

TRIDENT CONFERENCE

MAY 1943

PAPERS
AND
MINUTES OF MEETINGS

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C. C. S. 215

INVASION OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT FROM THE
UNITED KINGDOM IN 1943 - 1944

C.C.S. 215 was circulated 15 May 1943 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as a memorandum by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

This paper was considered but final action on the subject was taken in C.C.S. 242/6.

C.C.S. 215

13 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

INVASION OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT FROM
THE UNITED KINGDOM IN 1943-1944

Memorandum by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff

The enclosed study as prepared by the United States Joint Staff Planners and meets with the approval of the United States Chiefs of Staff. It is submitted for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

ENCLOSURE

INVASION OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT FROM
THE UNITED KINGDOM IN 1943-1944

1. A detailed examination of the merits and possibilities of the defeat of the European *AXIS* by a bomber offensive and air-ground invasion of the Continent from the *UNITED KINGDOM* has been made by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

2. It is estimated that *GERMANY* has 32 divisions in *FRANCE* and the low countries. Seven of these divisions are highly mobile and could on short notice be moved to oppose an invasion effort. These forces could be increased in time to a grand total of 60 divisions. She also has about 1254 planes in the area (747 fighters) which could be increased to 1766 (1158 fighters) by stripping all areas except the *MEDITERRANEAN* and Eastern Front. In addition to a coastal defense zone varying from 5 to 15 miles in depth, she has four defensive belts which must be reduced or neutralized before the *West Wall* is reached.

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3. The projected bomber offensive against *GERMANY* may be expected to so reduce her ability to wage war as to create favorable conditions for a reentry to the Continent unless *GERMANY* is able to develop timely and effective counter-measures.

4. By maximum utilization of shipping and *UNITED KINGDOM* port facilities for the movement of *UNITED STATES* forces, and by placing increased emphasis on the conversion of British defensive divisions into offensive units, it is estimated that 36 *UNITED NATIONS* Divisions can be made available for cross-Channel operations by 1 April 1944.

5. Whether the available shipping is used to move forces from the *UNITED STATES* or the *MEDITERRANEAN*, the total number of divisions available in the *UNITED KINGDOM* will be the same. However, the addition of battle seasoned troops from the *MEDITERRANEAN* will provide an added insurance for the success of the initial assault.

6. The two most promising areas for assault operations, the *CAEN* and *COTENTIN PENINSULA* sectors, will afford port facilities for a build-up in 12 months of about 1,000,000 men. By extending this bridgehead to include the *SEINE RIVER* and the ports of *LE HAVRE* and *ROUEN*, the build-up in 12 months would be about 4,000,000 men, or about 100 divisions.

7. It should be noted that consideration of cross-Channel operations in this study has been confined to the initial movement. Landing craft for this purpose as compared with the requirements of C.C.S. 105/2 may be met, but at the expense of some operations in other theaters. The build-up immediately thereafter and the requirements in *APA's*, *AKA's*, *AP's*, *AK's*, etc, have not been examined.

8. *IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT:*

a. The combined bomber offensive be given first priority in build-up and its execution be facilitated.

b. As the combined bomber offensive progresses, its effects should be continuously examined and integrated with other factors, the results of these examinations to be used in determining the date for cross-Channel operations.

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c. A balanced invasion force be built up in the *UNITED KINGDOM* as rapidly as possible for the purpose of an early invasion in the event of a collapse of *GERMANY (SLEDGEHAMMER)*.

d. No operations be undertaken in the *MEDITERRANEAN* which will interfere with the build-up of maximum forces in the *UNITED KINGDOM* for *SLEDGEHAMMER* as well as for *ROUNDUP*.

e. Production of landing craft be increased to the maximum without undue interference with the construction of other essential war materials.

f. The target date of 1 April 1944 be accepted for operations from the *UNITED KINGDOM*. The target date coincides with the completion of the fourth phase of the bomber offensive and is subject to revision in the light of the results obtained.

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PLAN FOR COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE
FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

References:

- CCS 85th Meeting Minutes, Item (4)
- CCS 87th Meeting Minutes, Item (7)
- 4th White House Meeting Minutes, Item (2)

C.C.S. 217 was circulated 15 May 1943 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

This paper was considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the recommendations contained herein were approved in their 87th Meeting.

C. C. S. 217

14 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

PLAN FOR COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE
FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

Note by the Secretaries

The attached plan for a combined bomber offensive from the *UNITED KINGDOM* meets with the approval of the United States Chiefs of Staff, and is submitted for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

PLAN FOR COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE
FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

1. *PROBLEM:* To provide a plan to accomplish, by a combined U. S.-British air offensive, the "progressive destruction and dislocation of the German Military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened;" as directed by the Combined Chiefs of staff at *CASABLANCA*.

2. Under the direction of the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, a plan to accomplish the above objective in early 1944 has been prepared. The complete plan is on file with the Secretary, U. S. Chiefs of Staff. A brief presentation of the plan is contained in Enclosure "B".

3. Representatives of the R.A.F. collaborated in the preparation of

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this plan which has been approved by the British Air Ministry (See Enclosure "A").

4. The plan establishes requirements for U. S. aircraft in the *UNITED KINGDOM* as follows:

	<u>Heavy Bombers</u>	<u>Medium Bombers</u>
By 30 June 1943	944	200
By 30 September 1943	1192	400
By 31 December 1943	1746	600
By 31 March 1944	2702	800

5. The Present U. S. Army Air Forces expansion program provides the air units and aircraft necessary to implement the above program, after provision has been made for meeting all present and planned undertakings in other theaters with reasonable balance in estimated aircraft production for unforeseen contingencies that may arise.

6. *IT IS RECOMMENDED:*

That the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the "Plan for Combined Bomber Offensive from the *UNITED KINGDOM*," presented in Enclosure "B" and direct its implementation to the maximum extent practicable, consistent with meeting aircraft production objectives, with the availability of combined shipping, and with proper relationship to strategic objectives given in Item 5, Minutes, Combined Chiefs of Staff, 76th Meeting.

ENCLOSURE "A"

AIR MINISTRY,
King Charles Street,
Whitehall, S.W.1.
15th April, 1943.

My dear Arnold,

As you know, the Eighth Air Force has been engaged with the Air Staff in drawing up a detailed plan for the purpose of discharging the responsibilities laid upon our combined bomber forces at the Casablanca Conference.

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The plan is now complete. It is based on our combined resources in the matter of intelligence and operational data including the very valuable report of your Operations Analysts and has been drawn up in close consultation with the Ministry of Economic Warfare.

I have carefully examined the plan and discussed it in all its aspects with the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force. I take this opportunity of saying that I believe it to be entirely sound and that it has my full support.

The plan includes an estimate of the rate at which the strength of the Eighth Air Force must be developed in order to achieve the planned effect. I believe this rate of build-up and the time factor generally to be of primary importance. The German Fighter strength is increasing rapidly and every week's delay will make the task more difficult to accomplish. We cannot afford to miss the good bombing weather which will soon be due. We cannot exploit to the full the great potentialities of the daylight bombing technique if the requisite numbers are not available.

For all these reasons I earnestly hope that every effort will be made to achieve and if possible to exceed the programme.

The plan has been carefully examined by the Commander in Chief, Bomber Command, and he too is convinced of its soundness and importance.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

/s/ C. Portal

ENCLOSURE " B "

THE COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

1. *THE MISSION*

- a. The mission of the U. S. and British bomber forces, as pre-

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scribed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at *CASABLANCA*, is as follows:

To conduct a joint U. S.-British air offensive to accomplish the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German Military, industrial, and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. This is constructed as meaning so weakened as to permit initiation of final combined operations on the Continent.

2. THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES

a. A thorough study of those elements of the German Military, industrial, and economic system which appeared to be profitable as bombing objectives was made by a group of Operations Analysts consisting of eminent U. S. experts. The report of the Operations Analysts concludes that:

The destruction and continued neutralization of some sixty (60) targets would gravely impair and might paralyze the western *AXIS* war effort. There are several combinations of targets from among the industries studied which might achieve this result.

b. Examination of this report shows complete agreement by U. S. and British experts. From the systems proposed by the Operations Analysts, six systems, comprising *seventy-six (76) precision targets* have been selected. These targets are located within the tactical radius of action of the two air forces, and their destruction is directed against the three major elements of the German Military machine: its submarine fleet, its air force, and its ground forces, and certain industries vital to their support.

c. The six systems are:

Submarine construction yards and bases.

German aircraft industry.

Ball bearings.

Oil.

Synthetic rubber and tires.
Military transport vehicles.

Concentration of effort against these systems will have the following effect. The percentage of destruction is as indicated by the Operations Analysts.

(1) Submarine Construction Yards and Bases

Destruction of the submarine building yards selected will reduce present submarine construction by eighty-nine percent (89%). Attack of submarine bases will affect the submarine effort at sea. If it is found that successful results can be achieved, these attacks should continue whenever conditions are favorable for as long and as often as is necessary.

(2) German Aircraft Industry

Depletion of the German Air Force will fatally weaken German capacity to resist our air and surface operations. Complete domination of the air is essential for our ultimate decisive effort. Destruction of forty-three percent (43%) of the German fighter capacity and sixty-five percent (65%) of the German bomber capacity is provided for in this plan, and will produce the effect required.

(3) Ball Bearings

The critical condition of the ball bearing industry in GERMANY is startling. The concentration of that industry renders it outstandingly vulnerable to air attack. Seventy-six percent (76%) of the ball bearing production can be eliminated by destruction of the targets selected. This will have immediate and critical repercussions on the production of tanks, airplanes, artillery, diesel engines - in fact, upon nearly all the special weapons of modern war.

(4) Oil

The quantities of petroleum and synthetic oil products now available to the German is barely adequate to supply the life

blood which is vital to the German war machine. The oil situation is made more critical by failure of the Germans to secure and retain the Russian supplies. If the *PLOESTI* refineries, which process thirty-five percent (35%) of current refined oil products available to the *AXIS* are destroyed, and the synthetic oil plants in *GERMANY* which process an additional thirteen percent (13%) are also destroyed, the resulting disruption will have a disastrous effect upon the supply of finished oil products available to the *AXIS*.

(5) Synthetic Rubber and tires

These products are vital to all phases of German Military strength on land and in the air. Provision is made for destruction of fifty percent (50%) of the synthetic rubber capacity and nearly all of the tire production. This destruction will have a crippling effect.

(6) Military Transport Vehicles

Seven (7) plants produce a large proportion of the military transport and armored vehicles. The precise proportion is unknown. Loss of these plants will strike directly at the German Military strength. *The cumulative effect of the destruction of the targets comprising the systems just listed will fatally weaken the capacity of the German people for armed resistance.*

d. The selection of these objectives is confirmed by the fact that the systems about which the Germans are most sensitive and about which they have concentrated their defenses such as balloons, camouflage, anti-aircraft, searchlights, decoys, and smoke are:

Aircraft factories.
Submarine construction yards.
Ball bearings.
Oil.

3. INTERMEDIATE OBJECTIVE

a. The Germans, recognizing the vulnerability of their vital industries, are rapidly increasing the strength of their fighter defenses. The German fighter strength in western *EUROPE* is being augmented. *If the growth of the German fighter strength is not arrested quickly, it may become literally impossible to carry out the destruction planned and thus to create the conditions necessary for ultimate decisive action by our combined forces on the Continent.*

b. Hence the successful prosecution of the air offensive against the principal objectives is dependent upon a prior (or simultaneous) offensive against the German fighter strength.

c. To carry out the Eighth Air Force's part of this combined bomber offensive it will be necessary to attack precision targets deep in German territory in daylight. The principal obstacle to this is the growing strength of the German Air Force. The growth of this fighter force has become so pronounced as to warrant a brief review of this development (Chart A).

d. The upper curve shows what has been happening to the German Air Force in the past nine months. The bomber strength has been sharply reduced from 1760 bombers to 1450 in operational units. The fighters, on the other hand, increased from 1690 to 1710. They suffered a reduction in strength doubtless caused by the intense operations in *RUSSIA* and the *MEDITERRANEAN* as well as in the Western Front, but those losses have been made good at the expense of the bombers. That same trend is reflected in the lower curve, which shows production was maintained fairly constantly for about five months and then increased so that fighter production has risen from 720 to 810 per month. Over a longer period of time, from the entrance of the U. S. into the war until the present time, the trend has been even more pronounced. German fighter strength has increased by forty-four percent (44%) in that period in spite of the heavy losses. This chart shows the margin of production over average monthly wastage in German fighters. Of course, the monthly wastage has not been constant over the past seven months, as shown on the

chart, but the average for that period has been fairly accurately determined at 655 fighters per month. The production rate as of last February showed 810 fighters per month. The average increase in production over the six month period depicted indicates a monthly surplus of production over average wastage of 108 airplanes. If this trend simply continues in its present ratio, it is well within the capacity of the Germans to produce enough fighter airplanes over and above wastage to provide a strength of 3,000 fighters by this time next year. (See Chart D). This is, of course, a capability and not necessarily a German intention, although current German development points very strongly in that direction. The increase in fighter strength is not reflected in this curve covering the past eight months; however, during that period the Germans diverted a great many fighter type airplanes into fighter bombers and fighter reconnaissance airplanes. The wastage rate was very high in those units and that probably accounts for the temporary decline in German fighter strength; however, in the last three months it has shown a sharp uprise.

e. The disposition of German fighters is also significant. (See Chart C). The top line shows the number of fighters on the Western Front. Since we entered the war, that strength has nearly doubled. It has risen from 420 to 830. This, in spite of the heavy drains on the Russian and *MEDITERRANEAN* Fronts. When we entered the war only thirty-six percent (36%) of German fighters were concentrated on the Western Front; today, fifty percent (50%) of all fighters available to the German Air Force are concentrated in opposition to our principal bombing effort from the United Kingdom. The German fighter force is taking a toll of our forces both by day and by night, not only in terms of combat losses but more especially in terms of reduced tactical effectiveness. If the German fighters are materially increased in number it is quite conceivable that they could make our daylight bombing unprofitable and perhaps our night bombing too. On the other hand, if the German fighter force is partially neutralized our effectiveness will be vastly improved.

f. For this reason German fighter strength must be considered as an *Intermediate* objective second to none in priority.

4. *INTEGRATED R.A.F.-U. S. ARMY AIR FORCES OFFENSIVE*

a. The combined efforts of the entire U. S. and British bomber forces can produce the results required to achieve the mission prescribed for this theater. Fortunately the capabilities of the two forces are entirely complementary.

b. The tremendous and ever increasing striking power of the R.A.F. bombing is designed to so destroy German material facilities as to undermine the willingness and ability of the German worker to continue the war. Because of this, there is great flexibility in the ability of the R.A.F. to direct its material destruction against those objectives which are closely related to the U. S. bombing effort which is directed toward the destruction of specific essential industrial targets. It is considered that the most effective results from strategic bombing will be obtained by directing the combined day and night effort of the U. S. and British bomber forces to all-out attacks against targets which are mutually complementary in undermining a limited number of selected objective systems. All-out attacks imply precision bombing of related targets by day and night where tactical conditions permit, and area bombing by night against the cities associated with these targets. The timing of the related day and night attacks will be determined by tactical considerations.

c. This plan does not attempt to prescribe the major effort of the R.A.F. Bomber Command. It simply recognizes the fact that when precision targets are bombed by the Eighth Air Force in daylight, the effort should be complemented and completed by R.A.F. bombing attacks against the surrounding industrial area at night. Fortunately the industrial areas to be attacked are in most cases identical with the industrial areas which the British Bomber Command has selected for mass destruction anyway. They include *HAMBURG, BREMEN, HANOVER, BERLIN, LEIPZIG, WILHELMSHAVEN, BREMERSHIRE, COLOGNE, STUTTGART,*

and many other principal cities. They also, of course, include smaller towns whose principal significance is coupled with the precision targets prescribed for the Eighth Air Force.

5. GENERAL PLAN OF OPERATIONS

a. It would be highly desirable to initiate precision bombing attacks against German fighter assembly and engine factories immediately. However, our present force of day bombers is too small to make the deeper penetrations necessary to reach the majority of these factories. Considering the number of German fighters which can be concentrated laterally to meet our bombers on penetration, and again on withdrawal, it is felt that 300 heavy bombers is the minimum operating force necessary to make deep penetrations.

b. The general tactical plan of operations with this minimum force involves the following general conception. A holding attack intending to attract German fighters to a particular area and prevent their massing against the main attacking force. For this purpose 50 heavy bombers with fighter escort are required. Second, a main striking force to penetrate through the fighter defenses and carry out the destruction of targets in Germany and return. Two hundred bombers is considered the minimum requirement to provide self-protection and at the same time carry out worthwhile destruction. Third, the covering force to attack still another area and attract fighters in order to divert them from the main force on withdrawal. Again, 50 bombers with fighter escort is the minimum force to carry out such a function.

c. In order to establish a yardstick to be used in the determination of the number of bombers required to destroy the objectives desired, the following procedure was employed:

Twelve successful missions were conducted in January, February, and March. Approximately 100 bombers were dispatched on each. It was found that sufficient bombs fell

within a circle of 1000 foot radius centered about the aiming point to cause the desired destruction. For each prospective target the number of 1000 foot radius circles necessary to cover it has been calculated. The yardstick as determined by experience is therefore: the number of 1000 foot radius circles of destruction, each requiring 100 bombers.

d. The plan of operations is divided into four phases. (See Maps 1, 2, 3, & 4). The depth of penetration, the number of targets available, and the capacity of the bombing forces increases successively with each phase.

e. Seventy-six precision targets have been selected for Eighth Air Force bombing operations. Having selected these 76 targets the questions arise: Can they be effectively destroyed, and if so, how many bombers will be required? As to the first question, operational experience answers yes.

6. EFFECTIVENESS OF EIGHTH AIR FORCE

a. The operations of the U. S. Army Air Force in daylight bombing of defended objectives in German occupied *EUROPE* have been sufficient to establish a criterion of precision daylight bombing effectiveness; the operations of the R.A.F. Bomber Command leave no room for doubt of the ability of that force to devastate industrial areas.

b. The daylight operations of the Eighth Air Force from 3 January 1943 to 6 April 1943 definitely establish the fact that it is possible to conduct precision pattern bombing operations against selected precision targets from altitudes of 20,000 feet to 30,000 feet in the face of anti-aircraft artillery and fighter defenses.

c. Of 20 missions dispatched by the U. S. Eighth Air Force in that period, 12 have been highly effective. These 12 daylight missions have been directed against a variety of targets, including:

Submarine bases.
Locomotive shops.
Power houses.
Marshalling yards.
Shipbuilding yards.
Motor vehicle and armament works.
Airplane engine factories.

The average number of aircraft dispatched against these targets has been eighty-six. The destructive effect has, in every case, been highly satisfactory. From this experience it may be definitely accepted that 100 bombers dispatched on each successful mission will provide entirely satisfactory destructive effect of that part of the target area within 1000 feet of the aiming point; and that two-thirds of the missions dispatched each month will be successful to this extent.

7. FORCES REQUIRED

a. Heavy Bombers

(1) In computing the force required, a yardstick of 100 bombers dispatched per target area of 1000 feet about each aiming point has been accepted as a reasonable product of actual experience to date. Each target has been evaluated in terms of these *Target Units*, or the number of 1000 foot radius circles in which this destructive effect must be produced.

(2) Experience in the European Theater to date indicates that at least 800 airplanes must be in the theater to dispatch 300 bombers on operations. Hence, until the level of U. S. bomber strength in this theater reaches approximately 800, it will not be feasible to sustain a precision bombing offensive against the German fighter factories. It is estimated that we will be able to accommodate and train a force of this capacity by July of this year. In the interim every effort should be made to reduce the German fighter force by attack of those fighter factories which can be reached, and by combat under favorable conditions. The

repair depots and airdromes are included for the purpose of giving commanders the necessary tactical latitude. Concurrently, operations can be conducted against submarine installations within reach and against other targets contributing directly to the principal objectives which are within covering range of our own fighters, or which do not require deep penetration. Some operations will have to be conducted to provide the necessary training for the incoming forces; such operations must be conducted against objectives within the listed categories.

(3) During the next phase, from July to October, in which it is estimated that we will be able to penetrate to a limit of 400 miles, a determined effort must be made to break down the German fighter strength by every means at our disposal, concentrating primarily upon fighter aircraft factories. During this time interim an additional increment of 258 bombers is required so that the strength in the theater by October should be approximately 1192. This would provide a striking force of 450 bombers at the end of this period. The average striking force during this period would be 400.

(4) During the third phase, the German fighter force must be kept depleted, and the other sources of German strength must also be undermined. During this phase our bombing offensive forces must be adequate to perform all their major tasks.

(5) From October to January an additional increment of 554 bombers is required, bringing the total to 1746. This should provide an operational striking force of 655 bombers at the end of that time. The average striking force during this period will be 550 bombers.

(6) During the last phase - early 1944 - the entire force should be used to sustain the effect already produced and to pave the way for a combined operation on the Continent. This will require a force of 2702 heavy bombers.

(7) It will be observed that the charts of the actual location of the targets to be attacked in each phase show the joint bombing effort of each phase. It will be noted that in the first phase (see Map 1), operations are limited to relatively shallow penetration. They include submarine bases along the coast, submarine construction yards, and the Focke Wulf airplane factory at *BREMEN*. Actually, of course, these operations have all been undertaken with the small forces available and in the case of the submarine yards at *VEGESACK* and the Focke Wulf plant at *BREMEN*, a long step has already been taken toward completion of the plan. There are two other systems of operations calling for deep penetrations shown in this phase. One of them calls for an attack against oil installations in the *RUHR*. This operation is entirely contingent upon an earlier attack from the *MEDITERRANEAN* Area against the oil refineries at *PLOESTI* in *RUMANIA*. Such an attack is under consideration now and if it is carried out we will be forced to operate against the *RUHR* refineries in order to exploit the advantage achieved in *RUMANIA*. The other attack calls for a very deep penetration at *SCHWEINFURT*. This operation might be undertaken as a surprise attack in view of the tremendous advantages accrued from a successful destruction of these plants; however, it would be most unwise to attempt it until we are perfectly sure we have enough force to destroy the objective in a single operation. Any attempt to repeat such an attack will meet with very bitter opposition. In the second phase (see Map 2), the plan calls for a concentration of effort against the German fighter assembly and fighter aircraft factories as well as attacks against airdromes and repair facilities. It is anticipated that approximately 75% of the striking force will be applied to this end during this phase. The other 25% is directed against submarine construction yards. In the third phase (see Map 3), an all-out attack against all the principal objectives is provided as well as repeat operations to continue neutralization of installations which have been destroyed and which can be repaired. During the fourth phase (see Map 4), these operations are continued and allowances made for concentration of attacks against

installations more directly associated with a cross-Channel operation such as rail transportation, arsenals, Military installations, etc.

(8) The determination of the number of aircraft required in each phase has been based strictly upon past experience. As to rate of operations, the Eighth Air Force has averaged six per month over the past six months. In the past three months, it has actually carried out twelve highly successful operations out of a total of 20. This plan is based on a total of 12 successful operations in each three month phase and recognizes the probability that the other six will for one reason or another be less satisfactory. Experience has shown that about 3/8 of the total number of airplanes in the theater can be dispatched on operational missions at any one time. This makes allowances for the airplanes in depot reserve, those in depot repair, and those being ferried and modified. There is every reason to believe that our forces will be more effective in the future than these figures indicate. In order to be as realistic as possible, however, the plan has been based in each case upon actual past experience.

(9) Charts appended to Maps 1, 2, 3, and 4 tabulate all the targets for contemplated destruction by the U. S. and British bomber forces to carry out the mission. The precision targets for attacks by the U. S. Bomber Command are shown as small symbols. The cities and towns in or near those precision targets and which constitute the complementary targets of the R.A.F. are shown as in circles. The German fighters are at present deployed in four main concentrations positioned well forward toward the coast. In general, the day fighters are in four lots of approximately 100 each in the general areas of northwest coastal *GERMANY*, *HOLLAND* and *BELGIUM*, the Channel coast of *FRANCE* and western *FRANCE* in the vicinity of the submarine pens. These fighters are capable of concentrating laterally from bases at least 200

miles away so that forces of 300 fighters might be employed against our main efforts if we penetrated directly toward the *RUHR* without distracting or diverting part of them.

(10) Chart D is illustrative of the effect of this plan of operations upon the intermediate objective, German fighter strength. This chart must be considered as pictorial rather than precise. The top line shows the increase in German fighter strength. That is a German capability if they choose to follow it. If German production is not interrupted and if German wastage is not increased it is possible for *GERMANY* to have in operation 3,000 fighters by next April. The broken line shows the effect of our operations upon that German fighter strength. In the first phase we do not expect to accomplish a great deal because our forces will not have been built up to decisive proportions. In the second phase, our attacks against German fighter factory and engine factories and the increased attrition should cause the levelling off of the German fighter strength. In the third phase the full effect of the attacks against German fighter production should make themselves felt so that German fighter strength should fall off rapidly in this phase. In the fourth phase that German fighter strength should decline at a precipitant rate. This second line has been computed in the following manner. The decrease in German fighter strength is the result of two factors. One is the attacks against German fighter factories, the other the accelerated rate of combat wastage caused by our increased bomber forces. This wastage rate has been computed in an extremely conservative manner. It is realized that past claims of enemy aircraft shot down may seem high, although our evaluation of them is very careful; nevertheless, in order to avoid any charge of unwarranted optimism combat claims have been arbitrarily divided by four, the resulting decrease in German fighter strength dependent upon expected combat wastage is at a rate only one quarter as great as our present combat claims. Even under these very conservative assumptions it is apparent that the German fighter strength will have passed

its limit by the end of the second phase and its powers of resistance should decline very rapidly thereafter.

b. Medium Bombers

It will be noted that no U. S. medium bombardment aircraft have been specifically included in the computation of force required above. That does not mean that medium bombardment is not necessary to implement this plan. Supplementary attacks against all strategic targets within range of medium bombers are anticipated as necessary adjuncts to the heavy bomber attacks. In addition, medium bombardment is required in order to conduct repeated attacks against German fighter airdromes, to aid the passage of the heavy bombers until the attacks against the German aircraft industry make themselves felt. Medium bombardment will be necessary to support combined operations in early 1944. The crews must be operationally trained in this theater by that date.

c. Fighters

At all times there is a need for an extensive U. S. fighter force both to protect the bombers and to assist in the reduction of the German fighter strength. Prior to the initiation of operations on the Continent, this fighter strength must be at a maximum, and must be fully trained for operations in this theater.

NOTE: This plan deals entirely with the requirements for the strategic bombing force, except for its use in the 4th phase on missions which will render most effective support to surface operations on the Continent, which may begin in early 1944. In order to supplement this force in providing the close support required for the surface operations, steps must be taken early to create and train a tactical force in this theater. This force must include light bomber, reconnaissance, fighter, and troop carrier elements.

8. CONCLUSIONS

a. Recapitulation of U. S. Bomber Forces Required

	<u>Heavy</u>	<u>Medium</u>	
1st Phase	944	200	Bombers required by 30 June 1943
2nd Phase	1192	400	Bombers required by 30 September 1943
3rd Phase	1746	600	Bombers required by 31 December 1943
4th Phase	2702	800	Bombers required by 31 March 1944

b. If the forces required as set forth above are made available on the dates indicated, it will be possible to carry out the mission prescribed in the Casablanca Conference. If those forces are not made available, then that mission is not attainable by mid-1944.

c. Depletion of the German fighter strength must be accomplished first. Failure to neutralize that force will jeopardize the execution of the war toward a favorable decision in this theater.

d. The following bombing objectives should be destroyed under the provisions of the general directive issued at the Casablanca Conference:

(1) Intermediate Objectives:

German fighter strength.

(2) Primary Objectives:

German submarine yards and bases.

The remainder of the German aircraft industry.

Ball bearings. *

Oil. * (Contingent upon attacks against *PLOESTI*
from the *MEDITERRANEAN*).

* A successful initial attack on the key element of either of those systems would demand the immediate concentration of effort on the remaining elements of that system to exploit the initial success.

(3) Secondary objectives in order of priority:

Synthetic rubber and tires.

Military motor transport vehicles.


U. S. SECRET

BRITISH MOST SECRET


e. The following statement of principle, expressed by the Operations Analysts, is concurred in:

In view of the ability of adequate and properly utilized air power to impair the industrial source of the enemy's Military strength, only the most vital considerations should be permitted to delay or divert the application of an adequate air striking force to this task.

A





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


C

DISPOSITION OF GERMAN FIGHTER PLANES








First Phase 1


PHASE I - APRIL - JULY
KEY TO TARGETS

Group:	Symbol:	Classification:	Location:	Straight-Line Mileage:	Approximate Percentage of Production	
I (a)	▲	SUBMARINES (OPERATING BASES)				
		1	Brest	350	-	
		2	Lorient	360	-	
		3	St. Nazaire	370	-	
I (b)	▲	SUBMARINES (BUILDING YARDS)				
		1	Bremen & Vegesack (2)	350	23 %	
		4	Wilhelmshaven	330	3 %	
		5	Bremerhaven	350	3 %	
	7	Emden	290	2 %		
II (a)	●	GERMAN AIR FORCE (FIGHTERS)				
		1	Bremen (Focke-Wulf)	350	12 %	
II (e)	■	GERMAN AIR FORCE (REPAIR & STORAGE)				
		1	Paris (9)	260	-	
		2	Antwerp (2)	180	-	
		3	Brussels (2)	200	-	
		4	Albert/Meuse (2)	190	-	
		5	Courcelles/G. (2)	220	-	
		6	Amsterdam (1)	190	-	
		7	Valkenburg (1)	260	-	
8	Le Mans (1)	300	-			
III	●	BALL BEARINGS				
		1	Schweinfurt	450	42 %	
	2	Paris	260	8 %		
IV	■	PETROLEUM PRODUCTION				
		1	Gelsenkirchen	280	3 %	
		2	Wesseling	280	1 %	
		3	Bottrop	290	1 %	
		4	Scholven	300	2 %	
5	Wanne Eickel	310	1 %			

● **BREMEN** Towns related to precision objectives, and are appropriate targets for the complementary effort of the Royal Air Force.

Concentric mileage lines are approximate.





Second Phase 2


PHASE 2 - JULY - SEPTEMBER
KEY TO TARGETS


Group:	Symbol:	Classification:	Location:	Approximate Straight-Line Mileage:	Approximate Percentage of Production:
I (a)	▲	SUBMARINES (OPERATING BASES)			
	1	Brest		350	-
	2	Lorient		360	-
	3	St. Nazaire		370	-
	4	La Pallice		430	-
I (b)	▲	SUBMARINES (BUILDING YARDS)			
	1	Bremen & Vegesack (2)		350	23 %
	2	Hamburg (4)		410	30 %
	3	Kiel (3)		430	21 %
	4	Wilhelmshaven		330	3 %
	5	Bremerhaven		350	3 %
	6	Flensburg		410	3 %
	7	Emden		290	2 %
	8	Lubeck		440	3 %
II (a)	●	GERMAN AIR FORCE (FIGHTERS)			
	1	Bremen (Focke-Wulf)		350	12 %
	2	Cassel		390	8 %
II (b)	●	GERMAN AIR FORCE (FIGHTER ENGINES)			
	1	Brunswick		430	-
	2	Cassel		390	-
	4	Hamburg		410	-
	5	Eisenach		430	-
II (c)	▲	GERMAN AIR FORCE (BOMBERS)			
	1	Bremen		350	6 %
	2	Lehrwerder		350	4 %
II (e)	■	GERMAN AIR FORCE (REPAIR & STORAGE)			
	1	Paris (9)		260	-
	2	Antwerp (2)		180	-
	3	Brussels (2)		200	-
	4	Albert/Meaulte (2)		190	-
	5	Courcelles/G. (2)		220	-
	6	Amsterdam (1)		190	-
	7	Valkenburg (1)		260	-
	8	Le Mans (1)		300	-
	9	Romilly (1)		300	-
	10	Rheims/Ch. (1)		270	-
	11	Nantes (1)		370	-
	12	Bourges (1)		380	-
III	●	BALL BEARINGS			
	1	Schweinfurt		450	42 %
	2	Paris		260	8 %
IV	■	PETROLEUM PRODUCTION			
	1	Gelsenkirchen		280	3 %
	2	Wesseling		280	1 %
	3	Bottrop		290	1 %
	4	Scholven		300	2 %
	5	Wanne Eickel		310	1 %
V (a)	●	SYNTHETIC RUBBER PLANTS			
	1	Huls		-	17 %
V (b)	●	RUBBER TIRE PLANTS			
	1	Aachen/Engelbert		270	-
	2	Wuppertal/Vorwerk		300	-
	3	Hanau/Dunlop		390	important
	4	Hanover/Continental		390	"
	5	Hanover/Continental		390	"
	6	Harburg/Phoenix		400	"

Prepared by the A-5 Section, HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE 7 Apr 43.

● BREMEN
Towns related to precision objectives, and are appropriate targets for the complementary effort of the Royal Air Force.

Concentric mileage lines are approximate.





Third Phase

PHASE 3 - SEPTEMBER - DECEMBER
KEY TO TARGETS


Group:	Symbol:	Classification:	Location:	Approximate Straight-Line Mileage:	Approximate Percentage of Production:
I (a)	▲	SUBMARINES (OPERATING BASES)			
	1	Brest		350	-
	2	Lorient		360	-
	3	St. Nazaire		370	-
	4	La Pallice		430	-
I (b)	▲	SUBMARINES (BUILDING YARDS)			
	1	Bremen & Vegesack (2)		350	23 %
	2	Hamburg (4)		410	30 %
	3	Kiel (3)		430	21 %
	4	Wilhelmshaven		330	3 %
	5	Bremerhaven		350	3 %
	6	Flensburg		410	3 %
	7	Emden		290	2 %
	8	Lubeck		440	3 %
	9	Rostock		500	1 %
II (a)	●	GERMAN AIR FORCE (FIGHTERS)			
	1	Bremen (Focke-Wulf)		350	12 %
	2	Cassel		390	8 %
	3	Oschersleben		460	8 %
	4	Warnemunde		500	8 %
	6	Dessau		500	2.3 %
	7	Brunswick		430	4.6 %
II (b)	●	GERMAN AIR FORCE (FIGHTER ENGINES)			
	1	Brunswick		430	-
	2	Cassel		390	-
	3	Stuttgart		460	-
	4	Hamburg		410	-
	5	Eisenach		430	-
II (c)	▲	GERMAN AIR FORCE (BOMBERS)			
	1	Bremen		350	6 %
	2	Lenzwerder		350	4 %
	3	Dessau		500	10 %
	4	Bernberg		480	4 %
	6	Wismar		470	6 %
	7	Halle		490	5 %
	9	Schkeuditz		500	5 %
	10	Rostock		500	10 %
II (d)	▲	GERMAN AIR FORCE (BOMBER ENGINES)			
	1	Dessau		500	-
	2	Magdeburg		470	-
	3	Schonebeck		470	-
II (e)	■	GERMAN AIR FORCE (REPAIR & STORAGE)			
	1	Paris (9)		260	-
	2	Antwerp (2)		180	-
	3	Brussels (2)		200	-
	4	Albert/Meaulte (2)		190	-
	5	Courcelles/G. (2)		220	-
	6	Amsterdam (1)		190	-
	7	Valkenburg (1)		260	-
	8	Le Mans (1)		300	-
	9	Romilly (1)		300	-
	10	Rheims/Ch. (1)		270	-
	11	Nantes (1)		370	-
	12	Bourges (1)		380	-
	13	Strasbourg (1)		420	-
	14	Limoges (1)		460	-
III	●	BALL BEARINGS			
	1	Schweinfurt		450	42 %
	2	Paris		260	8 %
	3	Stuttgart		460	15 %
IV	■	PETROLEUM PRODUCTION			
	1	Gelsenkirchen		280	3 %
	2	Wessling		280	1 %
	3	Bottrop		290	1 %
	4	Scholven		300	2 %
	5	Wanne Eickel		310	1 %
	6	Magdeburg		470	3 %
	7	Leuna		490	3 %
	8	Boehlen		500	1 %
V (a)	●	SYNTHETIC RUBBER PLANTS			
	1	Huls		280	17 %
	2	Schkopau			27 %
V (b)	●	RUBBER TIRE PLANTS			
	1	Aachen/Englebert		270	-
	2	Wuppertal/Vorwerk		300	-
	3	* Hanau/Dunlop		390	* important
	4	* Hanover/Continental		390	"
	5	* Hanover/Continental		390	"
	6	Harburg/Phoenix		400	-
	7	Montlucon/Dunlop		440	-
	8	Clermont-Ferrand		480	-
VI	●	MILITARY TRANSPORT PLANTS			
	1	Paris/Renault		260	-
	2	Paris/Citroen		260	-
	3	Cologne/Ford		300	-
	4	Bourges/Matford		380	-
	5	Stuttgart/D. Benz		460	-

Prepared by the A-5 Section,
HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE 7 Apr 43.

DHM

Towns related to precision objectives, and are appropriate targets for the complementary effort of the Royal Air Force.

Concentric mileage lines are approximate.



Fourth Phase

PHASE 4 - DECEMBER - APRIL
KEY TO TARGETS

Group: Symbol: Classification: Location: Approximate Straight-Line Mileage: Approximate Percentage of Production:

I (a)	▲	SUBMARINES (OPERATING BASES)	Brest	350	---
			Lorient	360	---
			St. Nazaire	370	---
			La Pallice	450	---
			Bordeaux	530	---
			Heligoland	330	---
I (b)	▲	SUBMARINES (BUILDING YARDS)	Bremen & Vegesack (2)	350	23%
			Hamburg (4)	410	21%
			Kiel (3)	450	---
			Wilhelmshaven	350	---
			Bremerhaven	350	---
			Flensburg	410	---
			Emden	290	---
			Lubeck	440	---
			Rostock	500	---
II (a)	●	GERMAN AIR FORCE (FIGHTERS)	Bremen (Focke-Wulf)	350	1%
			Cassel	420	---
			Oschersleben	460	---
			Warnemunde	500	---
			Leipzig	520	---
			Dessau	500	---
			Brunswick	430	---
			Augsburg	540	---
II (b)	●	GERMAN AIR FORCE (FIGHTER ENGINES)	Brunswick	430	---
			Cassel	420	---
			Stuttgart	460	---
			Hamburg	410	---
			Eisenach	460	---
			Zuhlsdorf	550	---
			Genshagen	550	---
			Berlin	550	---
II (c)	▲	GERMAN AIR FORCE (BOMBER PLANTS)	Bremen	350	6%
			Lemwerder	350	---
			Dessau	500	---
			Bernburg	480	---
			Oranienburg	550	---
			Wismar	470	---
			Halle	490	---
			Leipzig	520	---
			Schkeuditz	500	---
			Rostock	500	---
			Schonefeld	550	---
II (d)	▲	GERMAN AIR FORCE (BOMBER ENGINES)	Dessau	500	---
			Magdeburg	470	---
			Schonebeck	470	---
			Leipzig	520	---
II (e)	■	GERMAN AIR FORCE (REPAIR & STORAGE)	Paris	260	---
			Antwerp	180	---
			Brussels	200	---
			Albert/Meulne	190	---
			Courseilles/G.	220	---
			Amsterdam	190	---
			Valkenburg	260	---
			Le Mans	300	---
			Romilly	300	---
			Rheims/Ch.	270	---
			Nantes	370	---
			Bourges	390	---
			Strasbourg	420	---
			Limoges	460	---
			Bordeaux	530	---
III	●	BALL BEARINGS	Schweinfurt	450	42%
			Paris	260	15%
			Stuttgart	460	---
			Leipzig	520	---
			Berlin/Erkner	550	---
			Anney	550	---
IV	■	PETROLEUM PRODUCTION	Gelsenkirchen	280	3%
			Wesseling	280	1%
			Bottrop	290	---
			Scholven	300	---
			Wanne Eickel	310	---
			Magdeburg	470	---
			Leuna	490	---
			Bohlen	500	---
			Zeitz	510	2%
			Brux	530	1%
V (a)	●	SYNTHETIC RUBBER PLANTS	Huls	280	17%
			Schkopau	490	27%
V (b)	●	RUBBER TIRE PLANTS	Aachen/Engelbert	270	---
			Wuppertal/Vorwerk	300	---
			Hansu/Dunlop	390	---
			Hanover/Continental	390	---
			Hanover/Continental	390	---
			Harburg/Phoenix	400	---
			Montlucon/Dunlop	440	---
			Clermont-Ferrand	480	---
VI	●	MILITARY TRANSPORT PLANTS	Paris/Renault	260	---
			Paris/Citroen	260	---
			Cologne/Ford	300	---
			Bourges/Matford	380	---
			Stuttgart/D. Benz	460	---
			Brandenburg/Opel	520	---

Prepared by the A-5 Section,
DHM HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE 8 Apr 43.

● Towns related to precision objectives, and are appropriate targets for the complementary effort of the Royal Air Force.

Concentric mileage lines are approximate.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

C.C.S. 219

CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943 - 1944

References:

CCS 83rd Meeting

CCS 84th Meeting

C.C.S. 219 was circulated 14 May 1943 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

This paper was read by Admiral Leahy during the CCS 84th Meeting. The concepts contained herein are superseded by the final action in C.C.S. 249/6.

C.C.S. 219

14 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943 - 1944

Memorandum by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff

The enclosed study was prepared by the United States Joint Staff Planners and meets with the approval of the United States Chiefs of Staff. It is submitted for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

ENCLOSURE

CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943 - 1944

1. UNITED NATIONS OVERALL OBJECTIVE

The overall objective of the *UNITED NATIONS*, in conjunction with *RUSSIA* and other Allies, is to bring the war against *GERMANY*, *JAPAN*, and *ITALY* to a successful conclusion at the earliest possible date.

2. OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

a. In cooperation with *RUSSIA* and other Allies to force an unconditional surrender of the *AXIS* in *EUROPE*.

b. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other *PACIFIC* Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against *JAPAN* with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate unconditional surrender can be forced.

c. Upon the defeat of the *AXIS* in *EUROPE*, in cooperation with other *PACIFIC* Powers and, if possible with *RUSSIA*, to direct the full resources of the *UNITED STATES* and *GREAT BRITAIN* to force the unconditional surrender of *JAPAN*. If, however, conditions develop

which indicate that the war as a whole can be brought more quickly to a successful conclusion by the earlier mounting of a major offensive against *JAPAN*, the strategical concept set forth herein may be reversed.

3. OPERATIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AND EUROPEAN-AFRICAN AREAS

a. Secure the lines of communications in the *ATLANTIC* by defeating the U-boat and removing other threats to these sea communications.

b. European Area

(1) Conduct a full-scale assault from the *UNITED KINGDOM* against the Continent in the spring of 1944.

(2) Conduct a vigorous air offensive with a view to reducing *GERMANY'S* war potential and to making feasible a cross-Channel operation and exploitation from lodgments on the Continent in the spring of 1944.

(3) Build up appropriate forces in the *UNITED KINGDOM* for tasks (1) and (2).

(4) Prepare for and return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration at any time from now onwards with whatever forces may be available at the time.

c. African Area

(1) Accomplish *HUSKY*.

(2) After the completion of *HUSKY*, or in the event that *HUSKY* is cancelled, conduct limited offensive operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN* Area. These operations will be designed:

(a) To destroy Italian war potential by continuing air attacks from *MEDITERRANEAN* bases;

(b) To continue support to *RUSSIA* by the diversion of *AXIS* forces and materials;

(c) To force dispersion of *AXIS* forces in order to facilitate a cross-Channel operation; and

(d) To maintain the security of our positions and communications in the *MEDITERRANEAN* Area.

The strength of the forces to be employed in the *MEDITERRANEAN* will be so limited as not to prejudice the success of a cross-Channel operation in 1944. U. S. ground and naval forces will not be employed in the *MEDITERRANEAN* east of *SICILY*.

4. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST

a. Conduct operations to maintain lines of communication in the *PACIFIC*, particularly to *AUSTRALIA*; to maintain pressure on *JAPAN*, retain the initiative, force attrition, contain the Japanese Fleet in the *PACIFIC*, and attain or retain positions of readiness for a full-scale offensive against *JAPAN*; and to keep *CHINA* in the war.

b. For these purposes, U. S. Naval forces will be increased to a maximum consistent with the minimum requirements in the *ATLANTIC*. With due regard to the requirements of the main effort against the *EUROPEAN AXIS*, air and ground forces will be provided so as to facilitate joint action and make optimum use of the increasing strength of U. S. Naval forces.

c. Offensive operations in the *PACIFIC* and *FAR EAST* in 1943 - 1944 will have the following objectives:

- (1) Conduct of air operations in and from *CHINA*.
- (2) Seizure of *BURMA*.
- (3) Ejection of the Japanese from the *ALEUTIANS*.
- (4) Seizure of the *MARSHALL* and *CAROLINE ISLANDS*.
- (5) Seizure of the *SOLOMONS*, the *BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO*, and Japanese held *NEW GUINEA*.

5. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA, CHINA, AND THE COMBATANT FRENCH

a. Sustain the Soviet forces by the greatest volume of munitions that can be supplied and transported to *RUSSIA* without militating against the attainment of the overall objectives.

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b. Sustain *CHINA* by continuing to furnish munitions to the greatest extent practicable.

c. Continue to furnish munitions to the combatant French in Northwest Africa on the scale previously agreed upon.

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C.C.S. 220

STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

References:

CCS 90th Meeting, Item (3)
CCS 92nd Meeting, Item (1)

C.C.S. 220 was circulated 19 May 1943 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 90th Meeting, accepted C.C.S. 220 as a basis for a combined study and elaboration for future plans.

C. C. S. 220

14 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

Memorandum by the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

The attached strategic plan, prepared by the United States Joint Staff Planners, meets with the approval of the United States Chiefs of Staff and is submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

1. A brief discussion of a strategic plan for the defeat of *JAPAN* is contained in Enclosure "A".

2. The plan is based on the following overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war.

a. In cooperation with *RUSSIA* and other Allies to force an unconditional surrender of the *AXIS* in *EUROPE*.

b. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other *PACIFIC* Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against *JAPAN* with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate unconditional surrender can be forced.

c. Upon the defeat of the *AXIS* in *EUROPE*, in cooperation with other *PACIFIC* Powers and, if possible, with *RUSSIA*, to direct the full resources of the *UNITED STATES* and *GREAT BRITAIN* to force the unconditional surrender of *JAPAN*. If, however, conditions develop which indicate that the war as a whole can be brought more quickly to a successful conclusion by the earlier mounting of a major of-

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fensive against *JAPAN*, the strategical concept set forth herein may be reversed.

3. In view of the long period covered and the inevitable changes in conditions that cannot be foreseen, it is not practicable to divide the plan into definitely coordinated phases. With this reservation in regard to timing and coordination, the plan is expressed as follows:

PHASE I

a. CONTINUE AND AUGMENT EXISTING UNDERTAKINGS IN AND FROM CHINA.

Chinese Forces assisted by U. S. Forces.

b. RECAPTURE BURMA.

British Forces assisted by U. S. and Chinese Forces.

c. OPEN A LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS TO THE CELEBES SEA.

United States Forces.

PHASE II

a. OPERATIONS TO OPEN THE STRAIT OF MALACCA AND TO COMPEL WIDE DISPERSION OF ENEMY FORCES.

British Forces.

b. RECAPTURE THE PHILIPPINES.

United States Forces.

c. PREPARE TO CAPTURE HONG KONG.

Chinese Forces.

PHASE III

a. CONTINUE OPERATIONS TO OPEN THE STRAIT OF MALACCA AND TO COMPEL WIDE DISPERSION OF ENEMY FORCES.

British Forces.

b. SECURE CONTROL OF THE NORTHERN PART OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND ASSIST IN THE CAPTURE OF HONG KONG.

United States Forces.

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c. CAPTURE HONG KONG.

Chinese Forces.

PHASE IV

ESTABLISH AIR BASES IN JAPANESE OCCUPIED CHINA FROM WHICH TO LAUNCH AN OVERWHELMING BOMBING OFFENSIVE AGAINST JAPAN.

Chinese Forces, assisted by British and U. S. Forces.

PHASE V

CONDUCT AN OVERWHELMING AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST JAPAN.

U. S. Forces, assisted by British and Chinese Forces.

PHASE VI

INVADE JAPAN.

U. S. Forces, assisted by British and Chinese Forces.

ENCLOSURE "A"

STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

4. Objective of the Plan

The *UNITED NATIONS* war objective is the unconditional surrender of the *AXIS* Powers. The accomplishment of this objective may require the invasion of *JAPAN*.

5. Most Probable Japanese Courses of Action

JAPAN'S most probable courses of action are to direct her major effort toward securing and exploiting the territory she controls, and eliminating *CHINA* from the war.

6. The Invasion of *JAPAN*

Since the invasion of *JAPAN* is a vast undertaking, it should not be attempted until Japanese power and will to resist have been so reduced that favorable conditions for invasion obtain. Under these conditions the invasion of *JAPAN* is considered feasible.

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It is probable that the reduction of *JAPAN'S* power and will to resist may only be accomplished by a sustained, systematic, and large-scale air offensive against *JAPAN* itself.

7. An Overwhelming Air Offensive against *JAPAN*

An air offensive on the required scale can only be conducted from bases in *CHINA*.

8. Recapture *BURMA*

The attainment of bases in *CHINA* for the air offensive against *JAPAN* is dependent on the continuation of *CHINA* in the war, and on the establishment of adequate supply routes, not only to maintain *CHINA*, but also to maintain *UNITED NATIONS* forces which are to operate in and from *CHINA*. The recapture of *BURMA* is a prerequisite to the attainment of adequate bases in *CHINA*. The capacity of the Burma Road supplemented by the air route from *INDIA* is inadequate to support the air and ground forces required to implement an air offensive on the required scale. The seizure of a port in *CHINA* to augment the supply routes through *BURMA* is essential.

9. The Seizure of a port in *CHINA*

HONG KONG is the most suitable port which may be seized initially. Its seizure requires an offensive from the interior of *CHINA* by forces supported through *BURMA*, and, probably, by supplementary amphibious operations. Control of the *SOUTH CHINA SEA* by the *UNITED NATIONS* will be necessary to prevent *JAPAN* from successfully opposing these measures.

10. A Line of Communications to *HONG KONG*

The most feasible sea route from the *UNITED STATES* to *HONG KONG* is through the *CELEBES* and *SULU SEAS*; that from the *UNITED KINGDOM* is through the *STRAIT OF MALACCA*. The establishment of these routes will require the neutralization of Japanese bases in the northern *EAST INDIES*, the *PHILIPPINES*, *FORMOSA*, and on the Asiatic mainland south of *HONG KONG*. Control of these areas will prevent *JAPAN* from supporting her forces in the *NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES* and will deny her the economic

advantages she receives from that area. Operations to open a line of communications to *HONG KONG* and to control the *SOUTH CHINA SEA* are considered feasible.

11. A Line of Communications from *HAWAII* to the *CELEBES SEA*

This line of communications to the *CELEBES SEA* will be established by advancing in the *CENTRAL* and *SOUTHWEST PACIFIC* areas with a view to shortening the sea route, providing for its security, and denying to the enemy bases and means by which he may interfere with the line of communications.

12. A Line of Communications through the *STRAIT OF MALACCA*

Although the supply of forces in *CHINA* will come mainly from the *UNITED STATES*, operations to open the *STRAIT OF MALACCA*, after the reconquest of *BURMA*, are a vital part of the plan. The enemy must be continuously compelled to disperse his forces throughout the *PACIFIC* and *ASIATIC* areas thus exposing them to attrition on an additional front in *SOUTHEASTERN ASIA*. This area is one of British strategic responsibility, and is a suitable and feasible undertaking for British Commonwealth Forces.

13. Control of the Seas

Since control of the seas in the western *PACIFIC* by the *UNITED NATIONS* may force the unconditional surrender of *JAPAN* before invasion and even before *JAPAN* is subjected to an intensive air offensive, every means to gain this control will be undertaken by the *UNITED STATES*. The establishment of the line of communications to the *CELEBES SEA* will be used as the vehicle to gain this end. The selection of intermediate objectives which will compel the enemy to expose his naval forces will be the greatest single factor in determining the enemy positions to be seized.

Attrition of enemy shipping, air, and naval resources will be a continuing objective. Raids on Japanese lines of communication, and carrier-based air raids on Japanese positions extending to *JAPAN* itself, will be implemented as our naval strength increases.

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C.C.S. 223

OPERATIONS AFTER HUSKY

References:

5th White House Meeting Minutes

6th White House Meeting Minutes, Item (6)

C.C.S. 223 was circulated 14 May 1943 for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Final action on the subject was taken in C.C.S. 242/6.

C.C.S. 223

14 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONS AFTER HUSKY

*Memorandum by Chief of Staff, Allied Force Headquarters,
North African Theater of Operations*

The attached paper (Enclosure "A") prepared by the Operations Division, Allied Force Headquarters, represents the views of General Eisenhower and Admiral Cunningham with respect to operations after HUSKY. It is not concurred in by Air Chief Marshal Tedder whose comments are attached (Enclosure "B"). It is requested that both papers be submitted for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as representative of the opinion of the Commander in Chief, Allied Force, from the local viewpoint only.

. . .
ENCLOSURE " A "

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

G-3 SECTION

7 May 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff.

SUBJECT : Operations after HUSKY.

1. After Operation HUSKY there are two immediate possibilities:
 - a. To continue operations against the Italian mainland by action against:

- (1) The *REGGIO - SANGIOVANNI* area (Operation *BUTTRESS*)
- (2) The *CROTONE* area (Operation *GOBLET*)
- (3) The Heel of *ITALY* (Operation *MUSKET*)

These operations would be preparatory to an advance into *ITALY* in the direction of *NAPLES*.

b. To occupy *SARDINIA* and *CORSICA* as a preparatory measure to such further operations as may be decided upon.

2. *OBJECT*

To discuss the relative merits of the two courses of action referred to above.

3. *OPERATIONS BUTTRESS, GOBLET AND MUSKET*

a. The advantages of this course of action are:

(1) Operations on the Italian mainland even though confined to one area might be sufficient to compel *ITALY* to ask for terms.

(2) Operation *BUTTRESS* and possibly *GOBLET* might be undertaken so as to coincide with the final stages of Operation *HUSKY* thus taking direct advantage of the disorganization and confusion which may occur as a result of a rapid success in *HUSKY*.

(3) The fact that operations were carried into the mainland of *EUROPE* would have considerable political value.

(4) Bases would be obtained from which operations in the *BALKANS* could be supported if this strategy is decided upon.

b. The disadvantages are:

(1) The operations themselves will require considerable forces. Should *ITALY* not ask for terms as a result, we may be committed to a major campaign on the Italian mainland possibly involving all the forces available in the *MEDITERRANEAN*.

(2) Should *GERMANY* be in a position strongly to reinforce *ITALY* and should she so decide, we might be involved in a campaign against superior German forces in country in which superiority in numbers would have full weight.

(3) Both during and after the operations a considerable garrison commitment will be involved, since we shall be operating in enemy as opposed to occupied territory.

(4) We shall be responsible for the administration and supply of such areas of the mainland as we occupy. This will constitute a heavy shipping and economic commitment.

(5) Even if it is decided to limit the area of operations to the Toe and Heel of *ITALY*, considerable forces will be required to defend these areas unless *ITALY* has gone out of the war.

c. It is estimated that some 4-5 divisions would be required for Operations *BUTTRESS* and *GOBLET*. For Operation *MUSKET* it is estimated that 4-5 divisions would be required initially. The force in this area would probably have to be built up to a total of approximately 10 divisions (including two Armored divisions) if further operations are to be undertaken on the mainland.

The above requirements would be to some extent counterbalanced by the reduction which it would be possible to make in the garrison of *HUSKY*. It is clear, however, that operations on the mainland are likely to involve all the resources which we can make available.

4. OPERATIONS *BRIMSTONE* AND *FIREBRAND*

a. The advantages of this course of action are:

(1) It will place the whole of *ITALY* within easy bombing range. This fact alone might be sufficient to induce *ITALY* to ask for terms.

(2) A threat of invasion will exist over the entire length of the west coast of *ITALY*. This is likely to cause the Italians

to withdraw troops from the **BALKANS** and will cause the maximum dispersion of Axis troops on the mainland.

(3) It will constitute a threat to southern **FRANCE** and thereby tend to retain German troops in that area.

(4) It renders our sea communications in the western **MEDITER-RANEAN** secure and reduces the air threat to North **AFRICA** thus freeing air and AA resources.

(5) The operational commitment is limited and the subsequent garrison requirement will be small. Operation **FIREBRAND** can be undertaken by French forces.

b. The disadvantages are:

(1) If the occupation of **SARDINIA** and **CORSICA** does not induce **ITALY** to ask for terms, we should still be faced with the necessity for conducting operations on the mainland in order to achieve that end.

(2) We shall not be taking advantage of the disorganization which may be caused on the mainland by the success of **HUSKY**.

(3) We shall not reap the political advantages which will accrue from the opening of a campaign on the mainland of **EUROPE**.

c. It is estimated that Operation **BRIMSTONE** will require about 5 Inf Divs and one Armd Div; the garrison commitment is unlikely to be greater than 2 Inf Divs. On the other hand, it must be remembered that if this course is adopted it may be necessary to retain the maximum garrison in **HUSKY**.

5. SUMMARY

The position may therefore be summarized as follows:

a. Operations **BUTTRESS**, **GOBLET** and **MUSKET** require considerable forces and once we have embarked upon this course we are committed.

Unless Italian morale is already weakening, we may be involved in a major campaign the duration and requirements of which it is not possible to foresee.

b. Operations *BRIMSTONE* and *FIREBRAND* can be carried out with comparatively limited forces and after these operations we shall still retain full liberty of action to strike in whatever direction may seem advisable. If Italian morale is weakening after *HUSKY*, the threat of heavy bombing which these operations will produce may be sufficient to induce *ITALY* to ask for terms.

c. The decision between these two courses of action must depend to a great extent upon the state of Italian morale after *HUSKY*. It will not be easy to assess this accurately and it is therefore considered that the course of action which does not definitely commit us to the mainland is preferable.

6. CONCLUSION

It is concluded that the next operations after *HUSKY* should be *BRIMSTONE* and *FIREBRAND* in preference to *BUTTRESS*, *GOBLET* and *MUSKET*.

LOWELL W. ROOKS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

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ENCLOSURE " B "

MOST SECRET

Headquarters, Mediterranean Air Command.
8 May 1943

Ref: ACMT/S.515.

To : General Dwight D. Eisenhower,
Commanding General,
Allied Force Headquarters.

MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGY

I have just seen a paper prepared by G.3. section for the Chief of Staff. This paper has not been considered by the J.P.S. Previous editions of the paper (P/68) have been considered by the J.P.S. and I have instructed my representative to emphasize certain factors. This final paper does not, in my opinion, give these factors due weight. I cannot, therefore, agree with it or with its conclusions. The main points on which I am in disagreement are the following:

1. Firstly, the difficulties of the capture of Sardinia are completely glossed over. In my opinion, owing to the distance from air bases the capture of Sardinia would be a more difficult problem than Husky.

2. The alleged advantage that " It placed the whole of the Italian mainland within easy bombing range" is true, but misleading. The whole Italian mainland is already within easy bombing range from Tunisia and Sicily. The value of additional bases in Sardinia is more than balanced by the additional maintenance and supply involved.

3. The value of Sardinia is, in my opinion, almost entirely a defensive one, in that it would reduce the commitment for the protection of shipping passing along the North African coast.

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4. I do not agree that the capture of Sardinia would free considerable A.A. resources in North Africa, since North African bases are within reasonable operation range of enemy bases in Italy.

5. As regards Italy itself, the paper does point out that the establishment of air bases in central Italy would bring within range of our heavy bombers the main Axis industrial centers in southern Germany, etc., also the Roumanian oil fields. This is true, but the main advantage of using Italy as a base is omitted. The main value of such an air base is that heavy bomber attacks on the majority of the most vital centers in Germany, and other Axis countries pass through routes which completely evade the great belt of fighter and A.A. defenses which Germany has set up along the whole North and North Western approaches. These defenses are exacting an increasing toll on our bomber offensive. It would be quite impossible from every point of view for the enemy to create a similar organization covering the Southern approach, and bomber offensive directed from the South, especially when coordinated with that of U.K. would have enormously increased material and moral effects.

6. I must emphasize, therefore, that in my opinion the conclusions to paper No. P/69 are unsound insofar as they fail to pay due weight to the air aspect which I am sure you will agree has already proved itself to be one of the vital factors.

A. W. TEDDER,
Air Chief Marshal,
Air Commander in Chief.

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C.C.S. 224

OPERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER
BETWEEN " HUSKY " AND " ROUNDUP "

References:

CCS 84th Meeting, Item (2)

C.C.S. 224 was circulated 14 May 1943 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Final action on this subject was taken in C.C.S. 242/6.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
OPERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER
BETWEEN " HUSKY " AND " ROUNDUP "

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

1. The object of this paper is to indicate the action we recommend in the period which will elapse between the completion of *HUSKY*, which we assume will be about the middle of August, and the invasion of *FRANCE*.

2. In the Mediterranean Theater, Germany will be occupying a long and vulnerable front with poor north and south and even worse lateral communications. In this area large hostile populations are being, with difficulty, held down mainly by Italian troops. On the other hand, we shall be firmly established on the whole North African shore and will have developed a superior combination and structure of sea and air power. We shall have mastered an important stepping-stone to Europe, and we shall have large and experienced forces standing ready for fresh enterprises. We cannot afford to keep those forces out of action for a period of nine or ten months before we can launch an offensive from the United Kingdom into northern France. During this time, the battles on the Russian Front will be raging, and Germany will require all the forces that she can muster against the Russians. The first essential, therefore, will be to make certain that there will be no diminution of the threat to Germany's Southern Front, the vulnerability of which is proved by the tenacity with which she has clung regardless of cost to Tunisia. So long as she is faced by our formidable Mediterranean forces, she cannot be certain where the next blow will fall, and must lock up resources she can ill afford to spare in unsuitable localities for the prosecution of the war.

3. It will not be sufficient to exercise a threat across the Mediterranean. The attack on Italy must be carried out relentlessly to insure

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her elimination from the war. We believe that this, more than any other single event, would hasten the early defeat of Germany. Through the fall of Italy, Germany must be forced to divert large forces from the Russian Front to Yugoslavia, Greece and France, thus relieving the pressure on Russia. The way would thus be paved for the defeat of Germany on the Russian Front, and thus for a successful return to the Continent from the United Kingdom in 1944. We think these events, coupled with a great increase in the air bombardment of Germany possibly from Northern Italy as well as from the United Kingdom, may well bring about her collapse.

4. We have examined very carefully the various operations which we might carry out after *HUSKY* in the Mediterranean, with the object of eliminating Italy. The alternatives are:

a. Operations against the Mainland of Italy

These would take the form of the capture during or immediately after *HUSKY* of a bridgehead on the toe of Italy, to be followed by the seizing of Cotrone and further assault on the heel as a prelude to an advance on Bari and Naples. These operations present many difficulties and their practicability must depend on the situation prevailing in Russia and its repercussions on German assistance to Italy. Success must contribute materially to the disintegration of Italy and provide useful bases for further action against the Balkans.

b. The Capture of Sardinia

Much will depend on the extent to which this island is reinforced after *HUSKY*, particularly by the Germans. If strongly defended, the operation would be comparable to *HUSKY*. On the other hand we should enjoy the benefit of the experience gained in a successful *HUSKY* and be able to apply this to good effect against Sardinia. After Sardinia we should capture Corsica, which should not present undue difficulties.

The capture of the island would assist us to increase the intensity of our air attack against Italy, would threaten the south of France and increase the security of our sea communications in the Mediterranean.

5. Further alternatives, not so directly connected with the elimination of Italy, have also been examined. Of these the most promising are:

a. An Assault on Greece from the West

The capture of the Athens Area and the establishment of a front in Greece would enable us to increase the pressure on Germany, interrupt sea communications to Crete and the islands in the Aegean and would give us air fields from which the Roumanian oil fields could be attacked. In view, however, of the strength of the German garrison, the difficulty of providing fighter cover, and the lack of ports in the Gulf of Corinth this operation does not appear a practicable one at the present time.

b. Operations against the Dodecanese

These operations have been fully examined in the Middle East. In our view, they cannot be carried out simultaneously with amphibious operations in the Central Mediterranean. The use of air fields in Turkey would greatly simplify the air problem. We consider that the right time to carry out these operations is simultaneously with the entry of Turkey into the war. This contingency is considered later in this paper.

6. Our conclusion, after prolonged study of these alternatives, is that we ought to undertake those which not only contribute most directly to the elimination of Italy, but which also relate themselves naturally to operations from the United Kingdom in 1944. Our proposal, therefore, is as follows:

a. That preparations should be made forthwith for the establishment of a bridgehead on the toe of Italy, during or immediately after *HUSKY*.

b. That alternative plans should be made by General Eisenhower for operations against the heel of Italy, and for the capture of Sardinia. A decision on which of these two operations should actually be undertaken should be made when we see how matters stand at the conclusion of *HUSKY*. If as a result of Russian successes and the consequent lack of German reinforcements for Italy and the weakening

or withdrawal of German air forces, Italy is on the point of collapse, then we should enter the heel so as to administer the coup de grace, and prepare for exploitation across the Adriatic. If, on the other hand, Germany diverts large force to Italy - an event which in itself would relieve the pressure on the Russian Front - we could go for Sardinia and Corsica. The seizure of these islands would not only increase the pressure on northern Italy early next year, but would provide stepping-stones from which to threaten and perhaps invade the south of France, and thus ease the cross-Channel operation. At the same time it would add to the security of our communications through the Mediterranean.

7. It is quite possible, of course, that Italy may collapse before any of the operations discussed above have been carried out. The moral and material effects of her crushing defeats in Africa, the fall of *HUSKY*land, and the effects of our air attack on Italy herself, may prove decisive. If this proves to be so, than we shall have reached at an early stage the favorable position in the Mediterranean at which we are aiming, and which, if properly exploited, should insure the earliest possible defeat of Germany. We must act quickly in the confusion before the Germans have time to regroup their forces. This would be the moment to bring pressure to bear on Turkey, either to permit the use of Turkish bases by our forces, or to enter the war on our side. Provided the Russians are doing well, there is no other time when a Turkish entry would be so opportune or so likely.

8. If, therefore, Italy collapses after *HUSKY*, our immediate action should be:

a. To occupy southern Italy, taking over air bases and at least one port in the heel, an air field at Reggio or Cotrone, and the air fields in the Rome-Naples Area.

b. To establish a bridgehead in the Durrazo area, and introduce supplies and long-range penetration groups to rally and support the guerillas.

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c. To seize the Dodecanese, and if possible move into Turkey and attack Ploesti.

d. To occupy Corsica and the key points in Sardinia, and to complete the occupation of Sicily.

e. To land forces in central Italy to prevent German infiltration from the north.

9. The further exploitation of the situation must depend upon the progress of events and the German reaction. More than one possible theater of operations would be available. We do not believe that Germany can hold both northern Italy and the Balkans without risking a collapse on the Russian Front. Even if she decides to abandon Italy, and hold the Balkans, her task will be by no means easy, especially if Turkey comes into the war. We would carry out our plans for going to the support of Turkey in the first place with air and specialized units, and we should be prepared to exploit any weakening of the German position in the Balkans.

10. A further promising line of action would be to direct forces towards southern France from Corsica and northern Italy. Such a movement would fit in well with a simultaneous operation into northern France from the United Kingdom.

11. These projects should, we think, be further examined and we should like to hear the views of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

12. Our final conclusion is that the Mediterranean offers us opportunities for action in the coming autumn and winter, which may be decisive, and at the least will do far more to prepare the way for a successful cross-Channel operation in 1944 than we should achieve by attempting to transfer back to the United Kingdom any of the forces now in the Mediterranean Theater. If we take these opportunities, we shall have every chance of breaking the Axis and of bringing the war with Germany to a successful conclusion in 1944.

S. S. QUEEN MARY.

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C. C. S. 225

OPERATIONS FROM INDIA, 1943-44

References:

CCS 84th Meeting, Item (2)

Paragraph 11

CCS 89th Meeting, Item (2)

C.C.S. 225 was circulated for information 14 May 1943.

C.C.S. 225

14 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONS FROM INDIA, 1943-44

Memorandum by British Chiefs of Staff

1. At the Casablanca Conference the following were agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and approved by the President and the Prime Minister, to cover operations from India into Burma and China during 1943-44 (C.C.S. 170/2, Section V (b)).

(a) Operations aimed at the capture of Akyab before May, 1943 (*CANNIBAL*).

(b) A limited forward advance from Assam before May, 1943, to gain bridgeheads for further operations; to improve the air route to China; and possibly to gain additional air fields.

(c) The improvement of the air transportation services into China with the object of enabling a larger air striking force to be maintained.

(d) A provisional date of 15 November 1943, and a schedule of forces required for launching an assault on Burma (*ANAKIM*). This date to be subject to the availability of the necessary forces and to be reviewed in July, 1943.

2. Since the Casablanca Conference, the following developments have taken place:

(a) The advance on Akyab has not succeeded, and the capture of this place before the monsoon must now be ruled out.

(b) The forward advance from Assam has not been undertaken because of administrative difficulties and the inability of the Chinese to advance from Yunnan during the spring.

(c) Some increase has been made in the air transport available for the China route, but it has been established that the full development of the air route and the full requirements of land operations towards Central Burma cannot both be provided by the engineering and transportation resources available.

(d) The *ANAKIM* plan has been prepared in outline and has been examined by the British Chiefs of Staff with the Commanders in Chief.

3. In the light of all the above developments, and of the competing claims of all theaters of war for the available resources and shipping, we consider it essential that the review of *ANAKIM*, previously arranged for July, should take place now.

4. The British Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the full *ANAKIM* operation should not be attempted in the winter of 1943-44. Their main reasons are:

(a) The re-conquest of Burma involves a large-scale combined operation, followed by extended operations in very difficult country. These operations must be brought to a conclusion in a limited period of time, otherwise the onset of the monsoon will find us in a position of great difficulty. Even when Burma is once more in our hands, the operation is by no means finished. The Japanese have a good reinforcement route from Siam and we should become involved in ever extending operations in that country and in the Malay Peninsula. Operation *ANAKIM* is thus a very heavy commitment which we do not feel we can undertake at a time when the war with Germany is approaching its climax and when we cannot afford to relax the pressure for an instant.

(b) We are very doubtful of the feasibility of the operation if undertaken this year. Burma is a country whose topography is far more

suiting to Japanese tactics and equipment than to our own. The assault on Rangoon involves a difficult combined operation which depends for its success or failure by the Japanese to fortify the river approach. For there to be any reasonable prospect of success, we must have a sufficiency of forces especially trained and equipped, and backed up by ample reserves of men and material. These conditions cannot be fulfilled in the coming winter.

(c) Until long-term plans for the ultimate defeat of Japan have been decided upon, it cannot be assumed that the re-conquest of Burma, however desirable the political effect, especially on China and India is indispensable from the military point of view.

(d) Operation *ANAKIM*, even if successful in 1943-44, would not be likely to reopen the Burma Road until the middle of 1945.

5. We do nevertheless fully recognize that the objects which the Combined Chiefs of Staff had in mind at Casablanca still hold good, namely:

- (a) Increase in the air effort against Japanese sea communications.
- (b) Pressure on the Japanese forces in the Burma-China Theater.
- (c) Help to China.

We should do everything we can to achieve these objects and we must also bear in mind the effect on India of inaction and failure to remove the air threat to Bengal.

6. The following are some suggestions which we would like to discuss with the United States Chiefs of Staff, together with any which they themselves may desire to propose:

- (a) The concentration of available resources on building up and increasing the capacity of the air route to China, and the development of air facilities in Assam with a view to:

(i) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in Burma;

(ii) Maintaining increased American Air Forces in China with the object of striking at Japanese ports and shipping;

(iii) Maintaining the flow of air-borne supplies to China.

(b) Limited land operations in Assam with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, and covering the air route to China. These operations would, however, be limited to a scale which would not prejudice the development of the air facilities by excessive demands on engineer and transportation resources.

(c) The capture of Akyab. This would contribute to the main object of developing an air offensive, as it is possible from this air base to attack Japanese air fields and communications in Central Burma; while an attack on this island would bring on an air battle which would help to stretch the Japanese. Its capture would also provide a base from which we could increase our control of the Bay of Bengal, and from which coastal operations southwards could be covered.

(d) The capture of Ramree Island. The possession of this island is of assistance to the position, gives a good advance base for light naval forces, and, by threatening a landing at Taungup, from which there is a possible route inland to Prome, is likely to contain Japanese Air Forces.

7. The ways and means of providing the resources for these operations require examination, but we think they are likely to be within our power.

8. Whether or not *ANAKIM* should be undertaken at a later date must, we suggest, depend upon whether the reconquest of Burma is found to be essential to the ultimate defeat of Japan. We have already suggested to the United States Chiefs of Staff that steps should be taken forthwith to set up the machinery for evolving the plan for bringing about the defeat of Japan after Germany has sued for peace. Early and effective British participation must depend largely upon long-term preparations

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in India and Ceylon, which will be the bases for British operations. These preparations can only be made effectively in the light of an agreed plan.

Washington, D. C.

13 May 1943

C. C. S. 226

USE OF PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC ISLANDS

Reference:

CCS 85th Meeting, Item (6)
CCS 86th Meeting, Item (4)
CCS 87th Meeting, Item (2)
3rd White House Meeting, Item (2)
4th White House Meeting, Item (1)
5th White House Meeting.

C.C.S. 226 was circulated 15 May 1943 for consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 86th Meeting, considered C.C.S. 226 and agreed:

That the acquisition of the Azores Islands should be accomplished as soon as possible and that an effort should first be made to secure the use of these islands by diplomatic means without making military commitments to the Portuguese Government. They directed that the Secretaries, in consultation with the Chief of the British Air Staff, should prepare for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff a draft letter for submission to the President and the Prime Minister which would include the above recommendations and proposals.

C.C.S. 226/1 (17 May 1943) circulated a draft letter to the President and Prime Minister. In their 87th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered the draft letter, agreed to certain amendments, and circulated the amended version, as prepared for the signature of Sir Alan Brooke and Admiral Leahy, as C.C.S. 226/2, 18 May 1943.

C.C.S. 226

15 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
USE OF PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC ISLANDS

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

The enclosure is a report prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff Committee which is submitted for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

ENCLOSURE

WAR CABINET
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

USE OF PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC ISLANDS

Report by the Chiefs of Staff Committee

1. Experience has shown that so long as we can keep even a single aircraft with a convoy during the greater part of each day, the operation of U-boats is greatly hampered. In order to obtain maximum air protection at the present time it is necessary for our convoys to follow a route which not only suffers from the disadvantages of bad weather and ice, but which inevitably becomes known to the enemy. If we take a southerly route at the present time we have to forego a considerable measure of air protection. If we had both a northerly and southerly route which had equal air protection it would be a great advantage and consequently facilities in the Portuguese Atlantic Islands would be of outstanding value in shortening the war by convincing the enemy he has lost the Battle of the Atlantic.

2. The facilities which we particularly require are as follows:

a. Facilities in the Azores on Terceira and San Miguel Islands for operating V.L.R. and L.R. aircraft;

b. Unrestricted fuelling facilities for naval escorts at either San Miguel or Fayal;

c. Facilities in the Cape Verde Islands for operating G.R. aircraft. These, though desirable, are not comparable in importance to a above.

3. The benefits which would accrue from these facilities may be summarised as follows:-

a. They would give us a much extended air cover for all convoys plying between -

- (1) U.S.A. or West Indies and the Mediterranean;
- (2) West Indies and the U.K.;
- (3) South America and the U.K.;
- (4) U.K. and the Mediterranean;
- (5) U.K. and West Africa, and the Cape and Eastwards.

b. The increased areas under air cover would give us much greater scope for evasive routing, e.g., when U-boats were concentrating in northern waters, North Atlantic convoys could be routed via the Azores instead of always having to follow the Iceland (C) route.

c. Without the Azores we shall always be moving on the outside of the circle while the enemy operates inside it. Air forces there would be centrally placed to cover all varieties of the U-boat campaign against the North Atlantic and Mediterranean theatres.

d. We should be able to increase our carrying capacity owing to the possibility of using more direct routes across the middle of the Atlantic.

e. We could increase our harassing action against U-boats not only when on passage to and from the Biscay bases, but also while resting, refuelling and recharging their batteries in mid-ocean where hitherto they have been practically immune from interference by aircraft. New detection and attacking devices, which are expected to come into service this spring, would enhance the effect of such action.

f. Unrestricted fuelling facilities in the Islands would enable us to make better use of our inadequate numbers of surface escorts.

g. Blockade running between Germany and Japan would be rendered so hazardous as not to be worth the risk.

h. German warships and raiders would have greater difficulty in evading detection after breaking out into the Atlantic.

i. The Islands would prove useful staging points on the air supply routes from U.S.A. to the Mediterranean theatres of operations.

4. We shall clearly have to pay a price and undertake new commitments in order to induce Portugal to give us the facilities in question. The extent of the price and the character of those commitments will depend upon our, and still more important the Portuguese, estimate of the way in which the Axis is likely to react to the transaction. Although we cannot be certain of it, strong reasons can be advanced for thinking that Germany will not, in fact, attack the Iberian Peninsula.

It would, however, be clearly wrong to discount such an attack altogether, and we have, therefore, examined its possibilities. If we assume the worst case, i.e., that the Axis powers would at once make war upon Portugal and attack her metropolitan overseas territory by all the means at their disposal, the commitments which Portugal would require us to undertake in the face of this possibility would probably include:-

a. The defence of Portugal against land and air attack;

b. The protection of Portuguese shipping; and

c. Assistance in the local defence of Portuguese ports.

5. Of the above, only *a* calls for detailed consideration. The Portuguese Army is practically negligible and could not, of itself, offer any appreciable resistance. We have made a Staff study of the maximum scale of attack which could be built up against Portugal, with Spain's acquiescence (which is doubtful), without regard to the possible

availability of enemy forces. This works out at 2 divisions ten days after crossing the Spanish frontier, rising to 8 divisions after seven weeks. It is certain that the Germans could concentrate forces overland in Portugal more quickly than we could by sea. To fulfil a guarantee to go to the assistance of Portugal against such a scale of attack we should have to earmark and prepare now between 9 and 11 divisions and some 20 squadrons of aircraft, and hold these forces in readiness together with their shipping. This course could only be followed at the expense of *HUSKY* and other future operations in the Mediterranean. Even if this could be done, there would be no certainty that we could protect more than a portion of Portuguese territory.

In the event of the Germans moving into the Iberian Peninsula, our interests would be to cover the Straits of Gibraltar, not to protect Portugal, and this again would be an undertaking we could not hope to fulfil except at the expense of other Mediterranean operations.

If we take the risk of provoking a German invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, even if we consider such an invasion unlikely, we must do so with our eyes open to what the consequences may be. In fact, we may well find that we shall be left without a footing in the Peninsula, except at Gibraltar itself.

6. A base in the Azores would be of particular value during the winter, when the weather in the north frequently interferes with flying. From this aspect therefore, it is desirable to make our approach to the Portuguese sufficiently early to allow the base to be in full working order by the autumn. A particularly favourable moment to open negotiations is now when victory in Tunis is in sight. The Portuguese are less likely to make high demands for protection and the Spaniards are more likely to resist German pressure.

7. Having regard to the fact that we consider Germany is unlikely to invade the Iberian Peninsula, and the tremendous benefits we would gain from the use of the Islands, which are set out in paragraph 3, we feel the risk is acceptable. We therefore recommend that the War Cabinet

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should authorise an approach to the Portuguese Government now, but no guarantee should be given, and every endeavour should be made to persuade the Portuguese that no threat exists.

/s/ A. F. BROOKE,
DUDLEY POUND,
C. PORTAL.

S. S. *QUEEN MARY*,
7 May 1943

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C.C.S. 226/2

18 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
USE OF PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC ISLANDS

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure is a memorandum for the President and the Prime Minister which has been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

18 May 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER:

Subject: Use of Portuguese Atlantic Islands

The Combined Chiefs of Staff are agreed as to the tremendous benefits which the United Nations would gain from the earliest possible use of the Azores Islands. They recommend that the Portuguese Government should be approached at once on this subject, but that no guarantee should be given and that every endeavor should be made to persuade the Portuguese that no threat exists. They consider that Germany is unlikely to invade the Iberian Peninsula if the Azores Islands are so used, and that the risk is acceptable.

In submitting this recommendation the Combined Chiefs of Staff propose that while the diplomatic approach is being made forces should be prepared for the prompt seizure and use of the Azores if diplomacy

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fails. Plans are therefore being prepared and will be submitted, showing the earliest date for their execution and how, if at all, they will affect operations now in view.

A. F. BROOKE,
General,
Chief of the Imperial
General Staff.

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

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C.C.S. 227

RELIEF AND SUPPLIES FOR OCCUPIED AND LIBERATED TERRITORIES

C.C.S. 227 was circulated 16 May 1943 for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

C.C.S. 227

16 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

RELIEF AND SUPPLIES FOR OCCUPIED AND LIBERATED TERRITORIES

Reference: C.C.S. 85th Mtg., Item 4 b

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

ITALY

1. It is assumed that the Armistice terms would include a clause saying that, provided Italy supplies the necessary shipping, food, fuel and other commodities will be provided from United Nations stocks so far as military necessities allow. Until the Italian ships were in operation we would undertake to deliver the bare necessities of life.

2. To maintain the population at a minimum nutritional level (i.e. on about the present scale of rations) the only food imports required would be about 2,000 tons of edible oils and fats per month until December, when this amount would be doubled until March 1944. Italy is self-supporting in other foodstuffs, except for 75,000/100,000 tons of wheat per month for April, May and June. By April 1944 there should be sufficient Italian shipping to lift this wheat, so our commitments for food would be covered by one ship per month.

3. Though coal is available in Sardinia and on the mainland, Italy has insufficient fuel even to provide for those industries needed for the production and distribution of the essentials of life. The minimum requirements are 200,000 tons of coal and 45,000 tons of oil per month. The oil could be provided from the Eastern Mediterranean by some 8 tankers, or less when Albanian supplies of 15,000 t.p.m. are restored, but the coal commitment would be far more difficult to meet. The coal output position is such that the requirement could not be met from United Nations sources, even if the necessary 80 or 100 ships were available to carry it. Some coal could be found at the expense of Mediterranean or other stocks, but the supply of more than 10,000 or 20,000

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tons for each of the first few months would be extremely difficult. Therefore, owing to the shortage of coal, not more than 10 ships would be required for the coal trade.

4. Distribution of goods between the islands and the mainland would continue as at present in Italian coasters and schooners, except for the Dodecanese, which would have to be included in our supply programme for the Aegean area for some months. The total Italian shipping commitment is, therefore, 10-12 store ships and about 8 tankers.

GREECE

5. The minimum monthly requirements for Greece are 30,000 tons of food (mainly wheat); 12,500 tons of coal and 7,000 tons of oil. The fuel is an essential for the distribution of the food. It is presumed that these minimum supplies for Greece would be a first charge on our shipping in the Eastern Mediterranean after our own military commitments were met. The necessary shipping, one tanker and about eight store ships, could be supplied without any great readjustment to the existing allocation of tonnage.

ALBANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA

6. The areas in which we will operate will not be open for normal trading and distribution, at least for the first few months. Supplies to these countries will, therefore, have to be included in our military requirements. They will, in any case, not amount to more than one store ship a month for Albania and two or three per month for Yugoslavia.

C.C.S. 229

POTENTIALITIES OF AIR ROUTE
FROM ASSAM TO CHINA

References:

CCS 84th Meeting, Item (3)
2nd White House Meeting
CCS 85th Meeting, Item (3) (5)
CCS 86th Meeting, Item (2)
CCS 90th Meeting, Item (5)
CCS 91st Meeting
CCS 92nd Meeting, Item (1)
CCS 95th Meeting, Item (5)

C.C.S. 229 was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff 19 May 1943.

This paper was considered together with C.C.S. 231 (Operations in Burma to Open and Secure an Overland Route to China) and the comments of the Combined Staff Planners on C.C.S. 229 and C.C.S. 231 (C.C.S. 238 - Operations in Burma 1943-1944).

Action on these subjects was taken in the Minutes of the 91st Meeting which also directed that C.C.S. 229, C.C.S. 231, and C.C.S. 238 be withdrawn from the agenda; therefore these papers are not published in this volume. The final action on the subject contained in C.C.S. 229 was included in C.C.S. 242/6.

C.C.S. 231

OPERATIONS IN BURMA TO OPEN AND SECURE AN
OVERLAND ROUTE TO CHINA

References:

CCS 84th Meeting, Item (3)
2nd White House Meeting
CCS 85th Meeting, Item (3)
CCS 86th Meeting, Item (3)
CCS 90th Meeting, Item (4)
CCS 91st Meeting
CCS 92nd Meeting, Item (1)

C.C.S. 231 was circulated 19 May 1943 for consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered this paper together with C.C.S. 229 (Potentialities of Air Route from Assam to China) and the Combined Staff Planners comments on C.C.S. 229 and C.C.S. 231, circulated as C.C.S. 238 (Operations in Burma 1943-1944).

Action on these subjects was taken in the Minutes of the 91st Meeting which also directed that C.C.S. 229, C.C.S. 231, and C.C.S. 238 be withdrawn from the agenda; therefore these papers are not published in this volume. The final action on the subject contained in C.C.S. 231 was included in C.C.S. 242/6.

C.C.S. 232/1

AGREED ESSENTIALS IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

References:

- CCS 85th Meeting, Item (2)
- CCS 86th Meeting, Item (5)
- CCS 87th Meeting; Items (1) (3)
- CCS 88th Meeting, Item (2)

C.C.S. 232 was circulated 16 May 1943 for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 86th Meeting agreed to certain amendments to C.C.S. 232, (corrections noted in CCS 87th Meeting) and directed that the Secretaries publish an amended version of C.C.S. 232 which will show the items of agreement and disagreement (subsequently published as C.C.S. 232/1).

Final decisions re C.C.S. 232/1 are included in the resolutions contained in C.C.S. 242/6.

C.C.S. 232/1

18 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

AGREED ESSENTIALS IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

Reference: a. C.C.S. 85th Meeting, Item 2 a (1)

Note by the Secretaries

Of the following items, all except those in the split columns have been agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Those in the split columns have not so far been agreed upon but are subject to further consideration.

. . .

1. OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The overall objective of the UNITED NATIONS is:

In conjunction with *RUSSIA* and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the *AXIS POWERS*.

2. OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

a. In cooperation with *RUSSIA* and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the *AXIS* in *EUROPE*.

Proposed by C.P.S.

b. Simultaneously, in co-operation with other *PACIFIC POWERS* concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against *JAPAN* with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced.

Amendment proposed by
British Chiefs of Staff

Alter to read:

"To maintain, and so far as is consistent with a above, to extend..."

c. Upon the defeat of the *AXIS* in Europe, in cooperation with other *PACIFIC POWERS* and, if possible, with *RUSSIA* to direct the full resources of the *UNITED STATES* and *GREAT BRITAIN* to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of *JAPAN*.

3. ESTABLISHED UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF THE OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

a. Maintain the security and warmaking capacity of the *WESTERN HEMISPHERE* and *BRITISH ISLES*.

Proposed by C.P.S.

Amendment proposed by
British Chiefs of Staff

b. Support and maintain the warmaking capacity of our forces in all areas to which committed.

