DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET No. 20-261a

Historical Study

 

The German
Campaign in
Russia --
Planning and
Operations
    (1940-1942)

 


Department of the Army March 1955


Department of the Army Pamphlets Published
in the
GERMAN REPORT SERIES

No. Title Publication
date
20-201 Military Improvisations During the Russian Campaign Aug 51
20-202 German Tank Maintenance in World War II Jun 54
20-230 Russian Combat Methods in World War II Nov 50
20-231 Combat in Russian Forests and Swamps Jul 51
20-232 Airborne Operations: A German Appraisal Oct 51
20-233 German Defense Tactics Against Russian Break-Throughs Oct 51
20-234 Operations of Encircled Forces--German Experiences in Russia Jan 52
20-236 Night Combat Jun 53
20-240 Rear Area Security in Russia--The Soviet Second Front Behind the German Lines Jul 51
20-242 German Armored Traffic Control During the Russian Campaign Jun 52
20-243 German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944) Aug 54
20-260 The German Campaigns in the Balkans (Spring (1941) Nov 53
20-269 Small Unit Actions During the German Campaign in Russia Jul 53
20-290 Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign Jul 51
20-291 Effects of Climate on Combat in European Russia Feb 52
20-292 Warfare in the Far North Oct 51


Department of the Army Pamphlet       No. 20-261a


 

The German Campaign
in Russia
Planning and Operations
(1940-1942)

 

 


Department of the Army March 1955


DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington 25, D.C., 22 March 1955

Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-261a is published for the information and use of all concerned.

[AG 091 15 Feb 55)]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AARMY:

M.B. RIDGWAY,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
      JOHN A. KLEIN,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:
      Active Army:
            Gen Staff, DA (5)
SS, DA (5)
Tec Svc, DA (25)
Admin & Tec Svc Bd (10)
CONARC (10)
OS Maj Comd (50) Armies (10)
  MDW (2)
Gen & Br Svc Sch (25)
PMST ROTC Units (1)
Mil Dist (1)
TOE 30-500A (AA-AG) clas (1)
      30-600A (AA-AE), Mil Intel Svc Org (1)
      NG: State AF (1).
USAR: None.
 
      Unless otherwise noted, distribution applies to ConUS and overseas. For explanation of abbreviations used, see SR 320-50-1.

