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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET No. 20-261a
Historical Study
The German
Campaign in
Russia --
Planning and
Operations
(1940-1942)
Department of the Army March 1955
Department of the Army Pamphlets Published
in the
GERMAN REPORT SERIES
No. Title Publication
date20-201 Military Improvisations During the Russian Campaign Aug 51 20-202 German Tank Maintenance in World War II Jun 54 20-230 Russian Combat Methods in World War II Nov 50 20-231 Combat in Russian Forests and Swamps Jul 51 20-232 Airborne Operations: A German Appraisal Oct 51 20-233 German Defense Tactics Against Russian Break-Throughs Oct 51 20-234 Operations of Encircled Forces--German Experiences in Russia Jan 52 20-236 Night Combat Jun 53 20-240 Rear Area Security in Russia--The Soviet Second Front Behind the German Lines Jul 51 20-242 German Armored Traffic Control During the Russian Campaign Jun 52 20-243 German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944) Aug 54 20-260 The German Campaigns in the Balkans (Spring (1941) Nov 53 20-269 Small Unit Actions During the German Campaign in Russia Jul 53 20-290 Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign Jul 51 20-291 Effects of Climate on Combat in European Russia Feb 52 20-292 Warfare in the Far North Oct 51
Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-261a
The German Campaign
in Russia
Planning and Operations
(1940-1942)
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Department of the Army March 1955
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington 25, D.C., 22 March 1955Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-261a is published for the information and use of all concerned.
[AG 091 15 Feb 55)]
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AARMY:
M.B. RIDGWAY,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.OFFICIAL:
JOHN A. KLEIN,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.
DISTRIBUTION: Active Army: Gen Staff, DA (5)
SS, DA (5)
Tec Svc, DA (25)
Admin & Tec Svc Bd (10)
CONARC (10)
OS Maj Comd (50) Armies (10)MDW (2)
Gen & Br Svc Sch (25)
PMST ROTC Units (1)
Mil Dist (1)
TOE 30-500A (AA-AG) clas (1)
30-600A (AA-AE), Mil Intel Svc Org (1)NG: State AF (1).
USAR: None.Unless otherwise noted, distribution applies to ConUS and overseas. For explanation of abbreviations used, see SR 320-50-1.
Foreword
Clausewitz observed
Contents
PART ONE. PLANNING Chapter 1. Strategic Planning Page Initial Discussions (July 1940) 1 The Marcks Plan (5 August 1940) 6 Staff Work (August-September 1940) 12 Admiral Raeder's Suggestions (26 September 1940) 14 Strategic Survey (October 1940) 14 The Preliminary Plan (November-5 December 1940) 17 General Staff and Command Post Exercises (November-December 1940) 19 Economic Survey 20 Directive BARBAROSSA (18 December 1940) 21 2. Operational Planning The Army's Operation Order (3 February 1941) 26 Initiation of Subordinate Staffs (February-March 1941) 32 Changes in Plans (March-April 1941) 34 Army Group South 34 Far North 36 Delay in the Start 37 The Draft of Directive No. 32 (11 June 1941) 37 Strategic Concentration (21 June 1941) 38 Air Support 40 Other Factors 41 Estimate of Soviet Strength (June 1941) 42 Sources of Information 42 Estimate of Red Army Dispositions 42 Estimate of Soviet Air Force Strength 42 PART TWO. OPERATIONS IN 1941 Chapter 3. The Initial Operations (22 June-31 July 1941) D Day 44 The Situation on 30 June 1941 44 Developments in Early July 1941 45 The Mid-July Estimate 48 Directive No. 33 (19 July 1941) 50 The Army's Letter to the Armed Forces High Command 53 The Situation toward the End of July 1941 57 4. Planning for Future Operations The Army's Order of 28 July 1941 59 Directive No. 34 (30 July 1941) 61 Hitler's Vacillation over Strategy 61 The Supplement to Directive No. 34 (12 August 1941) 64 Developments to Mid-August 1941 65 The Army Memorandum of 18 August 1941 65 Hitler's Decision (20 August 1941) 69 5. The Diversion and Reassembly The Personnel Situation (End of August 1941) 71 Increasing Logistical Difficulties (Early September 1941) 72 POL 72 Track-Laying and Wheeled Vehicles 72 Developments to Mid-September 1941 73 Directive No. 35 (6 September 1941) 75 The Situation at the End of September 1941 77 Military-Economic Survey (2 October 1941) 78 The Muddy Period and Its Effect on Operations (October 1941) 79 Hitler's Plan for the Seizure of Moscow (12 October 1941) 81 6. The German Attack on Moscow Strategic Factors 83 Last-Minute Planning and Operations to 13 November 1941 85 The Course of the Offensive (14 November-5 December 1941) 86 The Personnel Situation (End of November 1941) 88 Critique 88 PART THREE. 