Omit.

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

Proposed by C.P.S.

Amendment proposed by
British Chiefs of Staff

d. Intensify the air offensive from the United Kingdom and concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.

Re-letter as c and amend to read:

"Intensify the air offensive against the *AXIS POWERS* in Europe. "

Add new paragraph:

"d. Take all necessary and practicable measures to draw land and air forces from the Russian front. "

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e. Sustain the Soviet Forces by the greatest volume of munitions that can be supplied and transported to *RUSSIA* without militating against the attainment of the overall objectives.

Proposed by C.P.S.

f. Undertake such measures as may be necessary to provide *CHINA* with a volume of supplies sufficient to keep *CHINA* actively in the war against *JAPAN*.

Amendment proposed by
British Chiefs of Staff

Amend to read:

"f. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to keep *CHINA* actively in the war against *JAPAN*."

H. REDMAN,

J. R. DEANE,

Combined Secretariat.

C.C.S. 233/1

AGENDA FOR THE REMAINING CONFERENCES

References:

CCS 85th Meeting, Item (2)

CCS 86th Meeting, Item (6)

Pursuant to a directive in the C.C.S. 85th Meeting that the Combined Staff Planners prepare a draft agenda for the remaining conferences in the light of the discussion which had taken place, C.C.S. 233 was circulated 16 May 1943 for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 86th Meeting considered and approved C.C.S. 233 subject to certain amendments.

Revised agenda subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 233/1 17 May 1943:

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C.C.S. 233/1

17 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

(TRIDENT)

AGENDA FOR THE REMAINING CONFERENCES

Reference: a. C.C.S. 85th Meeting, Item 2 a (2)

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosed agenda was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 86th Meeting on Monday, 17 May 1943.

H. REDMAN,

J. R. DEANE,

Combined Secretariat.

TRIDENT CONFERENCE

TENTATIVE PROGRAM OF WORK

PROPOSALS BY THE COMBINED STAFF PLANNERS

1. We submit the following tentative program of work. It is based on the assumption that the Combined Chiefs of Staff will have a full discussion on the "statement of agreed essentials" on Monday, 17 May. Thereafter, the program should be broadly as set out below.

TUESDAY 1. *THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY*

18th

- a. A United States paper on the bomber offensive against Germany.
- b. Plan for the defeat of Germany by concentrating on the biggest possible invasion force in the United Kingdom as soon as possible.

AND

Paper under preparation by U.S. Planners in consultation with the British.

- c. Plan for the defeat of Germany accepting the elimination of Italy as a necessary preliminary.

Paper under preparation by the British Planners in consultation with the U.S.

WEDNESDAY d. The possibility of an air offensive against Ploesti.

19th

Paper under preparation by the Combined Staff Planners.

THURSDAY 2. *THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN*

20th

- a. A paper showing proposals for operations in the Pacific is under preparation by the United States Staffs.

- b. The potentialities of the air route from Assam to China.

Paper under preparation by the Combined Staff Planners.

- c. Study of the most promising operation for opening a land route to China.

Paper under preparation by the Combined Staff Planners.

FRIDAY
21st

3. *THE U-BOAT CAMPAIGN* (Discussion)
4. *REARMING OF FRENCH FORCES IN NORTH AFRICA*
5. *TURKISH SITUATION* (General Discussion)
6. *MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS ARISING DURING THE WEEK*

SATURDAY
22nd

7. *RELATION OF RESOURCES TO AGREED STRATEGY WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO SHIPPING AND LANDING CRAFT*

Although these problems will be considered in the discussion on all the various plans for the defeat of Germany and the defeat of Japan, it will not be possible to collate a paper on the subject until all these various plans have been discussed. Once Items 2 and 3 have been cleared out of the way, the Combined Staff Planners will have to prepare a paper on this subject relating resources to agreed strategy.

SUNDAY
23rd

8. *GLOBAL STRATEGY: FINAL CONSIDERATION*

MONDAY
24th

9. *FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER*

This report is visualized as including agreed statements on global strategy, and on existing and projected undertakings arranged if possible in order of priority.

C.C.S. 234

DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE
(Elimination of Italy First)

References:

CCS 85th Meeting, Item (4)
CCS 87th Meeting, Item (5)
CCS 88th Meeting, Item (3)
5th White House Meeting

Pursuant to a directive in the C.C.S. 85th Meeting, the subject paper prepared by the British Planners in consultation with the U. S. Planners was circulated 17 May 1943.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered C.C.S. 234 together with a U. S. paper, prepared in consultation with the British Planners, (C.C.S. 235) in their 88th Meeting and agreed upon certain resolutions which were circulated as C.C.S. 237 (Revised in C.C.S. 237/1) and which were also included in C.C.S. 242/6.

C.C.S. 234

17 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE
(Elimination of Italy First)
(Previous Reference: C.C.S. 85th Mtg.,
Item 4 a (2))

Note by the Secretaries

The attached memorandum by the British Joint Planning Staff, prepared after consultation with the U. S. Joint Planners, contains a plan for the defeat of Germany, showing the course of operations and their feasibility accepting the elimination of Italy as a necessary preliminary.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

BRITISH PLAN FOR
THE DEFEAT OF AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE

OBJECT

The decisive defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe as early as practicable.

SECTION I - INVASION OF N.W. EUROPE

1. A necessary prerequisite to a re-entry on the Continent across the Channel is the initial softening of German war potential by the intensified combined bomber offensive, the naval blockade and the Russian offensive on the Eastern Front. Since this re-entry will ultimately be necessary, no plan for the defeat of Germany can be drawn up without first examining the essential features of the operation.

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2. The essentials for invasion are as follows:-

a. A high degree of air superiority must be achieved during the assault and build-up.

b. Air fields must be captured at an early date.

c. The Coast defences must be sufficiently reduced by the employment of all available means, both before and during the assault.

d. The initial assault must be on a sufficiently large scale and our rate of build-up must compete with that of the enemy.

e. The beach capacity must be sufficient to allow of the subsequent maintenance of the force landed in the first seven days. Sufficient ports must be captured and available for use early.

f. Weather conditions must be suitable.

3. There are two main factors in this problem. These are:-

a. The size of force which can be employed in the assault, which in general is limited by the assault shipping and landing craft available.

b. The relative rate of build-up of our own force, compared to that of the enemy, which can be achieved after the initial assault.

ASSAULT SHIPPING AND LANDING CRAFT REQUIREMENTS

4. Any assault is likely to meet not less than three divisions in the coastal zone reinforced by up to four divisions after 24 hours. The scale of assault cannot therefore be less than 10 divisions.

The assault shipping and landing craft required for an operation involving a force of this nature, run into large figures owing to the necessity for seven of these divisions being afloat simultaneously.

The scale of craft has been worked out in great detail by the British Planners in conjunction with the *ROUNDUP* Combined Planners. The number of craft required to cross the Channel is higher than in other parts of the world on account of the need for a quicker rate of build-up and of the higher degree of resistance expected.

5. Of the total force of 10 Divisions, the British can provide 2 assault and 3 *immediate* follow-up divisions provided that the Americans allot the following assault shipping and craft:-

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L.S.T.2	122)	
L.S.E.	6)	All required in
L.C.I.(I)	140)	
L.C.T.5 or 6	125)	U.K. by 1st
L.C.M.3	280)	
Certain maintenance)		February, 1944.
equipment)		

The above figures are based on the assumption that operations after *HUSKY* will take place in the Mediterranean, resulting in additional casualties to landing craft and ships.

6. The American contribution in the assault will amount to two assault divisions and three follow-up divisions. The two assault divisions which must be assault trained before arrival in U.K. must be carried in American assault shipping and American manned craft. The three follow-up divisions will be carried in the first turn-round of the ships and craft employed in the British and American assaults.

7. We understand that it is very doubtful if the total requirements could be found by 1 February 1944 - to permit an assault date of 1 April 1944. This would mean either a reduction in the scale of the assault or a rate of build-up too slow to be acceptable.

RATE OF BUILD-UP FOR INVASION

8. The most favourable area for build-up is that of the North Seine ports - Dieppe to Rouen, in which we estimate that there would be by D plus 7 ten Divisions ashore. Allowing for the build-up of reserves and for ports being put into working order, we estimate that by D plus 90 - twenty Divisions would be ashore, and by D plus 125 - twenty-five Divisions would be ashore. Thereafter additional ports would have to be used for the maintenance of a force of more than twenty-five Divisions.

9. The maximum maintenance capacity of the ports in the Cotentin peninsula is ten Divisions by D plus 90. Any build-up in this area can only be accomplished if additional ports outside the peninsula are captured.

ENEMY STRENGTH

10. The *estimated* German strength in France and the Low Countries in 1944 is 35 Divisions, of which at least four would be available as a mobile reserve. In addition there are some 100,000 static internal security defence troops. Reinforcing divisions would have to come from Germany or the Eastern Front. Up to ten under-strength divisions might conceivably be available in Germany, but would almost certainly not be available if Turkey were already in the war. Advance units of these might arrive four days after the decision to reinforce and might arrive thereafter in France (but not necessarily in the threatened area) at the rate of six divisions a week. The arrival of reinforcements from Russia must depend on the situation on that front. None could in any case arrive in less than 14 days, after which any available could come at the rate of 2 divisions a week. The defection of Italy would, however, have already reduced the German strength in Russia. Assuming, therefore, that the initial assault is faced by four divisions, our forces would, in the worst case, be faced by eighteen German divisions within the first fortnight, after which mobile reinforcements could only come at the expense of the Russian Front.

11. These rates of reinforcement might be considerably reduced by successful Allied air action, but the extent of this reduction would depend on a number of factors and cannot be assessed until the outline plan is firm.

12. Over and above the fixed defences the *minimum* Axis garrison which might be in France and the Low Countries, short of a complete withdrawal, is estimated at twenty-two divisions of which three would be in mobile reserve.

13. It is clear that unless Russian action or Allied action elsewhere reduces the enemy potential in France from the figures in paragraph 10 to something approaching those given in paragraph 12, we are unlikely to be able to retain a foothold in France until our rate of build-up gives us superiority over the enemy.

14. Another most important factor, though it cannot be defined as one that is limiting, is the achievement of a high degree of air

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superiority during the assault and build-up. The Combined Intelligence Staffs have agreed:-

a. If the exploitation of *HUSKY* is abandoned, the opposition to cross-Channel operations at 1 May 1944 will be 105 squadrons or 950 combat planes in France and the Low Countries. These might be reinforced immediately by some 10 squadrons, say 100 planes. Within a week 50 additional squadrons, 450 planes, would be concentrated in the area, giving a total, without losses, of 165 squadrons or 1,485 planes. Further reinforcements would depend on Germany's will to strip the Russian Front.

b. If Italy is out of the war the early opposition to cross-Channel operations will also be 105 squadrons or 950 combat planes. *But the enemy's ability to reinforce this force, will be negligible unless he is prepared to strip the Russian Front.*

DEDUCTIONS

15. To ignore the limitations of a cross-Channel operation outlined above would be to invite the danger of entering on a build-up race in which we could probably never obtain the necessary margin of superiority for success. If, however, the German strength in France can be reduced to the required extent - and we feel confident that it can - without too serious an effect on the availability of our forces in the U.K., successful invasion should be possible with the forces outlined above in the spring or summer of 1944.

16. The Mediterranean commitment which would result from a collapse of Italy would cause a reduction from some 1,480 to 950 aircraft in the potential ability of Germany to resist our cross-Channel operations. Only some unknown and incalculable weakness on the part of Russia could ease this situation for Germany.

METHOD OF DEFEATING GERMANY

17. After *HUSKY* we must intensify, with every means at our disposal, the process of weakening Germany sufficiently to ensure a successful invasion across the Channel in 1944. To the effect of the intensified bomber offensive, the naval blockade and the Russian war, we must therefore add continued pressure by our combined forces further

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to stretch the enemy without respite, and if possible win new bases from which to hit him.

POTENTIALITIES OF THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE

18. We have in the Mediterranean powerful and seasoned forces, whose attack is now gaining its full impetus, destroying the enemy and forcing him to give ground. This momentum must be sustained till we have reaped the great advantages in weakening Germany which it promises. Not to do so would be to cast away an unrivalled opportunity of inflicting on Germany a mortal injury and, instead, to give her a chance to parry the final blow and delay her defeat for at least another year.

19. This final blow can only be struck across the Channel; it cannot be delivered from the Mediterranean - but the peculiar nature of the cross-Channel operation sets limits to the weight of this blow.

We therefore strongly hold the belief that to make this blow possible every opportunity must be taken between now and its delivery to exhaust and weaken Germany.

DECEPTION

20. Moreover, apart from weakening the Germans, it is an essential part of this preparation to deceive them as to our intentions. To discontinue operations in the Mediterranean and concentrate our forces in the United Kingdom in a series of moves which could not be concealed, would be to invite them to take appropriate measures to meet what would become an obvious threat.

IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF AN ITALIAN COLLAPSE

21. After a successful *HUSKY* the greatest aid we could give to Russia, and thereby inflict greatest injury which could be done to Germany, would be to tear Italy from the Axis.

22. Seven Italian divisions in France and Corsica, and 32 in the Balkans and the Aegean would lay down their arms and Germany would have to find at least fifteen divisions to replace them or so weaken her hold on the Balkans that she would be in danger of losing control in this vital area - a prospect which she could not tolerate. The loss of some 1,400 Italian aircraft, and the approach of the war towards the

southern boundaries of the Reich would cost the extended Luftwaffe at least 450 fighters, half of which would have to be found by improvisation. The enemy's total air commitments would reduce his ability to reinforce the Western Front to negligible proportions unless he were prepared to strip the Russian Front. The Italian fleet, though admittedly no great menace, contains valuable British heavy units which would be immediately released to engage the Japanese.

23. Apart, therefore, from the moral and political effects of the collapse of Italy, this calamity would immediately prove for Germany a military disaster of the first magnitude.

SUBSEQUENT EFFECTS

24. In the West, the occupation of key points in Sardinia and the restoration of Corsica to France would create a threat to southern France which the Germans could not ignore. The Germans would either have to occupy and fight for northern Italy, which they might well be unable to do, or yield air bases which could place 500 bombers within range of a large number of important German targets - notably aircraft factories and oil plants - which cannot be attacked from England, North Africa or Sicily. The *safe areas* to which the population of western Germany are being evacuated would come under constant threat of air attack, with serious effect on morale. The German air defences would be split and the effectiveness of the air offensive greatly increased. Moreover, the threat of invasion to southern France would be increased, together with the potentialities of diversionary action to coincide with our invasion across the Channel.

25. In Russia the German forces on land and in the air would have to be reduced below the strength that was already inadequate during the winters of 1941/42 and 1942/43.

26. In the East, the Germans would have great difficulty in controlling the Balkans. Sustained at comparatively little cost to the Allies, and supported by air action, up to 300,000 guerillas could harass the enemy's vulnerable communications, denying him important economic resources in Yugoslavia and Greece, facing him with seriously

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increasing recalcitrance and throttling his garrisons in Greece to such an extent that it is difficult to see how they could be maintained.

27. Added to this, Ploesti itself would, for the first time, be brought within range of effective air attack, from Italy; great - possibly vital - damage could be done, and the German air defence commitments would once more be increased. The Roumanians are, moreover, unlikely to show much firmness under air bombardment and only a small proportion of the 38,000 operatives are thought to be Germans.

28. In the Aegean, the Dodecanese would be weakened and might well be taken, and the way opened for Turkey to enter the lists. This event would be a further heavy blow. Its political effect would be immense, Ploesti would be threatened, together with the eastern Balkan and Black Sea communications, and Germany would be faced with a land front in Thrace which she could only attack if she were to find 7 to 8 more divisions and allot proportionate air squadrons from her already attenuated air forces. We are committed to support Turkey if she is attacked with 48 squadrons and two armoured divisions. These forces must, therefore, be held ready in the Mediterranean against this possibility.

DEDUCTION

29. Collectively, all these strategic prizes might even be decisive. This policy, together with the effects of the Eastern Front and the weighty air offensive, is bound to produce powerful results. The results in our opinion will create a situation which will make the difference between success or failure of a re-entry into northwest Europe in 1944.

SECTION II - SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

THE COLLAPSE OF ITALY

30. The Tunisian disaster has been a severe shock to the Italians. While *HUSKY* is being mounted, southern Italy will be bombed, and virtually blockaded at sea. Success in *HUSKY* will be a further blow to Italian morale. Whether Italy will collapse at once will depend to a

great extent on the degree of support which she receives from Germany and on events on the Eastern Front.

31. If *HUSKY* does not bring about a collapse, Italy can be subjected to a heavy scale of air attack. From August onwards, the bomber force from the United Kingdom could develop a scale of attack on the industrial areas concentrated in the North which would create conditions in which the supply and maintenance of the Italian armed forces would become precarious. Concurrently an even heavier attack could be directed from North Africa and Sicily against the South. The combined effects of these attacks might well bring about the collapse of Italy.

32. It is, however, so important to knock Italy out quickly that we cannot rely on air attack alone. We, therefore, consider that limited combined operations should be developed to support the air offensive, maintain the momentum of the onslaught and tip the scales in our favor, as this can be done at reasonable cost and with the resources present on the spot.

33. In the Central Mediterranean, we have the choice of two lines of advance, one northeastwards into the Toe and Heel of Italy to threaten, if necessary, the Rome-Naples area, the other northwestwards to Sardinia and Corsica. An Aegean advance by the Dodecanese would not have an immediate or speedy effect on the collapse of Italy. Operations against the Mainland are more continuous than an attack on Sardinia and are more likely to collapse Italy this autumn. The capture of Sardinia would cost the equivalent of seven divisions. The capture of the Heel of Italy would involve a total of nine divisions. In either case we should employ the bulk of our resources in present Allied air forces in the Mediterranean. The selection of the course to be pursued must await *HUSKY* and will turn on such factors as the general air and land situation at the time; German reinforcement; if any, of the objectives; and the morale of the Army and people of Italy.

34. We feel that either of these operations following rapidly upon a successful *HUSKY* and in conditions of rising air bombardment would tip the scale in our favor.

SITUATION AFTER AN ITALIAN COLLAPSE

35. The general war weariness and dissatisfaction of all sections of the Italian people will dispose them towards dealing with the Allies. Owing to the heavy commitment imposed by an Italian default, Germany will be forced to cut her unessential commitments and dispose her available forces so as to hold the areas which she considers essential to her security. These are, we consider: -

a. The Maritime Alps between France and Italy which she will hold with some two or three divisions.

b. The area east of the River Adige towards the Yugoslav frontier held with some two or three divisions.

36. The fear of air attack on south Germany from airdromes in the Milan and Turin areas, might force the enemy to fight a delaying action on the line Ravenna-Pisa. In this case five low category divisions would be required for internal security in north Italy, twelve divisions for a determined stand on the line Ravenna-Pisa or four divisions for a token stand to delay our progress northward. The provision of these forces would leave the Balkans disastrously weak.

OPERATIONS AFTER AN ITALIAN COLLAPSE

37. After an Italian collapse we must take full advantage of the situation, to give the maximum further aid to Russia and to facilitate cross-Channel operations in 1944.

38. During the period of confusion we should secure a bridgehead at Durazzo. This would cost four assault brigades and two infantry divisions with one mixed division in reserve in Italy, and might be accomplished with little opposition. We should thus put in a total force of three divisions. This force would activate the guerillas, and we could support it with up to 500 bombers and 300 transport aircraft from the mainland.

39. On an Italian collapse, we should forestall the Germans in the Dodecanese and bring pressure on Turkey to enter the war, and so make available to us the benefits we have already noted, and in particular the use of air bases from which to bomb Ploesti.

40. Should the Germans decide to remain on the Ravenna-Pisa line, three divisions would be required in the Rome-Naples area to stop German infiltration to the southward. An enemy withdrawal from the Milan-Turin area would leave the air fields open to occupation by us, if we wished to do so. A force of six divisions would be required to secure the air fields against an estimated scale of German attack of 4 - 6 divisions, but only minor forces would then be required in the Rome-Naples area.

GARRISON COMMITMENTS

41. We should occupy the Cagliari and Alghero areas of Sardinia and Corsica and occupy, or remain in occupation of, the Trapani, Messina and possibly the Catania areas of Sicily. This commitment would amount to about 15 battalions and 3 brigades.

SUMMARY OF COMMITMENTS

42. Our proposals for meeting these commitments and our commitments in North Africa are detailed in Appendix "A". After they have been met, we estimate that we shall have available in reserve, or for further operations such as an attack on the south of France:-

5 American Divisions
4 - 7 British Divisions
1 French Division

In any event our total commitment on the Italian mainland in the event of a collapse will not exceed 9 divisions.

43. The economic commitment which may have to be shouldered is described in C.C.S. 227. This problem will have to be faced in the event of an Italian collapse, whether or not we carry out any further operations in the Mediterranean after *HUSKY*.

**SECTION III - EFFECT OF MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGY
ON THE BUILD-UP OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN FORCES
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM**

ASSAULT SHIPS AND CRAFT

44. Allowing for casualties at the agreed rate, any of the above courses of action can be carried out with the assault shipping and

landing craft (British and American combined) allocated to the Mediterranean Theatre for *HUSKY*, together with one or two minor reinforcements of certain specialized British types.

45. Operations in the Mediterranean subsequent to *HUSKY* would only reduce the amount of assault shipping and landing craft for cross-Channel operations in 1944, by the equivalent of 10% of the total personnel and 6% of the total number of vehicles to be landed. The reduction in personnel lift is not serious as the numbers could be ferried from ship to shore.

Thus, in terms of assault shipping and craft, it is evident that the continuance of Mediterranean operations after *HUSKY* has comparatively little effect on cross-Channel operations in 1944.

BOLERO BUILD-UP

46. After allowing for a *SICKLE* movement of 380,000 men as well as for the necessary R.N., R.A.F. and Canadian troop movements by 1st April, 1944, the number of U.S. divisions which will be in the U.K. by this date will be:

- a. Assuming no further Mediterranean operation after
HUSKY - 20
- b. Assuming a continuance of Mediterranean operation
after *HUSKY* - 14-1/2

Of the above divisions under *a*, two will be in process of disembarkation and two will be linking up with their equipment; but under *b*, owing to the slower rate of movement to the United Kingdom, only one will be in process of disembarkation and one linking up with its equipment. The total number of U.S. divisions which will, therefore, be available for operations from the U.K. on 1st April 1944, under the two above hypotheses will be:

- a. 16 divisions
- b. 12-1/2 divisions

47. In this connection, the two examinations of the cargo shipping position just completed by the British and United States Committees on Shipping Availability reveal an apparent deficiency against total requirements, other than post-*HUSKY*, of 336 sailings for the rest of the year.

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Losses have so far been less than the agreed rate taken as the basis of the calculations. In view of this and the economies that could be effected by the Combined Loading of British imports and U.S. Army supplies in the North Atlantic, this deficiency may be largely eliminated and all calculations in the above paragraph are based on the realization of this hope. It may even happen that the reduction in the programmed *BOLERO* movement shown above due to the additional requirement of some 90 ships for post-*HUSKY* operations, may not be fully necessary.

BRITISH FORCES AVAILABLE IN THE U.K

48. The British forces available in the U.K. for cross-Channel operations by 1st April 1944 amount to 10-14 divisions dependent on whether cannibalization proves necessary or not.

RETURN OF LAND FORCES FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN

49. The size of the cross-Channel assault, as we have already shown, is limited by the number of landing craft that will be available. It would be possible to bring two additional British divisions ex North Africa to U.K. in the first quarter of 1944 without materially affecting the *BOLERO* program as planned for that quarter.

50. It will be seen from Appendix "A" that after the elimination of Italy there will be some ten divisions (British and American) in the Mediterranean available for other employment. Even if we halted in the Mediterranean after *HUSKY*, there will be no object in bringing these forces back to U.K. except that they are battle experienced troops, since the availability of landing craft and maintenance limitations will preclude their use in *ROUNDUP*.

DEDUCTION

51 Thus, if we continue operations in the Mediterranean after *HUSKY*, there can be available in the United Kingdom by 1st April 1944 for cross-Channel operations some 22 1/2 - 26 1/2 divisions, United States and British. These figures could be increased by a further two divisions if it is decided to bring two British divisions back from North Africa (see paragraph 49 above). Even if no post-*HUSKY* operations are carried out, the total number of divisions available in the United Kingdom would only be increased by 3 1/2.

AIR FORCES

52. There are sufficient air forces in the Mediterranean to implement the strategy recommended. Allowing for the bombing of Italy and necessary air striking forces, defensive fighter commitments and air forces for Turkey, we could possibly return to United Kingdom, if offensive amphibious operations in the Mediterranean stopped after *HUSKY*, up to the following strength of air forces:

<u>Type</u>	<u>U.S.</u>		<u>British</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Sqns.</u>	<u>A/c</u>	<u>Sqns.</u>	<u>A/c</u>	<u>Sqns.</u>	<u>A/c</u>
Fighter	16	400	9	144	25	544
Fighter/Recce	2	36	2	32	4	68
Light Bomber	12	156	5	80	17	236
P.R.U.	1	13	2	24	3	37
Transport	20	250	-	--	20	258

53. It is at present impossible to say to what extent this would actually increase the air forces available in U.K. in April, 1944, since only a proportion of these units could actually be reconstituted in the line. Additional strength would, however, be given to existing formations by additional reserves of aircraft and personnel.

54. If amphibious operations were continued in the Mediterranean after *HUSKY*, the air forces stated in paragraph 52 would have to remain until offensive operations were concluded. There should then still be time to bring back a proportion before April, 1944, but there would be no fighter squadrons to spare, and extra transport aircraft would have to be retained. The retention of fighter squadrons in the Mediterranean would, in addition to the considerations stated in paragraph 53, probably not have a restricting effect on fighter reserves for cross-Channel operations.

SECTION IV - CONCLUSIONS

55. To concentrate our efforts after the completion of *HUSKY* solely upon *ROUNDUP* is to forego the initiative to the enemy for some months, to adopt a defensive attitude on land and to allow Germany to concentrate for the defense of France and the Low Countries against our invasion.

56. Our plan for the defeat of Germany is therefore:

a. To eliminate Italy by:

(1) Air action and one of the following alternatives:

Either

(2) During or immediately after *HUSKY*, a landing in the *REGGIO* area and thereafter continuing operations as soon as possible on the mainland by landing first at *COTRONE* and then in the *HEEL*.

We estimate that the approximate timings of those operations might be mid-August, 1st September, and mid-October.

Or

(3) During or immediately after *HUSKY* a landing in the *REGGIO* area and thereafter continuing operations as soon as possible by a landing in *SARDINIA* followed by one in *CORSICA*.

We estimate that the approximate timing of these operations might be mid-August, mid-October, and mid-November, respectively.

b. To invade northwest Europe with the target date of April 1944.

/s/ C. E. LAMBE

/s/ W. PORTER

/s/ W. ELLIOT

Washington, D. C.

17th May 1943

APPENDIX "A"

COMMITMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AFTER THE ELIMINATION OF ITALY

1. At the conclusion of a successful *HUSKY*, there will be the following forces in the Mediterranean:-

U.S.	-	9 divisions
British	-	25 divisions
French	-	<u>4 divisions</u>
Total		38 divisions

On the assumption that a deduction of 10 percent over all should be made to cover casualties in further operations in the Mediterranean after *HUSKY*, this total would be reduced to 35 divisions, made up as follows:-

U. S.	-	8 divisions
British	-	23 divisions
French	-	<u>4 divisions</u>
Total		35 divisions

2. After the collapse of Italy, we estimate that we shall require the following forces for garrison and internal security purposes:-

3. SICILY

3 Static Bns.
1 Inf. Bde (Mobile)

4. TOE OF ITALY

2 Static Bns.
1 Inf. Bn. (Mobile)

5. HEEL OF ITALY

3 Static Bns.
1 Inf. Bde. (Mobile)
1 Armd. Regt.

6. ENFORCEMENT OF ARMISTICE

a. *Heel of Italy.* We estimate that we shall need one mixed division in this area (in addition to the permanent occupation force in para. 5) to provide the threat of further military occupation necessary for the enforcement of the Armistice.

b. *Rome Area.* There will be one mixed division in reserve in this area for use in central or northern Italy (see para. 7 below). For enforcement of the Armistice one brigade group would probably be sufficient.

7. CENTRAL ITALY

If the Germans retain a hold on the north of Italy a force of 3 divisions will be required in the Rome-Naples area to prevent incursion southwards. If the Germans withdraw from northern Italy, a force of 6 divisions would be required, if it were decided to occupy the air fields in the Milan-Turin area.

- 8. OCCUPATION OF SARDINIA
1 division
- 9. OCCUPATION OF CORSICA
1 division
- 10. BRIDGEHEAD IN DURAZZO AREA
3 Inf. Divs.
- 11. SECURITY OF DODECANESE
5 Static Bns.
1 Inf. Bde. as reserve
- 12. COMMITMENT IF TURKEY ENTERS THE WAR
2 Armd. Divs.
- 13. SECURITY IN NORTH AFRICA AND LEVANT
 - Morocco* 2 divisions
 - Tunisia and Algeria 2 divisions
 - Tripolitania 1 division
 - Cyrenaica 1 division
 - Levant and Cyprus 2-1/3 divisions
 - 8-1/3 divisions

14. The total liabilities as shown above will therefore be a total of 22 - 25 divisions, made up as follows:-

	<u>Equivalent Divisions</u>		
	<u>British</u>	<u>U. S.</u>	<u>French</u>
Sicily, Toe and Heel of Italy	1-2/3	-	-
Enforcement of Armistice	1 **	-	-
Central Italy	3 - 6	-	-
Sardinia	-	1	-
Corsica	-	-	1
Security N. Africa and Levant	4-1/3	2	2
Dodecanese	1	-	-
Durazzo bridgehead	3	-	-
Commitment for Turkey	2	-	-
	<hr/>		
	16 - 19	3	3

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15. When this liability is subtracted from the assets shown in paragraph 1, there will be available in the Mediterranean as reserve and for other employment:-

5 American Divisions
4 - 7 British Divisions
1 French Division
Total 10 - 13 Divisions.

APPENDIX "B"

BRITISH AND AMERICAN AIR FORCES
AVAILABLE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Type	British		U. S.		Total	
	Sqns.	A/c	Sqns.	A/c	Sqns.	A/c
S.E.F.	48	768	27	675	75	1443
T.E.F.(D)	4	64	9	225	13	289
T.E.F.(N)	7	112	4	64	11	176
L.B.	8	128	12	192	20	320
M.B.(D)	-	-	28	448	28	448
M.B.(N)	6	120	-	-	6	120
H.B.(D)	-	-	24	288	24	288
H.B.(N)	2	32	-	-	2	32
Transport	3	48	28	364	31	412
Army Co-op.	5	80	2	36	7 ?	116 ?

BASIS OF COMPUTATION

British

M.B.(N) 20 aircraft.
All other sqns. 16 aircraft.

U. S.

S.E.F.) 25 aircraft.
T.E.F.(D))
L.B.) 16 aircraft.
M.B.(D))
H.B.(D) 12 aircraft.
Transport 13 aircraft.
Army Co-op. 18 aircraft.

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FIGHTER FORCE NECESSARY FOR DEFENCE ON
CONCLUSION OF OPERATIONS

	<u>S.E.F.</u>	<u>T.E.F.(D)</u>	<u>T.E.F.(N)</u>
Levant	1	-	-
Egypt	3	-	½
Cyrenaica	3	1	½
Tripolitania	-	1	-
Tunisia	2	-	½
Sicily	2	-	1
Malta	1	-	½
Reggio	1	-	-
Crotone	1	-	-
Heel	4	1	½
Durazza	4	-	1
N. Italy	12	-	3
C. Italy	10	1	1
Dodecanese	3	-	½
Sardinia & Corsica	5	1	1
Algeria & Morocco	2	1	1
TOTAL	<u>54</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>11</u>

COMMITMENT TO TURKEY

HARDIHOOD I

S.E.F.	17
T.E.F.(D)	1
T.E.F.(N)	1
L.B.	3
F/Recce.	2
(G.R.)	1)

HARDIHOOD II

S.E.F.	7
H.B.	12
(G.R.)	1)

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CONCLUSION

Apart from S.E.F. squadrons (of which there would be a small deficit) and transport aircraft, the same forces as those detailed in para. 52 of the paper would be available for transfer to U. K., though there might not be sufficient time to take full advantage of this before April, 1944.

* If a threat to Spanish Morocco develops, a further 2-1/3 divisions will be required.

** Rome area covered by Central Italy commitment.

C.C.S. 235

DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE
(Concentration of Largest Possible Force in U. K.)

References:

- CCS 85th Meeting, Item (4)
- CCS 88th Meeting, Item (3)
- 4th White House Meeting, Item (3)
- 5th White House Meeting

Pursuant to a directive in the C.C.S. 85th Meeting, the subject paper prepared by the U. S. Planners in consultation with the British Planners was circulated 18 May 1943.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered C.C.S. 235 together with a British paper, prepared in consultation with the U. S. Planners (C.C.S. 234) in their 88th Meeting and agreed upon certain resolutions which were circulated as C.C.S. 237 (Revised in C.C.S. 237/1), and which are also included in C.C.S. 242/6.

C.C.S. 235

18 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

DEFEAT OF AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE

(Concentration of Largest Possible Force in U.K.)

Previous reference: C.C.S. 85th Mtg., Item 4 a (1)

Note by the Secretaries

The attached memorandum by the U. S. Joint Staff Planners, prepared after consultation with the British Joint Planning Staff, contains a plan for the defeat of Germany showing the course of operations and their feasibility by concentrating the biggest possible invasion force in the U. K. as soon as possible.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

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DEFEAT OF GERMANY FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

PROBLEM

1. To present a plan for the defeat of *GERMANY* (showing the course of operations and their feasibility) by concentrating on the biggest possible invasion force in the *UNITED KINGDOM* as soon as possible.

ASSUMPTIONS, 1943-44

2. a. *RUSSIA* remains an effective Ally in the war and is containing the bulk of the German forces. She is at peace with *JAPAN*.

b. No amphibious operations will be undertaken in the *MEDITERRANEAN* area subsequent to *HUSKY*.

c. *HUSKY* starts on the date at present planned and all organized opposition in the island ceases by 31 August. Landing craft can be released by 15 August for movement to other areas for further operations by 15 August.

- d. *SICKLE* continues at full scale as planned.
- e. Air operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN* area will be limited to the protection of shipping and the bombing of *ITALY* and other remunerative *AXIS* targets.
- f. *SPAIN* remains neutral.
- g. *TURKEY* is either neutral or an active Ally.

OBJECTIVE

3. The decisive defeat of the *AXIS* Powers in *EUROPE* as early as practicable.

GENERAL STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS EUROPEAN - MEDITERRANEAN AREA, 1943-44

4. To attain this objective we believe that the courses of action outlined below are essential:

- a. *SICKLE*, and the bomber offensive from the *UNITED KINGDOM*.
- b. *BOLERO*, in order to achieve the primary objective, *ROUNDUP*, in the spring of 1944.
- c. Keep *RUSSIA* in the war.
- d. *MEDITERRANEAN* air operations after *HUSKY* must not prejudice *SICKLE*, the bomber offensive from the *UNITED KINGDOM*, *BOLERO*, and *ROUNDUP*.

5. A sound strategic concept for the defeat of *GERMANY* at the earliest possible date can only be developed after careful analysis of existing and anticipated conditions in the entire European-*MEDITERRANEAN* area in 1943-44. Our strategic concept is firmly based on such an assessment, and accepts the following premises:

- a. Defeat of the Western *AXIS* by means of an invasion from the *MEDITERRANEAN* is unsound strategically and logistically.
- b. The *UNITED KINGDOM* is an unparalleled base from which to create conditions for a successful landing on the Continent and to launch the decisive invasion of the Fortress of *EUROPE*.
- c. *GERMANY* intends to concentrate on the defeat of the Russian armed forces in 1943. Only a major threat from another direction will divert *GERMANY* from this purpose, as she is fully conscious that failure on the Russian Front means her ultimate defeat by the *UNITED NATIONS*. The minor operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN* which could be

conducted after *HUSKY*, within the limited capabilities of the *UNITED NATIONS*, even if they resulted in the defection or collapse of *ITALY*, would be of lesser importance to *GERMANY* than the defeat of *RUSSIA*. The *UNITED STATES* and British forces are incapable of interfering seriously, by Military action other than air, with *AXIS* operations against *RUSSIA* in 1943. *GERMANY* will either fail or succeed in *RUSSIA* this summer.

d. We believe that *RUSSIA* will continue to require the major part of the *AXIS* effort in 1944. The heavy pressure on the *AXIS* by the Russian armies, together with the devastating results of an overwhelming and uninterrupted bomber offensive from the *UNITED KINGDOM*, *AFRICA*, and *SICILY*, will create a situation favorable for *ROUNDUP* in April 1944.

e. We further believe: that the elimination of *ITALY* is not a prerequisite for the creation of conditions favorable for *ROUNDUP*; that the elimination of *ITALY* may possibly be brought about without need of further amphibious operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN*, by a successful *HUSKY* and an intensified bomber offensive against *ITALY*--in fact Italian defection might precede *HUSKY*; that if, after *HUSKY*, *ITALY* has not surrendered or collapsed, the advantages to be gained in eliminating *ITALY* by conducting further amphibious operations are not worth the cost in forces, shipping, amphibious equipment, and time; that secondary operations after *HUSKY* to eliminate *ITALY* will have a drastic effect in forces, shipping amphibious equipment, and time on our main effort--*SICKLE*, the bomber offensive, *BOLERO*, and *ROUNDUP*.

f. Experience in *TORCH* and in preparation for *HUSKY* has shown that once an operation, even though admittedly secondary, is directed, the desire to insure its success leads to increasing demands for greater and greater forces. Such would undoubtedly be the case with secondary operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN* after *HUSKY*, especially if directed against *ITALY*. The additional forces can only be provided at the direct expense of *SICKLE*, *BOLERO*, and *ROUNDUP*.

AXIS CAPABILITIES IN THE SPRING OF 1944
(Reference C.I.C. 24, 16 May 1943)

GENERAL

6. GERMANY will be increasingly war weary and will be faced with an economy inadequate to a prolonged war, resulting, among other things, in the armed forces beginning to experience shortages in supply. The presence of RUSSIA on the East and the Allied threat on the West will prevent the hoped for remanning of industry by men released from the armed forces. Her total number of divisions will remain approximately static, but they will be under strength. Our build-up in the UNITED KINGDOM will offer for the first time a positive threat of a war on a second front. While this build-up is being effected, the bomber offensive will be carrying the striking power of the UNITED NATIONS to the Germans and creating conditions favorable for a successful invasion.

GROUND FORCES

7. In the spring of 1944, German ground forces may be estimated at about 280 combat divisions, which could be distributed as follows:

Eastern Front (including FINLAND)	195
NORWAY	11
POLAND	2
DENMARK	2
Southeastern EUROPE	11
FRANCE and Low Countries	32 (1/3 re- fitting)
GERMANY (Strategic reserve)	27 (1/3 re- fitting)

8. An attack against the European coast would be met by coastal divisions varying, with the area attacked, from 2 - 3 to 3 - 5. The mobile reserves of 2 to 4 divisions could begin to arrive after 24 hours, but the movement of these divisions can reasonably be expected to be delayed by aerial action.

9. The strategic reserve in GERMANY will total a maximum of 18 under-strength divisions. Units could begin to arrive in 4 days and the total could be in FRANCE, but not in the areas of operations, in 3-1/2 weeks.

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If this movement were not undertaken prior to our attack, it would require 5 weeks to complete the move to *FRANCE*. If units could be spared from the Eastern Front, the first division would arrive in 14 days and 2 each week thereafter. Continued air attack on these units while enroute will materially reduce their combat effectiveness.

AIR FORCES

10. The number of airplanes is difficult to determine, but after planes have been allocated to the Russian Front, it is estimated that there will be 2050 planes available for all other areas.

11. It is estimated that on 1 May 1944 there will be 950 combat airplanes in *FRANCE* and the Low Countries. These might be reinforced immediately by 100 additional planes. Within a week, 450 planes probably could be concentrated in the area giving a total of 1500 planes, assuming no losses. Further reinforcements would depend on *GERMANY'S* will to strip the Russian Front, but in any event the absolute number of German planes is of relatively minor importance due to the *UNITED NATIONS'* preponderance (8 to 1) of air power, in the *UNITED KINGDOM*.

NAVAL FORCES

12. An invasion would probably be opposed at sea by 70 E-boats, 17 destroyers, 30 torpedo boats, and a large but indeterminate number of submarines.

SUMMARY

13. A cross-Channel assault would be faced, initially, with from 2 to 5 coastal defense divisions which might be reinforced by 2 to 4 mobile divisions after a minimum of 24 hours. A minimum delay of from 3 to 5 weeks can be expected before the 18 understrength divisions in *GERMANY* could be moved to *FRANCE*. Additional time would be required to move them to the combat zone.

14. Our overwhelming air superiority (8 to 1) could seriously delay, or even prevent, the arrival of reserves, if not eliminate them entirely from early arrival in combat. This applies equally to the mobile reserves in *FRANCE* as well as to the 18 understrength divisions in *GERMANY*. Therefore, 3 to 4 coastal divisions must be defeated initially

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and a build-up effected to face a reinforcement of 2 to 4 divisions which may arrive in a depleted and disorganized condition, as a result of our air attacks. After 30 to 60 days, *GERMANY* might be in a position to face us with a maximum of 15 - 20 understrength divisions. At this time their air strength would be negligible unless they chose to strip other areas including the Russian Front.

CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION

TARGET DATE

15. Because 1 April 1944 coincides with the completion of the 4th phase of the Allied bomber offensive against *GERMANY*, and is the earliest date on which the weather becomes favorable for a cross-Channel operation, it should be accepted for planning purposes as the date on which we must be prepared to re-enter the Continent. The continued examination of the results of the bomber offensive and the integration of its effects with other factors, including events on the Russian Front and in the *MEDITERRANEAN*, will enable the *UNITED NATIONS* to decide by November, 1943, if a change in the proposed target date should be necessary.

GENERAL CONCEPT

16. The Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander for cross-Channel operations has been directed to study and prepare plans for invasion at any time with whatever forces may be available. This planning is proceeding, but has not yet progressed to a full study of *ROUNDUP*. Lacking complete examination of this problem, only the broader aspects of a plan can be presented. Detailed examination may therefore result in some modifications to the plan presented herewith.

17. In general, it is proposed that an operation be conducted to secure a lodgment in the north of *FRANCE*. It is estimated that ten divisions will be required for the initial cross-Channel movement, and that sufficient amphibious assault craft will be available to float those required in the initial assault provided those now in the *MEDITERRANEAN* are moved to the *UNITED KINGDOM* on the completion of *HUSKY*, and that no other major amphibious operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN* are undertaken. Thereafter, a build-up of forces be accomplished at the

maximum rate consistent with available port capacities together with an exploitation of the lodgment to secure additional ports and air bases. When a sufficient build-up of forces and the organization of logistical establishments have been accomplished, and when the effects of the air offensive has been reflected in decreased German resistance, the advance to the heart of the German citadel can be accomplished.

AVAILABILITY OF UNITED NATIONS FORCES

AIR FORCES

18. The U.S.A.A.F. program and the R.A.F. projected order of battle for April, 1944, is indicated below. The U.S.A.A.F. must be given first priority on shipping if the bomber offensive program is to be accomplished.