--ii--

Foreword

Clausewitz observed

--iii--

Contents

PART ONE. PLANNING
    Chapter 1. Strategic Planning Page
          Initial Discussions (July 1940) 1
          The Marcks Plan (5 August 1940) 6
          Staff Work (August-September 1940) 12
          Admiral Raeder's Suggestions (26 September 1940) 14
          Strategic Survey (October 1940) 14
          The Preliminary Plan (November-5 December 1940) 17
          General Staff and Command Post Exercises (November-December 1940) 19
          Economic Survey 20
          Directive BARBAROSSA (18 December 1940) 21
    2. Operational Planning  
          The Army's Operation Order (3 February 1941) 26
          Initiation of Subordinate Staffs (February-March 1941) 32
          Changes in Plans (March-April 1941) 34
                Army Group South 34
                Far North 36
                Delay in the Start 37
          The Draft of Directive No. 32 (11 June 1941) 37
          Strategic Concentration (21 June 1941) 38
                Air Support 40
                Other Factors 41
          Estimate of Soviet Strength (June 1941) 42
                Sources of Information 42
                Estimate of Red Army Dispositions 42
                Estimate of Soviet Air Force Strength 42
PART TWO. OPERATIONS IN 1941
    Chapter 3. The Initial Operations (22 June-31 July 1941)  
          D Day 44
          The Situation on 30 June 1941 44
          Developments in Early July 1941 45
          The Mid-July Estimate 48
          Directive No. 33 (19 July 1941) 50
          The Army's Letter to the Armed Forces High Command 53
          The Situation toward the End of July 1941 57
    4. Planning for Future Operations  
          The Army's Order of 28 July 1941 59
          Directive No. 34 (30 July 1941) 61
          Hitler's Vacillation over Strategy 61
          The Supplement to Directive No. 34 (12 August 1941) 64
          Developments to Mid-August 1941 65
          The Army Memorandum of 18 August 1941 65
          Hitler's Decision (20 August 1941) 69
    5. The Diversion and Reassembly  
          The Personnel Situation (End of August 1941) 71
          Increasing Logistical Difficulties (Early September 1941) 72
                POL 72
                Track-Laying and Wheeled Vehicles 72
          Developments to Mid-September 1941 73
          Directive No. 35 (6 September 1941) 75
          The Situation at the End of September 1941 77
          Military-Economic Survey (2 October 1941) 78
          The Muddy Period and Its Effect on Operations (October 1941) 79
          Hitler's Plan for the Seizure of Moscow (12 October 1941) 81
    6. The German Attack on Moscow  
          Strategic Factors 83
          Last-Minute Planning and Operations to 13 November 1941 85
          The Course of the Offensive (14 November-5 December 1941) 86
          The Personnel Situation (End of November 1941) 88
          Critique 88
PART THREE. 1942--THE YEAR OF INDECISION
    Chapter 7. The Russian Counteroffensive (December 1941-February 1942)  
          The First German Reverses 91
          Hitler's Directive No. 39 (8 December 1941) 92
          The Army High Command Order of 8 December 1941 94
                Intelligence Estimate 94
                Plans 95
                The Mission of the Army Groups 95
                Conduct of Operations 96
                Organization 96
          The Red Army Seizes the Initiative 97
          Developments to 25 December 1941 99
          The German Crisis in Mid-January 1942 101
          The Crisis Reaches Its Climax (Beginning of February 1942) 105
          The Russian Offensive Is Halted (20 February 1942) 106
          Critique 107
    8. Prelimimary Planning for a German Offensive in the Caucasus, 1942  
          Exploratory Steps (July 1940-September 1941) 109
          The First Plan for a Caucasus Operation (October 1941) 110
          Caucasus Planning in November 1941 112
          Effects of the Moscow Setback (January 1942) 113
          The First Prepatory Orders (February 1942) 114
          The Navy's Role (February 1942) 117
          Intelligence Estimate (20 February 1942) 117
          Hitler's Preoccupations in Early March 1942 118
          The Situation at the End of March 1942 119
    9. Preparations for the German Summer Offensive  
          Directive No. 41 (5 April 1942) 121
          Estimates, Delays, and Disappointments in April 1942 124
                Intelligence Estimate 124
                Delay in the Preliminary Operations 125
                The Situation at Army Group Center 125
                Chain of Command 125
                Transportation 126
                Turkey Remains Neutral 127
          Logistical Preparations 127
                Timing 127
                Chain of Command 127
                Supplies 127
                Motor Vehicles 128
                Rail Transportation 128
                Summary 128
          Organizational Problems 128
                Rehabilitation of Units 128
                Shortage of Technicians 129
                Construction of Fortifications 129
                Oil Brigade Caucasus 130
                Casualties and Replacements 130
                The Participation of Germany's Allies 131
                Rear Area Security 132
                Army Group South's Defense Line 132
                The Role of Army Group A 132
          Feint and Counterfeint 133
          Warning Notes (May 1942) 134
          The Armed Forces Potential in the Spring of 1942 134
          The Preliminary Operations (May-June 1942) 139
          Last-Minue Incidents and Impressions (June 1942) 141
    10. Initial Operations and New Plans (July 1942)  
          The First Phase (28 June-6 July 1942) 143
          The Second Phase (30 June-7 July 1942) 143
          Changes in German Order of Battle (July 1942) 145
          The Army Group A Offensive 145
                The Operation Plan 145
                The Army Group A Attack 147
                German and Russian Weaknesses 148
                Directive No. 43 149
                The Continuation of Operations 149
          The Situation of the Other Army Groups by 20 July 1942 150
          Directive No. 44 (21 July 1942) 152
          Directive No. 45 (23 July 1942) 152
          German Shortages 155
                Tanks 155
                Gasoline 155
          Stalingrad Takes Priority Over the Caucasus (End of July 1942) 156
    11. The Period of Stagnation (August-October 1942)  
          Developments to Mid-August 1942 158
          Personnel and Other Problems (16-18 August 1942) 161
          The Situation in the Caucasus (Second Half of August 1942) 162
          The Opening of the Battle for Stalingrad (End of August 1942) 164
          The German Leadership Crisis (September 1942) 165
          Faulty Inelligence and Its Interpretation 167
          The German Offensive Grinds to a Halt (26 September 1942) 167
          German Estimates in October and Early November 1942 169
                Army Group A 169
                Army Group B 170
                The Estimae of 6 November 171
          The Oil of the Caucasus 173
                German Efforts at Production 173
                Russian Supplies 174
          Local Engagements (October--Mid-November 1942) 174
    12. Critical Analysis of the German Summer Offensive in 1942  
          Different Concepts of Strategy 176
          Differences over the Choice of Objective 177
          Mistakes in the Execution of the German Offensive 177
APPENDIXES
    A. List of German Military Leaders (July 1940-November 1942) 180
    B. Chronology of Events 184
    C. Bibliographical Note 187
         

MAPS
No.    
1. General Reference Map of Eastern Europe 3
2. The Marcks Plan 5
3. The Army Plan 17
4. General Reference Map of the Far North 29
5. The Final Plan for Operation BARBAROSSA 36
6. German Russian Dispositions (June 1941) 43
7. Situation on 19 July 1941 facing 48
8. Situation on 30 July 1941 facing 57
9. The Army Plan of 18 August 1941 facing 66
10. Situation in Mid-September 1941 facing 74
11. Situation on 6 October 1941 facing 79
12. Situation on 5 December 1941 facing 86
13. Situation in Mid-January 1941 facing 101
14. General Reference Map of the Caucasus Area facing 110
15. Situation at the End of June 1942 facing 144
16. Situation on 20 July 1942 facing 151
17. Situation on 18 November 1942 facing 174
CHARTS
1. German Chain of Command (1 July 1940)
2. Order of Battle on 21 June 1941
3. German Order of Battle--Russian Theater of War (January 1942)
4. German Order of Battle--Russian Theater of War (Beginning of July 1942)
5. German Order of Battle--Russian Theater of War (12 August 1942)



Transcribed and formatted for HTML by Tim Koors & Patrick Clancey, HyperWar Foundation