1942--THE YEAR OF INDECISION Chapter 7. The Russian Counteroffensive (December 1941-February 1942) The First German Reverses 91 Hitler's Directive No. 39 (8 December 1941) 92 The Army High Command Order of 8 December 1941 94 Intelligence Estimate 94 Plans 95 The Mission of the Army Groups 95 Conduct of Operations 96 Organization 96 The Red Army Seizes the Initiative 97 Developments to 25 December 1941 99 The German Crisis in Mid-January 1942 101 The Crisis Reaches Its Climax (Beginning of February 1942) 105 The Russian Offensive Is Halted (20 February 1942) 106 Critique 107 8. Prelimimary Planning for a German Offensive in the Caucasus, 1942 Exploratory Steps (July 1940-September 1941) 109 The First Plan for a Caucasus Operation (October 1941) 110 Caucasus Planning in November 1941 112 Effects of the Moscow Setback (January 1942) 113 The First Prepatory Orders (February 1942) 114 The Navy's Role (February 1942) 117 Intelligence Estimate (20 February 1942) 117 Hitler's Preoccupations in Early March 1942 118 The Situation at the End of March 1942 119 9. Preparations for the German Summer Offensive Directive No. 41 (5 April 1942) 121 Estimates, Delays, and Disappointments in April 1942 124 Intelligence Estimate 124 Delay in the Preliminary Operations 125 The Situation at Army Group Center 125 Chain of Command 125 Transportation 126 Turkey Remains Neutral 127 Logistical Preparations 127 Timing 127 Chain of Command 127 Supplies 127 Motor Vehicles 128 Rail Transportation 128 Summary 128 Organizational Problems 128 Rehabilitation of Units 128 Shortage of Technicians 129 Construction of Fortifications 129 Oil Brigade Caucasus 130 Casualties and Replacements 130 The Participation of Germany's Allies 131 Rear Area Security 132 Army Group South's Defense Line 132 The Role of Army Group A 132 Feint and Counterfeint 133 Warning Notes (May 1942) 134 The Armed Forces Potential in the Spring of 1942 134 The Preliminary Operations (May-June 1942) 139 Last-Minue Incidents and Impressions (June 1942) 141 10. Initial Operations and New Plans (July 1942) The First Phase (28 June-6 July 1942) 143 The Second Phase (30 June-7 July 1942) 143 Changes in German Order of Battle (July 1942) 145 The Army Group A Offensive 145 The Operation Plan 145 The Army Group A Attack 147 German and Russian Weaknesses 148 Directive No. 43 149 The Continuation of Operations 149 The Situation of the Other Army Groups by 20 July 1942 150 Directive No. 44 (21 July 1942) 152 Directive No. 45 (23 July 1942) 152 German Shortages 155 Tanks 155 Gasoline 155 Stalingrad Takes Priority Over the Caucasus (End of July 1942) 156 11. The Period of Stagnation (August-October 1942) Developments to Mid-August 1942 158 Personnel and Other Problems (16-18 August 1942) 161 The Situation in the Caucasus (Second Half of August 1942) 162 The Opening of the Battle for Stalingrad (End of August 1942) 164 The German Leadership Crisis (September 1942) 165 Faulty Inelligence and Its Interpretation 167 The German Offensive Grinds to a Halt (26 September 1942) 167 German Estimates in October and Early November 1942 169 Army Group A 169 Army Group B 170 The Estimae of 6 November 171 The Oil of the Caucasus 173 German Efforts at Production 173 Russian Supplies 174 Local Engagements (October--Mid-November 1942) 174 12. Critical Analysis of the German Summer Offensive in 1942 Different Concepts of Strategy 176 Differences over the Choice of Objective 177 Mistakes in the Execution of the German Offensive 177 APPENDIXES A. List of German Military Leaders (July 1940-November 1942) 180 B. Chronology of Events 184 C. Bibliographical Note 187