	U.S.A.A.F.		R.A.F.	
	<u>Groups</u>	<u>Aircraft (U.E.)</u>	<u>Squadrons</u>	<u>Aircraft (U.E.)</u>
Heavy Bombers	51	2448	80	1600
Medium Bombers	9	576	12	240-
Light and Dive Bombers	13	832	13	260
Bomber Recon.			1	14
Day Fighter	25	2500	62	1116
Night Fighter			19	412
Fighter Recon.			15	231
Army Support (Fighters)			8	112
Army Support (Bombers)			4	56
Photo Recon.	2	168	5	100
Observation	4	336	10	160
Air/Sea Rescue			8½	170
Transport	8½	442	7	190
	<u>112½</u>	<u>7302</u>	<u>244½</u>	<u>4661</u>

GROUND FORCES

19. If commitments to other theaters remain at the 1943 level there will be available in the *UNITED STATES*, through 1944, more divisions than can be shipped to the *UNITED KINGDOM*. After *HUSKY*, 6 additional U. S. divisions in the *MEDITERRANEAN* will be available for use elsewhere.

20. The British will have 10 offensive divisions available in the *UNITED KINGDOM* by October, 1943. This may be increased to 14 divisions by 1 April 1944. After *HUSKY*, 11 additional British divisions in the *MEDITERRANEAN* will be available for use elsewhere.

BUILD-UP IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

21. The build-up in the *UNITED KINGDOM* for a cross-Channel operation can be obtained by the movement of forces from the *UNITED STATES* only, or by moving troops from the *UNITED STATES* and transferring surplus U. S. and British formations from *NORTH AFRICA*. The two methods of build-up are indicated below (priority on shipping has been given to the air force units and provides for completion of U.S.A.A.F. build-up by May, 1944). These figures are based on British estimates of the numbers that can be processed through U. K. ports rather than on a larger number which can actually be moved by available shipping.

BUILD-UP (DIVS.) FROM THE UNITED STATES ONLY (SEE APPENDIX "A")

	1 Oct <u>1943</u>	1 Jan <u>1944</u>	1 Apr <u>1944</u>	1 Jul <u>1944</u>	1 Oct <u>1944</u>	1 Jan <u>1945</u>
U. S.	7	13	20	25	28	31
British	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>14*</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>
Total	17	23	34	39	42	45

22. It is reasonable to assume that operations have secured continental ports through which troops and cargo may pass, and that the flow through U. K. ports has been increased, thus permitting the following build-up:

	1 Jul 1944	1 Oct 1944	1 Jan 1945
Total divisions	43	50	64

* These 4 additional British divisions are dependent on the present program of conversion of defensive divisions to an offensive type.

23. BUILD-UP (DIVS.) FROM THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH AFRICA (SEE APPENDIX "A")

	1 Oct <u>1943</u>	1 Jan <u>1944</u>	1 Apr <u>1944</u>	1 Jul <u>1944</u>	1 Oct <u>1944</u>	1 Jan <u>1945</u>
U. S.	6	8	10	18	24	27
British	<u>10</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>25</u>
Total	16	22	34	43	49	52

These figures are based on what the British have indicated can be processed through U. K. ports and not on the availability of shipping. The latter would permit a material increase in the build-up indicated were it not for the limitations imposed by the port capacities of the UNITED KINGDOM.

24. The second method of build-up, from the UNITED STATES and NORTH AFRICA is presented because of the desirability of using battle seasoned units for the initial cross-Channel operations. Units can be found in the MEDITERRANEAN that are not only composed of veterans, but that have also participated in large scale amphibious operations.

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT CRAFT

25. Appendix "B" lists the amphibious assault craft which will be available after HUSKY, and also after each of two major amphibious operations subsequent to HUSKY, if such operations are conducted.

GARRISONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

26. Proposed garrisons in the MEDITERRANEAN are contained in Appendix "C."

EFFECT OF OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO HUSKY
ON ROUNDUP AND SICKLE

GROUND FORCES

27. If major operations, other than by air are undertaken in the MEDITERRANEAN after the successful completion of HUSKY, no ground forces may be released for BOLERO until after the collapse of ITALY.

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28. Such operations may interfere seriously with *ROUNDUP* if shipping available for *BOLERO* has to be diverted to reinforce and support the forces engaged in the *MEDITERRANEAN*.

29. The time required to gain the objective of the *MEDITERRANEAN* operations--the collapse of *ITALY*--is indefinite. Success cannot be expected before 1 January 1944. After that date sufficient time remains to move two divisions from the *MEDITERRANEAN* to the *UNITED KINGDOM* before the target date selected for *ROUNDUP*, but there can be no assurance that shipping will be available. *ROUNDUP* would probably be deprived, therefore, of battle-experienced troops.

30. Little would be gained in the build-up following *ROUNDUP* by moving any other available forces from the *MEDITERRANEAN* to the *UNITED KINGDOM* over the movement of similar numbers from the *UNITED STATES*.

AIR FORCES

31. After providing for an air offensive against *ITALY*, convoy protection, and defense, about 900 combat aircraft and 250 transports will be available and could be moved to the *UNITED KINGDOM* following the completion of *HUSKY*. However, if further advances are undertaken, all aircraft employed at the time of *HUSKY* will remain in the *MEDITERRANEAN* until offensive operations are completed. All of the fighters (550), most of which are first line, and 250 transports, sufficient to lift two parachute regiments simultaneously, would be retained in the *MEDITERRANEAN* for garrison and supply of additionally occupied areas. Only light bombers and special purpose airplanes (about 350) could be released for transfer to the *UNITED KINGDOM*.

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT CRAFT (SEE APPENDIX "B")

32. If no operations are conducted subsequent to *HUSKY*, the number of amphibious assault craft available for *ROUNDUP* will total 4,657 of all types.

33. After one major amphibious operation subsequent to *HUSKY*, the total will be reduced to 3,540, or 76 percent of the maximum.

34. A second major amphibious operation subsequent to *HUSKY* will reduce the total to 2,461 or 53 percent of the total.

35. If the second operation is not undertaken until the middle of November 1943, the amphibious assault craft remaining cannot arrive in the *UNITED KINGDOM* until about 1 March 1944.

36. It is probable that the amphibious assault craft available after *HUSKY* will not meet fully the maximum vehicle requirements of a large scale *ROUNDUP*. It is apparent, therefore, that any lesser number would be entirely inadequate.

CONCLUSIONS

37. After *HUSKY*, the main effort of the *UNITED NATIONS* should be concentrated on executing *SICKLE*, the bomber offensive, *BOLERO*, and *ROUNDUP*.

38. The planning date for *ROUNDUP* should be 1 April 1944.

39. The launching of a *ROUNDUP* operation about 1 April 1944 is considered entirely feasible, and the movement of *UNITED STATES* and British resources to the *UNITED KINGDOM*, therefore, should be executed.

40. Operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN* subsequent to *HUSKY* should be limited to the air offensive, because any other operations would use resources vital to *ROUNDUP* and present the risk of a limitless commitment of *UNITED NATIONS* resources to the *MEDITERRANEAN* vacuum, thus needlessly prolonging the war.

APPENDIX "A"

BUILD-UP IN THE UNITED KINGDOM FOR CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATIONS

1. The build-up in the *UNITED KINGDOM* for cross-Channel operations can be accomplished by two methods:

- a. The movement of forces from the *UNITED STATES* only.
- b. The movement of forces from the *UNITED STATES* and the transfer of all excess U. S. and British units from *NORTH AFRICA*.

The results of these two methods are indicated below:

BUILD-UP FROM THE UNITED STATES ONLY

2. Cargo shipping will be available to move and maintain troops up to the limit of troopship capacity.

3. Reckoning the initial movement requirements at 7 ship tons per man, monthly maintenance at 1 ship ton per man, and the strength for a division at 40,000 men and replacements at 4,000 men per month until 1 April 1944, after that time at 5 percent per quarter, the following build-up of U. S. forces in the *UNITED KINGDOM* from the *UNITED STATES* can be obtained (all figures are cumulative). Army Air Force units are given priority over ground forces.

BUILD-UP IN PERSONNEL

	Total <u>In the U.K.</u>	<u>Air</u>	<u>Ground</u>	<u>Div.</u>
1 July 1943	180,700	117,800	62,900	1
1 Oct 1943	449,700	170,000	279,700	7
1 Jan 1944	783,700	278,000	505,700	13
1 Apr 1944	1,180,000	390,000	790,000	20
1 July 1944	1,409,000	406,000	1,003,000	25
1 Oct 1944	1,553,000	406,000	1,147,000	28
1 Jan 1945	1,646,000	406,000	1,240,000	31

4. The total U. S. and British divisions that will be available in the *UNITED KINGDOM* for cross-Channel operations are indicated below:

	1 July <u>1943</u>	1 Oct <u>1 Oct</u>	1 Jan <u>1944</u>	1 Apr <u>1 Apr</u>	1 July <u>1 July</u>	1 Oct <u>1 Oct</u>	1 Jan <u>1945</u>
U. S.	1	7	13	20	25	28	31
British	<u>4</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>14*</u>	<u>14*</u>	<u>14*</u>	<u>14*</u>
Total	5	17	23	34	39	42	45

* These 4 additional British divisions are dependent on the present program of conversion of defensive divisions to an offensive type. The figure may later be revised either up or down.

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5. If operations have secured continental ports through which troops and cargo may pass or *if the flow through the UNITED KINGDOM ports should be increased*, the build-up under troop lift restrictions could *increase the above* by the number of divisions indicated below:

1 July 1944	4 Divisions
1 October 1944	11 Divisions
1 January 1945	19 Divisions

6. The information in paragraph 3 above is based on what the British have indicated can be processed through U. K. ports and not on the availability of shipping. The accomplishment of this build-up will require Army Service Force troops in June and July to operate 16,000,000 square feet of depot space, now in existence for U. S. Forces, at maximum capacity. Port battalions must be furnished to discharge additional cargo ships arriving from August onward. Engineer construction units must be provided in August and September to allow the completion of 4 new depots by December for handling increased tonnage.

7. A time lag of 4 weeks should be allowed between the arrival of troops in the UNITED KINGDOM and the completion of the distribution of equipment to their units. It is also estimated that units should be in the UNITED KINGDOM 3 months prior to the initiation of operations to provide for the completion of the distribution of equipment, planning, training, rehearsals, and final organization. These allowances have not been made in stating the number available on the various dates listed in the preceding paragraphs.

BUILD-UP FROM THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH AFRICA

8. After the completion of HUSKY and the garrisoning of the MEDITERRANEAN area, if no further operations are conducted in this theater, the following units would be available for transfer elsewhere:

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<u>Type</u>	<u>U. S.</u>		<u>British</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	Sqns.	A/c	Sqns.	A/c	Sqns.	A/c
Fighter	16	400	9	144	25	544
Fighter Recons.	2	36	2	32	4	68
Light Bomber	12	192	5	80	17	272
P.R.U.	1	13	2	24	3	37
Transport	20	250	-	-	20	258

GROUND

6 - U. S. divisions (including 1 A/B div.)

11 - British divisions

9. If the excess divisions are moved from NORTH AFRICA to the UNITED KINGDOM, the U. S. divisions will leave their equipment in NORTH AFRICA for the French and will be refitted in England. The British will carry their equipment with them. The same information on the capabilities of British ports again applies. The air forces are given priority on shipping. The following build-up can be effected:

BUILD-UP IN U. S. PERSONNEL

	<u>Total</u> <u>in the U.K.</u>	<u>Air</u>	<u>Ground</u>	<u>Div.</u>
1 July 1943	180,700	117,800	62,900	1
1 Oct 1943	415,700	186,000	229,700	6
1 Jan 1944	656,300	332,000	324,300	8
1 Apr 1944	844,700	444,000	400,700	10
1 July 1944	1,195,700	460,000	735,700	18
1 Oct 1944	1,418,700	460,000	958,700	24
1 Jan 1945	1,560,700	460,000	1,100,700	27

BUILD-UP IN BRITISH PERSONNEL

	<u>Total</u> <u>moved</u> <u>to the U.K.</u>	<u>Air</u>	<u>Ground</u>	<u>Div.</u>	<u>Divs.</u> <u>already</u> <u>in the U.K.</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Divs.</u>
1 Oct 1943	43,000	8,000	35,000	1	10	11
1 Jan 1944	163,400	23,400	140,000	4	10	14
1 Apr 1944	389,500	23,400	360,100	10	14	24
1 July 1944	409,500	23,400	386,100	11	14	25

10. The total U. S. and British divisions that will be available in the *UNITED KINGDOM* for cross-Channel operations are indicated below:

	<u>1 July</u> <u>1943</u>	<u>1 Oct</u> <u>1943</u>	<u>1 Jan</u> <u>1944</u>	<u>1 Apr</u> <u>1944</u>	<u>1 Jul</u> <u>1944</u>	<u>1 Oct</u> <u>1944</u>	<u>1 Jan</u> <u>1945</u>
U. S.	1	6	8	10	18	24	27
British	<u>-</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>24*</u>	<u>25*</u>	<u>25*</u>	<u>25*</u>
Total	1 ?	17	22	34	43	49	52

* Four additional British divisions have been added as an increase in the *UNITED KINGDOM*. This comes from the conversion of defensive divisions to an offensive role. The figure may later be revised either up or down.

11. The figures given above are also based on what the British have indicated can be accepted through *UNITED KINGDOM* ports, and not on the availability of shipping. The latter would allow an increase in the number of units.

APPENDIX "B"

DEFEAT OF GERMANY FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM
AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT CRAFT THAT CAN BE IN
 THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1 APRIL 1944

TYPE	<u>No operation subsequent to HUSKY</u>			One operation subsequent to HUSKY	Two operations subsequent to HUSKY
	<u>U.K. provide</u>	<u>U.S. provide</u>	<u>Total</u>		
LSI (L)	18		18	15	12
LSI (M)	4		4	4	3
LSI (S)	5		5	4	3
LSI (H)	25		25	25	24
LSH	3		3	2	2
LST (I)	4		4	3	3
LSS	2		2	2	2
LSG	3		3	3	2
LCT (3)	24		24	15	6
LCT (4)	327		327	267	207
LCM (I)	180		180	140	100
LCI (S)	32		32	32	32
LCA	465		465	329	193
LCP (S)	80		80	68	56
LCP (M)	24		24	24	24
LCF (L)	28		28	20	12
LCS (L)	12		12	12	12
LCS (M)	89		89	77	65
LCS (S)		32	32	16	0
LCG (M)	19		19	9	0
LBV (Spec)	380		380	380	380
BBV	408		408	408	408
Coasters	200		200	200	200
LST (2)	48	116	164	136	108
LSE	5		5	5	5
LCT (5 & 6)	89	122	211	161	111
LCM (3)	136	250*	386	228	70
LCI (L)	103	95	198	80	0
LCP (L)(R)	283		283	240	197
LCVP	221	800*	1021	621	221
LCE	25		25	14	3
TOTAL	3242	1415	4657	3540	2461

* Subject to some further increase, if required.

NOTE: (1) APA's and AKA's are additive to the above.

(2) Attrition allowed for subsequent operations is assumed the same as HUSKY.

(3) U.S. figures have had a 3 months' slippage applied to insure availability in U.K.

APPENDIX "C"

MEDITERRANEAN GARRISONS FOLLOWING A SUCCESSFUL HUSKY

1. Following a successful *HUSKY*, and provided no further major amphibious operations are undertaken, garrisons in the *MEDITERRANEAN* will be required as follows:

a. *GROUND FORCES*

FRENCH MOROCCO

ALGERIA and TUNISIA

3 U. S. and 4 French divisions

2 U. S. or British divisions (Other French forces not listed will be available for local security in French African possessions.)

SICILY

4 U. S. or British divisions

TRIPOLITANIA

1 British division

CYRENAICA

1 British division

EGYPT, LEVANT STATES,

6 British divisions

AND CYPRUS

(Includes commitment for the defense of *TURKEY*)

TOTAL

21 divisions

b. *AIR FORCES*

	<u>U. S.</u>		<u>British</u>	
	<u>Sq.</u>	<u>A/c</u>	<u>Sq.</u>	<u>A/c</u>
Fighters	20	500	39	624
L.B.			3	48
M.B.	24	384	6	120
H.B.	20	240	2	32
Transport	8	104	3	48
Army Coop.			3	48

C.C.S. 237/1

DRAFT RESOLUTIONS BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

References:

CCS 88th Meeting, Item (3)

CCS 89th Meeting, Item (1)

C.C.S. 237 circulated the draft resolutions determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 88th Meeting during the discussion of C.C.S. 234 and C.C.S. 235.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered these draft resolutions in their 89th Meeting and agreed upon certain amendments which are incorporated in C.C.S. 237/1, and which are also included in C.C.S. 242/6.

C.C.S. 237/1

20 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

RESOLUTIONS BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
(European Operations)

Reference: C.C.S. 89th Meeting, Item 1

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Resolved:

- a. That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944:

<i>Assault:</i>	5 Infantry Divisions (Simultaneously loaded in landing craft)
	2 Infantry Divisions - Follow-up
	<u>2</u> Airborne Divisions
<i>Total:</i>	9 Divisions in the Assault
<i>Build-up:</i>	20 Divisions available for movement into lodgment — area
<i>Total:</i>	29 Divisions

- b. That the Allied Commander in Chief, North Africa, should be instructed to mount such operations in exploitation of *HUSKY* as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Each specific operation will be subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for his operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the

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United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for *HUSKY* will not be considered available.

- c. The above resolution shall be reviewed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at a meeting in July or early in August, the date to be decided later, in order that the situation may be examined in the light of the result of *HUSKY* and the situation in Russia.

C. C. S. 238

OPERATIONS IN BURMA 1943-44

References:

CCS 91st Meeting
4th White House Meeting, Item (4)
5th White House Meeting

C.C.S. 238 circulated 19 May 1943 the Combined Staff Planners' comments on C.C.S. 229 and C.C.S. 231.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered this paper together with C.C.S. 229 (Potentialities of Air Route from Assam to China) and C.C.S. 231 (Operations in Burma to Open and Secure an Overland Route to China). Action on these subjects was taken in the Minutes of the 91st Meeting which also directed that C.C.S. 229, C.C.S. 231, and C.C.S. 238 be withdrawn from the agenda; therefore, these papers are not published in this volume. The final action on the subject contained in C.C.S. 238 was included in C.C.S. 242/6.

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C.C.S. 239/1

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST IN 1943-44

References:

CCS 92nd Meeting, Item (4)
4th White House Meeting, Item (5)

C.C.S. 239 was circulated 20 May 1943 for consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In their 92nd Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved C.C.S. 239 subject to certain amendments which are incorporated in the amended version subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 239/1. The conclusions of C.C.S. 239/1 are included in C.C.S. 242/6.

C.C.S. 239/1

23 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST IN 1943-44

Reference: a. C.C.S. 220
b. C.C.S. 92nd Mtg., Item 4

Note by the Secretaries

1. The enclosed report by the *United States* Joint Staff Planners, in the form as amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 92nd Meeting, is circulated for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. The operations set forth in this paper are in support of the overall "Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan" as set forth in C.C.S. 220, already noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This plan for 1943-1944 operations is based on the premises:

a. That China must be retained as a base for operations against Japan

b. That Japanese lines of communication must be subjected to continuous attack.

c. That Japanese Military forces must be subjected to continuous and increasing pressure to prevent consolidation and to effect attrition on Japanese Military power.

d. That positions must be secured in readiness for full-scale operations when such operations can be undertaken.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST IN 1943-44

1. An analysis has been made of possible *UNITED NATIONS* courses of action in the *PACIFIC*-Asiatic area in 1943 and 1944 to conform to the objectives set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 219. The analysis is contained in Enclosure "A".

2. The courses of action examined and conclusions reached are as follows:

a. Far Eastern Theater

(1) Operations in *BURMA* to augment supplies to *CHINA*.

Vital to implementing the strategic plan for the defeat of *JAPAN* and to keeping *CHINA* in the war.

(2) Air Operations in and from *CHINA*

Close coordination with other elements of plan are essential.

b. *PACIFIC* Theater

(1) Operations in the *SOLOMONS* and *BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO*

Provides for retaining the initiative, maintaining pressure on *JAPAN*, and the defense of *AUSTRALIA*.

(2) Operations in *NEW GUINEA*

The capture of *NEW GUINEA* will facilitate the opening of a line of communications to the *CELEBES SEA* and contribute to the defense of *AUSTRALIA*.

(3) Operations in eastern *NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES*

Due to limitation of forces, operations other than air warfare should be restricted to the seizure of those islands necessary to the capture of *NEW GUINEA*.

(4) Operations in the *MARSHALL ISLANDS*

Shortens line of communications to *SOUTHWEST PACIFIC* and *CELEBES SEA*.

(5) Operations in the *CAROLINE ISLANDS*

Necessary to gain control of Central *PACIFIC*, thereby facilitating establishment of line of communications to *CELEBES SEA*. Will enable *UNITED NATIONS* forces to directly threaten the Japanese Archipelago.

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(6) Intensification of Operations against Enemy Lines of Communication.

All the foregoing operations are essential to the attainment of positions which enable the intensification and expansion of attacks on the enemy lines of communication in the Pacific.

3. *CONCLUSIONS:*

a. Offensive operations in the *PACIFIC* and *FAR EAST* in 1943-1944 should have the following objectives:

- (1) Conduct of air operations in and from *CHINA*.
- (2) Operations in *BURMA* to augment supplies to *CHINA*.
- (3) Ejection of the Japanese from the *ALEUTIANS*.
- (4) Seizure of the *MARSHALL* and *CAROLINE ISLANDS*.
- (5) Seizure of the *SOLOMONS*, the *BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO*, and Japanese held *NEW GUINEA*.

(6) Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communication.

b. Operations to gain these objectives will be restricted by the availability of trained amphibious divisions and amphibious craft.

ENCLOSURE "A"

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST IN 1943-44

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. To prepare an analysis of possible *UNITED NATIONS* courses of action in the *PACIFIC-Asiatic* area in 1943 and 1944, in conformity with *UNITED NATIONS* strategy.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. It is assumed that:

- a. *CHINA* will continue in the war against *JAPAN*.
- b. It is the intention of *JAPAN* to invade *SIBERIA* at a time advantageous to her and disadvantageous to *RUSSIA*, and before *GERMANY* is defeated.

3. After a thorough estimate of the situation for 1943-44 was made it was concluded that in the *PACIFIC* and *FAR EAST*:

a. The *UNITED NATIONS* should conduct limited offensive operations in order to maintain pressure on *JAPAN*, retain the initiative, and attain or retain positions of readiness for a full-scale offensive against *JAPAN*, and in order to keep *CHINA* in the war.

b. For these purposes, *UNITED STATES* Naval forces should be increased to a maximum consistent with the minimum requirements in the *ATLANTIC*, and with due regard to the requirements of the main effort against the European *AXIS*, air and ground forces should be provided so as to facilitate joint action and make optimum use of the increasing strength of *UNITED STATES* Naval forces.

4. C.C.S. 220 sets forth a strategic plan for the defeat of *JAPAN*. Based on this strategic plan for the defeat of *JAPAN*, the following courses of action are open to the *UNITED NATIONS*:

a. In the Asiatic Theater:

(1) Operations *ANAKIM* and Revised *ANAKIM*.

(2) Air operations in and from *CHINA*.

b. In the *PACIFIC* Theater:

(1) Operations in the *SOLOMONS* and in the *BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO*.

(2) Operations in *NEW GUINEA*.

(3) Operations in the eastern *NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES*.

(4) Operations in the *MARSHALL ISLANDS*.

(5) Operations in the *CAROLINE ISLANDS*.

(6) Operations in the northern *PACIFIC*.

PART I

OPERATIONS IN ASIA

5. Operations in *BURMA*

These operations have been considered in other papers.

6. Air Operations in and from CHINA

a. General examination of this course of action.

(1) This course of action is suitable.

(2) The feasibility of the current plan for air operations in CHINA is limited by the problem of supply. Air transport is the only route of supply leading into CHINA and air operations in CHINA during 1943 and 1944 will expand in size and scope of operations, in direct proportion to the increase in the amount of supplies made available to the air force in CHINA.

b. In the event that the operation ANAKIM or a Revised ANAKIM is successful, it is estimated that supplies to CHINA will begin to move by land routes in approximately six months. A rapid expansion of the capacity of the air route will be immediately practicable, due to the added facilities available at the western terminus, and the existence of more favorable operating conditions.

c. Current plans for the air transport route to CHINA contemplate that its present capacity of approximately 3,000 tons per month may be expanded to approximately 10,000 tons per month by the end of 1943.

d. The Commanding General, 14th Air Force, estimates that the forces required to conduct planned combat operations in CHINA are as follows:

4 Fighter Groups	300	airplanes
2 Medium Bomber Groups	114	"
1 Heavy Bomber Group	35	"
1 Recon. Squadron	<u>24</u>	"
TOTAL	473	airplanes

e. The Commanding General, 14th Air Force, estimates that this force can be operated on a monthly supply of 7,128 tons. This is only possible by cutting the ground echelon T/O approximately in half and utilizing local sources of supply to the utmost.

f. It is believed that the operation of this force will accomplish the following objectives:

(1) Subject the Japanese Air Force to a very costly attrition.

(2) Permit sustained and damaging attacks against Japanese shipping on the YANGTSE RIVER, along the CHINA coast, and out to sea to include all of the islands of FORMOSA and HAINAN and the sea lane between JAPAN and SHANGHAI.

(3) Permit damaging air attack on Japanese industrial targets as far north as *SHAN-HAI-KWAN* and east to include *NANKING*, *SHANG-HAI*, and the island of *FORMOSA*.

(4) Permit limited bombardment attacks on the mainland of *JAPAN*.

(5) Make extensive preparations for the eventual operation of large air forces to be used in the air offensive against *JAPAN* proper.

(6) Give support to Chinese ground forces.

g. Air operations in and from *CHINA* are considered a vital and necessary step in the "Strategic Plan for the Defeat of *JAPAN*," C.C.S. 220. The scale and tempo of the air operations must be carefully gauged as they progress, in the light of probable *Japanese reaction*. If advanced too rapidly they might precipitate a large scale land offensive by the Japanese in *CHINA*, at an earlier date than we consider desirable.

h. Following these limited operations, the large scale, sustained air offensive against *JAPAN* proper becomes feasible when supply routes to *CHINA* are developed to the point where the forces involved can be logistically maintained. This latter phase will undoubtedly require logistic support through a *CHINA* port in order that it may be conducted on the scale we contemplate.

PART II

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC

7. Operations in the *SOLOMONS* and in the *BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO*.

a. Operations now Directed

(1) Operations for the seizure of the *SOLOMONS-BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO* have been under way since July, 1942 (about nine months). The tasks prescribed by the latest directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (28 March 1943) are quoted below:

" TASKS

"4.(a) Establish air fields on *KIRIWINA* and *WOODLARK ISLANDS*.

(b) Seize *IAE - SALAMAUA - FINSCHAFEN - MADANG* area and occupy western *NEW BRITAIN*.

(c) Seize and occupy *SOLOMON ISLANDS* to include the southern portion of *BOUGAINVILLE*.

"5. Purposes To inflict losses on Japanese forces, to deny these areas to *JAPAN*, to contain Japanese forces in the *PACIFIC* Theater by maintaining the initiative, and to prepare for the ultimate seizure of *BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO*."

b. Present Status of Operations

(1) General

The Supreme Commander, *SWPA*, given 15 June 1943 as the target date for the occupation of *KIRIWINA* and *WOODLARK ISLANDS*. No date is indicated for subsequent phases of the entire operation.

(2) Forces Required

It is estimated that on 1 July 1943, *UNITED NATIONS* forces in the *SOUTH* and *SOUTHWEST PACIFIC* areas will total 14 offensive divisions and 2,106 combat aircraft. These forces, together with naval forces in the area, are considered adequate for the operations directed.

(3) Time of Completion

The exact timing of the successive operations is impracticable at this time to predict, since the enemy reaction to the plans is indeterminate, and limited topographical intelligence may result in unexpected hindrances. The operations may run well into 1944.

c. Subsequent Operations

(1) Capture *BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO*

(a) General

UNITED NATIONS strategic plans envisage the capture of the *BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO* (including *ADMIRALTY ISLANDS*) following the completion of tasks indicated in paragraph *a* above.

The existing concept of operations provides initially for the capture of *KAVIENG*, in order to isolate sea communications to *RABAU*L. After the establishment of airdromes in *NEW BRITAIN* and *NEW IRELAND* the defenses of *RABAU*L will be heavily attacked

by land-based aviation. When the enemy defenses are softened up, capture of the area will be made by two amphibious forces. One force will be mounted from the *SOUTHWEST PACIFIC* and one from the *SOUTH PACIFIC*.

After the seizure of the *NEW BRITAIN-NEW IRELAND* area, the *ADMIRALTY ISLANDS* can be neutralized by land-based aviation operating from *NEW GUINEA* and *NEW BRITAIN*. Seizure will be made by amphibious forces.

(b) Forces Required

The Supreme Commander, *SWPA*, estimates that 7 Infantry divisions, 5 of which are amphibious, will be required to seize *KAVIENG* and capture *RABAUL*. It is believed, however that with effective air neutralization of the *RABAUL* area, the foregoing estimate may be reduced to 5 divisions, 3 of which would be amphibious.

The timing of the capture of the *BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO* will determine to a great extent the availability of ground forces. Provided there is sufficient time for reorganization and recuperation of units, it appears the 5 divisions can be provided from the 18 offensive divisions allocated to the area as of 1 January 1944. This figure will be subject to revision after the operations now projected for the area get under way. The ground forces required for the successive operations in the *BISMARCK-NEW GUINEA* area must take into account the losses from malaria and battle casualties which necessitate withdrawal of troops to rear areas for rehabilitation after four to six months.

It appears that 2,579 combat aircraft allocated to the *SOUTH* and *SOUTHWEST PACIFIC* as of 1 January 1944, will be sufficient to complete the capture of the *BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO*.

(c) Time Required for Operation

Assuming the *UNITED NATIONS* establish positions in western *NEW BRITAIN* and southern *ROUGAINVILLE* by 1 December 1943,

it is estimated that, exclusive of medical rehabilitation of personnel, at least two months will be required to reorganize amphibious units, develop the advance air bases, and make the complete preparations for the amphibious attack on the *RABAUL* area. It is estimated that a minimum of two months will be required to complete the operations subsequent to the landing attack on *RABAUL*. From the foregoing, it appears that the most optimistic estimates indicate that the *BISMARCK* operations cannot be completed before 1 April 1944.

8. Operations in *NEW GUINEA*

a. Capture *NEW GUINEA*

After the seizure of the *HUON PENINSULA* and the capture of the of the *BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO*, our strategic plans contemplate operations to extend our line of communications through the *PACIFIC* to the *HALMAHERA-northwest CELEBES* area. The control of *NEW GUINEA* to include the *VOGELKOP* area is obviously essential to accomplishing this objective.

The concept of operations for the seizure of *NEW GUINEA* envisages the projection of our line of communications to the *VOGELKOP* region by the successive seizure of air bases along the north and southwest coasts.

The initial phases of operations along the north coast consist primarily of air-ground action, covered by air and fleet operations to prevent interference by enemy counterattacks. Ground forces will be employed in the seizure of air bases by shore-to-shore amphibious operations.

In order to gain control of the *ARAFURA-BANDA* seas and of the south coast of *NEW GUINEA*, it will be necessary to seize *AROE*, *KEI*, and possibly *TANIMBAR* Island.

b. The operations to capture *NEW GUINEA* will consist of two phases as follows:

PHASE I

(1) Seizure of north coast of *NEW GUINEA* to include *CAPE D'URVILLE*.

(2) Establishment of an air base on southwest coast of *NEW GUINEA* as a preliminary to seizure of the *AROE* Islands. Possible occupation of *TANIMBAR* Island.

PHASE II

(1) Capture of the *VOGELKOP* area to include the Island of *WAI GEO*.

This phase will be accomplished by the seizure of *SCHOUTEN* and *JAPEN* Islands on the north coast. The southern and western portion of the *VOGELKOP* will be seized after we have established positions in *McCLUER GULF* and *AMBOINA*.

c. The capture of *NEW GUINEA* envisages a movement along the coast line 1,200 miles in length. The forces required for this operation, so distant in the future, cannot be estimated with any degree of accuracy. After the loss of the *HUON PENINSULA* and the *RABAUL* area, the enemy may decide to withdraw to a more advantageous defensive position in the *CELEBES SEA* area. On the other hand, he may be able to build up his defenses in depth along the entire north coast.

The extent of our control of the sea to the north of *NEW GUINEA* will in a great measure determine the ease with which we eject him from the area.

d. Estimate of Enemy Forces

(1) *Ground forces*

It is estimated that the Japanese now have approximately five divisions deployed in the area. It is assumed that this force could be augmented to a total of eight divisions. Port facilities and enemy shipping will be limiting factors.

(2) *Air forces*

It is estimated that the Japanese now have approximately 807 operative aircraft deployed in this area (*SOUTH* and *SOUTHWEST PACIFIC*). It is assumed that the Japanese could reinforce to a total of 1,000 to 1,200 aircraft, depending on the state of their activity and requirements on other fronts.

e. ESTIMATE OF UNITED NATIONS FORCES REQUIRED

(1) Ground forces (assault units)

- 2 air-borne divisions
- 16 infantry divisions (including 5 amphibious)
- 2 parachute regiments

(2) Air forces

(a) Assault

Type	Groups	Aircraft		
BH	7	245		
BM	6	321		
L/DB	6	321		
Fighters	9	720		
Photo Recon.	1	52		
Obsn.	5	260		
Troop Carrier	10	390	Groups	Aircraft
Total	44	2309	44	2309

(b) Area defense

BH	3	105		
BM	3	171		
L/DB	3	171		
Fighters	3	240		
Photo Recon.	1	52		
Obsn.	-	--		
Troop Carrier	-	--		
Total	13	739	13	739
TOTAL			57	3048

(3) Naval forces

Sufficient forces to

- (a) Cover advances along the north and south coasts of NEW GUINEA.
- (b) Protect line of communications.
- (c) Provide naval defense in ARAFURA-BANDA Seas.

9. FURTHER OPERATIONS TO EASTERN NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

a. Paragraph 8 discussed the implications of a campaign through the ARAFURA-BANDA sea area for the purpose of seizing the VOGELKOP region. If those operations are not conducted, other offensive-defensive operations should be undertaken in the TIMOR-CELEBES-CERAM area in order to maintain the security of AUSTRALIA and subject enemy forces to attrition.

b. These operations will consist of air and amphibious action. In view of other operations more pressing in attaining our strategic objectives, it is considered that the availability of forces will limit our activity primarily to air action.

10. OPERATIONS IN THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

a. The capture and occupation of the *MARSHALL ISLANDS* is a preliminary objective in establishing a line of communications to the *CELEBES SEA*. It also secures and shortens the line of communications to the *SOUTHWEST PACIFIC*. The occupation of these islands extends our control of the sea two thousand miles into the central *PACIFIC*. Land-based aircraft from bases in the *MARSHALLS* will facilitate the operation of naval surface craft against enemy lines of communication. Operations in this area will force attritional losses on enemy aircraft and shipping. It may also compel the Japanese Fleet to accept battle. It is in conformity with the strategic plan for the defeat of *JAPAN*.

b. Operations against enemy positions in the *MARSHALLS* consist of amphibious operations initially supported by carrier aircraft. The success of the operation will be greatly enhanced by the use of amphibious tractors which are capable of crossing coral reefs.

c. To control the *MARSHALLS* it will be necessary to occupy or neutralize all of the major atolls in the group and *WAKE ISLAND*. The amphibious troops will have to be relieved by garrison troops, and then reorganized and trained for the *CAROLINE* operations. A minimum estimate of the periods required are as follows:

Control of the <i>MARSHALLS</i>	3.0 months
Relief by garrison force	1.5 "
Rehabilitation in <i>HAWAII</i>	75 "
Training new replacements and rehearsals for <i>CAROLINES</i>	1.0 "
Movement, <i>HAWAII</i> to <i>MARSHALLS</i> and preparation for assault on <i>PONAPE</i>	.5 "
TOTAL	<u>6.75 months</u>

d. It is estimated that forces required for capture of the *MARSHALLS* are as follows:

(1) *Ground*

2 Infantry Amphibious Divisions, reinforced

(2) *Air*

2 Groups, Bombardment (H)

2 Groups, Fighter

Carrier-based aircraft in 4 CVs and 4 ACVs

(72 VT, 192 VSB, 156 VF)

(3) *Naval*

4 BB, 4 CV, 7 ACV, 8 CA, 8 CL, 63 DD,

24 APA, 44 LST, plus landing craft.

e. The following forces will be required to garrison the islands:

(1) *Ground*

1 Infantry Division, reinforced

10 Defense Battalions

(2) *Air*

	<u>B(H)</u>	<u>B(M)</u>	<u>VF</u>	<u>VSB</u>	<u>VT</u>	<u>Total</u>
Land-based	72	72	221	108	72	545
Seaplanes	72 VP					
	24 VSO					

(3) *Naval*

18 PT, miscellaneous craft.

11. OPERATIONS IN THE CAROLINES

a. Purpose

Operations in the *CAROLINES* will be for the purpose of wresting control of the central *PACIFIC* from the Japanese. The establishment of a main fleet base at *TRUK*, adequately protected by outlying air bases, is required in order to maintain control, and thus be in a position to continue westward across the *PACIFIC*, to provide naval support for *BANDA SEA* operations, or to directly threaten the Japanese Archipelago.

b. Operations required

The following operations are required in a campaign to capture the *CAROLINES*:

TASK ONE. To capture *PONAPE* and *TRUK*, and to establish air and garrison forces thereon.

(1) *Operations*

(a) Capture *PONAPE*.

(b) Destroy or neutralize enemy air on atolls within radius of 250 miles and as far west as *WOLEAI*.

(c) Prevent interference with landing operations by major naval forces.

(d) Prevent strong reinforcement of *TRUK* garrison after landing operations have been initiated.

(e) Capture *TRUK*, by attack launched from the *MARSHALLS* and *PONAPE*, in three phases with several days elapsing between initial landing and final assault and capture, during which time considerable naval support must remain in the vicinity. The capture should not be envisaged as placing a landing force ashore and then a departure of naval forces.

(f) Movement of garrison forces to *TRUK*.

TASK TWO. To secure control of the western *CAROLINES*.

(1) *Operations*

(a) Neutralization of enemy air establishments in the western *CAROLINES* in which there are five probable seaplane bases.

(b) Aerial raids against *GUAM* and *SAIPAN*.

(c) Aerial raids against *KAPINGAMARINGI*, if enemy occupies *RBAUL*.

(d) Establishment of air and garrison forces on *NOMOI*, *WOLEAI*, and *GAFERUT*.

TASK THREE. To establish a main fleet operating base on *TRUK*.

(1) Availability of mobile operating and repair facilities such as *LIONS*, *CUBS*, and *ACORNS* must be assured prior to execution of *TASK TWO*.

(2) *Operations*

(a) Assembly of this material at *PEARL HARBOR* and western coast of the *UNITED STATES*.

(b) Movement of this material to *TRUK* and assembly thereof.

c. *FACTORS INFLUENCING THE CAMPAIGN*

(1) The campaign should be launched from the *MARSHALLS* even though we hold *RABAU*. It should follow the capture of the *MARSHALLS* as quickly as possible. It appears that the controlling factors in this respect will be:

(a) Length of time the two amphibious divisions which captured the *MARSHALLS* are held thereon before being relieved by the garrison division.

(b) The availability of a third amphibious division and its transports.

(2) A study of the time required to complete the operations enumerated in Tasks One, Two, and Three, above, clearly indicates that the capture of the *CAROLINES* will require a campaign of several months duration.

d. *ESTIMATE OF FORCES REQUIRED*

(1) In determining forces required, estimates are based on tasks to be performed and a considerable increase of the Japanese garrisons. At *TRUK*, the garrison is estimated to be one reinforced division.

(2) *For the capture of the CAROLINES*

(a) *Ground*

3 Inf. Amph. Divs., reinf.

(b) *Air*

Land-based

2 Groups, Bombardment (H)

Carrier-based (10 CV's *ENTERPRISE-ESSEX*
Class and 7 ACV's)

VF	VSB	VT	VSTB
Sq.	Sq.	Sq.	Sq.
23-1/2	23	7	4-1/2

(c) *Naval*

4 BB, 9 OBB, 10 CV, 7 ACV, 3 CA, 10 CA or CL,
18 CL, 108 DD, 20 SS, 45 APA, 15 AKA, 6 LSD,
3 Hq. Ships, Misc. aux.

(3) *For garrisoning the CAROLINES*

(a) *Ground*

2 Infantry Divisions, reinforced
3 Defense Battalions

(b) *Air*

Land-based

1 VP Wing
3 VSO (Naval) Squadrons
1 Group, Bombardment (H)
1 Group, Bombardment (M)
1 Group, Bombardment (L and D)
2 Groups, Pursuit

(c) *Naval*

Misc. Harbor and Local Defense Craft

12. OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH PACIFIC

a. *General*

Operations are now in progress for the capture of *ATTU* and the occupation of *SHEMYA*. These operations envisage cutting the enemy line of communications from *JAPAN* to *KISKA*. The seizure of this area will provide additional bases for the air offensive against *KISKA* and will enable us to base our submarine operations further to the westward.

Until the Japanese are driven out of *KISKA*, the *UNITED STATES* must keep large air and ground forces in the *ALEUTIANS* and is forced to

disperse naval forces to that area. The Japanese must be expelled from *KISKA*. It may be that the air offensive and blockade will force them to evacuate or surrender. Based on the results of the aerial offensive which has been in progress for several months past, it is probable that landing operations will be required.

The Japanese reaction to our seizure of *ATTU* will determine the strength of forces and length of time required for operations in the north *PACIFIC*.

b. U. S. forces now engaged

(1) Ground

3 Infantry Regiments, reinforced
1 Engineer Regiment

(2) Air

2 Sq. Heavy Bombardment
2 Sq. Medium Bombardment
6 Sq. Pursuit
54 Patrol planes

(3) Naval

3 OBB, 3 CA, 4 CL, 19 DD, 3 DM, 11 OSS, 1 ACV,
4 APA, 1 APD, 4 AP, 1 AT, 1 XAP, 3 XAK, 3 XAPc,
6 AO, 2 AD, 11 MTB, 1 AVP, 2 DE, 1 PG, 3 AM, 4 LST.

c. Our present strategic concept does not contemplate further amphibious operations west of the *ALEUTIANS*. Our forces there will assume a defensive role until conditions are favorable to operations in support of *RUSSIA* in the *KAMCHATKA PENINSULA*-Siberian area.

13. NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC

Naval operations in the fall of 1943 will have to be undertaken in the *PACIFIC* to hold Japanese naval forces in the *PACIFIC* at the time operations are conducted in the Bay of Bengal in connection with operations in *BURMA*. It is unlikely that operations in the *SOLOMONS-NEW GUINEA* area will have the desired effect. Probably a carrier-based air attack on *JAPAN* will be required.

AVAILABILITY AS TO MEANS

14. General

One of the controlling factors for the operations discussed above is the availability of amphibious divisions and amphibious equipment.

a. Amphibious divisions

The only amphibious divisions available in May, 1943 are two Marine Corps divisions in the *SOUTH PACIFIC* and one in the *SOUTHWEST PACIFIC*. Readiness for action dates are:

1st Marine Division, (Southwest Pac)	1 June
2d Marine Division, (SoPac)	1 June
3d Marine Division, (less 1 Regt.) (SoPac)	1 June
1 Regt., 3d Marine Division	15 July

Commander *SOUTHWEST PACIFIC* has set 15 June as target date for commencing operations designed to continue as far as *MADANG (NEW GUINEA)* - western *NEW BRITAIN - BOUGAINVILLE*, and has stated that sequence and timing is subject to fluctuation of tactical circumstances. Three amphibious divisions are required in these operations.

A most optimistic view, excluding the capture of *RABAU*, can not envisage relief of amphibious divisions from the *SOLOMON - BISMARCK - NEW GUINEA* area before February, 1944. Any division relieved will require four to six months for rehabilitation.

