staff in World War II and His Successors 46 7. Four Deputy Chiefs in the Late Prewar Period 67 Stanley D. Embrick 67 Richard C. Moore 67 William Bryden 67 H.H. Arnold 67 8. Secretaries of the General Staff in the Late Prewar Period 68 Robert L. Eichelberger 68 Harold R. Bull 68 Orlando Ward 68 Walter B. Smith 68 9. A Warning from the Chief of Staff 427 10. A Revision by the Chief of Staff 428 11. Clarifying the Instructions 430
All pictures in this volume are from U.S. Army photos.