The 4th Marine Division is scheduled to depart *UNITED STATES* in December, 1943. It could be earmarked as one of the two amphibious divisions required for the capture of the *MARSHALLS*, provided excessive losses are not encountered in *SOUTHWEST PACIFIC* operations prior to the completion of the *MADANG (NEW GUINEA)* - western *NEW BRITAIN - BOUGAINVILLE* campaign.

Therefore, for the capture of the *MARSHALLS* there is available one Marine Corps amphibious division from the *UNITED STATES* in December, 1943, while the other must be provided from the *SOUTHWEST PACIFIC* or by training an Army division in the *UNITED STATES*.

(1) Summary of availability of amphibious divisions

<u>Campaign number</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Divisions required</u>	<u>Possible sources of divisions required</u>
1	MADANG-western NEW BRITAIN - DOUGAINVILLE (See par. 7 a)	3	3 Marine Corps Divisions in SOUTH PACIFIC and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
2	BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO (See par. 7 c)	5 (possibly reduced to three)	3 Marine Corps Divisions used in Campaign No. 1, after 4 - 6 months rehabilitation. 1 Marine Corps Division from U. S. in Dec., 1943. 1 Army Division must be trained.
3	NEW GUINEA (See par. 8)	5	CASE I Army and Marine Corps Divisions used in Campaign No. 2, after 4 - 6 months rehabilitation or CASE II Train 5 Army Divisions during Campaign No. 2.
4	Further opera- tions in eastern NEI (See par. 9)	5	Same as for Campaign No. 3

<u>Campaign number</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Divisions required</u>	<u>Possible sources of divisions required</u>
5	MARSHALL ISLANDS (See par. 10)	2	<p>CASE I</p> <p>1 Marine Corps Division in U. S. in 1943 in which case 2 Army Divisions must be trained for Campaign No. 2.</p> <p>1 Marine Corps Division from SOUTH PACIFIC upon completion Campaign No. 1 in which case other provisions must be made for 1 Division if Campaign No. 2 is to follow No. 1 without delay.</p> <p>or</p> <p>CASE II</p> <p>1 Marine Corps Division in U. S. in December, 1943 with same implications as noted in Case I.</p> <p>1 Army Division or a new Marine Corps Division must be trained in U. S.</p>
6	CAROLINES (See par. 11)		<p>CASE I</p> <p>2 Divs. used in Campaign No. 5.</p> <p>1 Army or a second new Marine Corps Division must be trained in U. S.</p> <p>or</p>

<u>Campaign number</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Divisions required</u>	<u>Possible sources of divisions required</u>
			<i>CASE II</i>
			2 Divisions used in Campaign No. 5.
			1 Division from <i>SOUTH PACIFIC</i> about after Campaign No. 2, and possibly after 4 - 6 months rehabilitation; in which circumstances Campaign No. 3 (Case I) will be short 1 Division and arrangements must be made to provide it.

NOTE: It should be emphasized that in transferring divisions from *SOUTH* or *SOUTHWEST PACIFIC* to central *PACIFIC* an additional load will be placed on shipping.

(2) *Conclusions based on above summary*

A minimum of four additional amphibious divisions must be organized. Consideration should be given to organizing:

- 2 Marine Corps divisions - making a total of 6 Marine Corps divisions.
- 2 Army divisions.

b. Amphibious craft

(1) It is estimated that 26 APA's and 7 AKA's will be in service in the *PACIFIC* on 1 January 1944. This will be sufficient to lift two amphibious divisions. Assuming that all APA's and AKA's becoming available for assignment in 1944 are assigned to the *PACIFIC*, and allowing no attrition after 1 January 1944, the following table indicates the number available to meet all of the requirements in the *PACIFIC* Theater:

	1 Apr 1944	1 Jul 1944	1 Oct 1944	1 Jan 1945
APA	31	43	55	63
AKA	8	20	32	40

The *CAROLINE* operations alone will require 45 APA's.

(2) In addition to special types of landing craft now allocated for use in the *PACIFIC*, it is assumed that landing craft used for cross-Channel operations in May 1944 will become available for transfer to *PACIFIC* Theater about June 1944.

c. *Ground (less amphibious), air, and naval forces*

The *UNITED NATIONS* have 14 offensive divisions in the *SOUTH* and *SOUTHWEST PACIFIC* Theaters. The deployment of these divisions cannot be determined far in advance of an actual operation. The requirements for the defense of important bases in the line of communications, and the necessity for rehabilitation of units greatly reduces the number of units actually available at any one time for offensive action.

Experiences to date in *NEW GUINEA* and the *SOLOMON ISLANDS* indicate that combat units can carry on offensive operations for approximately 3 months, after which they must be withdrawn to rear positions for recuperation. For each division (or similar combat unit) actually engaged with the enemy, it is essential that an additional division be located in the combat zone in order to insure the availability of combat units to meet counter-attacks or recoup an unfavorable situation. Due to the distances involved, the recuperative period will be about 6 months. It follows that one-third the combat units will at all times be in, or enroute to, recuperative bases too far from the combat zone to be available for an emergency. For planning purposes, it can therefore be assumed that not over one-third of the offensive divisions actually in the area will be available for operations at any given date. The foregoing estimate is substantiated by experiences thus far in the *PACIFIC* Theater.

Estimates of requirements for subsequent operations are therefore based on the foregoing analysis.

15. OPERATIONS IN CHINA

a. Air

The estimated aircraft requirements for CHINA as listed in paragraph 6 d above, totals 473 airplanes.

Present deployments indicate the following total aircraft available, and shortages, not classified by types:

	<u>Aircraft available</u>	<u>Shortage</u>
Present	209	264
July 1, 1943	209	264
Jan 1, 1944	209	264
July 1, 1944	279	194
Jan 1, 1945	279	194

16. OPERATIONS IN BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO

a. Ground

It was noted in paragraph 7 c (1) (b) that a minimum of five divisions will be required for the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO. Assuming the occupation of the MADANG-western NEW BRITAIN-BOUGAINVILLE area is accomplished with the forces now planned, it is estimated there will be sufficient infantry divisions available in the area to complete the BISMARCK operation. The availability of amphibious forces has been discussed in paragraph 14 a, above.

b. Air

2,579 combat airplanes are estimated to be required in the area. This number will be available as of 1 January 1944. This includes Army, Navy, R.A.A.F., and R.N.Z.A.F. Some adjustment as to types may be necessary.

c. Naval

Sufficient naval forces will be made available for this operation.

17. OPERATIONS IN NEW GUINEA

a. Ground

It is estimated that 18 offensive divisions will be required to capture *NEW GUINEA*. In addition a minimum of five divisions will be required to secure vital bases on the line of communications, making a total of 23 divisions. Tentative deployments as of 1 January 1944 indicate that the *UNITED NATIONS* will have 18 divisions in the *SOUTH* and *SOUTHWEST PACIFIC*. This number is exclusive of Australian and *NEW ZEALAND* defense divisions.

It would appear, therefore, that a minimum of five additional offensive divisions will be required to provide the necessary divisions to capture *NEW GUINEA*.

It should be pointed out that the 18 divisions include three U. S. Marine Divisions. The withdrawal of these units to the central *PACIFIC* would require their replacement with three Army Divisions.

The status of the availability of the amphibious equipment for this operation cannot be determined until after the *RABAUL* campaign.

b. Air

A total of 3,048 combat aircraft are estimated to be required for this operation. As of 1 January 1944, 2,579 will be available. This includes Army, Navy, R.A.A.F., and R.N.Z.A.F. This indicates a shortage of 469 aircraft. In addition some adjustment as to types may be necessary.

c. Naval

In view of the other operations which may be conducted in the *PACIFIC*, such as the *BISMARCK*, *CAROLINE*, or *MARSHALLS* operations, the requirements and availability of naval forces for the capture of *NEW GUINEA* cannot be determined.

18. OPERATIONS IN THE MARSHALL AND CAROLINE ISLANDS

a. Ground

The defense of the *MARSHALL* and *CAROLINE ISLANDS* will require three Army Divisions. One division may be obtained from *HAWAII* by reducing the strength of the garrison to two divisions. The remaining two divisions must come from the *UNITED STATES*.

b. Air (*MARSHALLS*)

(less carrier-based)

	<u>Assault</u>	<u>Garrison</u>
B (H)	96	72
B (M)	0	72
B (L/D)	0	180
Ftr	200	221
	<u>296</u>	<u>545</u>

As of 1 January 1944 the U. S. Navy will have 714 combat aircraft of all types (exclusive of carrier-based), deployed for special assignment by *CINCPAC*. Required aircraft should be available for this operation.

c. Naval (*MARSHALLS*)

The situation in cruisers to mount the *MARSHALL ISLANDS* operation (8 CL plus 8 CA) will be tight until early in 1944. As of 1 January 1944 there will be 9 CA, 12 CL, and 4 OCL in the *PACIFIC*. If all cruisers which become available for assignment in the first quarter of 1944 (1 CA and 4 CL) are assigned to the *PACIFIC*, and assuming no attrition after 1 January 1944, there would be available on 1 April 1944 10 CA, 16 CL, and 4 OCL. After meeting the requirements for this operation 2 CA, 8 CL, and 4 OCL would be available to meet all other requirements in the *PACIFIC*. One CL and one CA become available for assignment during the second quarter of 1944.

d. Air (CAROLINES)

(exclusive of carrier-based)

	<u>Assault</u>	<u>Garrison</u>
VSO	0	36
B (H)	96	48
B (M)	0	64
B (L/D)	0	96
Ftr	0	200
	<u>96</u>	<u>444</u>

As of 1 January 1944 the U. S. Navy will have 714 combat aircraft of all types (exclusive of carrier-based) deployed for special assignment by CINCPAC. No deployments have been made for later dates, but it is assumed that this figure of 714 will be increased after 1 January 1944 and that the *CAROLINE* operation is not likely to occur until after this date. It therefore appears that sufficient aircraft will be available for this operation.

e. Naval (CAROLINES)

The *CAROLINES* operation requires 4 BB and 9 OBB, total 13. Assigned to the *PACIFIC* as of 1 January 1944 are 6 BB and 8 OBB, total 14. One additional BB becomes available for assignment in the 3rd quarter of 1944.

Thirty-one cruisers are required for this operation. Assigned to the *PACIFIC* as of 1 January 1944 are 9 CA, 12 CL, 4 OCL, a total of 25. Assuming the 2 CA and 5 CL which become available in the first half of 1944 are all assigned to the *PACIFIC*, and no attrition after 1 January 1944, there will be 32 cruisers in the *PACIFIC* on 1 July 1944 available to meet all the requirements of that area.

Ten CV are required for the *CAROLINES*. Nine will be available for the *PACIFIC* on 1 January 1944. Assuming the five which become available in the first half of 1944 are all assigned to the *PACIFIC*, and no attrition after 1 January 1944, on 1 July 1944 there will be 14 CV available to meet all the requirements of that area. Seven ACV will be required and will be available.

It is estimated that destroyers and other types can be made available.

19. *SUMMARY AS TO AVAILABILITY OF MEANS*

a. Ground

From the above, it is estimated that the capture of *NEW GUINEA* and the *MARSHALL* and *CAROLINE ISLANDS* will require the shipment of 7 additional Army divisions to the *PACIFIC*.

b. Air

Air operations in *CHINA* will require additional aircraft as shown in paragraph 15 a above.

Air deployments to *SOUTH* and *SOUTHWEST PACIFIC* (2,579 aircraft), 1 January 1944, have been made in accordance with requests for forces by the Commander, *SOUTHWEST PACIFIC*, to perform tasks assigned, exclusive of capture of *RABAU*.

It is entirely possible that attrition of Japanese aircraft during the preliminary phases of operations under way will permit the taking of *RABAU* and completion of subsequent operations in *NEW GUINEA*, with the forces allocated.

However, for planning purposes, and assuming *JAPAN* has not been evicted from the *CAROLINES*, it is estimated that for operations to complete the capture of *NEW GUINEA*, including defense forces, 3,048 aircraft will be required. This indicates a shortage of 469 aircraft as of 1 January 1944.

There will be sufficient land-based aircraft available to *CINCPAC* for the operations in the *MARSHALLS* and *CAROLINES* during 1944.

c. Naval

It is concluded that there are sufficient naval forces to carry on major operations in the central *PACIFIC* and amphibious operations in the *SOUTH PACIFIC* simultaneously during 1943-44.

d. Logistics

The logistical implications for supporting major operations such as those in *NEW GUINEA* or the *CAROLINES* have not been assessed in this paper. Among these implications would be the shipping required to support the additional ground, air, and naval forces moved to the theater. Furthermore, as the forces advance there will be increasing demands for cargo shipping due to the extension of the line of communications, such as from *HAWAII* to the *MARSHALLS*, the *MARSHALLS* to the *CAROLINES*, or from *RABAU* to *NEW GUINEA*.

20. SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC

Operations in the northern *PACIFIC* are in progress.

The *MADANG*-western *NEW BRITAIN-BOUGAINVILLE* campaign will commence about 15 June, and will probably take the remainder of 1943 to complete.

Prior to the completion of the above campaign, a decision must be made whether to launch the *BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO* or *MARSHALL ISLANDS* campaign. The *MARSHALL ISLANDS* campaign cannot be launched before early 1944.

The relative value, as well as the magnitude, of further operations in *NEW GUINEA* with respect to operations in the *CAROLINE ISLANDS* must be assessed during the progress of the *BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO* or *MARSHALL ISLANDS* campaign, depending on which had been previously selected.

When the direction of the main effort has been determined, a firm decision on the sequence of operations can be made.

CONCLUSIONS

21. From the above discussion, it is concluded that the objectives in the *PACIFIC* and *FAR EAST* in the 1943-44 should be:

- a. Conduct of air operations in and from *CHINA*.
- b. Operations in *BURMA* to augment supplies to *CHINA*.
- c. Ejection of Japanese from the *ALEUTIANS*.
- d. Seizure of the *MARSHALL* and *CAROLINE ISLANDS*.
- e. Seizure of the *SOLOMONS*, the *BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO*, and Japanese held *NEW GUINEA*.

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C.C.S. 240

SONIC WARFARE

Reference:

CCS 93rd Meeting, Item (4)

C.C.S. 240 was circulated 21 May 1943 for consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In their 93rd Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations contained in this paper.

C.C.S. 240

21 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

SONIC WARFARE

*Memorandum by the Representatives of
British Chiefs of Staff*

1. The development of Sonic equipment in the United Kingdom has been based on the use of sound for the purpose of deception. Sounds of tanks, vehicles and other battle noises can now be reproduced with 98 per cent fidelity over ranges of 1500 to 3500 yards according to conditions of weather and terrain. Special units are now being formed to handle this equipment and should be ready for operations by the autumn of 1943.

2. It is understood that Sonic equipment has been developed in the U.S.A. but no details are known. It is from the first use of this new weapon that the maximum effects can be expected, and it is considered that its first use should be in some major operation. The British Chiefs of Staff recommend, for the approval of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff, that the first operational use of Sonic Warfare in any form should be subject to the prior agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

C.C.S. 241/3

ANTI-U-BOAT WARFARE
(Suggested Basis for Discussion)

Reference:

CCS 93rd Meeting, Item (2)

CCS 94th Meeting, Item (2)

C.C.S. 241 (21 May 1943) circulated lines for discussion of the subject, suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff.

In their 94th Meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered C.C.S. 241 together with C.C.S. 241/1, a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff, and took note of C.C.S. 241 subject to certain amendments. (Subsequently published as C.C.S. 241/3.)

C.C.S. 241/3

24 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ANTI-U-BOAT WARFARE

(Suggested Basis for Discussion)

Reference: C.C.S. 94th Mtg., Item 2

Note by the Secretaries

The attached Memorandum, amended in accordance with C.C.S. 94th Meeting, conclusion 2 a. is circulated herewith for purposes of record.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

(No paper has been circulated with the number C.C.S. 241/2.)

ENCLOSURE

ANTI-U-BOAT WARFARE

(Suggested Basis for Discussion)

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

1. FLEXIBILITY OF SUPPORT GROUPS

During the last month support groups have proved how essential they are whilst the escorts for convoys are below strength. At the moment the U-boats are disposed with the majority of those working in the Atlantic to the north of the line 40° N. It is estimated that the number of support groups required in the area north of 40° N. is 9, but owing to the withdrawal of the Home Fleet destroyers, which are now acting as support groups, the number from the middle of June onwards will be reduced to 7, in which is included *BOGUE'S* support group. The 7 support groups will only be obtained by opening the cycle of HX ON convoys from 5 to 7½ days, in consequence of which the number of

ships in each convoy will be increased up to a possible maximum of 80. In view of the importance of not reducing the number of support groups below 7, it is hoped that *BOGUE's* support group may be retained until it is possible to replace it, which is not likely to be until the end of August.

On the assumption that it is the intention of the Navy Department to create support groups operating in connection with convoys running south of 40° N., it is suggested that support groups should be transferred from the area north of 40° N. to that south of 40° N. or vice versa, according to how the U-boats are disposed.

2. V.L.R. AIRCRAFT

At the present time, 45 V.L.R. are in operation either from Iceland (C) or N. Ireland. In addition there are 16 Halifaxes which cannot do more than 1700 miles. It would be of value if we could be informed of the rate of build up of the V.L.R. aircraft in Newfoundland.

3. BAY OFFENSIVE

The number of aircraft available for the Bay Offensive is now 72 short of the number it is estimated is required for producing the results given in C.C.S. 189/4.

Between 13th April and 17th May there were 89 sightings and 60 attacks in the Bay of Biscay area. The results of these attacks are as follows:

- 2 sunk
- 3 probably sunk
- 4 probably seriously damaged.

We are at the moment shorter of aircraft for day patrol as opposed to night patrol and hence it is not necessary for all the 72 aircraft referred to above to be fitted with A.S.V., and though it is desirable that these aircraft should be L.R., this also is not essential.

As the U-boat offensive in the Bay is equally effective whatever the "trend" of the disposition of the U-boats may be, it is of great importance that it should be made fully efficient at the earliest possible date.

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It is therefore hoped that as many additional aircraft as possible up to a maximum of 72 may be provided by the U. S. A. to supplement the Bay Offensive.

4. TRANSFER OF AIRCRAFT FROM U. S. ARMY ANTI-SUBMARINE COMMAND TO BAY OFFENSIVE

In the U. S. Army Anti-Submarine Command Monthly Intelligence Report for February, 1943, it is noticed that the number of hours flown on anti-submarine operations in the Gulf and Eastern Sea Frontiers was 26,067 and that there were no sightings or sinkings due to the fact that there were apparently no U-boats in either of these areas during February. On the other hand, the operational hours flown by Coastal Command, including Iceland (C) and Gibraltar, for the same month totalled 14,000. During this period there were over 100 U-boats operating in Coastal Command's area and there were 87 sightings of U-boats and 43 attacks.

The accepted policy as laid down in A.C.C.3 was that A/S air units should be transferred from time to time where the need is greatest. On the above facts it would appear that it would be advantageous to transfer some of the aircraft now working in the Gulf and Eastern Sea Frontiers to the Bay Offensive and it is suggested that this should be given consideration. On the other hand it is believed that the number of operational hours flown by aircraft in the Gulf and Eastern Sea Frontiers is largely made up of patrols by single seater aircraft of short range, which would be of no value for the Bay Offensive and, should this be the case, the case for a transfer as proposed above would not be so strong.

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C.C.S. 241/4

ANTI-U-BOAT WARFARE

Reference:

CCS 93rd Meeting, Item (2)

CCS 94th Meeting, Item (2)

C.C.S. 241/1 (22 May 1943) circulated a memorandum by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

In their 94th Meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered C.C.S. 241/1 together with C.C.S. 241. They agreed to take note of C.C.S. 241/1 subject to certain amendments. (Subsequently published as 241/4.)

C.C.S. 241/4

24 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ANTI-U-BOAT WARFARE

Reference: C.C.S. 94th Mtg., Item 2

Note by the Secretaries

The attached memorandum, amended in accordance with C.C.S. 94th Meeting, Conclusion 2 *b*, is circulated herewith for purposes of record.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE

22 May 1943

MEMORANDUM BY
THE UNITED STATES CHIEFS OF STAFF
TO
THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: C.C.S. 241

1. *FLEXIBILITY OF SUPPORT GROUPS*

The views as to the value of support groups and altering of convoy cycles in the *NORTH ATLANTIC* are concurred in. However, prospective additional commitments are such that there is small possibility of the *UNITED STATES* being able to maintain any support groups other than the *BOGUE* Group which, though committed only until 1 July 1943, will be made available to operate under British control until 1 September 1943. As to recommendations for exchange of support groups between the area north

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of 40-N and south of 40-N, this is a matter that should be handled by the First Sea Lord and the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and not by the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board. This view is taken because this matter is considered to be a command function.

2. VLR AIRCRAFT

At present there are one and one half Army squadrons and one half a Navy squadron in *NEWFOUNDLAND*. It is planned that these numbers will be increased to two and one, respectively, as of 1 June and, by 1 July, to three Army squadrons and one Navy squadron.

3. BAY OFFENSIVE

On several previous occasions a genuine desire to augment British Air Forces in the Bay Offensive has been indicated. At the moment there are no LR planes in excess of requirements, but it appears possible that some British LR planes may become available for this project by 1 July when they can be relieved elsewhere. In this connection it is to be noted that fourteen squadrons of Navy LR planes (PBM type), that are frequently considered in making calculations as to possible assignments, are of a type that has not yet proven itself in service. This matter is further referred to in paragraph 4.

4. TRANSFER OF AIRCRAFT FROM U. S. ARMY AIR A/S COMMAND TO BAY OFFENSIVE

As to the 26,067 hours flown in the *GULF* and *EASTERN SEA FRONTIERS* in February, 1943, a breakdown of the figures shows that only about 4,500 of these hours were flown by planes of the rating of LR (Army and Navy), or better; the remainder having been flown by SR planes and Civil Air Patrol. Investigations toward this end which have been in hand for some time will be continued in the endeavor to provide planes for service in the *BAY OF BISCAY*.

C.C.S. 242/6

DRAFT OF AGREED DECISIONS

Reference:

CCS 92nd Meeting, Item (5)
4th White House Meeting
CCS 95th Meeting, Item (2)
5th White House Meeting
CCS 96th Meeting, Item (1)(2)
6th White House Meeting (2)

A memorandum to the President and Prime Minister setting out the agreed decisions that had been reached so far by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, C.C.S. 242, was prepared by the Secretaries at the direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 92nd Meeting, circulated and submitted 21 May 1943.

In the 4th White House Meeting certain amendments were agreed upon.

C.C.S. 242/1 (23 May 1943) was circulated for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as a draft report to the President and Prime Minister.

C.C.S. 242/2 (23 May 1943) was a revision of C.C.S. 242/1 prepared by the Combined Secretariat in the light of the most recent decisions.

Following the discussions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 95th Meeting C.C.S. 242/3 (24 May 1943) was the first draft of the Final Report to be presented to the President and Prime Minister.

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C.C.S. 242/3 was considered and amended in the 5th White House Meeting. Amended paper subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 242/4 (24 May 1943).

C.C.S. 242/5 (25 May 1943) contained certain changes to C.C.S. 242/4 which were suggested by the Prime Minister.

In their 96th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the final report to the President and Prime Minister (C.C.S. 242/4) as modified by C.C.S. 242/5 and as amended in the course of discussion.

The President and Prime Minister at the 6th White House Meeting gave final approval to the report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 242/6, 25 May 1943.)

C.C.S. 242/6

25 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

(FINAL REVISION)

FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

The Enclosure is the final report on the results of the Trident Conference as approved by the President and the Prime Minister on 27 May 1943.

ENCLOSURE

TRIDENT

Report to the President and Prime Minister of the Final Agreed Summary of Conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

In a previous memorandum (C.C.S. 242) the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented certain agreed conclusions reached during the present Conference regarding operations in the three main theaters. These conclusions have been amended to accord with the views expressed by the President and the Prime Minister. The amended conclusions, and others reached since the previous memorandum was submitted, have now been related to resources available, and a final agreed summary of conclusions is submitted herein.

I. OVERALL OBJECTIVE

In conjunction with *RUSSIA* and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the *AXIS* powers.

II. OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

1. In cooperation with *RUSSIA* and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the *AXIS* in *EUROPE*.

2. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other *PACIFIC* Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against *JAPAN* with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

3. Upon the defeat of the *AXIS* in *EUROPE*, in cooperation with other *PACIFIC* Powers and, if possible, with *RUSSIA*, to direct the full resources of the *UNITED STATES* and *GREAT BRITAIN* to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of *JAPAN*.

III. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

1. Maintain the security and war making capacity of the *WESTERN HEMISPHERE* and the *BRITISH ISLES*.

2. Support the war making capacity of our forces in all areas.

3. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

4. Intensify the air offensive against the *AXIS* Powers in *EUROPE*.

5. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the *AXIS* citadel.

6. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of *RUSSIA*.

7. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of *CHINA* as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against *JAPAN*.

8. To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of *TURKEY* in the war on the side of the Allies. (See also Section VI 1.)

9. To prepare the French Forces in *AFRICA* to fulfill an active role in the war against the *AXIS* powers. (See also Section VI 2.)

IV. SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR 1943-44 IN EXECUTION OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The following operations in execution of the overall strategic concept are agreed upon. No order of priority is necessary since the result of relating resources to operations shows that all are possible of accomplishment. (See Section V.) If a conflict of interests should arise, it will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. THE U-BOAT WAR

a. Operation to Seize the AZORES ISLANDS

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the occupation of the *AZORES* is essential to the efficient conduct of the anti-U-boat war for the reasons set out in the Annex. The preparation of the plan for the capture of the *AZORES ISLANDS* is a responsibility of the British Chiefs of Staff, and accordingly plans are actively in preparation under their authority. The British Chiefs of Staff have made a preliminary examination of these plans. It is proposed that the expedition should be mounted from the *UNITED KINGDOM* and that in the first place the islands of *FAYAL* and *TERCEIRA* should be seized. It is expected that a force of about nine battalions will be required. The availability of landing craft is likely to be the limiting factor regarding the date of the operation and as far as can be seen at

present the earliest date for the arrival of the force in the *AZORES* will be about the end of August. It is agreed that the land, air, and sea facilities of the *AZORES* will be available to all *UNITED NATIONS* forces.

The possibility of an earlier move on the *AZORES* will receive further study. Meanwhile, the political decision involved will be settled by the two Governments.

b. Other Anti-U-boat Measures

All possible measures for strengthening the air forces engaged in the Bay of Biscay Offensive and for increasing the number of VLR aircraft engaged in convoy protection have been examined and such steps as are practicable are being taken.

c. Flexibility of Forces

The necessity for flexibility in the utilization of both air and sea forces has been agreed, and steps to improve matters in this respect are being constantly studied and implemented.

2. DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE

a. Combined Bomber Offensive from the UNITED KINGDOM

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved a plan to accomplish, by a combined *U. S. - British* air offensive, the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German Military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.

The plan will be accomplished in four phases between now and 1 April 1944. In each successive phase our increased strength will allow a deeper penetration into enemy territory. An intermediate objective of particular importance is the continuing reduction of German fighter strength.

b. Cross-Channel Operations

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:

That forces and equipment shall be established in the *UNITED KINGDOM* with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the *UNITED KINGDOM* by 1 May 1944, in addition to the air forces then available.

Assault: 5 Infantry Divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing craft).

2 Infantry Divisions - Follow-up.

2 Air-borne Divisions.

Total 9 Divisions in the Assault.

Build-up: 20 Divisions available for movement into lodgment area.

Total 29 Divisions.

The possibility of adding one French Division will be considered at a later date.

The expansion of logistical facilities in the *UNITED KINGDOM* will be undertaken immediately, and after the initial assault, the seizure and development of Continental ports will be expedited in order that the build-up forces may be augmented by follow-up shipments from the *UNITED STATES* or elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of 3 to 5 divisions per month.

The preparation and constant keeping up to date of plans for an emergency crossing of the Channel in the event of a German collapse will proceed in accordance with the directive already given to General Morgan. In addition, General Morgan will prepare and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for sending forces to *NORWAY* in the event of a German evacuation becoming apparent.

c. Operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN* to Eliminate *ITALY* from the War
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:

That the Allied Commander in Chief, North Africa, will be instructed, as a matter of urgency, to plan such operations in exploitation of *HUSKY* as are best calculated to eliminate *ITALY* from the War and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Which of the various specific operations should be adopted, and thereafter mounted, is a decision which will be reserved to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander in Chief in *NORTH AFRICA* may use for his operations all those forces available in the *MEDITERRANEAN* Area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the *UNITED KINGDOM*, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for *HUSKY* will not be considered available. It is estimated that the equivalent strength of 19 British and Allied, 4 United States, and 4 French divisions, or a total of 27 divisions will be available for garrisons and operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN* area subsequent to *HUSKY*. These figures exclude the 4 United States and 3 British divisions to be transferred to the *UNITED KINGDOM* and the 2 British divisions constituting the British commitment to *TURKEY*. It is further estimated that there will be available after *HUSKY* a total of 3,648 aircraft including 242 heavy bombers (day and night), 519 medium bombers (day and night), 299 light and dive bombers, 2,012 fighters, 412 transports, and 164 army cooperatives.

d. Bombing of Ploesti

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the U. S. Army Air Forces should send representatives, without delay, to present to the Commander in Chief, North African Theater, the plan which they have prepared concerning the bombing of the Rumanian oil fields from bases in *NORTH AFRICA*. Further, they have agreed that the Commander in Chief, North African Theater, will be asked to submit appropriate comments and recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. These steps have been taken.

3. OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

We have directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare an appreciation leading up to a plan for the defeat of *JAPAN*, including an estimate of the forces required.

a. Operations in the *BURMA-CHINA* Theater

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on:

(1) The concentration of available resources, as first priority within the *ASSAM-BURMA* Theater, on the building up and increasing of the air route to *CHINA* to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early fall, and the development of air facilities in *ASSAM* with a view to:

(a) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in *BURMA*;

(b) Maintaining increased American Air Forces in *CHINA*; and

(c) Maintaining the flow of air-borne supplies to *CHINA*.

(2) Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations at the end of the 1943 monsoon from *ASSAM* into *BURMA* via *LEDO* and *IMPHAL*, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from *YUNNAN*, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to *CHINA*, and as an essential step towards the opening of the *BURMA* Road.

(3) The capture of *AKYAB* and of *RAMREE ISLAND* by amphibious operations, with possible exploitation.

(4) The interruption of Japanese sea communications into *BURMA*.

(5) The continuance of administrative preparations in *INDIA* for the eventual launching of an overseas operation of about the size of *ANAKIM*.

b. Operations in the *PACIFIC*

Various courses of action have been examined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the operations they have agreed to undertake have the following objects:

- (1) Conduct of air operations in and from *CHINA*.
- (2) Ejection of the Japanese from the *ALEUTIANS*.
- (3) Seizure of the *MARSHALL* and *CAROLINE ISLANDS*.
- (4) Seizure of the *SOLOMONS*, the *BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO*, and Japanese held *NEW GUINEA*.
- (5) Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communication.

V. AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN EXECUTION OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT 1943-44

We have examined our resources with the object of assessing our ability to carry out the above operations and our conclusions are as follows:

GROUND FORCES

1. All the ground forces required can be made available.

NAVAL FORCES

2. If a covering force is required for the operations to capture *AKYAB* and *RAMREE*, and if the Italian fleet has not been eliminated some diversion of U. S. Naval forces may be required. Subject to this, all the naval forces required can be made available.

AIR FORCES

3. Broadly there are sufficient air forces to meet all requirements in all theaters.
4. For cross-Channel operations there will be sufficient air forces in the U. K. with the exception of transport aircraft, the provision of which needs further investigation. In the absence of any detailed plan for cross-Channel operations, it has not been possible to estimate the requirements in gliders. This will have to be the subject of urgent study, which we are initiating.

5. For operations in *BURMA* there are only small deficiencies which can probably be reconciled by adjustments within the theater.

6. Subject to the development of air fields and necessary communications in *ASSAM*, the air transport and defense requirements of the air route into *CHINA*, up to 10,000 tons per month, can be met.

ASSAULT SHIPPING AND LANDING CRAFT

7. Provided the casualties in operations are no greater than we have allowed for, and provided that the U. S. and British planned productions are maintained, all the assault shipping and landing craft required can be made available. We have agreed upon the necessary allocations.

SUPPLY OF CRITICAL ITEMS

8. In the absence of detailed plans of operations for each theater it is not possible to give finalized requirements and to estimate detailed shortages of critical items. With the exception of steel for landing craft construction, deficiencies do not appear serious. We recommend that the possibilities of providing the necessary items, and particularly steel, should be further examined.

SHIPPING

9. The examination of the shipping resources of the United Nations shows that so far as can be foreseen now, and on the assumption that future losses do not exceed the agreed estimate, personnel shipping will be available to permit of the optimum deployment of United Nations forces up to the limits imposed by the availability of cargo shipping.

The optimum deployment of available United Nations cargo shipping to meet the requirements of the basic undertakings and projected operations for 1943/1944 reveals small deficiencies in the third and fourth quarters of 1943 and first quarter of 1944 and a surplus of sailings in the second and third quarters in 1944. The deficiencies are small and, if properly spread over all the programs concerned, the effect will not be unmanageable.

OIL

10. We have not been able to include a survey of the oil position in the various theaters, but the whole question of stocks and of tankers must receive urgent examination in the light of the decisions taken at the Trident Conference.

VI. CONCLUSIONS ON MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS

1. EQUIPMENT FOR TURKEY

The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed at the *ANFA* Conference that the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to the Munitions Assignments Boards all bids for equipment for *TURKEY*. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have now agreed that, with due regard to other important commitments, the assignment of such equipment as may be agreed to by the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be made with the least practicable delay.

2. RE-ARMING OF THE FRENCH IN NORTH AFRICA

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the rearming and reequipping of the French forces in *NORTH AFRICA* should be proceeded with as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipment will allow, but as a secondary commitment to the requirements of British and U. S. forces. The use of captured German equipment for this purpose will be explored.

VII. OTHER CONFERENCES

1. Decisions of the *CASABLANCA* Conference in conflict with the provisions of this report are modified or cancelled accordingly.

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will meet in July or early August in order to examine the decisions reached at this Conference in the light of the situation existing at the time.

ANNEX

ADVANTAGES TO BE GAINED BY THE USE OF THE AZORES

1. Experience has shown that so long as we can keep even a single aircraft with a convoy during the greater part of each day, the operation of U-boats is greatly hampered. In order to obtain maximum air protection at the present time it is necessary for the U. S.-U. K. convoys to follow a northerly route which not only suffers from the disadvantages of bad weather and ice, but which inevitably becomes known to the enemy. If we take a southerly route at the present time, we lose shore-based air protection over a large part of the passage. There is the further peril of U-boat concentrations against the U. S.-Mediterranean convoys. We regard the immediate occupation of the AZORES as imperative to conserve lives and shipping and, above all, to shorten the War.

2. The facilities which we particularly require are as follows:

a. Facilities in the AZORES on *TERCIEIRA* for operating V.L.R. aircraft;

b. Unrestricted fueling facilities for naval escorts at either *SAN MIGUEL* or *FAYAL*.

3. The benefits which would accrue from these facilities may be summarized as follows:

a. They would give us a much extended air cover for all convoys plying between:

(1) *U. S. A.* or *WEST INDIES* and the *MEDITERRANEAN*;

(2) *WEST INDIES* and the *U. K.*;

(3) *SOUTH AMERICA* and the *U. K.*;

(4) *U. K.* and the *MEDITERRANEAN*;

(5) *U. K.* and *WEST AFRICA*, and the Cape and Eastwards.

b. The increased areas under air cover would give us much greater scope for evasive routing, e.g., when U-boats were concentrated in northern waters, *NORTH ATLANTIC* convoys could be routed via the *AZORES* instead of always having to follow the *ICELAND (C)* route. (See diagram.)

c. Without the *AZORES* we shall always be moving on the outside of the circle while the enemy operates inside it. Air forces there would be centrally placed to cover all varieties of the U-boat campaign against the *NORTH ATLANTIC* and *MEDITERRANEAN* Theaters.

d. We should be able to increase our carrying capacity owing to the possibility of using more direct routes across the middle of the *ATLANTIC*.

e. We could increase our harassing action against U-boats not only when on passage to and from the *BISCAY* bases, but also while resting, refueling and recharging their batteries in mid-ocean where hitherto they have been practically immune from interference by aircraft. New detection and attacking devices, which are expected to come into service this spring, would enhance the effect of such action.


f. Unrestricted fueling facilities in the Islands would enable us to make better use of our inadequate numbers of surface escorts.

g. Blockade running between *GERMANY* and *JAPAN* would be rendered so hazardous as not to be worth the risk.

h. German warships and raiders would have greater difficulty in evading detection after breaking out into the *ATLANTIC*.

i. The Islands would provide more direct all-weather air supply routes from *U. S. A.* to *EUROPE*, *AFRICA*, and the *FAR EAST*.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET



C.C.S. 244/1

**IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSUMED BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC
OPERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943-1944**

Reference:

CCS 94th Meeting, Item (5)

C.C.S. 244 was circulated 22 May 1943 for consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In their 94th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved C.C.S. 244, as amended, except that paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Summary of Conclusions should be taken note of as recommendations only.

The amended version of C.C.S. 244 subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 244/1, 25 May 1943.

C.C.S. 244/1

25 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSUMED BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC
OPERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 1943-1944

Reference: C.C.S. 94th Mtg., Item 5

Note by the Secretaries

The attached revision of C.C.S. 244 incorporates the amendments agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 94th Meeting and certain changes requested by the Combined Staff Planners for purposes of necessary editing and clarification.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSUMED BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC
OPERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 1943-1944

*AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES TO MEET THE
REQUIREMENTS OF CRITICAL STRATEGY*

Report by the Combined Staff Planners

1. We have examined the available means of the United Nations with the object of assessing our ability to carry out the policy agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. A summary of this policy, which has been taken as the basis of our investigation, is attached as Annex I.

3. Our conclusions are set out below.

Ground Forces (Annex II)

4. All the ground forces required can be made available.

Naval Forces (Annex III)

5. If a covering force is required for the operations to capture *AKYAB* and *RAMREE*, and if the Italian fleet has not been eliminated, some diversion of U.S. naval forces may be required (see Annex III, paras. 7 to 10). Subject to this, all the naval forces required can be made available.

Air Forces (Annex IV)

6. Broadly there are sufficient air forces to meet all requirements in all theaters.

7. For Operation *ROUNDHAMMER* there will be sufficient air forces in the *U.K.* with the exception of transport aircraft, the provision of

which needs further investigation (see Appendix "A" to Annex IV). In the absence of any detailed plan for *ROUNDHAMMER*, it has not been possible to estimate the requirements of gliders. This will have to be the subject of urgent study by the *ROUNDHAMMER* planners.

8. For operations in Burma it will be seen there are only small deficiencies which can probably be reconciled by adjustments within the theater. (See Annex IV, Appendix "C").

9. Subject to the development of air fields and necessary communications in Assam, the air transport and defense requirements of the air route into China, up to 10,000 tons per month, can be met.

Assault Shipping and Landing Craft (Annex V)

10. Provided the casualties in operations are no greater than we have allowed for, and provided that the U.S. and British planned productions are maintained, all the assault shipping and landing craft required can be made available.

11. The allocations set out in Appendix "B" to Annex V are recommended.

12. Further recommendations are:-

(a) If production permits 6 naval pontoon causeways or treadway bridges should be supplied to the Indian Ocean Area, to arrive simultaneously with the L.S.T. from the U.S., and 56 should be supplied for *ROUNDHAMMER*.

(b) There is need for one floating dock capable of docking an L.S.T. in the Indian Ocean Area.

Supply of Critical Items (Annex VI)

13. In the absence of detailed plans of operations for each theater it is not possible to give finalized requirements and to estimate detailed shortages of critical items. A provisional estimate is, however, set out in Annex VI. With the exception of steel for landing craft construction, these deficiencies do not appear serious. We recommend that the possibilities of providing these items, and particularly the steel should be further examined.

Shipping (Annex VII)

14. The examination of the shipping resources of the United Nations shows that so far as can be foreseen now, and on the assumption that future losses do not exceed the agreed estimate (C.C.S. 174),* personnel shipping will be available to permit of the optimum deployment of United Nations forces up to the limits imposed by the availability of cargo shipping.

The optimum deployment of available United Nations cargo shipping to meet the requirements of the basic undertakings and projected operations for 1943/1944 reveals small deficiencies in the third and fourth quarters of 1943 and first quarter of 1944 and a surplus of sailings in the second and third quarters in 1944. The deficiencies are small and, if properly spread over all the programs concerned, the effect will not be unmanageable.

Oil

15. We have not been able to include a survey of the oil position in the various theaters but we feel that the whole question of stocks and of tankers will require urgent examination in the light of decisions taken at the Trident Conference.

* See paragraph 6 of Annex II.

ANNEX I

BASIS OF INVESTIGATION

The following operations and undertakings have been used as a basis for this investigation. They are not arranged in order of priority.

I. *USE OF THE AZORES ISLANDS*

Preparation and earmarking of the necessary British forces for the occupation of the *AZORES*.

II. *OPERATIONS IN NORTHWESTERN EUROPE*

- (1) Combined air offensive from the United Kingdom.
- (2) Cross-Channel operations.

To be launched from the United Kingdom with a target date of 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944.

Assault: 5 Infantry Divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing craft)
2 Infantry Divisions - Follow-up
2 Air-borne Divisions

Total: 9 Divisions in the assault

Build-up: Available for movement into lodgment area - 20 Divisions.

III. *OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN*

(1) Bombing of Ploesti by U.S. Army Air Forces from bases in North Africa.

(2) Continuing directed operations against Sicily.

(3) Such operations in exploitation of *HUSKY* as are best calculated to eliminate *ITALY* from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. The Allied Commander in Chief in *NORTH*

AFRICA may use for his operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British Divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for *HUSKY* will not be considered available.

IV. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC - FAR EAST THEATER

(1) Operations in Burma

(a) The concentration of available resources as first priority within the *ASSAM-BURMA* theater on the building up and increasing of the air route to *CHINA* to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early fall, and the development of air facilities in *ASSAM* with a view to -

(i) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in *BURMA*.

(ii) Maintaining increased American Air Forces in *CHINA*.

(iii) Maintaining the flow of air-borne supplies to *CHINA*.

(b) Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations from *ASSAM* into *BURMA* via *LEDO* and *IMPHAL*, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from *YUNNAN*, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to *CHINA*, and as an essential step towards the opening of the *BURMA* Road.

(c) The capture of *AKYAB* and of *RAMREE ISLAND* by amphibious operations, with possible exploitations.

(d) The interruption of Japanese sea communications into *BURMA*.

(2) Conduct air operations in and from *CHINA*.

Annex I

(3) Continue the directed operations in the *SOLOMONS-BISMARCK-NEW GUINEA* Area.

(4) Seizure of the *SOLOMONS*, the *BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO* and Japanese-held *NEW GUINEA*.

(5) Seizure of the *MARSHALL* and *CAROLINE ISLANDS*.

(6) Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communications.

(7) Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.

V. *OTHER UNDERTAKINGS*

(1) Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the *WESTERN HEMISPHERE* and *BRITISH ISLES*.

(2) Support and maintain the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.

(3) Maintain vital overseas lines of communications, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

(4) Undertake such measures as may be necessary to provide *CHINA* with a volume of supplies to keep *CHINA* actively in the war against *JAPAN*.

(5) To sustain the Soviet forces by the greatest volume of munitions that can be supplied and transported to *RUSSIA* without militating against the attainment of the over-all objectives.

(6) To provide for the fulfillment of British undertakings to Turkey with due regard to other important commitments.

(7) To provide for the maintenance of prisoners of war.

(8) To provide for the economic support of countries occupied by the United Nations.

Annex I

U. S. SECRET

BRITISH MOST SECRET

(9) To rearm and reequip French forces in North Africa as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipment will allow, but as secondary commitment to the requirements of British and United States forces in the various theaters.

Annex I

ANNEX II

LAND FORCES

SECTION I - MEDITERRANEAN

1. RESOURCES AVAILABLE

a. At the conclusion of a successful *HUSKY*, there will be the following forces in the Mediterranean:

British & Allied	27 Divisions
U.S.	9 Divisions
French	<u>4 Divisions</u>
Total	<u>40 Divisions</u>

On the assumption that 10% over-all casualties are allowed to cover *HUSKY* and subsequent operations in the Mediterranean, this total will be reduced to the equivalent strength of 36 Divisions, made up as follows:

British & Allied	24 Divisions
U.S.	8 Divisions
French	<u>4 Divisions</u>
Total	<u>36 Divisions</u>

2. UNDERTAKINGS

After allowing for the forces to be returned to the U.K. after 1 November 1943 (4 American and 3 British Divisions) and the British undertaking to Turkey (2 Divisions) there will be available in the Mediterranean the following Divisions:

British & Allied	19 Divisions
U.S.	4 Divisions
French	<u>4 Divisions</u>
Total	<u>27 Divisions</u>

3. Subject to the overriding approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the method of employment of those divisions will be for the Allied C-in-C to decide. The garrison undertakings which might have to be met might amount to:

British	14-17 Divisions
U.S.	3 Divisions
French	<u>3 Divisions</u>
Total	<u>20-23 Divisions</u>

(For calculation see Appendix to this Annex)

4. The balance which will, therefore, be available after 1 November 1943 is as follows:

	<u>British</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>French</u>	
Total available, allowing for casualties	24	8	4	Divisions
Total undertakings, as shown above	<u>19-22</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>3</u>	Divisions
Balance Available	<u>2-5</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	Divisions

5. The figures in this section include 1-1/3rd British and 1 U.S. Air-borne Divisions, and 31st Indian Armored and 4th Indian Infantry and N.Z. Mixed Divisions. The two *INDIAN* Divisions might return to the Indian Theater before the end of the war. Our figures take no account of further French Divisions furnished with the equipment of U.S. Divisions moving to the U.K.

SECTION II - UNITED KINGDOM

6. FORCES AVAILABLE

The forces available in the United Kingdom on 1 May 1944, provided

that the shipping losses continue at less than the agreed rate* and economies are effected by the combined loading of British imports and U.S. Army supplies in the North Atlantic, will be as follows:

British - 10-14 Divisions, dependent on whether cannibalization proves necessary, or not
3 Divisions returned from the Mediterranean
1 Air-borne Division
American - 12½ Divisions ex U.S. (includes one at present in U.K.)
4 Divisions returned from the Mediterranean
1 ex Iceland
1 Air-borne Division, ex U.S.

Grand Total 35½-36½ Divisions

7. Of the above, 6½ American Divisions which will be in the U.K. will not be operationally available on 1 May 1944. These 6½ American

* The "agreed rate" here envisaged is taken from C.C.S. 174 and is as follows:-

(a) For non-tankers permanently in use for the fighting Services

0.91% per month for the whole of 1943 (to be adjusted for planned operational hazards).

(b) For other non-tanker shipping:-

2.39% per month for the first half of 1943.

1.91% per month for the second half of 1943.

This "agreed rate" is subject to revision on 1st July, 1943.

Annex II

Divisions will, however, be operationally available two months from their date of arrival and can, therefore, be used in the build-up subsequent to the initial assaults.

Between May and September 1944, the build-up will be limited by reception and despatch facilities in the U.K. to approximately a half Division per month, assuming operations start in May. Every expedient should therefore be used to overcome the congestion in depots and ports which will not otherwise be able to deal with the simultaneous output and intake during the period of active operations.

A gradual build-up of from 3 to 5 Divisions per month could be accomplished in the lodgment area assuming the availability of appropriate port facilities on the Continent.

8. *FORCES OPERATIONALLY AVAILABLE ON 1 MAY 1944*

The total forces which will, therefore, be operationally available on 1 May 1944 are as follows:-

British	13-17 Divisions (includes Canadians)
American	11 Divisions
Air-borne	<u>2 Divisions</u> (1 British and 1 American)
Total	<u>26-30 Divisions</u>

In addition to the above, 6½ American Divisions will be available for the subsequent build-up, which should continue at the rate, if practicable, of 3 to 5 Divisions per month through ports made available on the Continent.

SECTION III - INDIA AND BURMA

9. *REQUIRED FOR OPERATIONS*

British	6 Divisions* including
	3 Assault Brigades
	3 Follow-up Brigades
	3 Long Range Penetration Groups
	(2 battalions each)
	1 Parachute Brigade
Chinese	13 Divisions

10. *RESOURCES AVAILABLE*

British forces available in India are adequate for the operations envisaged.

Chinese forces available amount to 22 Divisions (assuming 10,000 to a Division). This will allow 9 Divisions in reserve.

SECTION IV - THE AZORES

11. *UNDERTAKING*

3 Infantry Brigades and minimum supporting Arms.
2 Commandos.

12. *AVAILABILITY OF FORCES*

The above can be found from the forces in the U.K., for an assault date about the end of August, without interfering with any other operations.

* Two additional Divisions as a reserve will be held in India, and extra engineers for the making of the Assam road are required.

Annex II

SECTION V - THE PACIEIC

13. RESOURCES AVAILABLE

The following major Allied Ground Forces are present in, or projected for, the area as of 1 January 1944.

ALASKA	Equivalent of 3 Infantry Divisions
PACIFIC OCEAN	1 Marine Infantry Division
CENTRAL PACIFIC	3 Infantry Divisions
SOUTH PACIFIC	5 Infantry Divisions 2 Marine Infantry Divisions 1 N. Z. Division
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC	4 Infantry Divisions 1 Air-borne Division 1 Marine Infantry Division 11 Australian Divisions

Note: Three Australian Infantry Divisions (6th, 7th and 9th) are available for offensive operations. There are also six Australian Infantry Divisions and two Australian Armored Divisions (militia) presently assigned for defense.

14. REQUIREMENT FOR CONTEMPLATED OPERATIONS AND AVAILABLE FROM U.S. RESOURCES

Presently directed operations in the Solomons-Bismarck-New Guinea Area	Required in addition to allocations in paragraph 13 above
Guinea Area	None
Kiska	1 Division
Marshalls	2 Divisions
Carolines	2 Divisions
New Guinea	3 Divisions

Annex II

APPENDIX TO ANNEX II

LAND FORCES

POSSIBLE GARRISON REQUIREMENTS IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN

	<u>British</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>French Divisions</u>
Sicily, Toe and Heel of Italy	1-2/3rds	-	-
Enforcement of Armistice	1*	-	-
Central Italy	3-6	-	-
Sardinia	-	1	-
Corsica	-	-	1
Security of N. Africa and Levant	4-1/3rd	2	2
Dodecanese	1	-	-
Durazzo bridgehead	3	-	-
Totals	<u>14-17</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3 Divisions</u>

* Rome area covered by Central Italy undertaking.

The above estimate of garrison requirements is believed to be the absolute minimum, and should be reviewed at the next conference when a more accurate estimate of the German reaction to the probable collapse or surrender of Italy may be made.

Appendix to Annex II

ANNEX III

PROVISION OF NAVAL FORCES

1. General requirements for the escorts for the specific strategic operations projected in this paper can be met from our combined resources without unduly weakening the convoy escorts and support groups required for the existing convoy system. The escorts required for the North Russian convoys, should they be resumed in September, and for certain adjustments envisaged in existing convoy cycles can, however, only be met partly by new construction and partly by a reduction in the number of support groups employed.

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS

USE OF THE AZORES

2. The British forces in the Atlantic will be sufficient to undertake the occupation of the Azores while at the same time guarding against a breakout of the German Fleet.

CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATIONS (ROUNDHAMMER)

3. By accepting a reduction in local convoy escorts and Local Defense requirements in United Kingdom waters, there will be sufficient light craft to counter a probable German threat within the Channel, while the British Home Fleet will be of sufficient strength to counter any move by German heavy units.

U.S. - U.K. MOVEMENT

4. Two escort groups will be required for U.S. - U.K. personnel ships. Two U.S. groups now employed with U.G.F. convoys will cease to run by the time the movement starts, and will then become available for use elsewhere.

OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

5. Sufficient forces have already been allocated for Operation *HUSKY*.

Annex III

6. British forces in the Mediterranean after *HUSKY* will be sufficient for through Mediterranean and local convoy escorts and for Operations *BUTTRESS*, *GOBLET* and *MUSKET* or *BRIMSTONE*, except that there will be a deficiency of some 22 escorts should the Allied Commander in Chief decide to undertake Operation *BRIMSTONE*. Assuming that no extra escorts could be taken from the Atlantic, this could only be met by a temporary interference with all convoys inside the Mediterranean. The above is dependent on the losses sustained in *HUSKY*.

THE CAPTURE OF AKYAB AND RAMREE

7. It is not possible to say at present whether a covering force will be required, as this is dependent on the extent to which the Japanese Fleet is contained by United States operations in the Central and Southwest Pacific. If a covering force is required, we estimate that it should not exceed that set out in the right hand column in paragraphs 8 and 9 below.

8. The British can provide forces as follows:

<u>Assault Forces</u>	<u>Covering Forces</u>
4 Cruisers (C.L.)	3 Battleships (O.B.B.)
1 Escort Carrier (A.C.V.)	4 Heavy Cruisers (C.A.)
2 A.A. Cruisers	2 Light Cruisers (C.L.)
5 Destroyers (D.D.)	14 Destroyers (D.D.)
24 Escorts (D.E.)	
8 Minesweepers	
8 Submarines	

9. To complete estimated requirements, there will be needed from the United States:

<u>Assault Forces</u>	<u>Covering Forces</u>
5 Escort Carriers (A.C.V.)	2 Fleet Carriers (C.V.) -
21 Destroyers (D.D.)	Should Italy be out of
6 Submarines	the war, the British will

Annex III

Tanker Force
8 Escorts (D.E.)

be able to provide one of these.

VICTORIOUS is counted as a U.S. unit.

10. U.S. ships now available and becoming available in 1943 and 1944 provide for the operations now under way in the Aleutians, those directed in the *SOLOMONS-BISMARCK-NEW GUINEA* Area, and those projected in *NEW GUINEA*, the *MARSHALLS* and *CAROLINES*. The need for U.S. Naval forces set forth in paragraph 9 will involve some diversions from present planned deployment.

SMALL CRAFT FOR INSHORE AND RIVER WORK

11. Numerous small patrol etc. craft will be required on the Burma coast and rivers. The provision of these craft cannot be assessed, but as the original operations against Rangoon have been postponed, the present construction program of river steamers in India should be reexamined to decide whether we can slow it down and produce patrol craft instead. The possibility of supplying the necessary engines would require detailed investigation.

PROVISION OF NAVAL PERSONNEL

12. There are some requirements for special naval personnel for which provision has to be made. Proposals as to how they might be met are as under:-

(a) Naval Embarkation Staff at Loading Ramps for
ROUNDHAMMER

Total requirement is estimated at 120 officers and 920 men of which the British portion might be two thirds.

(i) British portion

Since no technical knowledge is required it is considered these should be found from local Home Guard or equivalent sources. This will be resolved in the United Kingdom.

Annex III

(ii) American portion

The provision of approximately 40 officers and 300 seamen can be met by the United States.

(b) Naval Port Parties for Captured Ports in *ROUNDHAMMER*

The numbers required have not yet been computed but they are considerable and include a proportion of technicians and specialists. The requirements and the method of providing them should be set forth in the plan for the cross-Channel operation.

(c) Naval Port Parties for Captured Ports of Akyab and Ramree

These parties, which will not be large, but include specialists and technicians, cannot be found from India and must be provided from elsewhere.

(d) Naval Beach Parties

The requirements outside *ROUNDHAMMER* and the Mediterranean are as follows:-

(i) Akyab and Ramree - 3

One of these is available in India and it is proposed that the other two should either be transferred from those surplus in the Mediterranean on completion of *HUSKY* if *MUSKET* is carried out, or provided from the U.K. if *BRIMSTONE* is carried out.

(ii) Azores - 2 (low establishment)

These can both be provided from the United Kingdom when the operation is mounted.

(e) Naval Landing Craft Maintenance Personnel

On the assumption that each nation will provide the maintenance personnel for its own craft in all operations, the British and American portions can be provided.

ANNEX IV

PROVISION OF AIR FORCES

1. The following appendices show the resources available to us for the various operations.

Appendix "A" Cross-Channel Operations - Provision of Forces.

Appendix "B" Operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN* to eliminate *ITALY* from the war.

Appendix "C" Operations in *BURMA*.

We summarize below our conclusions on the availability of forces for the operations contemplated.

ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS FROM THE AZORES

2. It is planned that R.A.F. Coastal Command will initially provide the V.L.R. aircraft which will be established after the occupation. It is recognized that combined United States-British forces may be employed subsequently from this area in anti-submarine warfare, and for other purposes.

COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE U.K.

3. The projected strength of American Heavy and Medium Bomber Force for the combined bomber offensive from U.K. as of 1 April 1944 is included in Appendix "A". This tabulation of unit equipment does not show reserves which were included in the requirements for U.S. aircraft set forth in C.C.S. 217.

BOMBING OF PLOESTI

4. Sufficient forces are available in the U.K. and the *MEDITERRANEAN* Air Command.

CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATIONS (ROUNHAMMER)

5. With the exception of transport aircraft the provision of which needs further investigation, there will be sufficient air forces in the U.K. to support Operation *ROUNHAMMER*. (See Appendix "A".)

OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

6. There are sufficient air forces in the *MEDITERRANEAN* for contemplated operations, except for an estimated deficiency of 108 transport aircraft for Operation *BRIMSTONE*. (See Appendix "B".)

OPERATIONS IN BURMA

7. In Appendix "C" is a table showing the British and U.S. forces available for operations.

8. The operations planned in *BURMA* take place in November and December 1943. In Appendix "C" is a table showing the air forces required for the operations and for the fighter defense of *CEYLON* and *CALCUTTA* together with an estimate of the British and U.S. Air Forces likely to be available in the theater at the time of the start of operations. From this it will be seen that there are some deficiencies. These can probably be reconciled by adjustments within the theater.

AIR OPERATIONS IN AND FROM CHINA

9. The planned strength of the 14th Air Force is 1 Heavy Bomber Group, 1 Medium Bomber Squadron - to be increased to 1 Group when 10,000 tons per month capacity on the *CHINA* air route is achieved - and 2 Fighter Groups. In addition, there will be 80 Chinese Fighters and 40 Chinese Medium Bombers. This is considered the maximum force which can be maintained in *CHINA* until the limited lifting capacity of the air route has been increased beyond 10,000 tons a month. Contemplated operations should result in increasing facilities for the *CHINA* air route.

DIRECTED OPERATIONS IN SOLOMONS-BISMARCK-NEW GUINEA AREA, AND OPERATIONS TO SEIZE THE SOLOMONS, THE BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO AND JAPANESE-HELD NEW GUINEA

10. Accepting the air requirements of the *SOUTH* and *SOUTHWEST PACIFIC* for the continuing of directed operations in the *SOLOMONS-BISMARCK-NEW GUINEA* area as being those allocated by J.C.S. 238/3, it would appear that adequate forces are or will be available in those theaters for the operations contemplated in their due progression.

SEIZE THE MARSHALL AND CAROLINE ISLANDS

11. No approved plan for this operation exists. Preliminary estimates of required air strength for seizure of the *MARSHALL ISLANDS* alone are:

<u>HB</u>	<u>MB</u>	<u>Fighter</u>	<u>LB</u>	<u>Patrol (M)</u>	<u>Patrol (L)</u>
72	36	113	90	36	24

With the exception of the heavy and medium bomber categories, it would appear that adequate air forces for this enterprise would be available about January 1944, with a somewhat reduced garrison force for the *HAWAIIAN ISLANDS*. The U.S. Naval aircraft indicated therein do not include those available to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, for assignment. Certain air units from these might be made available. A firm estimate of requirements for the seizure of the *MARSHALL* and *CAROLINE ISLANDS* cannot be made at this time.

EJECT THE JAPANESE FROM THE ALEUTIANS

12. Adequate air forces are available for this operation.

APPENDIX "A"

COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE U.K. AND
CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATIONS (ROUNDHAMMER)

After allowing for the fighter defense requirements of the U.K. and Northern Ireland not covered by the *ROUNDHAMMER* operation, which will amount to 18 SEF Squadrons and 13 TEF Night Fighter Squadrons, it is estimated that the following air forces will be available in the U.K. by 1 May 1944, subject to the provision of accommodation, which requires further study.

	<u>U.S.A.A.F.</u>		<u>R.A.F.</u>	
	<u>Groups</u>	<u>Aircraft</u> <u>(U.E.)</u>	<u>Squadrons*</u>	<u>Aircraft</u> <u>(U.E.)</u>
Heavy Bombers	51	2,448	80	1,600
Medium Bombers	9	576	12	240
Light & Dive Bombers	13	832	13	260
Bombers Recce			1	14
Day Fighters	25	2,500	44	792
Night Fighters			6	150
Fighter Recce			15	231
Army Support (Fighters)			8	112
Army Support (Bombers)			4	56
Photo Recce	2	168	5	100
Observation	4	336	10	160
Air/Sea Rescue			8½	170
Transport	8½	442	7	190
Total	<u>112½</u>	<u>7,302</u>	<u>213½</u>	<u>4,075</u>

* These squadrons represent those that will be formed or forming on 1 January 1944 which will allow for their being fully operational for cross-Channel operations by 1 May 1944.

Appendix "A" to Annex IV

U. S. SECRET

BRITISH MOST SECRET

Of the above U.S. forces, the 51 Heavy Bomber Groups, the 9 Medium Bomber Groups and 10 of the Fighter Groups are projected for the Combined Bomber Offensive.

It should be noted that there will only be 632 transport aircraft available in the U.K. for the lift of two air-borne divisions. This will leave a deficiency which, together with the use and provision of gliders, will require further detailed investigation as a matter of urgency.

Appendix "A" Annex IV

APPENDIX "B"

OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN TO ELIMINATE
ITALY FROM THE WAR

1. BRITISH AND AMERICAN AIR FORCES AVAILABLE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Type	British		U.S.		Total	
	Sqdns.	A/C	Sqdns.	A/C	Sqdns.	A/C
S.E.F. & T.E.F. (D)	52	852	40	1,000	92	1,852
T.E.F. (N)	7	112	4	48	11	160
L.B.	8	128	12	171	20	299
M.B. (D)	-	-	28	399	28	399
M.B. (N)	6	120	-	-	6	120
H.B. (D)	-	-	24	210	24	210
H.B. (N)	2	32	-	-	2	32
TRANSPORT	3	48	28	364	31	412
ARMY CO-OP	5	80	4	84	9	164

VARIOUS MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS

2. Operations which might be undertaken in the Mediterranean are set out below:

3. Operations to Collapse Italy

With the air forces available (except for an additional 108 transport aircraft for *BRIMSTONE*) either of the two following sets of operations (A or B) could be undertaken in addition to all necessary defensive undertakings in the Mediterranean.

A

- | | | |
|------------------------------------|--|--|
| (a) Air offensive
against Italy | - All Heavy & Medium Bombers | |
| (b) <i>BUTTRESS</i> | - 37 S.E.F. Sqdns. | All dependent on (c)
for bomber support.
Operations are not
simultaneous. |
| (c) <i>GOBLET</i> | - 37 S.E.F. Sqdns. | |
| (d) <i>MUSKET</i> | - 20 S.E.F. Sqdns. | |
| | - 1 F/Recce Sqdn.
1 Strat/Recce Sqdn.
9 T.E.F.(D) Sqdns. | |

Appendix "B" to Annex IV

(e) Required in S. Italy after (d) 24 S.E.F. Sqdns.
1 F/Recce. "
1 Strat/Recce. "
1 T.E.F. (N) "
4 L/M.B. (D) "

OR B

(f) Air offensive against *ITALY* - All heavy and medium bombers

(g) *BUTTRESS* 37 S.E.F. Sqdns. Dependent on
(f) for bomber support.

(h) *BRIMSTONE* 40 S.E.F. Sqdns.
12 T.E.F. (D) "
2 T.E.F. (N) "
25 L/M.B. (D) "
6 M.B. (N) "
24 H.B. (D) "
2 H.B. (N) "
2 Strat/Recce "
520 Transport Aircraft

(i) *FIREBRAND* 8 S.E.F. Sqdns.
9 T.E.F. (D) "
4 L/M.B. (D) "

4. Operations after an Italian Collapse

After an Italian collapse, there would be sufficient air forces to undertake the following further operations (C) and meet essential defensive commitments (D), as well as assistance to Turkey (E).

C

(a) Establishment of a bridgehead at Durazzo - 22 S.E.F. Sqdns.
2 T.E.F. (N) Sqdns.
4 L.B. "

Appendix "B" to Annex IV

U. S. SECRET

BRITISH MOST SECRET

(b) Establishment of a bomber force in central (and southern) Italy for an air offensive against southern Germany and the Balkans, together with such transport aircraft as may be available in the Mediterranean A.C. for the supply of guerrillas in the Balkans:

12 S.E.F. Squadrons

1 T.E.F. (N) Squadron

The following bomber force (in aircraft):

160 M.B. (D)

210 H.B. (D)

120 M.B. (N)

32 H.B. (N)

D

(c) Fighter force necessary for defense on conclusion of operations (in Sqdns.).

	<u>S.E.F.</u>	<u>T.E.F. (D)</u>	<u>T.E.F. (N)</u>
Levant	1 (Br.)		
Egypt	3 (Br.)		1/2 (Br.)
Cyrenaica	3 (Br.)	1 (Br.)	1/2 (Br.)
Tripolitania		1 (Br.)	
Tunisia	2 (U.S.)		1/2 (U.S.)
Sicily	2 (Br.)		1/2 (Br.)
Malta	1 (Br.)		1/2 (Br.)
Reggio	1 (Br.)		
Cotrone	1 (Br.)		
Heel	4 (U.S.)	1 (Br.)	1/2 (U.S.)
Sardinia & Corsica	5 (U.S.)	1 (U.S.)	1 (U.S.)
C. Italy	10 (U.S.)	1 (U.S.)	1 (U.S.)
Durazzo	4 (Br.)		1 (Br.)
Algeria & Morocco	4 (U.S.)	1 (U.S.)	1 (U.S.)
Dodecanese	3 (Br.)		1 (Br.)
Totals	<u>44</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>8</u>

Appendix "B" to Annex IV

E

(d) Assistance to Turkey (British)

Hardihood I	-	17 S.E.F.	Sqdns.
		1 T.E.F. (D)	"
		1 T.E.F. (N)	"
		3 L.B.	"
		2 F/Recce.	"
		1 G.R.	"
Hardihood II	-	7 S.E.F.	"
		12 H.B.	"
		1 G.R.	"

CONCLUSION

5. With the air forces available (as shown in paragraph 1 above) we could undertake operations A or B, and C, D and E (except for an estimated deficiency of 108 transport aircraft for operation *BRIMSTONE*).

APPENDIX " C "

OPERATIONS IN ASSAM AND BURMA

Requirements cover: A. Air operations from ASSAM into BURMA (Phases I & II of C.C.S. 231).
including defense of CHINA Air Route Bases in ASSAM.
B. Capture of AKYAB and KANREE Island (Phases I & II of C.C.S. 231).
C. Defense of CEYLON and CALCUTTA.

CLASS	REQUIREMENTS					AIRCRAFT ESTIMATED AS AVAILABLE ON 1 NOVEMBER 1943			(AIRCRAFT) + or -
	A.	B.	C.	Total Sqns.	Total Aircraft	British	U. S.	Total	
	BOMBER Heavy	5	-	-	5	80	32	48	
Medium	-	-	-	-	-	64	39	103	+103
Light	4	-	-	4	64	64	-	64	O.K.
FIGHTERS S.E. Day	6	8	6	20	320	272	75	347	+27
Fighter Bomber	4	4	-	8	128	64	-	64	-64
T. E. Day	4	-	-	4	64	32	-	32	-32
T. E. Night	-	-	1	1	16	16	-	16	O.K.
Fighter Recon. or Obs.	4	1	-	5	60	60	-	60	O.K.
U. S. Photo Recon.) Br. Bomber Recon.)	2	1	-	3	48	-	39	39	-9
Coastal A.S.	2	-	-	2	24	24	-	24	O.K.
Torpedo Bomber	1	-	-	1	16	16	-	16	O.K.
P. R. U.	1	-	-	1	20	20	-	20	O.K.
Transport	6	-	-	6	150	100	26	126	-24
Totals	39	14	7	60	990	764	227	991	+1

NOTE 1 The above air forces allow for 3 single engine day fighter and one twin engine night fighter squadrons for the defense of CALCUTTA and 3 single engine day fighter squadrons for the defense of CEYLON. It also allows for a minimum of 2 single engine day fighter squadrons for the defense of the CHINA air route bases for northeast ASSAM during the advance from ASSAM into BURMA from LEDO and IMPHAL (C.C.S. 231 Phases I & II).

NOTE 2 The above forces do not include the 4 single engine day fighter squadrons of the 14th U. S. Air Force, some of which will be used in supporting the CHINESE advance from YUNNAN which takes place simultaneously with the advance from LEDO and IMPHAL (C.C.S. 231 Phases I & II).

NOTE 3 The table shows a net deficiency of 37 single engine fighters. This is more apparent than real as the flow of British S.E.F. aircraft should provide an extra 32 S.E.F. aircraft by December provided wastage between now and November is reasonably low. It should also be noted that Operation B is not due to start until December by which time the deficiency in single engine fighters should be less than shown in the table.

Appendix "C" to Annex IV

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

ANNEX V

ASSAULT SHIPPING AND CRAFT

1. See Appendix "A" for availability and deployment of assault ships and landing craft for operations *HUSKY*, *BUTTRESS*, *GOBLET*, *MUSKET*, *ANAKIM*, *BRISK*, and *ROUNDHAMMER*. This table is based on a casualty rate of 20 per cent in the case of special *ships* and 50 per cent in the case of landing *craft* as committed in each major amphibious operation.

2. See Appendix "B" for allocation of U.S. production to the *ATLANTIC*, *INDIAN* and *PACIFIC* Theaters. No deployment within the *PACIFIC* has been shown.

3. Figures given for British built landing craft allow for the maximum rate of production. Production of major landing craft, i.e., L.C.T., L.C.F.(L), and L.C.G.(M), cannot be increased except at the expense of other naval construction, such as corvettes, destroyers, etc. This cannot be accepted.

4. U.S. allocations are based on production as indicated below and are subject to revision in the event that this production is not realized.

(a) LST's - Bureau of Ships estimated production (dated 15 May 1943) for remainder of calendar year 1943; and a production thereafter of 12 per month through 1944.

(b) LCI(L)'s - Increasing production from 16 per month to 20 per month beginning in October 1943 and continuing at that rate until the end of 1944.

(c) LCT(6)'s - Maintaining production at the November 1943 level of 20 per month until the end of 1944.

5. All of these assumptions provide for an *increase in* production. It should be noted that no increase in landing craft production is

Annex V

possible *unless* sufficient additional material is made available for this purpose. For the *present* naval building program there is already a deficit of 110,000 tons of steel in the third quarter.

6. *NAVAL PONTOON CAUSEWAYS OR TREADWAY BRIDGES*

148 L.S.T. are being used in Operation *HUSKY*. In order that vehicles can be landed from L.S.T. on flat beaches, 48 Naval Pontoon Causeways, each 175 feet long, have been supplied. These are sufficient for 24 L.S.T., or one-sixth of the total number employed.

18 L.S.T. are allocated to Operation *ANAKIM*. On the same basis as the *HUSKY* requirements, 6 pontoons or bridges will be necessary.

143 L.S.T. are to be used in Operation *ROUNDHAMMER*. The beaches on the north coast of *FRANCE* are particularly flat. Naval Pontoon Causeways sufficient for one-quarter of the above should be available. Assuming enough equipment to provide 16 causeways can be salvaged from the *MEDITERRANEAN*, a further allocation of 56 causeways is necessary.

7. *DOCKING FACILITIES FOR OPERATION ANAKIM*

The facilities for docking ships and craft for *ANAKIM* are limited. 18 L.S.T.(2) are being used in the operations in addition to some 190 small craft. Consideration should be given to the supply of at least one floating dock to *INDIAN OCEAN* Area for docking of L.S.T. The L.S.D. could be used, prior to the operation, for docking small craft.

CONCLUSION

8. Provided:

- (1) The casualties in operations do not exceed our estimate (paragraph 1),
- (2) United States and British production is realized (paragraphs 3 and 5),
- (3) 42 LCI(L) are allocated to the British for British manning if necessary (Appendix "B" footnote),

there will be sufficient landing craft for the operations contemplated.

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APPENDIX "B"
UNITED STATES ALLOCATIONS

LST

LCT

ALLOCATED TO	1943							1944						1943							1944						
	AS OF 1 July	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	AS OF 1 July	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	
PACIFIC	84	0 (84)	19 (103)	19 (122)	19 (141)	3 (144)	0 (144)	0 (144)	0 (144)	0 (144)	0 (144)	0 (144)	0 (144)	180	3 (183)	3 (186)	3 (189)	6 (195)	6 (201)	6 (207)	6 (213)	6 (219)	6 (225)	6 (231)	6 (237)	6 (243)	
ATLANTIC	92	6 (98)	3 (101)	1 (102)	3 (105)	16 (121)	17 (138)	0 (138)	0 (138)	0 (138)	0 (138)	0 (138)	0 (138)	139	7 (146)	7 (153)	11 (164)	14 (178)	14 (192)	14 (206)	1 (207)						
ANAKIM	10*	0 (10)	0 (10)	0 (10)	0 (10)	0 (10)	0 (10)	0 (10)	0 (10)	0 (10)	0 (10)	0 (10)	0 (10)	0													
COMMITTED TO U.K.		16												0													
UNALLOCATED							1 (1)	12 (13)	12 (25)	12 (37)	12 (49)	12 (61)	12 (73)								13 (13)	14 (27)	14 (41)	14 (55)	14 (69)	14 (83)	
TOTAL		22	22	20	22	19	18	12	12	12	12	12	12	10	10	14	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20

* Allocated from early June production.
Parenthetical figures are cumulative.

LCI(L)

LCM(3)'s, LCVP's, and LSD's

ALLOCATED TO	1943							1944					
	AS OF 1 July	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun
PACIFIC	70	12 (82)	10 (92)	12 (104)	12 (116)	12 (128)	12 (140)	12 (152)	12 (164)	12 (176)	12 (188)	12 (200)	
ATLANTIC	102	4 (106)	6 (112)	4 (116)	8 (124)	8 (132)	8 (140)	8 (148)					
ANAKIM		0											
COMMITTED TO U.K.		0*											
UNALLOCATED								8 (8)	8 (16)	8 (24)	8 (32)	20 (52)	
TOTAL		16	16	16	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	

* None committed. However, on the assumption that the United Kingdom provides two assault and one immediate follow-up divisions and the United States provides one assault and one immediate follow-up division, 42 of the LCI(L)'s provided by the U.S. will be needed to lift British troops and it would appear desirable that they be British manned.

Parenthetical figures are cumulative.

OPERATION	LCM(3)	LCVP	LSD
HUSKY	154	324	
ROUNDHAMMER	196	389	
ANAKIM			1
TOTAL	350	713	1

ANNEX VI

AVAILABILITY OF CRITICAL SUPPLY AND CONSTRUCTION ITEMS

1. After providing for the basic undertakings, as stated in Annex I, which are to be the first charge against our resources, the United Nations will be able to provide the critical supply and construction items peculiar to the specific operations projected, except as indicated hereafter.

a. *GENERAL*

There are overall shortages in radar and radio equipment. It is estimated that this condition will improve progressively to an extent which will permit an adequate distribution of these items to U.S. Army Air Forces by September 30, 1943, and to meet all projected requirements by June, 1944.

An increase in the production of spare parts for naval aircraft will be necessary to support the projected operations without resort to cannibalization.

Finally, in the absence of detailed plans of operations for each theater, it is not possible to give finalized requirements, and to estimate shortages. These must be the subject of further detailed examination and discussion. The following, therefore, must be read in the light of the foregoing, and must not be read as complete planning data.

b. *THE OCCUPATION OF THE AZORES*

The British are able to meet all requirements for this operation.

In the event U.S. or Brazilian forces are involved in the occupation of or in anti-submarine operations from the islands, they can be equipped with United States equipment after completing training. Training of Brazilian units has not yet started and is expected to take nine months.

Annex VI

c. OPERATIONS IN NORTHWESTERN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

(1) Combined bomber offensive from the United Kingdom

Requirements are being met.

(2) Bombing of PLOESTI by U. S. Army Air Forces from Bases in North Africa

Requirements can be met.

(3) Cross-Channel Operations (ROUNDHAMMER)

U.S. requirements can be met.

Requirements for Lend-Lease for British are being met in most part. There is urgent need for heavy motor vehicles (6-ton Mack, 10-ton White-Mack, and 2½-ton Amphibian (DUKW) and every effort should be made to expedite their production.

Landing craft in adequate numbers can only be furnished provided the correct projected rate of production can be maintained.

(4) Operations in the Mediterranean to Eliminate ITALY from the War

All requirements for HUSKY are being met. It is expected that, with continued maintenance, all critical supply and construction items necessary for subsequent operations in the Mediterranean Theater will be available in North Africa.

d. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC-FAR EAST THEATER

(1) Operations in Burma

All requirements for the U.S.-Chinese forces in ASSAM are being met.

Shortages in Lend-Lease supplies for the British can be met at the expense of requirements of U.S. troops overseas. Critical items are 2½-ton amphibian trucks (DUKW), armored amphibians, ¼-ton trailers and pipe lines. High priority must

be given also to the remainder of the excavating and road-making machinery, and to the assigned equipment for increasing the output of the *DIGBOI* refinery.

Although the highest priority has been given to the 10 heavy moorings needed by the British at Trincomalee before the naval covering force assembles there in November, the critical item in short supply is the steel chains. Information is not available as to production, but these will be made available for shipment immediately they come off production.

(2) Air Operations in and from China

The amount of supplies delivered by air transport into China is directly dependent upon the capacity of the ferry route and the communications in *ASSAM*.

(3) Directed operations in the Solomons-Bismarck-New Guinea Area

Requirements are being furnished and can continue to be furnished.

(4) Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago and Japanese-held New Guinea

It is expected that requirements, when determined, can be met.

(5) Seizure of the Marshall and Caroline Islands

Equipment for two amphibious divisions can be furnished. It is expected that other requirements, when determined, can be met.

(6) Eject the Japanese from the Aleutians

Requirements are being met.

ANNEX VII

PART I - DRY CARGO SHIPPING POSITION

Military cargo shipping requirements for the remainder of 1943 have been reexamined in the light of the strategy agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. These requirements are now as follows:-

1. For the maintenance and build-up of British forces overseas monthly sailings are required as shown below:-

a. 1943

Theater	JUL		AUG		SEP		OCT		NOV		DEC	
	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US
India & Ceylon	10	18	9	18	8	15	8	15	8	15	8	15
Mediterranean Theaters	41	32	58	29	56	27	51	32	47	29	43	27
Russian Aid	5	-	4	-	10	-	10	-	10	-	10	-
Turkish Aid	4	5	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	5	-	-
Persian Gulf	2	4	3	5	3	5	2	4	2	4	2	4

b. 1944

Sailings from U.K. and U.S. Combined

Theater	<u>1st Quarter</u>	<u>2nd Quarter</u>	<u>3rd Quarter</u>
India & Ceylon	80	100	100
Mediterranean Theaters	250	280	280
Russian Aid	30	30	30
Turkish Aid	25	25	25
Persian Gulf	20	20	20

It is believed that it is just possible that the 1943 sailings can be met from British availabilities together with the customary assistance afforded by the W.S.A. Individual adjustments may, however, be necessary from month to month. In 1944 a higher rate of assistance from the U.S.A. will be necessary, which is indicated in paragraph 3.

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2. Operational shipping is required in addition as follows:-

a. *BRISK* 8 vessels representing a loss of approximately 8 North Atlantic sailings in the second half of 1943.

b. Operations post-*HUSKY* 90 cargo ships (plus say 15 Combat Loaders) retained after *HUSKY* for some five months representing an equivalent loss of North Atlantic sailings of 90 in 1943 and 70 in 1944.

c. Operations in Burma, 25 cargo ships from November to January representing a further loss of 30 North Atlantic sailings in 1944. Although the shipping required for the three sets of operations above can no doubt be found from the United Nations shipping physically available in their respective areas, the loss of North Atlantic capacity involved cannot be made good from any British resources and must, therefore, be a commitment against U.S. tonnage.

3. These requirements are, therefore, included with all U.S. commitments and are given in the following table of sailings:

<u>Requirement</u>	<u>1943</u>		<u>1944</u>		
	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>
To maintain the war making capacity of <i>WESTERN HEMISPHERE</i>	134	134	134	134	134
To maintain war making capacity of <i>BRITISH ISLES-U.K. Import Program</i>	270	300	330	330	360
To maintain war making capacity of areas other than the <i>BRITISH ISLES- Regular Lend-Lease Allocations</i>	111	111	150	180	200

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<u>Requirement</u>	<u>1943</u>		<u>1944</u>		
	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>
Support and maintenance of forces in all areas-					
U.S. Navy requirements	240	235	204	195	205
U.S. Army requirements (Less U.K. - N. Africa-China-Burma- India-Pacific moves in 1944)	365	355	240	240	240
Aid to Russia	45	54	54	54	54
Re-arm and re-equip FRENCH forces	Included in North African requirements or by use of French shipping.				
Maintenance of prisoners of war	12	2	-	-	-
Economic support of occupied countries	-	-	90	90	90
<i>STRATEGIC OPERATIONS</i>					
China-Burma-India					
U.S. Army requirements	48	52	34	51	51
U.S. allocations for British	-	-	25	-	-
Mediterranean operations	-	90	70	-	-
BRISK	-	8	-	-	-
U.K.					
U.S. Army requirement	259	280	420	400	360
British requirement (from North Africa)	-	44	31	-	-
North Africa	188	166	123	123	123
Marshall Islands					
U.S. Army requirements	-	-	25	22	9
U.S. Navy requirements	-	-	-	-	18

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<u>Requirement</u>	<u>1943</u>		<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>1944</u>	
	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>		<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>
Solomons-Bismarck- New Guinea					
U.S. Army require- ments	-	-	47	84	39
U.S. Navy require- ments	-	-	45	24	-
TOTAL REQUIREMENTS	1672	1831	2022	1927	1883
TOTAL AVAILABLE	1606	1762	1900	2050	2250
BALANCE	-66	-69	-122	+123	+367

NOTE: The foregoing is based on the assumption that each *BOLERO* cargo ship will lift approximately 1500 tons of British import cargo and on the other hand the equivalent of 12 shiploads of measurement cargo on *BOLERO* account will be lifted monthly in U.K. import vessels.

Annex VII

PART II - PERSONNEL SHIPPING POSITION

4. In examining the British personnel shipping resources and determining their optimum deployment, the following assumptions have been made:

a. That the operational requirements will be as in Table I attached.

b. That the move of 82 West African Division from West Africa to India will not take place.

c. That British personnel shipping will be required to fulfill the following permanent commitments.

(1) 9,000 troops per month from U.K. to North Africa.

(2) 17,000 troops per month from U.K. to Indian Ocean.

(3) Move of 81 West African Division to India during 3rd Quarter of 1943.

(4) 15,000 Canadian troops and Air Trainees and Naval personnel per month to be moved from Canada to the U.K.

d. Losses in the operations shown in Appendix "A" do not exceed 40 per cent of the shipping employed.

e. North African personnel route can not open until January 1944.

f. That the pool of British personnel shipping to the Indian Ocean is capable of meeting local requirements (except for certain operational requirements) in that theater.

5. After meeting the requirements in paragraph 4 above, it has been assumed that British personnel shipping will be available for the movement of United States troops from U.S.A. to United Kingdom, and that from November onwards some ships of the escorted class of shipping will also be available to move United States troops either from North Africa or U.S.A. to the United Kingdom.

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6. Post-*HUSKY* operations make use of capacity of 80,000 in their initial stages, but it is estimated that about half of this can be released after the assault. In view of the fact that the average interval between convoys from the United States to the United Kingdom will be about four weeks, it is unlikely that any of this shipping, when released, would be able to move United States troops from the U.S.A. to the United Kingdom during 1943. This shipping will, however, be able to move British and United States troops from North Africa to the United Kingdom during November and December 1943. It is considered that personnel shipping released from the Mediterranean should be used for the movement of troops from North Africa in preference to the movement of troops from U.S.A. to United Kingdom because the employment from North Africa will save this shipping a voyage empty westbound across the Atlantic.

7. In the calculations, account has been taken of the fact that the balanced movement of troops and their cargo into the United Kingdom is limited by the quantity of cargo which can be accepted each month into the U.K. The maximum practical limit is 150 shiploads of cargo per month except in absolute emergency. This must include the maintenance requirements of the growing number of U.S. troops in the U.K. and, therefore, conditions the monthly *SICKLE/BOLERO* build-up. It is pointed out that the early arrival of certain Port and Engineer Units is essential if the maximum quantity of *SICKLE/BOLERO* cargo is to be handled.

8. The opening of a personnel route along the North African coast to the Middle East would release personnel shipping from the U.K.-Indian Ocean route equal to a total capacity of about 30,000. This would give a further monthly lift from North America across the Atlantic of 20,000 men per month as soon as the route is opened. If work on the development of the route starts now, personnel movement should start in January.

9. British personnel shipping, after meeting all present known British personnel movement requirements, can lift U.S. troops into

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U.K. or through Atlantic continental ports on the scale shown in Table II. It must be borne in mind, however, that in 1944 a monthly

TABLE I

OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PERSONNEL SHIPPING

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Period Required</u>	<u>Capacity Required</u>	<u>Proposed Source and Class of Shipping*</u>
Operations in Mediterranean	Oct/Dec 1943	80,000 (including 12 L.S.I.(L))	(20,000 now in Med: (WS)) (50,000 UK-Indian Ocean (WS))
	Jan/Feb 1944	30,000	(10,000 Indian Ocean (IO))
Burma	Aug/Nov 1943	3,000	
	Nov/Dec 1943	36,000 (including 6 L.S.I.(L) and 3 L.S.P.)	16,000 UK-Indian Ocean (WS) 20,000 Indian Ocean (IO)
Portuguese Islands	Aug/Sep 1943	14,000 (including 2 L.S.P. and 4 L.S.I.(L))	14,000 UK-Indian Ocean (WS)

* Notes: (WS) Large troopships over 14½ knots permanently employed on the U.K.-Indian Ocean Service.

(IO) Smaller troopships unsuitable for major ocean voyages and used for local movement between Indian Ocean theaters.

TABLE II

AVAILABILITY OF BRITISH PERSONNEL SHIPPING FOR THE MOVEMENT OF U.S. TROOPS FROM U.S.A., OR OF U.S. AND BRITISH TROOPS FROM NORTH AFRICA TO U.K.

		<u>From U.S.A.</u>			<u>From North Africa</u>
		<u>Unescorted</u>	<u>Escorted</u>		<u>Escorted</u>
July	1943	26,000	-		-
August	"	26,000	-		-
September	"	25,000	-		-
October	"	25,000	-		-
November	"	25,000	-		25,000
December	"	25,000	-		25,000
January	1944	25,000	35,000	or	45,000
February	"	25,000	35,000		
March	"	25,000	35,000		
April	"	34,000	35,000		
May	"	34,000	35,000		
June	"	34,000	35,000		
July	"	34,000	35,000		
August	"	34,000	35,000		
September	"	34,000	35,000		

TABLE III
U.S. TROOP MOVEMENTS

	STRENGTH July 1 1943	1943			1943			1944			1944			1944		
		July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.
		3rd Quarter			4th Quarter			1st Quarter			2nd Quarter			3rd Quarter		
1. U.S. Trooplift Reserved for Navy			83,800			102,000		102,000				76,600		80,500		
2. U.S. Army Troop Movements to all areas except U.K., North Africa, China-Burma-India and Pacific: in 1944	832,300		84,250			67,070										
3. U.K. Build-Up																
From U.S.	180,700	22,000	124,200	114,400	92,000	91,000	34,000	58,000	128,000	147,000	154,000	115,000	24,000	20,000	17,000	15,000
From Iceland			15,000													
Replacements		4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	22,000	24,000	24,000	24,000	25,000
Cumulative (incl. transfers from N. Africa)		202,700	341,900	456,300	548,300	684,300	763,300	871,300	999,300	1,146,300	1,300,300	1,415,300	1,439,300	1,459,300	1,476,300	1,491,300
AAF (cumulative)	118,000	131,800	148,000	170,000	201,800	234,500	278,200	317,200	359,700	380,900	393,200	406,500	406,500	406,500	406,500	406,500
AGF and ASF (cumulative)	62,700	70,900	193,900	286,300	346,500	449,800	485,100	554,100	639,600	765,400	907,100	1,008,800	1,032,800	1,052,800	1,069,800	1,084,800
DIVISIONS (Limited by Ports from May 1944)	1	1	2	4 1/2	5 1/2	6 1/2	8	10	12	15	18 1/2	21	21 1/2	22	22 1/2	23
Surplus troop capacity												45,000	110,000	160,000	165,000	170,000
<u>To U.K. from North Africa</u>																
U.S. Ships						45,000	45,000	45,000								
British Ships (British Troops)						(25,000)	(25,000)	(40,000)								
4. <u>North Africa</u>		9,000				-45,000	-45,000	-50,000								
Cumulative	503,300	512,300	512,300	512,300	512,300	467,300	422,300	372,300	372,300	372,300	372,300	372,300	372,300	372,300	372,300	372,300
5. <u>China-Burma-India</u>		15,500		6,100	9,500		11,100									
Cumulative	40,600	56,100	56,100	62,200	71,700	71,700	82,800	83,000	83,000	83,000	83,000	83,000	83,000	83,000	83,000	83,000
6. <u>Marshall Islands</u>								15,000	20,000							
Cumulative								15,000	35,000							
7. <u>Solomons-Bismark-New Guinea</u>								20,000	25,000	25,000	35,000	35,000	35,000			
Cumulative								20,000	45,000	70,000	105,000	140,000	175,000	175,000	175,000	175,000

= 4 U.S. Divisions incl. in cumulative total above
= 3 British Divisions not incl. in totals

PART III - CONCLUSIONS

11. The examination of the shipping resources of the United Nations shows that, so far as can be foreseen now, and on the assumption that future losses do not exceed the agreed estimate as indicated in C.C.S. 174, the shipping limitation on the fulfillment of the overall strategy will be cargo shipping.

Personnel shipping will be available to permit of the optimum deployment of United Nations forces, up to the limits imposed by the availability of cargo shipping.

The optimum deployment of available United Nations cargo shipping to meet the requirements of the basic undertakings and projected operations for 1943-1944 reveals the following balance in cargo ship sailings:

3rd Quarter 1943 - 66 sailings deficient
4th Quarter 1943 - 69 sailings deficient
1st Quarter 1944 - 122 sailings deficient
2nd Quarter 1944 - 123 sailings surplus
3rd Quarter 1944 - 367 sailings surplus

The deficiencies are small, but if properly spread over all the programs concerned the effect will not be unmanageable.

During the 2nd and 3rd quarters of 1944 there are considerable surpluses of personnel and cargo shipping which roughly balance one another and which could lift approximately half a million men on an Atlantic or equivalent voyage within that period.

NOTE 1: Memorandum by Mr. Lewis W. Douglas and Lord Leathers is attached hereto as an Appendix.

NOTE 2: The detailed employment of British shipping has been published separately as the report of the British Committee on Shipping Availability, dated 24 April 1943.

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APPENDIX TO PART III OF ANNEX VII

23 May 1943

COMBINED STATEMENT COVERING DRY CARGO
SHIPPING AVAILABILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS

This statement commenting on the schedules of cargo shipping is divided into two parts. The first summarizes the estimates of requirements for dry cargo ships and the ships available for loading during the period 1 June 1943 to 1 January 1944; the second summarizes the estimated requirements and availables for the period 1 January 1944 through September 1944.

The Statement is divided in this manner because the method of determining the estimates during the last half of 1943 is quite different from the method employed for the nine months period in 1944. The first period, being closer to hand, is less liable to error than the second. Moreover, there are certain important still undetermined factors such, for example, as the ship construction program, that render estimates for the nine months period of 1944 subject to a more considerable variation.

1 JUNE 1943 - 1 JANUARY 1944

Based upon the statement of estimated requirements and available dry cargo ships in paragraph 3, there appears to be a deficiency of 155 U.S. controlled ships available for loading during the period in question. This deficit, if properly spread, is not unmanageable.

1 JANUARY 1944 - 1 OCTOBER 1944

There are at the moment so many undetermined factors in the estimates of requirements and availables for this period that further review of the position is necessary. It does not now, however, appear to present insurmountable difficulties.

/s/ LEWIS W. DOUGLAS

/s/ LEATHERS

Appendix to Part III of Annex VII

C.C.S. 246

MOVEMENTS OF THE "QUEENS"

Reference:

CCS 93rd Meeting, Item (5)

CCS 94th Meeting, Item (3)

In their 93rd Meeting the Combined Chiefs Staff took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would present a paper recommending a change in the cycle of military transport vessels of the "Queen" type with a view to lessening the risk of passage.

C.C.S. 246 (23 May 1943) circulated the British memorandum as noted in the above meeting.

In their 94th Meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff accepted the proposals for the future movement of the "QUEENS" as set out in Paragraph 6 of C.C.S. 246.

C.C.S. 246

23 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

MOVEMENTS OF THE "QUEENS"

(Reference: C.C.S. 93rd Mtg., Item 5)

Memorandum by British Chiefs of Staff

1. The most dangerous part of the trans-Atlantic passage is that which crosses the Bay of Biscay and it is essential that this part of the passage should take place under the most favorable conditions which are those when there is little or no moon.

2. By running these ships on a 28 day cycle it could be arranged that the passage of the dangerous areas in both directions is carried out in favorable conditions.

3. Up to the present time these ships have been running on the 21 day cycle and after the 28 day cycle is adopted it will result in a loss in troop lift of 15,000 for the third quarter of the year and 31,000 for the fourth quarter, making a total of 46,000 for the remainder of the year.

4. Should one of these ships be torpedoed she will be out of action for several months and the loss in lift will be considerably more than the 46,000 mentioned above.

5. The loss of life, should one of these ships be damaged to such an extent that it is necessary to take to the boats, will be inevitably very great in view of the fact that only 3,000 out of 15,000 carried on an eastward passage can be accommodated in the boats.

6. Taking the above factors into consideration, it is considered that these ships should be run on the 28 day cycle and that the consequent loss in lift should be accepted.

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C.C.S. 248/1

PROVISIONS OF NEW L.S.I. (L)'S

Reference:

CCS 95th Meeting, Item (4)

C.C.S. 248 was circulated 23 May 1943 for consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In their 95th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that certain amendments should be made to C.C.S. 248 as incorporated in C.C.S. 248/1. Further action on this paper was deferred.

C.C.S. 248/1

24 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

PROVISION OF NEW L.S.I. (L)'S
Reference: C.C.S. 95th Meeting, Item 4

Note by the Secretaries

The Enclosure is C.C.S. 248 as amended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 95th Meeting.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

1. The present L.S.I. (L)'s in use by the British include nine large liners of 15,000 to 23,000 tons.

2. The use of these large ships as assault ships is most undesirable since, not only are they exposed to great risk, but by virtue of being used in the assault, they waste a proportion of their carrying capacity. The most economical use of this type of ship is undoubtedly on normal trooping service where their full lift can be employed.

The Minister of War Transport has reported that there are no further suitable British ships left of 15 knots speed or over which can be converted to L.S.I. (L)'s to replace these ships. He has also suggested that, in his opinion, the most suitable types of ship available for this service, and those which would most nearly meet "ideal" requirements, are:

a. Certain of the Dutch "Jay" ships.

b. American combat loaders.

3. Both the above types are operated by the American Army and Navy. Several of the former are at present understood to be employed on troop-ing service; the latter, which include many ships under construction, as assault ships.

4. Both types of ship would require conversion, including alterations to davits, to be able to hoist British type L.C.A.'s.

5. *RECOMMENDATION*

a. The total number of ships required by the British is thirteen, made up as follows:

(1) Nine to replace the large liners referred to in paragraph 1 above:

(2) Four to replace estimated casualties that may occur during operations in 1943; this number only to be supplied when and if these casualties do in fact occur.

b. It is therefore recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff be asked to authorize:

(1) The allocation for use by the British Services of as many "Jay" ships as are suitable for conversion to L.S.I. (L)'s. If required, the corresponding lift could be made available from British personnel ships to make good the loss of carrying capacity to the Americans.

(2) That as many combat loaders under construction as are necessary to make up the total number of thirteen ships referred to in the previous paragraph should be converted in the same way, to be able to lift L.C.A.'s, and then after conversion temporarily allocated to British control.

C.C.S. 249

CODE NAMES FOR AGREED OPERATIONS

Reference:

- CCS 92nd Meeting, Item (2)
- CCS 93rd Meeting, Item (4)
- 6th White House Meeting, Item (7)

C.C.S. 249 was presented by hand to the President, Prime Minister and each Chief of Staff present during the 6th Meeting at the White House. This paper was not circulated. It contains proposed code names for operations agreed upon during the Trident Conference. With some amendments, C.C.S. 249 was approved by the President and Prime Minister and thereafter sent to appropriate security agencies of the United States and United Kingdom for implementation.

C.C.S. 250/1

IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISIONS REACHED AT THE
TRIDENT CONFERENCE

Reference:

CCS 96th Meeting, Item (3)

C.C.S. 250 was circulated 24 May 1943 for consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In their 96th Meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the covering memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners as amended in the course of discussion and approved the draft directives to General Eisenhower and the draft supplementary directive to the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (Designate) subject to the incorporation therein by the Secretaries of the agreed decisions that had been arrived at subsequent to the preparation of these draft directives.

Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 250/1, 25 May 1943.

C. C. S. 250/1

25 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISIONS REACHED
AT THE TRIDENT CONFERENCE

Note by the Secretaries

The attached memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners is in the form as amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 96th Meeting.

H. REDMAN,
J. F. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISIONS REACHED
AT THE TRIDENT CONFERENCE

Memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners

1. In order that there may be no delay in action to implement the decisions arrived at the Trident Conference, the Combined Staff Planners recommend as follows:

a. That a directive be issued to General Eisenhower for operations after *HUSKY* (Enclosure A).

b. That a supplementary directive be issued to General Morgan (Enclosure B).

c. That General Morgan should be instructed to give, as soon as possible, a preliminary estimate of the requirements for operation *ROUNDHAMMER* in transport aircraft and gliders.

2. In view of the urgency of completing the *ROUNDHAMMER* plan, we suggest that further consideration should be given to the early appointment of the Supreme Commander.

ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO GENERAL EISENHOWER

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:

a. That forces and equipment shall be established in the *UNITED KINGDOM* with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the *UNITED KINGDOM* by 1 May 1944, in addition to the air forces then available.

<i>ASSAULT:</i>	5 Infantry Divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing craft)
	2 Infantry Divisions - Follow-up
	<u>2</u> Air-borne Divisions
Total	9 Divisions in the Assault

<i>BUILD-UP:</i>	20 Divisions available for movement into lodgment area
	<u> </u>
Total	29 Divisions

The possibility of adding one French Division will be considered at a later date.

The expansion of logistical facilities in the *UNITED KINGDOM* will be undertaken immediately, and after the initial assault the seizure and development of Continental ports will be expedited in order that the build-up forces may be augmented by follow-up shipments from the *UNITED STATES* or elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of 3 to 5 divisions per month.

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b. That the Allied Commander in Chief North Africa will be instructed, as a matter of urgency, to plan such operations in exploitation of *HUSKY* as are best calculated to eliminate *ITALY* from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Which of the various specific operations should be adopted, and thereafter mounted, is a decision which will be reserved to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander in Chief in *NORTH AFRICA* may use for his operations all those forces available in the *MEDITERRANEAN* Area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the *UNITED KINGDOM*, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for *HUSKY* will not be considered available. It is estimated that the equivalent strength of 19 British and Allied, 4 United States, and 4 French divisions, or a total of 27 divisions will be available for garrisons and operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN* Area subsequent to *HUSKY*. These figures exclude the 4 United States and 3 British divisions to be transferred to the *UNITED KINGDOM* and the 2 British divisions constituting the British commitment to *TURKEY*. It is further estimated that there will be available after *HUSKY* a total of 3,648 aircraft including 242 heavy bombers (day and night), 519 medium bombers (day and night), 299 light and dive bombers, 2,012 fighters, 412 transports, and 164 army cooperatives. Further instructions will be issued as to the availability of combat loaders and cargo ships.

2. You are directed to submit proposals with appropriate recommendations for operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN* Area, to be carried out concurrently with or subsequent to a successful *HUSKY*. All considerations related to your proposed operations must be consonance with the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreements quoted in paragraph 1 above. Proposals will be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff not later than 1 July 1943.

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3. *LANDING CRAFT*. In view of necessity for starting preparations in the *UNITED KINGDOM* at once for cross-Channel operations referred to in paragraph 1 *a* above, it may be necessary after *HUSKY* to withdraw from the *MEDITERRANEAN* and *LEVANT*:

a. The crews of all landing craft that may be lost in *HUSKY*.

b. Maintenance and base staffs, with repair equipment and spare gear surplus to those required for the upkeep of landing ships and craft then remaining.

The landing craft available for operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN* after *HUSKY* are based on an estimate of 50 per cent loss in that operation. If the losses are less than this, surplus crews and craft may have to be returned to the U. K. This does not necessarily apply to special ships.

ENCLOSURE B

DRAFT SUPPLEMENTARY DIRECTIVE TO THE CHIEF
OF STAFF TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER (DESIGNATE)

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS FROM THE U. K.

1. Under the terms of your present directive you have been instructed to prepare plans for:

a. An elaborate camouflage and deception scheme extending over the whole summer with a view to pinning the enemy in the West and keeping alive the expectation of large-scale cross-Channel operations in 1943. This would include at least one amphibious feint with the object of bringing on an air battle employing the Metropolitan Royal Air Force and the U.S. 8th Air Force.

b. A return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration at any time from now onwards with whatever forces may be available at the time.

c. A full-scale assault against the Continent in 1944 as early as possible.

2. In amplification of paragraph c above the Combined Chiefs of Staff have now resolved that forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944, to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out.

3. You will, therefore, plan an operation based on the presence of the following ground forces available for use in the U.K. on 1 May 1944:

ASSAULT:	5 Infantry Divisions simultaneously loaded in landing craft.
	2 Infantry Divisions - follow up.
	2 Air-borne Divisions.
Total	9 Divisions in the assault.
	—
BUILD-UP:	20 Divisions available for movement into lodgment area.
Total	29 Divisions.

A detailed statement of the forces which it is estimated will be available for this operation will be provided separately, and the possibility of adding one French Division will be considered at a later date.

4. The expansion of logistical facilities in the U. K. will be undertaken immediately. You should plan for the development and seizure of Continental ports, after the initial assault, in order that the build-up forces may be augmented, and follow-up shipments may be made from the United States, or elsewhere, of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of 3 to 5 divisions per month.

The preparation and constant keeping up to date of plans for an emergency crossing of the Channel in the event of a German collapse will proceed in accordance with the directive already given to you. In addition, you will prepare and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for sending forces to *NORWAY* in the event of a German evacuation becoming apparent.

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5. Your *outline plan* for this operation should be prepared and submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as early as possible and not later than *1 August 1943*.

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C.C.S. 251/1

PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING COMBINED PLANNING

Reference:

CCS 96th Meeting, Item (5)

C.C.S. 251 was circulated 24 May 1943 for consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In their 96th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the proposals put forward by the Combined Staff Planners, subject to certain amendments which have been incorporated in C.C.S. 251/1.

C.C.S. 251/1

25 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING COMBINED PLANNING

Note by the Secretaries

The attached memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners is in the form as amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 96th Meeting.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

. . .

PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING COMBINED PLANNING

Memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners

1. The attached proposal is submitted for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. An immediate planning problem is before us and, subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, we propose to tackle it as follows:

PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

To meet the Combined Chiefs of Staff requirement for an appreciation leading up to an outline plan for the defeat of Japan, we propose that a U. S. Planning Team should visit London to discuss the grand strategy of the war against Japan, and in particular to assist the British Joint Planners in preparing the British part of this paper. Subsequently, a British Planning Team should visit Washington to assist in the completion of the outline plan.

ENCLOSURE

PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING COMBINED PLANNING

Report by the Combined Staff Planners

1. As a result of our experiences at the Trident Conference, the Combined Staff Planners have considered whether any steps can be taken to improve combined planning in the future.

2. The early days of this present Conference were devoted almost entirely to an exchange of strategic thought, much of which was new to both sides. Had it been possible for the Joint Planning teams on both sides of the Atlantic to have kept each other informed beforehand of the details of the strategic operations under consideration, we feel that the task of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the present Conference would have been easier.

3. We, therefore, submit for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the following measures, designed to promote the continual exchange of strategic thought between London and Washington, should be authorized by the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

a. That planning papers affecting combined strategical operations in the various theaters of war should be mutually exchanged, as appropriate, and should be discussed between the U. S. Planners and the British Planners in Washington. This interchange of information would, of course, be understood as in no way committing the Chiefs of Staff of the country concerned.

b. That Army, Naval and Air Force Staff Officers should be exchanged at frequent intervals between the American Joint Planners in Washington and the British Joint Planners in London in order to keep planning activities properly related to the existing and continuously changing situation. Such officers would not act merely as Liaison Officers, but would work as an integral part of the Joint Planning Staff in the consideration of plans of combined interest.

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c. That it should be the aim for the Directors of Plans or their representatives to meet from time to time. These meetings would probably take place alternately in the United States and in the United Kingdom. This might involve the Directors of Plans of each nation being absent from their respective capital for a period of two to three weeks every four months. Some of these meetings will immediately precede or coincide with C.C.S. Conferences.

MINUTES
OF
MEETINGS

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

TRIDENT

MINUTES

1ST MEETING, THE WHITE HOUSE, 2:30 P.M., 12 MAY 1943

PRESENT

British

The Prime Minister
Field Marshal Sir John Dill
General Sir Alan F. Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles F. A. Portal
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay

U. S.

The President
Admiral Wm. D. Leahy
General G. C. Marshall
Admiral E. J. King
Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney
Mr. Harry L. Hopkins

SECRETARIES

Brig. General J. R. Deane
Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob

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THE PRESIDENT welcomed Mr. Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff. He recalled that it was less than a year ago when they had all met in the White House, and had set on foot the moves leading up to *TORCH*. It was very appropriate that they should meet again just as that operation was coming to a satisfactory conclusion. The meeting at Casablanca had set on foot operation *HUSKY*, and he hoped that this would meet with similar good fortune. He thought that the keynote of our plans at the present time should be an intention to employ every resource of men and munitions against the enemy. Nothing that could be brought to bear should be allowed to stand idle.

He then asked the Prime Minister to open the discussion.

THE PRIME MINISTER recalled the striking change which had taken place in the situation since he had last sat by the President's desk, and had heard the news of the fall of Tobruk. He could never forget the manner in which the President had sustained him at that time, and the Shermans which had been handed over so generously had made their reputation in Africa. The British came to the present meeting adhering to the Casablanca decisions. There might have to be adjustments made necessary by our success, which also enabled us to take a longer forward view. *TORCH* was over, *HUSKY* was near, what should come next? He would put forward some views which had been formed by careful study. These would not be in the shape of fixed plans, but rather of ideas for the common stock. We had been able by taking thought together to produce a succession of brilliant events which had altered the whole course of the war. We had the authority and prestige of victory. It was our duty to redouble our efforts, and to grasp the fruits of our success. The only questions outstanding between the two Staffs were questions of emphasis and priority. He felt sure that these could be solved by mutual agreement.

He did not propose to deal with the U-boat war, and the aerial bombardment of Germany. There were no differences of opinion on these subjects, though there might be a few points of detail to be cleared up between the two Staffs. He would like to put forward for consideration a number of objectives, and questions which might focus subsequent

study. The first objective was in the Mediterranean. The great prize there was to get Italy out of the war by whatever means might be the best. He recalled how in 1918, when Germany might have retreated to the Meuse or the Rhine and continued the fight, the defection of Bulgaria brought the whole of the enemy structure crashing to the ground. The collapse of Italy would cause a chill of loneliness over the German people, and might be the beginning of their doom. But even if not immediately fatal to Germany, the effects of Italy coming out of the war would be very great, first of all on Turkey, who had always measured herself with Italy in the Mediterranean. The moment would come when a Joint American-Russian-British request might be made to Turkey for permission to use bases in her territory from which to bomb Ploesti and clear the Aegean. Such a request could hardly fail to be successful if Italy were out of the war, and the moment were chosen when Germany could take no powerful action against Turkey. Another great effect of the elimination of Italy would be felt in the Balkans, where patriots of various nationalities were with difficulty held in check by large Axis forces, which included 25 or more Italian Divisions. If these withdrew, the effect would be either that Germany would have to give up the Balkans, or else that she would have to withdraw large forces from the Russian Front to fill the gap. In no other way could relief be given to the Russian Front on so large a scale this year. The third effect would be the elimination of the Italian fleet. This would immediately release a considerable British squadron of battle-ships and aircraft carriers to proceed either to the Bay of Bengal or the Pacific to fight Japan.

Certain questions presented themselves in relation to the Mediterranean. Need we invade the soil of Italy, or could we crush her by air attack? Would Germany defend Italy? Would Italy be an economic burden to us? He did not think so. Would arguments against a general conquest of Italy apply equally against a *toe and heel* operation to establish contact with Yugoslavia? Finally, there was a large political question for the British and United States Governments. What sort of life after the war should we be willing to accord to Italy if she placed herself unreservedly in our hands? He might observe that if Italy made

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a separate peace, we should have the use of Sardinia and the Dodecanese without having to fight for them.

The second objective was the taking of weight off Russia. He was much impressed by Stalin's attitude, in spite of the stopping of the Arctic convoys. For the first time, in his recent speech, Stalin had acknowledged the efforts and victories of his Allies. But we should never forget that there were 185 German Divisions on the Russian Front. We had destroyed the German Army in Africa, but soon we would not be in contact with them anywhere. The Russian effort was prodigious, and placed us in their debt - a position from which he would like to emerge. As he had already mentioned, the best way of taking the weight off the Russian Front in 1943 would be to get, or knock, Italy out of the war, thus forcing the Germans to send a large number of troops to hold down the Balkans.

The third objective had already been mentioned by the President in his opening remarks. It was to apply to the greatest possible extent our vast Armies, Air forces, and munitions to the enemy. All plans should be judged by this test. We had a large Army, and the Metropolitan Fighter Air Force in Great Britain. We had our finest and most experienced troops in the Mediterranean. The British alone had 13 Divisions in that theater. Supposing that *HUSKY* were completed by the end of August, what should these troops do between that time and the date 7 or 8 months later, when the cross-Channel operation might first be mounted? They could not possibly stand idle, and he could not contemplate so long a period of apparent inaction. It would have a serious effect on relations with Russia, who was bearing such a disproportionate weight.

The objectives he had so far mentioned all led up to *BOLERO*, *SLEDGEHAMMER*, and *ROUNDUP*. By *BOLERO*, he meant the administration arrangements necessary for the movement and reception of large American forces in the United Kingdom. He could not pretend that the problem of landing on the Channel coast had been solved. The difficult beaches, with the great rise and fall of tide, the strength of the enemy's defenses, the number of his reserves, and the ease of his communications,

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all made the task one which must not be underrated. Much, however, would be learned from *HUSKY*. The question arose whether anything could be done this year before the weather broke in August or September. All the British landing craft had gone from the United Kingdom to *HUSKY*, and owing to priority having been rightly given to *SICKLE*, only one U. S. Division was so far available in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, plans were being made for an operation to provoke an air battle, and we were standing ready to exploit a German collapse, should this by any chance take place. He wished to make it absolutely clear that H. M. Government earnestly desired to undertake a full-scale invasion of the Continent from the United Kingdom as soon as possible. They certainly did not disdain the idea if a plan offering reasonable prospects of success could be made.

The fifth objective was aid to China. As a result of Casablanca, Field Marshal Wavell had prepared the best plan he could for operation *ANAKIM*, and he thought that it had some prospect of success. The difficulties of fighting in Burma were apparent. The jungle prevented the use of our modern weapons. The monsoon strictly limited the length of the campaigning season, and there was no means of bringing sea power to bear. Should, however, *ANAKIM* be successfully carried out, he was advised that it would not be till 1945 that the Burma Road could be reopened, and even then its capacity would not be more than 20,000 tons a month. Nevertheless, he had not gone back on the status of *ANAKIM*. He attached the same degree of importance as before to activity in the Indian Ocean theater of war. Was there any means by which China could be helped in 1943 other than the air route? How could this be improved? The British readily shouldered their responsibility to establish and guard the air facilities required in Assam. If further study showed that it would be better to by-pass Burma, he was anxious that another means should be found of utilizing the large forces standing in India. He thought that this alternative might well be found in an operation against the tip of Sumatra and the waist of Malaya at Penang. He was most anxious that we should find in that theater some means of making use of those advantages which had been so valuable in *TORCH*. In that operation, sea power had played its full part; complete surprise had

been possible; we had been able to seize a territory of importance which not only brought in a new Army on our side, but forced the enemy to fight in a place most disadvantageous to him. These conditions might apply to an attack on the area he had described. The fleet to cover the operation would come from the Mediterranean after the elimination of Italy. This meant that the operation could not be launched before March, 1944, which would, however, be a suitable moment from the point of view of weather.

He felt that the time had now come to study the long-term plan for the defeat of Japan. He would like once more to state the British determination to carry the struggle home to Japan. The only question was how best to do it. He thought that the United States Chiefs of Staff should lead in a joint study, on the assumption that Germany would be out of the war in 1944, and that we could concentrate on the great campaign against Japan in 1945. If the underlying strategic conception was agreed, then operations could be planned to fit in, and the requisite specialized apparatus could be got ready in time.

If, of course, Russia could be brought in against Japan, that would prove the best solution of all. Stalin had shown plain indications that Russia would want to be in at the death, but the timing of Russian action must obviously depend upon what happened to Hitler, and when.

In conclusion, the Prime Minister said that he hoped his remarks would be of use in framing an Agenda for Combined Chiefs of Staff Conferences, and would be some guide as to the emphasis and priorities which should be assigned to the various theaters of operation as well as to their relationship and reciprocal reactions.

THE PRESIDENT expressed his gratitude to the Prime Minister for the open manner in which he had presented his views. He said that the Combined Staffs must approach their problems with open minds, giving full consideration to the priorities and relative importance of the many problems which they would consider in the course of the conferences.

THE PRESIDENT stated that he has always been a firm believer in *attrition* as an effective weapon. He pointed to the North African campaign and suggested that it might not have been so successful had sufficient force been sent to capture Tunisia on the initial landing. As a result of the Tunisian campaign there will be perhaps some 200,000 enemy casualties. He felt there would have been considerably less had Tunisia been taken at the outset.

He pointed out that the United Nations are now out-producing both the Germans and the Japanese and that if we break even in our losses of airplanes and other munitions we are, in effect, forging ahead.

THE PRESIDENT then said that with the large armies and naval forces that are available to the United Nations every effort should be made to keep them engaged with the enemy. He felt that the United Nations were losing ground when their forces remain idle.

THE PRESIDENT expressed optimism as far as the situation in Turkey was concerned. When the Prime Minister went on his *fishing trip* after the Casablanca Conferences he, the President, had been surprised by the cordial reception that the Prime Minister had received. He felt that Turkey was now in a better political position than she had ever been before. Perhaps Turkey could be brought to a favorable attitude toward the United Nations by diplomacy alone. If so, this would permit the use of her airfields for combined air operations against Ploesti and the Germans' right flank and their lines of communication. If Turkey could be brought into the war, there would be the possibility of combined operations toward the Adrianople line, thus threatening Bulgaria, and inducing that country to withdraw from the war. He felt that the Russians would welcome any effort on the part of the United Nations which would result in breaking the Germans' lines of communication. He pointed out also that attrition would be at work during any operations from Turkey.

THE PRESIDENT then asked "Where do we go - from *HUSKY*?" He said he had always shrunk from the thought of putting large armies in Italy. This might result in attrition for the United Nations and play into

Germany's hand. He indicated that a thorough investigation should be made of what an occupation of Italy proper, or of the *heel* or *toe* of Italy, would mean as a drain on allied resources. At the same time, he pointed out that the Mediterranean area contained large armies of the United Nations, perhaps about a total of 25 divisions, and that these must be kept employed. He said there was not much time in 1943, because planning future operations is a lengthy procedure. The question to be decided quickly, is how to use the Mediterranean troops this year. He said that conditions in Italy are known to be precarious. Italy might drop into the lap of the United Nations, who would then have the responsibility of supplying the Italian people. Everyone was agreed that Italy must be reconstituted, but that the mistakes regarding possession of the Northern Adriatic, which occurred at the peace table after the last war, must not be repeated.

Summing up, the *PRESIDENT* said a survey should be made to determine the cost of occupying Italy or parts of it as opposed to the cost of achieving the same results by air offensives from Sicily or the *heel* and *toe* of Italy.

THE PRESIDENT said that regardless of operations undertaken in the Mediterranean there would be a surplus of manpower. He said that this surplus should be used to build up *BOLERO*. Preparations for such build-up should begin at once. He felt that all were agreed that no *ROUNDUP* or *SLEDGEHAMMER* was possible of accomplishment this year, but if one or the other were to be mounted in the spring of 1944, preparations should begin now. *ROUNDUP* and *SLEDGEHAMMER* have been talked about for two years but as yet none of these operations had been accepted as a concrete plan to be carried out at a certain time. Therefore he wished to emphasize that *SLEDGEHAMMER* or *ROUNDUP* should be decided upon definitely as an operation for the spring of 1944.

THE PRESIDENT then directed his remarks toward the Pacific. He said that at the present time a landing was being made in the Aleutians, on the Island of Attu. Approximately 3,000 men had already been put ashore. By this operation it was hoped to put Kiska in a *box* between Attu and Amchitka which would also result in imposing *attrition* on

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the enemy. So far, the operations in the Aleutians had resulted in a net gain to the United Nations. The operations in the Solomons and in New Guinea had had the same result.

THE PRESIDENT said that while things are apparently going along all right in the Pacific, attention must be devoted to the length of the Japanese supply lines. He likened them to a *segment of pie* in which Japan proper was at the apex, and the line from the Solomons through the Dutch East Indies to Burma represented the *outer crust*. While there was some attrition going on against the *outer crust*, the most effective way to get at the Japanese shipping was to strike at the apex. So far the United Nations have done well in sinking Japanese merchant tonnage. Proof of this has been in the fact that the Japanese have been taking shipping from the Yangtze and using it, together with junks they are building, for coastal runs, in order to release coastal shipping for ocean work. Since the war started the Japanese have suffered a net loss of 1,000,000 tons of shipping or approximately one-seventh of the shipping which they had available at the beginning of the war. If they continue to lose shipping at this rate they can not maintain the *outer rim* of the *pie* and will have to contract in their operations. *THE PRESIDENT* said that the same was true with regard to aircraft. Attrition suffered by the Japanese air forces has resulted in their having less strength available now than at the beginning of the war.

THE PRESIDENT repeated that the most effective way to strike the Japanese shipping was to strike it leaving Japan proper. This could best be done from bases either in China, or from China and Russia. Therefore much depends upon keeping China a *going concern*. He said he did not believe the Chinese were *crying wolf* when reporting the critical condition which exists in their country today. He said that the conference could not justify overlooking the possibility of a Chinese collapse. This brought up the question of the priority for aid to China with regard to 1943 and 1944.

ANAKIM and similar plans proposed at Casablanca might not have an effect which would be immediate enough to keep China in the war;

the results of *ANAKIM* would not be felt until March or April of 1944 and the Burma Road would not be fully open to traffic until 1945. The necessity was for doing something for China now. The *PRESIDENT* said that the question resolves itself to assisting China by air.

THE PRESIDENT said that to assist China by air it was essential to reconstruct and maintain the security of the airfields in Assam to the west of the mountains. They must be made secure regardless of the cost in manpower and materiel, and they must also be protected. On the east side of the mountains the Chinese are building landing fields and now have five or six fields in good condition. General Stilwell has two divisions in training for the protection of these fields. The *PRESIDENT* said that the Generalissimo does not fear a ground attack in Yunnan.

He said that air in China would accomplish three objectives: it would be able to harass Japanese troops South of Hankow or those advancing from the South against Chungking; it could harass Japanese attacks against Chungking from the North; and it could stop Japanese attacks against Chungking which might be made up the Yangtze. The *PRESIDENT* said he doubted if reliance could be placed on the Chinese army, excepting those troops being trained in Yunnan and Ramgarh. However, he thought it important to give the Generalissimo, who is the head of both the Army and the State, what he wants at this time. This, he said, is a strong build-up of the American-Chinese Air forces. Such an air force can be built up to strike against Japanese shipping and against Japan itself. He emphasized that the Chiefs of Staff must bear in mind the political fact that China is in danger of collapse.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that aid to China at the present time does not have an immediate effect of taking weight off Russia but that it would have an ultimate effect when Russia joins up with the United Nations in their war against Japan. This he predicted would take place within 48 hours after Germany has been defeated.

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THE PRESIDENT said, with regard to taking weight off Russia, that the United Nations continue with strategy which would compel the Germans to fight. It was for that reason that he questioned the occupation of Italy, feeling that this might result in releasing German troops now in that country. He said he felt the most effective way of forcing Germany to fight was by carrying out a cross-Channel operation.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he did not feel that an occupation of Italy would be necessary. In the event of an Italian collapse, the United Nations would occupy the necessary ports and air bases from which to carry on operations against the Balkans and Southern Europe, but they should let an Italian Government control the country, subject to supervision on the part of the United Nations.

THE PRESIDENT and the *PRIME MINISTER* then indicated that the possibility of securing the use of the Azores was under consideration. An attempt would be made to accomplish this by diplomacy, and, if necessary, the diplomacy might be coupled with threats or an actual surprise arrival of forces. They thought that an arrangement might be made with Portugal whereby the use of the Azores could be obtained on a rental basis. However, they indicated that the question was largely political.

FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN DILL asked if consideration had been given to the present attitude of Spain.

Both the *PRESIDENT* and the *PRIME MINISTER* indicated that they felt that Spain was much relieved by the turn of events in Africa, that it was becoming more favorably disposed toward the United Nations, and that it had in mind constantly the threat of the American forces facing Spanish Morocco.

THE PRESIDENT announced that the next meeting would be on Friday, 14th May, at 2:00 P.M., at which time it was desired to have the Commanders in Chief, India, and Generals Stilwell and Chennault present to discuss conditions in the Burma-China Theater.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

TRIDENT

REVISED MINUTES

2ND MEETING, THE WHITE HOUSE, 2:00 P.M., 14 MAY 1943

PRESENT

British

The Prime Minister
Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Field Marshal Sir Archibald
Wavell
General Sir Alan F. Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Admiral Sir James Somerville
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles F. A. Portal
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Richard Peirse
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay

U. S.

The President
Admiral Wm. D. Leahy
General G. C. Marshall
Admiral E. J. King
Lt. Gen. J. W. Stilwell
Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney
Maj. Gen. C. L. Chennault
Mr. Harry L. Hopkins

SECRETARIES

Brig. General J. R. Deane
Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob

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THE PRESIDENT said that this Conference had been called to talk about the local situation in the India-Burma-China Theater because that area presented problems which were extremely difficult. The United Nations were now on deadcenter with regard to operations in that area. The thought on the subject must be simplified. He said the problem should be divided into two main subdivisions: first, operations to be carried out forthwith and, second, operations to be carried out at the end of the present monsoon season. The two should not be confused. Preparations for operations in November and December of 1943 must certainly start now, but preparations for operations to be carried out forthwith must be rushed.

THE PRESIDENT indicated that China is now in a dangerous political condition. The United Nations could not let China go to pieces. It should be remembered, when discussing demands of the Generalissimo, that he was the head of the Army and of the State. It was imperative that the United Nations not be put in the position of being responsible in any way for the collapse of China. It was no longer possible to simply tell China to take what she was given. There must be active cooperation on the part of the United Nations. An attitude of *It can't be done* could not be tolerated because it was certain that something must be done. He said there would have to be a 1943 *affirmative*.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that there must be a 1943 and a 1944 *affirmative*.

THE PRESIDENT then asked those present to express their convictions freely on the subject of China and asked the Prime Minister to present his views.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he felt that the President had put the case very clearly. He himself had once been keen on action of the *ANAKIM* type and two years ago had written a memorandum on the subject, a copy of which he had given to Admiral King at Casablanca, in which he had proposed an operation through Rangoon on Bangkok. A decision had been made at Casablanca that *ANAKIM* was to be mounted. Accordingly, Field Marshal Wavell had prepared a plan which was in his opinion the

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best method for accomplishing the recapture of Burma. *THE PRIME MINISTER* said he now gathered that Field Marshal Wavell considered the outlook for the accomplishment of this plan to be bleak, but he still held it feasible if and when the necessary material was provided.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that operations in Burma so far had not been effective. However, they had taught lessons. He said when he looked at Field Marshal Wavell's plan, in the light of results to date, he did not like the looks of it. He questioned the value of trying to retake Burma now, and asked if it could not be by-passed. If so, would not the construction and defense of air fields be sufficient to insure a flow of supplies into China? The question was how to construct these air fields quickly and to insure their protection. He said that, for himself, he had little inclination to go to swampy jungles in which operations could be conducted for only five months of the year, country infested with malaria, where modern equipment could not be used. The idea of making four attacks from the sea, to say nothing of the advance up the Rangoon River to Rangoon, subject to attack from shore defenses of various kinds, did not present a favorable outlook. All of these factors, together with the long lines of communications, made the prospects for *ANAKIM*, as now planned, extremely gloomy, a view that was shared by his military advisers.

THE PRIME MINISTER indicated that he could not see how operations in the swamps of Burma would help the Chinese. The factor that had turned him against the plan, more than any other, was that only 20,000 tons could be transported over the Burma Road, and then only in early 1945, even though *ANAKIM* were completely successful. He questioned what would happen to the Chinese in the interval. He felt that the above considerations indicated that there should be a *passionate* development of air transport into China, and the build-up of air forces in China, as the objectives for 1943.

THE PRIME MINISTER then turned the discussion to 1944. He indicated an Asiatic *TORCH* should be sought. A blow should be struck where it could be accomplished with complete surprise. It would, of necessity, have to be an operation which would attract enemy reaction and thus take

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the pressure off China and the South Pacific. He suggested the possibility of seizing the northern tip of Sumatra. It would be much better to baffle the enemy by surprise than to continue with the *development of the obvious*.

THE PRESIDENT said that in the **TORCH** operation the objective had been to drive the Axis forces out of Africa, or at least to form a junction between Generals Alexander and Montgomery in the East and General Eisenhower's forces in the West. Our objectives in China should be: first, to save China and keep it going and, second, to continue to increase the rate of attrition on Japan in ships and airplanes. He said that until now the United Nations have met with considerable success in their battle of attrition against Japan, but the pace would have to be stepped up. He then asked Field Marshal Wavell to express his views on the Burma and **ANAKIM** operation.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that he had had the Burma campaign and Burma constantly in mind for two years. He considered it to be the most important pivot in the war against Japan. After war had been declared, it became impossible to defend Burma once the United Nations had lost control of the seas. He had been thinking of the reconquest of that country ever since. He said he was convinced that a reconquest could not be accomplished by land operations alone but must be combined with amphibious operations and naval action. He had always realized the political effect that the loss of Burma had on China and also upon India. The moral effect on both countries was also of extreme importance.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that the more he had planned for reconquest the more difficult it had become. Communications to northeast India, which must be a base for land operations, are extremely difficult. They are dependent upon a railroad which has small capacity and is often out of operation for long periods. Air fields must have metal or concrete surfaces. To illustrate the difficulties in communications, he said that his troops at Manipur had never been on full rations during the last monsoon period because of the effect of rain on the roads. Current operations have shown that the Japanese have good troops for

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defensive fighting, whereas the Indian forces, accustomed to the open plains, require intensive training for this type of warfare.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that when he was asked to produce a plan to conquer Burma in the next dry season, he had had prepared what he thought was the best plan possible. Even so, it was a hazardous one and difficult of accomplishment. He felt it had a reasonable chance of success if his troops were fully trained and equipped. The plan required a considerable increase of supplies which had to be sent to the theater at once. It was necessary that 180,000 tons per month be sent to India. Actually, in March and April only 65,000 and 70,000 tons respectively had been shipped. He felt that therefore the operation could not start in November as originally planned. Unless the operation could start in November, it could not succeed in the coming dry season. It would be necessary to get land-based air cover on the Arakan coast first, then capture Rangoon, while, at the same time, conducting operations in the north with British and Chinese troops. The Chinese forces from the north and the British-Indian forces from the south would then attempt to form a junction. After that it would be necessary to repair the railroads and bring supplies in through Rangoon and ship them north in order to start repair of the Burma Road. His administrative experts had informed him that the road could not be fully opened to traffic until the middle of 1945.

THE FIELD MARSHAL indicated that relief to China would therefore not be effective until 1945, but that the moral effect, on the other hand, would be considerable at once to both China and India. If success was assured, it would be worth hazarding the losses. He said, however, that an unsuccessful expedition would be much worse than none at all.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that his Planners had been examining alternatives. He said that, in the long run, it was probable that more supplies could be sent into China by air alone in the next 18 months than would be the case if the air transport was required to use much of its capacity for operations leading to the construction of the Burma Road.

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The possibility of using troops in the India Theater for some other operation was being examined. An effort was being made to determine the effect of creating a break or landing somewhere in the semi-circle from Burma through the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, and Java. Possible objectives were Bangkok via the Kra Isthmus, northern Sumatra, and Malaya, or the Sunda Straits. Bangkok was considered to be impracticable because there was no adequate port or routes across the Kra Isthmus. Sunda Straits was an attractive objective because it threatens the Palembang oil fields. This, however, was not possible within the resources available. An operation which did appear to be promising was one which would seize three or four air fields in northern Sumatra and from there drive on into the Malayan Peninsula at Penang, where there were four or five additional air fields. The object of such an expedition would be to place large air forces in Sumatra and Malaya from where they could attack Bangkok, Singapore, the Palembang oil fields, and Japanese shipping. If it were possible to place strong air forces on northern Sumatra and protect them, a bad situation would be created for the Japanese and cause them considerable air losses. The expedition would probably require about the same forces as would be required by *ANAKIM*. It would have the advantage that the operation would not be dependent on the monsoon. It would be an expensive operation in aircraft because of the distance from air bases and it would also require considerable shipping. The proposed operation, if feasible, however, would cause considerable attrition to Japanese air power and shipping. The Japanese would have to react to the United Nations' operations and this would bring on air battles. Considerable further study would be required before an opinion could be given as to the possibility of the operation.

In reply to a question by the Prime Minister, the *FIELD MARSHAL* said the operation proposed could not take place until 1944.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that there were many naval problems involved in the capture of Rangoon. He questioned whether sufficient carriers could be made available.

ADMIRAL SOMERVILLE said that the Rangoon operation was not attractive. Even to seize the air fields on the Arakan coast would require carriers standing off from one to three weeks, which was too long against Japanese land-based air attack. Seizure of Rangoon was not feasible unless it could be covered to some extent by land-based aircraft from the Arakan coast.

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR DUDLEY POUND indicated that carriers could not be made available until they could be released from the Mediterranean.

ADMIRAL SOMERVILLE said that the naval approach to Rangoon was narrow and could be easily defended. He doubted if the operation was feasible from the naval point of view.

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL PEIRSE said that, from an airman's point of view, air development appeared to meet the requirements, which were

- a. to defeat the enemy air forces;
- b. to assure military aid to China; and
- c. to bring support in the form of supplies at the earliest date.

One thing was essential and that was that we should have adequate air forces operating from India to neutralize Japanese air forces which might interfere with the air route. He pointed out that it had become clear that the development of land operations through Assam into China and development of the facilities required both for the Royal Air Force and the American Ferry Command were mutually antagonistic. He continued that, in his opinion, if all the effort was put into building up the air forces operating under General Chennault and the air transport into China, much more could be done than is at present planned. He felt that the tonnage over the air transport route to China could be considerably increased. He further considered that, for the defense of this air route, it was not necessary to reconquer Burmese territory, provided that Allied Air Forces were adequate for the neutralization of the enemy air forces.

Referring to *ANAKIM*, *AIR CHIEF MARSHAL PEIRSE* said that he had never considered the plan to be sound since the sea-borne expedition

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and the landings could not be supported by land-based aircraft. The plan was based on the assumption that the enemy might have 300 to 350 aircraft and that of these, 100 might attack any landing operation. Clearly the defense which one or two carriers could oppose would be quite inadequate to a scale of attack of this order.

THE PRESIDENT asked how many airports there were in the area from Assam to Chittagong.

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL PEIRSE said that at the present moment he was operating 14 squadrons from forward airdromes between northeast Assam and Chittagong, exclusive of those used by the American Air Force.

THE PRESIDENT asked if the runways were long enough for bombers.

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL PEIRSE replied that there were six air fields with hard runways from which medium and heavy bombers could operate. For the most part, heavy bombers operated from air fields further back. He said that the plan to capture Sumatra has considerable merit because it extends our air cover eastwards and interferes with the Japanese shipping lanes. The radius of bomber aircraft operating from Malaya to northern Sumatra will extend far enough to meet that of bombers operating through southern China. He considered that air operations undertaken from Malaya in conjunction with offensive air operations undertaken from China would be bound to draw considerable enemy air forces into these areas to oppose them. Such air forces the enemy could ill spare.

GENERAL STILWELL said that the weight of opinion was apparently against him. To his mind China represented a base which the United Nations wanted. They wanted it both for its geographic position and for the use of Chinese manpower. He felt that ultimately the United Nations must meet the Japanese Army on the mainland of Asia. If China were allowed to fall now, it would be a long road back before the United Nations would be in a position to meet Japan on Chinese soil. He said that to keep China in the war it was essential to retain control of Yunnan.

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GENERAL STILWELL said that he had been worried for a long time over the possibilities of a Japanese attack against Kunming, particularly one from the south. The Japanese have the forces available in Indo China to make such an attack. He said that if we are to hold Yunnan, ground forces must be trained to do it, and they must be Chinese forces.

GENERAL STILWELL said that there are now 32 divisions in training which will be available for the defense of Yunnan. At the present time they have a strength of about 8,100. However, it is planned to inactivate one out of each three divisions so as to bring the remainder to a total strength of 10,000 each. This will result in 22 divisions being available as soon as their equipment is received and the others will be brought up to strength later. He felt that if this force could be trained and equipped, it would be capable of defending Yunnan Province. Sufficient equipment would be available if 10,000 tons capacity were utilized for this purpose over the air transport route between now and September.

GENERAL STILWELL indicated that it was absolutely essential to open land communications to China. Even though the initial supplies were small, they would have a tremendous moral effect on China and munitions thus transported would be used to build up a second group of 30 divisions which had been promised by the Generalissimo. He said that under this program there would ultimately be a force capable of fighting the Japanese. If supplies for these ground forces were not sent at once, it would be impossible to train and equip the Chinese Yunnan forces and the Chinese Army would disappear. He admitted that if all supplies were devoted to building up the Chinese Air Forces, it would have an effect on the Japanese shipping lanes, and it would be a *shot in the arm* to Chinese morale, but he felt that it would not lead to decisive results. He said as soon as the build-up of American forces begins to sting the Japanese too much, they will launch an attack from Indo China to capture the Kunming Area. If that proved to be the case, the eastern terminal of the air route would disappear and China would be out of the war. It was imperative, therefore, that Yunnan Province be defended and the only way this could be accomplished was by the build-up of Chinese Ground Forces.

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THE PRESIDENT said that he had never accepted such a low tonnage figure for the air route, that it must be divided up between Air and Ground equipment. Why should not sufficient be conveyed for both?

GENERAL STILWELL said that up to the present, 3,400 tons had been the maximum conveyed in any one month. Increased quantities were certainly possible on paper, but it must always be remembered that we were fighting the conditions of the country, the monsoon, and inadequate air fields, and there was always the danger that the Japanese would interfere with the route.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that there was no great danger to the Assam air fields from land attack. The warning system was reasonably adequate, giving 13 minutes warning.

GENERAL STILWELL thought that the warning system required improvement. He thought that all possible steps had already been taken by Field Marshal Wavell to speed up the development of the air fields. Labor had already been switched from the Ledo Road.

In response to an inquiry by the President, *GENERAL STILWELL* said that his requirements for the Chinese Army in Yunnan were 2,000 tons a month in the next five months; and *GENERAL CHENNAULT* said that he required 4,700 tons a month for four months, and after that 7,000 tons a month.

THE PRESIDENT suggested that the immediate objective for the air route should therefore be 7,000 tons a month.

In further discussion, it was pointed out that the plan was already to achieve 10,000 tons per month by November, though something might be done to speed up matters so as to try to achieve 7,000 tons a month by July.

GENERAL STILWELL said that the only way of getting large quantities of material into China was by road. We might, by a great effort, achieve 10,000 tons by air, but a land route would ultimately be essential.

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THE PRESIDENT said that it must be borne in mind that the Generalissimo was head of the State, as well as Commander in Chief. General Stilwell and General Chennault were thus in a sense under him when they were in his territory. It was difficult from the psychological point of view to tell the Generalissimo that we thought things should be done in some manner different from his ideas.

GENERAL CHENNAULT agreed that it was necessary to listen to what the Generalissimo said. His own plan was first to use his air forces to protect the terminal base in Yunnan, and then to operate from another area farther east from which Japanese shipping could be attacked in the Hong Kong-Formosa area. He doubted whether the Japanese could advance across-country and capture Yunnan. They had never yet succeeded in such an operation. They had always advanced up rivers which they used for their line of communication, and the traffic on the rivers was thus open to air attack. The Generalissimo certainly feared an attack up the Yangtze, but quite a small force, say two Fighter squadrons and one Bomber squadron, would be enough to prevent such an advance.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that if all efforts now concentrating on the Ledo Road and on supporting the troops in Burma were concentrated on developing the air fields, the progress might be more rapid, and the higher tonnage might be achieved earlier.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that a certain amount of resources might be saved from the Ledo Road, though it was in itself of some importance for improving the warning system. Air fields already had first priority.

GENERAL MARSHAL said that several steel mats for air fields were on their way, and General Wheeler's demand for two or three more Engineer Battalions was under examination. It might be possible to supply these from the Middle East.

THE PRESIDENT inquired what would be the effect on the Generalissimo if Operation *ANAKIM* were not carried out.

GENERAL STILWELL said that the effect was unpredictable, but there was no doubt that the Generalissimo was relying on the operation.

GENERAL CHENNAULT said that the Generalissimo always wanted definite commitments on dates and size of forces. He believed that if 7,000 tons a month were flown in the Generalissimo would be satisfied.

FIELD MARSHAL DILL pointed out that the Generalissimo knew about the plan for 10,000 tons a month, and was expecting this to be carried out in addition to *ANAKIM*. A 7,000 ton project would thus not be anything new to him.

GENERAL STILWELL said that the Generalissimo felt that he had been himself concerned in the making of the *ANAKIM* plan, and was committed to it. He expected the operation to be carried out as planned. If it were not, he would feel deserted. Operations against Sumatra or Malaya would have no bearing on the opening of the Burma Road, and would thus greatly prolong the period during which no steps were being taken to reopen it. The Chinese were suspicious of the British, and it would be necessary for the British to prove to them that they were in earnest. The effect of the cancellation of *ANAKIM* would be very bad on the Chinese people, and the development of the air supply route would not be regarded as an adequate substitute.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was not prepared to undertake something foolish purely in order to placate the Chinese. He was not prepared to make war that way. He would do anything that was sensible to help the Chinese in exactly the same way as he would do anything that was sensible to help the Russians; but he did not see any particular value in carrying out costly operations to no purpose.

ADMIRAL KING said that the Burma Road was a symbol to the Chinese, and operations in Burma would make them feel that at any rate the reopening was on the way.

THE PRESIDENT suggested that a possible alternative solution would be to make use of the forces designed for *ANAKIM* for an advance towards China, opening the Road as the advance progressed.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that this possibility had been carefully studied. The question was how could a force advancing in this

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manner be sustained? The railhead in Assam was already overloaded. Beyond that there were 200 miles of hill road already completed. Then came 80 miles of partly made hill road to a point still west of the Chindwin River. After that point there was no all-weather road at all in Upper Burma north of Mandalay. The Japanese had built a dry-weather road towards the Chin hills, but it was separated from the end of our road by 120 miles. We should have to build 250 miles of all-weather road in 4/5 months - an engineering effort entirely beyond the capacity of the line of communication through Assam to support. Upper Burma was the most malarial country in the world, and if operations were continued there in the rainy season, 25% casualties per month must be expected. It might be better to go down to Mandalay, rather than to try to go due east, but after we got to Mandalay, we should then be trying to maintain our forces over 300 miles of road of which 150 miles were not all-weather. We could not possibly meet the Japanese on even terms as they would have behind them the railway, the road, and the river. He did not think it would be possible to cut their line of communication decisively by air.

GENERAL STILWELL, in reply to a question by the President, said that he agreed with Field Marshal Wavell that an attack on Rangoon would be very hazardous. He thought it might be better to go in through Bassein.

ADMIRAL SOMERVILLE observed that an attack on Bassein was open to the same objection, that for two or three weeks air support would have to be provided by carriers.

THE PRIME MINISTER, reverting to General Stilwell's statement about the attitude of the Chinese, said that he was sorry to hear that the Chinese were suspicious of the British. The British had asked nothing of the Chinese and were prepared to do anything that would really contribute to their safety. He was not prepared, however, to undertake months of unprofitable operations in order to remove the unfounded suspicions of the Chinese. The United States would realize that it was not a question of saving the expenditure of British blood. The British were perfectly prepared to fight in true brotherhood with their Allies.

GENERAL STILWELL explained that it was only because China was essential ultimately as a base that it was so necessary to undertake operations to open the way thereto.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was not at present convinced that this was so. However, he saw no reason openly to abandon the operation at present. He thought that moves in preparation should continue provided they did not hamper the development of the air route. Further study would be necessary before a decision could be taken on the actual operation to be carried out.

THE PRESIDENT said that he thought the two objectives should be to get 7,000 tons a month by air into China by July; and, secondly, to open land communication with China. It was for the Military advisers to suggest the best way in which the latter objective could be carried out.

ADMIRAL LEAHY thought that the task for the staffs was to find out the most promising operation to open the way to China irrespective of any agreement actually to carry it out in the immediate future.

GENERAL MARSHALL urged that no suggestion be made to the Generalissimo that 7,000 tons per month was the target as this would appear to the latter as a reduction from the 10,000 tons per month which he knows to be the objective. He said that in the development of *ANAKIM*, *RAVENOUS* had been the first approach. Field Marshal Wavell had objected to *RAVENOUS* as being unsound for supply reasons, Sir Alan Brooke had objected because of the insecurity of the south flank, and the Generalissimo had objected because it was not coupled with naval action. Finally, *ANAKIM* in its present form had been agreed upon by all. This was now considered to be impracticable. He said that the plan proposed by General Stilwell was new in many of its features and should be thoroughly explored.

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

TRIDENT

MINUTES

3RD MEETING, THE WHITE HOUSE, 6:00 P.M., 19 MAY 1943

PRESENT

British

The Prime Minister
Field Marshal Sir John Dill
General Sir Alan F. Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles F. A. Portal
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay

U. S.

The President
Admiral Wm. D. Leahy
General G. C. Marshall
Admiral E. J. King
Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney
Mr. Harry L. Hopkins

SECRETARIES

Brig. General J. R. Deane
Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob

1. *PROGRESS OF CONFERENCE*

THE PRESIDENT inquired what progress had been achieved in the Conferences between the Chiefs of Staff.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he hoped that it would be possible to furnish the President and the Prime Minister with some tentative conclusions in time for the week end. *ANAKIM* had only been dealt with in a very general way up to the present, but would be considered in more detail the following day.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was entirely in favor of carrying out whatever operations might be possible in Burma without trenching too deeply on shipping and naval resources. Of course any troops who could be placed in contact with the enemy should not be allowed to stand idle.

GENERAL BROOKE agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he very much hoped it would be possible in time to arrange for some British squadrons to take part in the operations in China. *SIR CHARLES PORTAL* agreed that it would be very desirable.

GENERAL McNARNEY said that logistical difficulties would prevent any employment of British squadrons in the near future.

THE PRESIDENT drew attention to the importance of political and personal considerations in planning action in China.

2. *THE U-BOAT WAR AND THE USE OF PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC ISLANDS*

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether in the opinion of the First Sea Lord the U-boat war was proceeding reasonably well.

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that results recently had been fairly satisfactory.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the air operations against submarines were being extended and it was hoped to increase not only the total

sinkings by this means but also the rate of sinkings per aircraft employed.

GENERAL MARSHALL inquired whether the President had yet considered the possibility of securing the use of the Azores.

THE PRESIDENT said that he had been considering the matter and he thought that one method of procedure might be to ask President Vargas of Brazil to make a secret approach to the Portuguese Government. The President then read to the meeting a telegram drafted by the Secretary of State putting the matter to President Vargas. He said that he had mentioned the idea to President Vargas when he had last seen him, and had suggested that if a token Brazilian force were sent to the Islands, the Portuguese might be enabled to transfer back to the mainland some of the good troops which they had serving in the Islands. This might be an added inducement to the Portuguese to allow the United Nations to make use of bases in their Island territory.

In the discussion that followed the following were the main points made:

a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff were all agreed as to the great military advantages which would follow the occupation of the Azores and considered that no time should be lost in carrying it out.

b. *MR. HOPKINS* thought the chances of the Portuguese willingly conceding the use of bases in the Azores were extremely remote. He thought therefore that before any approach was made we should be quite sure in our minds that we were prepared to occupy the Islands by force if our request was refused.

c. Although on the face of it it might appear to be an action savoring somewhat of German or Japanese technique, the occupation by force of the Azores could hardly be condemned when it is remembered that Portugal, together with the other small nations depended for their very existence upon the victory of the United Nations, and that as long as the latter were debarred from making use of the Azores, their shipping was subjected to damaging attacks, against which a proper defense could not be provided. In the last war it had been found necessary to make a technical breach of neutrality by

occupying the Piraeus, but the incident had eventually been settled to everyone's satisfaction. It should not be forgotten that it was on the margin of shipping that the Allies depended for their war-making capacity.

d. Probably the best way of handling the matter would be to have ample force available off the Islands, and to inform the Portuguese Government that the Islands would be occupied the following morning and that resistance would be hopeless. Solid inducements would be offered, and if the Portuguese desired it, the Brazilians could ostensibly provide the occupying troops.

In conclusion, it was agreed that the Prime Minister should telegraph proposals on these lines to the British Government for their comments, and that in the meanwhile the Combined Chiefs of Staff should have a plan prepared for carrying out the operation as soon as possible. The plan should be ready for examination by the President and Prime Minister on Monday, 24 May.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked how the discussions regarding the Mediterranean and *BOLERO* had been progressing.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had today reached an agreement which provided for a build-up in England of a sufficient force to secure a bridgehead on the Continent from which further offensive operations could be carried out. This was to involve approximately nine divisions in the assault and a build-up of twenty additional divisions. At the same time, the Chiefs of Staff had agreed that the Commander in Chief, North Africa, should be instructed to mount such operations in exploitation of *HUSKY* as would be best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and contain the maximum number of German forces. These operations would, of course, be subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General Eisenhower was to be told that he might use for this purpose those forces available in the Mediterranean Theater except that four American divisions and three British divisions would be held in readiness from the first of November onward for withdrawal to take part in the operations from the United Kingdom. *SIR ALAN BROOKE* said it was also agreed

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that these decisions would be reviewed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at a meeting in July or early in August in order that the situation might be reexamined in the light of the results of *HUSKY* and the situation then existing in Russia.

THE PRESIDENT asked what the situation concerning the troops in Syria was at the present time.

SIR ALAN BROOKE informed the President that there were not many divisions available in Syria at this time. Most of them were being trained for *HUSKY* either in Syria or in Egypt. There were two Polish divisions now in Iraq.

THE PRIME MINISTER observed the Polish troops would be much improved if they could be actively engaged.

THE PRESIDENT asked what use could be made of Yugoslav troops.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that there was only a handful of these troops, about a battalion. He said the Greeks had also organized one brigade.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he thought September of this year would be a good time to urge Turkey to permit the United Nations to use air bases in that country. He felt that the relations with Turkey would have been considerably strengthened by that time because of having supplied them with considerable munitions of war and that they might be receptive to such an approach.

In reply to a question from the President, *SIR CHARLES PORTAL* said that weather for flying conditions out of Turkey was not too reliable after the late summer.

THE PRIME MINISTER indicated that it would be desirable, of course, to obtain Turkey's permission to use her air bases prior to September and thought it might be possible if Italy were to be eliminated from the war. In the latter case, we should get free access to Rhodes and the Dodecanese.

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THE PRESIDENT then indicated to General Marshall that he had sent him a message concerning General Eisenhower's proposals that pre-*HUSKY* propaganda should contain a promise of *peace with honor* to Italy. *THE PRESIDENT* and the *PRIME MINISTER* both agreed that such a promise should not be made.

THE PRIME MINISTER indicated his pleasure that the Conference was progressing as well as it was and also that a cross-Channel operation had finally been agreed upon. He had always been in favor of such an operation and had to submit to its delay in the past for reasons beyond control of the United Nations. He said that he thought Premier Stalin would be disappointed at not having an invasion of northern France in 1943 but was certain that Mr. Stalin would be gratified by the results from *HUSKY* and the further events that were to take place this year.

THE PRESIDENT and *THE PRIME MINISTER* agreed that the next meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be held at 5:00 P.M. on Friday, 21 May.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

TRIDENT

MINUTES

4TH MEETING, THE WHITE HOUSE, 5:00 P.M., 21 MAY 1943

PRESENT

British

The Prime Minister
Field Marshal Sir John Dill
General Sir Alan F. Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles F. A. Portal
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay

U. S.

The President
Admiral Wm. D. Leahy
General G. C. Marshall
Admiral E. J. King
Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney

SECRETARIES

Brig. General J. R. Deane
Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob

INTERIM REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

The Meeting had before them a draft of agreed decisions prepared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and submitted to the President and the Prime Minister (C.C.S. 242). The draft was considered paragraph by paragraph.

1. AZORES ISLANDS

THE PRIME MINISTER reiterated the view which he had expressed at the previous meeting that nothing would be gained by a diplomatic approach to the Portuguese Government which was not backed up immediately by force. In his opinion, the Portuguese should be presented with the fact of an imminent occupation with only sufficient time in which to send a message to order that there should be no resistance. He therefore suggested that if the Combined Chiefs of Staff were in agreement, it would be better to omit from this paragraph of the agreed decisions the following words: "(b) That an effort should first be made to secure the use of these Islands by diplomatic means without making military commitments to the Portuguese" and also in the last sentence of the paragraph the words "in case diplomatic efforts should fail."

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would certainly agree to the omission of these words which had only been inserted because it was understood that it was the wish of the Governments to proceed in this manner.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that the question of the diplomatic approach should be left to the President and himself and he hoped shortly to have the views of the British Government on the subject. At the same time it would be necessary to have on record a statement by the Combined Chiefs of Staff showing the reasons why it was of such importance to occupy the Islands without delay. This could be achieved by expanding paragraph 1 (a).

It was agreed that in their final report the Combined Chiefs of Staff should expand their recommendation in the manner suggested by the Prime Minister and should omit the words quoted above.

2. THE COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

GENERAL McNARNEY gave the meeting a short account of the process which had been gone through in building up the plan for the combined bomber offensive. In view of the expansion of the German fighter forces, it had been found necessary to include in the plan attacks on the manufacturing plants. According to a conservative estimate based on experience, it was hoped to reduce the German fighter strength down to 500 as against the 3,000 to which it would otherwise rise in the middle of 1944. 25% of the bomber effort would go on submarine targets. About 425,000 ground personnel would be required to implement the plan.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that this figure included the ground personnel for *ROUNDHAMMER*.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked whether the figure could not be reduced. He recalled that when he had asked Monsieur Maisky why the Russians had refused the 20 squadrons for the Caucasus, the latter had pointed to the large number of ground personnel who would have to accompany the aircraft and the complication this would cause to the Russian communications. Every man brought to the U. K. on the ground staff of the Air Force would exclude a soldier. He earnestly hoped there could be a reduction.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had appointed a special group under an experienced and capable officer whose duty it was to survey the establishments of the Army and of the Air Corps. General Arnold had already made an arbitrary cut in the numbers of ground personnel for the United Kingdom and it was hoped that a further reduction might be secured, though the figure was already lower than that set by General Arnold.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he attached the greatest importance to this combined plan. There had not yet been an opportunity for the American scheme of daylight bombing to be applied in full, and he had been from time to time critical of the account of the few occasions when the bombers could go out and the comparatively small loads thus

delivered on Germany; but he could see in the future, when several raids could be made in one day, most deadly results would be produced. He therefore welcomed the plan and hoped that it could be developed to the full.

GENERAL MARSHALL observed that in the latest raid which the U. S. B-17's had carried out from England three separate forces had been employed on three different objectives. One had had 6% casualties, and the other had had nil. The over-all loss had been 3-1/2%. This was an indication of what might be achieved in the future. He assured the Prime Minister that he was just as anxious as he was to reduce the number of ground personnel to be transported to the United Kingdom.

THE PRIME MINISTER thanked General Marshall for this assurance.

THE PRESIDENT drew attention to the value of occasional raids, say 5% of the effort, on the smaller towns where factories were known to exist. It would greatly depress the Germans if they felt that even the smaller towns could not escape.

General agreement was expressed with this view.

3. DEFEAT OF AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether the forces listed in paragraph 3 (a) would be sufficient to hold the Brest Peninsula.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that they should be sufficient to enable this area to be held and extended. The latter would be most necessary in order to secure more ports for the build-up.

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired what would be the build-up after that shown in this paragraph. Could not something be added to indicate the subsequent rate?

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he would very much like to include something to show the subsequent build-up. It would be purely a matter of shipping and this was being examined. The probable rate would be three to four divisions per month.

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In response to an inquiry by the Prime Minister, it was pointed out that the "Air Forces provided on a temporary basis for *HUSKY*" consisted of certain British and American air reinforcements which had been specially lent to the Mediterranean Theater from the United Kingdom for a short period immediately around the *HUSKY* date.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that it would be desirable to include a statement to show what Army forces would be available in the Mediterranean Theater for use after *HUSKY*. He did not think it would be right to leave North Africa entirely in the hands of the French, some of whom should certainly move forward in the general advance.

THE PRESIDENT said that no French Division was shown as taking part in the first attack on the Continent: he thought that politically it might be very desirable that one should be included. He agreed that a statement of forces which would be available in the Mediterranean Area should be drawn up. For example, it would be well to know what would be available to send into, say Salonika, if the Germans withdrew from the Balkans. One would also want to know what could be done supposing Italy collapsed immediately after *HUSKY*.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that this matter had been considered, and a survey of the troops in the Mediterranean Area, and of the various garrisons required, had been drawn up.

After further discussion it was agreed that the final report should include a statement of the troops which would be available in the Mediterranean Area after *HUSKY*, excluding the American and British Divisions earmarked for the United Kingdom.

It was also agreed that the words "Italy and" should be inserted before the word "Russia" at the end of paragraph 3 (c).

THE PRIME MINISTER drew attention to the need for a new code word to cover post-*HUSKY* operations in general.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the security staffs had already been instructed to propose code words for a number of different operations and

final suggestions would be put forward by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. BURMA-CHINA THEATER

THE PRESIDENT read the Combined Chiefs of Staff's decision concerning the Burma-China Theater. At the conclusion, he questioned the statement given in paragraph 4 *d* with regard to interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma. He wished to know if it implied an operation against Rangoon.

ADMIRAL KING replied that it did not, that actually it envisaged submarine operations against Japanese communications in the Bay of Bengal and the approaches to all the ports of Burma.

THE PRIME MINISTER then stated that he was in agreement with paragraph 4 of the Chiefs of Staff's report on the proposed Burma operations, but was unhappy that it did not include any mention of offensive action against Kra, Sumatra, or Penang.

SIR ALAN BROOKE informed the Prime Minister that the whole conception for the defeat of Japan was now the subject of study by the Combined Staff Planners and all of the operations which the Prime Minister had referred to would be considered in this study; the present report included only the operations proposed for Burma.

THE PRESIDENT was concerned about the failure to mention Rangoon in the decision. He thought the Chinese would be much happier if some mention of Rangoon was included and thought it would be wise to do so if only for political reasons.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that paragraph 4 *c* might be amended to read: "The capture of Akyab and of Ramree Island by amphibious operations with possible exploitation toward Rangoon." After some discussion it was agreed that the words "toward Rangoon" should be deleted from the amendment suggested by the Prime Minister in order that it would not be interpreted as a promise by the Chinese.

THE PRIME MINISTER informed Admiral King that as soon as the Italian Fleet had been neutralized the First Sea Lord intended to send six or seven battleships, with necessary auxiliaries, from the Indian Ocean to operate in coordination with the United States Fleet in the Pacific.

ADMIRAL KING felt that mounting operations against Sumatra, Kra, or Penang, would depend upon the availability of shipping. He doubted if they could be mounted in conjunction with the operations planned in the report under consideration. He pointed out that the shortage of shipping also limited the use of troops from India in the Burma Theater. He said, however, that he felt some such operation as an attack on Sumatra or the Kra Peninsula was eventually indispensable to induce the Japanese to split their naval forces. If this could be accomplished, an augmented Indian Ocean Fleet, operating in coordination with the U. S. Pacific Fleet, might inflict severe damage on the enemy.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the Chiefs of Staff had shown in their report that they had considered all of the operations that are essential. He felt that subsidiary plans should also be worked out in order to be prepared to take advantage of opportunities that might present themselves.

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR DUDLEY POUND said that the program under discussion would probably take all of the resources available. As a matter of fact the Planners were now investigating to see whether or not the operations envisaged could actually be carried out with the resources available.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the relating of resources to the operations would occur on Saturday and Sunday and the results would be included in the final report to be submitted to the President and the Prime Minister on Monday.

5. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC 1943-44

THE PRESIDENT, after reading paragraph 5, concerning operations in the Pacific, commented that it included no sub-paragraph concerning

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air coverage for U. S. convoys, or regarding patrolling for enemy submarines.

ADMIRAL KING said that aircraft were being sent to the Pacific for this purpose as rapidly as possible but there are not sufficient numbers available to give the complete cover everywhere. He pointed out that other operations, particularly *HUSKY*, absorb many aircraft of the types necessary for this work.

THE PRESIDENT said that while everything possible was being done in this regard nothing was said concerning it in the report.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the submarine situation in the Pacific was difficult to explain. He could not understand why the Japanese had not attacked our West Coast. He felt that they had great potentialities which they were not using, and indicated that he was concerned constantly over the possibility of a Japanese submarine effort carried out in accordance with a well conceived plan.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said he thought the President had made a good point and suggested adding paragraph 5 b (7) which would make provision for the protection of the U. S. lines of communications.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that the question of security to lines of communications would be covered in a paper that was being prepared on global strategy.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought perhaps it would be better to leave the question of protection of the lines of communications out of the report under consideration as most of the decisions recorded were conceptions of the offensive. Defensive measures, therefore, might more properly be included in the global strategy paper. He asked Sir Dudley Pound how many submarines had been sunk in the last four days, to which the *ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET* replied that the United Nations had been maintaining an average of about one per day.

6. RE-ARMING OF THE FRENCH IN NORTH AFRICA

After the President had read a paragraph on this subject, the *PRIME MINISTER* asked for further information. He pointed out that large quantities of captured material had been taken from the Germans and suggested that investigation be made to determine whether it would be worthwhile to start manufacturing a limited amount of ammunition of German calibers.

GENERAL MARSHALL informed the Prime Minister that General Smith, the Chief of Staff at Allied Force Headquarters, had informed him that a rapid survey was being made to determine what captured material could be used for equipping the French forces.

THE PRIME MINISTER then asked Admiral King if ammunition was being manufactured for use on the Richelieu. When Admiral King replied in the affirmative, the *PRIME MINISTER* suggested that something of similar nature might be accomplished with regard to manufacturing ammunition for captured German weapons.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he would have General Somervell make an immediate investigation of the possibilities in this connection.

THE PRIME MINISTER then asked how many French Divisions were to be armed.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that it was proposed to rearm a maximum of eleven. At the present time three and a half divisions have been reequipped, including two and a half infantry divisions and one armored division.

THE PRESIDENT asked if use was being made of French pilots.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that the British have provided airplanes for one French squadron, and the United States has equipped another.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that the British were also supplying the French with airplanes for patrolling purposes off the coast of

West Africa. However, apart from the one squadron which they had already given the French toward the build-up of a French Air Force, the entire project was in the hands of the United States.

7. BOMBING OF PLOESTI

After reading a paragraph on this subject, the *PRESIDENT* asked how far the Ploesti oil fields were from North Africa.

GENERAL McNARNEY replied that Ploesti was 895 miles from Tobruk and 875 miles from Aleppo.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked when it was envisaged conducting the proposed operation.

GENERAL McNARNEY said that it should be accomplished either in June or early July because of the excellent weather conditions which obtain in those months, and also because a blow struck then would coincide with the summer campaign in Russia. He said it would require two B-24 groups to be taken from the United Kingdom for a period of about four weeks, that is, two weeks prior to mounting the operation and two weeks after it had been completed. Additionally, one B-24 group on its way to the United Kingdom would be diverted to this operation and thus be about two weeks late in its arrival in Great Britain. He said that officers with special sights for low level bombing which would be required for the attack on Ploesti were now on their way to England and North Africa to give instructions in the use of these sights. Those going to North Africa were to present the plan to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters, who was then to submit his comments to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that there were two considerations which were of paramount importance in deciding whether the proposed bombing of Ploesti should be undertaken. The first was whether or not aircraft should be diverted from pre-*HUSKY* preparation. The British Chiefs of Staff were doubtful if this should be done. The second consideration was that unless the operation was fully successful, it would make subsequent operations from more suitable bases, which might later beco.

available, more difficult. This could be attributed to the additional defenses that the enemy would install. He added, however, that since the prize was so great and because of weather conditions, the subject should be thoroughly explored before a decision was made.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that if there was a fair degree of success, an attack against Ploesti would be a staggering blow to the enemy, probably the greatest single blow that could be struck.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that even if the operation were not successful, it would result in diverting considerable German anti-aircraft equipment from the Russian Front.

THE PRIME MINISTER then asked the Chiefs of Staff to consider the subject report in the light of the discussion that had taken place, with a view to making appropriate amendments.

SIR ALAN BROOKE informed the Prime Minister that the report submitted included only those decisions which had been agreed upon thus far. They were still to be related with the resources that are available. When this was done, the items which had been considered would be incorporated in a final report, which would be submitted on Monday.

THE PRESIDENT called attention to a news report concerning the German evacuation of Norway and suggested that the staffs might consider what action should be taken in the event such report proved true.

THE PRESIDENT and *THE PRIME MINISTER* both expressed their gratification regarding the work accomplished by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and regarding the decisions which had been reached.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that what appealed to him most was the spirit of the offensive that permeated the paper, and the provisions which it made for the full utilization of our troops and resources.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

TRIDENT

MINUTES

5TH MEETING, THE WHITE HOUSE, 4:45 P.M., 24 MAY 1943

PRESENT

British

The Prime Minister
Field Marshal Sir John Dill
General Sir Alan F. Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles F. A. Portal
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay

U. S.

The President
Admiral Wm. D. Leahy
General G. C. Marshall
Admiral E. J. King
Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney
Mr. Harry L. Hopkins

SECRETARIES

Brig. General J. R. Deane
Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER
(C.C.S. 242/3)

THE PRESIDENT indicated his satisfaction and that of the Prime Minister with regard to the unanimity of opinion and the satisfactory decisions that had been arrived at by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He was particularly grateful that so much had been accomplished in such a short time. He said the Prime Minister recalled that in the last war decisions were made with undue speed. There was no organized group which corresponded to our Combined Chiefs of Staff which was able to provide continuity in the strategic direction of the war.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that "today we meet in the presence of a new fact"; namely, what might prove to be decisive progress in the anti-U-boat war. There were indications that there might be as many as 30 sinkings in May. If this continued, a striking change would come over the scene.

THE PRESIDENT then read the draft report contained in C.C.S. 242/3. There was complete agreement on all items until he came to paragraphs 6 and 7 under Section III. These were amended slightly.

SECTION III, PARAGRAPH 9 - REARMAMENT OF FRENCH FORCES

With regard to paragraph 9 under Section III, *ADMIRAL KING* pointed out that the original paper provided only for the equipment of French Army Forces in North Africa. At his suggestion the paragraph was changed to apply to French Forces in Africa.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that Admiral Godfroy had received an order from Vichy to scuttle his ships in Alexandria. He had replied that he had definitely thrown in his lot with General Giraud's forces. As a result of this action the British Government would probably lift the pay ban on Godfroy's squadron. It was now Admiral Godfroy's desire that his heavy ships would proceed around the Cape, call at Dakar, and then proceed to the United States for refitting.

SECTION IV, PARAGRAPH 1 a - OPERATION TO SEIZE THE AZORES

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the political considerations involved in the seizure of the Azores must be considered. There was a possibility that the Islands might be secured without the necessity of utilizing a force as strong as 9 battalions. He suggested that a smaller force might approach the Azores in June. From 7 to 10 hours before its arrival, the Portuguese Government might be approached diplomatically and told that the force was en route. If they were received without opposition, the Portuguese Government would be reimbursed by whatever figure might be set. He thought the chances were possibly 3 to 1 that the Portuguese Government would submit.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he personally favored an expedition in sufficient force to take the Islands. His government, however, had not as yet authorized him to approve such action. The British cabinet members felt that the matter should be further discussed on his return.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that if a smaller force could be assembled in June which would act as a threat to back up a diplomatic approach, he would favor such action. He thought the present success in the anti-submarine warfare made it even more imperative that the use of the Islands be obtained as soon as possible.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that if President Salazar refused to give his assent and the smaller force failed to attack, the Allied Forces would be in a bad position. They would have the humiliation of withdrawing; the Germans would know of the diplomatic approach and, as a result, would stiffen the resistance of the Islands.

THE PRESIDENT said that he had never liked the idea of being put in a position of permitting President Salazar to *call our bluff*. He was inclined to favor the approach with sufficient force to take the Islands in the event that President Salazar refused to permit a peaceful occupation.

GENERAL McNARNEY suggested the possibility of reinforcing the *bluff* by timing it with the sailing of a *HUSKY* convoy from the United Kingdom.

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THE PRIME MINISTER said that the earlier operation would have a good prospect of success as the Portuguese would have no way of knowing how strong the force was with which they were threatened.

GENERAL ISMAY said that a plan was being examined to see if something less than a full-scale operation could be mounted.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was content to leave paragraph 1 a of Section IV as it was written, and that he would discuss the matter with his government upon his return to England and let the President know the outcome of these discussions. He suggested the addition of the following sentences to the end of the paragraph: "The possibility of an earlier move will receive further study. The political decision involved will be settled in the meanwhile by the two governments."

THE PRESIDENT suggested that in his discussions with the Cabinet the Prime Minister might bear in mind the alternative of an approach to the Portuguese Government by the U.S.A. and Brazil. In any case, the idea that Brazil might provide the occupying force would be a strong factor in influencing the Portuguese Government to submit.

SECTION IV, PARAGRAPH 2 b - CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATIONS

THE PRESIDENT then read paragraph 2 of Section IV regarding the combined bomber offensive from the United Kingdom and the cross-Channel operations. He asked if the decision as written in paragraph 2 b precluded the use of French Divisions in the assault to be made on the Continent.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that the use of French Forces might be covered if the last subparagraph of paragraph 2 b could be changed to read "that the follow-up divisions might come from the United States or elsewhere."

THE PRESIDENT said, however, that he was considering the advisability of having a French Division as either one of the 9 assault divisions, or, at least, as one of the first 20 build-up divisions. He thought that politically it was of great importance to have the French represented in the first attempt to reconquer French soil.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked if there was any possibility of this decision being communicated to the French.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he thought that would be extremely dangerous. General Giraud and General DeGaulle were soon to have another meeting. He felt that this meeting might result in violent disputes. General Giraud had become stronger because of the Tunisian victories while DeGaulle would think, of course, that he was about to regain control. The important thing was not to let these two French generals create discord between the United States and the British. He did not feel reassured regarding the outcome of the Giraud-DeGaulle conference. He thought it extremely important not to inform the French of our decisions when there was the prospect of a split.

THE PRESIDENT said he thought it was entirely satisfactory to leave any mention of the utilization of French Forces in the assault on the Continent out of the paper which was under consideration provided it was recorded in the minutes of the present meeting and if it was understood by the Staffs that serious consideration should be given to the participation of some French Forces early in the operation.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the decision regarding cross-Channel operations, as set forth in paragraph 2 b of Section IV, failed to make any mention of the month by month planning that was being undertaken by General Morgan in London for the purpose of insuring readiness on the part of such forces as were available in the United Kingdom in the event of the German *crackup*.

THE PRESIDENT agreed that it would be a good idea to put agreed decisions concerning month by month planning in the report. He pointed out that it was impossible to tell when a break in the German resistance might take place. In the last war the first element of the German Forces to crack was the submarine crews. He felt that at the rate they were now losing submarines, that is, one a day, the crews would be unable to *stick it*. German submarine losses in 1918 were not as great as those they are now experiencing and yet they had induced a break in the German morale. Recently airplanes have entered two theaters of

operations with definite objectives. These had failed to reach their objective by 10 or 20 miles, but it is known that the reports they rendered when they returned to their bases stated that the objectives had been reached. He thought that this was indicative of a bad state of morale and efficiency in the German Air Force. These conditions were bound to spread. As soon as the German ground forces learned that they did not have adequate air protection and that the U-boat campaign had failed, the news would spread rapidly and a serious break in morale might come unexpectedly. For these reasons it was essential that the Allies be prepared to take advantage of such conditions whenever they might occur. *THE PRESIDENT* also said that there had been rumors of a German evacuation of Norway. He thought that plans should be under preparation to take advantage of such a contingency.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that a subparagraph be put into the paper at the end of paragraph 2 *b* of Section IV which would read as follows: 'Meanwhile preparations will be continuously kept up to date in order to take advantage of a collapse of the enemy in France, or, alternatively, for the occupation of Norway in the event of a German withdrawal.'

In reply to a question by the President, *SIR CHARLES PORTAL* said that for bombing operations, air bases in Norway would not be of great assistance. It would be more economical to utilize those in England than it would be to build new ones in Norway, especially since Norway would not greatly extend the bombing range. He added, however, that it would have a very beneficial effect if fighters could be based on air fields in southern Norway.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that if Norway could be occupied, it would reopen our communications with Russia. This fact, in itself, would make it imperative that immediate advantage be taken of the situation.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the United States authorities would be kept informed of studies being made by General Morgan's Staff in this regard.

SECTION IV, PARAGRAPH 2 c - OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN TO
ELIMINATE ITALY FROM THE WAR

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether the Poles were included in the forces detailed in this paragraph as available for garrisons and operations in the Mediterranean.

SIR ALAN BROOKE confirmed that these were included in the 19 British or Allied Divisions.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he hoped that it was not the intention of this paragraph to commit us to carrying out particular operations. For example, he would be very much opposed to any idea of an operation to capture Sardinia as a sequel to HUSKY. This would be an eccentric operation, which would have no influence on the securing of the great prize open to us if we could take the *toe* and *heel* of Italy, and gain touch with the insurgents of the Balkan countries.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that it was stated in the paragraph that each specific operation would be subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that General Eisenhower would not be able to tell which operation he could do after HUSKY until the situation had declared itself. The idea, therefore, was to plan several operations and to decide, at the meeting to be held after HUSKY had been launched, which of them to carry out.

THE PRESIDENT said that it was certainly difficult to foretell what the conditions would be. For example, it might be that a movement in Sardinia to separate from Mussolini's regime might gain way, and consequently comparatively small forces could gain possession of the island. Or again, as one report suggested, the Germans might decide to withdraw their forces behind the Po, in which case entry into southern Italy would be easy. It might be better to widen the instructions to General Eisenhower, and to tell him to prepare operations against all parts of southern Europe.

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GENERAL MARSHALL said that General Eisenhower would prepare a number of different operations, and which of them was adopted would be determined when we saw how *HUSKY* went. General Eisenhower had already put in summaries of plans against the *heel and toe of Italy*, and against Sardinia, and had expressed a preference for Sardinia. Air Chief Marshal Tedder had dissented from this conclusion, mainly on account of the difficulties of staging an attack on Sardinia with adequate air support.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that Air Chief Marshal Tedder had also thought that the value of northern Italy as a base from which to bomb Germany had been underrated.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the prime factor which should be kept in mind was the position in the Balkans, where 34 Axis Divisions were held in play by rebels, who would become much more active if we could gain touch with them through Durazzo, or any other suitable point. Of course, if Italy went out of the war, then the Italian Divisions would have to withdraw, and Germany would either have to fill the gap, or retire to the Danube. The effect on Turkey would be very important. None of these effects could possibly accrue from an operation against Sardinia.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that General Eisenhower would be instructed to prepare those operations which were best calculated to eliminate Italy. It was the elimination of Italy which would place these prizes within our grasp, and the right operation to bring this about would depend upon the situation after *HUSKY*. Moreover, much would depend upon events on the Russian Front. It might be that the presence of large numbers of Germans in the *toe and heel* would make a direct assault on this unprofitable - in which case Sardinia would be a better choice.

THE PRIME MINISTER did not agree that Sardinia could be an acceptable alternative. Operations in the general direction of the Balkans opened up very wide prospects, whereas the capture of Sardinia would

merely place in our possession a desirable island. There was nothing in the paper which would indicate to General Eisenhower that we held a view on this matter. The politico-strategic aspect would not be present in his mind.

THE PRESIDENT said he did not feel ready to make up his mind on this matter. Certainly there were greater advantages in going to places other than Sardinia, but he did not think we were ready yet to say where.

Discussion then took place on the exact meaning of the word to *mount* an operation.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that to mount an operation meant to draw up the plans, to allocate the forces, and to give them the necessary special training. *HUSKY*, for example, had been mounted during *VULCAN*. It was quite possible to mount more than one operation at a time, as considerable changes could always be made, and, indeed, had been made quite recently in the *HUSKY* plan.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that the word *mount* meant the fixing on a particular operation for execution to the exclusion of others. He did not think more than one operation at a time could be mounted with the same resources.

After some further discussion, *THE PRIME MINISTER* suggested that he should take further time to consider this paragraph, and said that he would propose certain amendments for consideration.

SECTION IV, PARAGRAPH 2 d - THE BOMBING OF PLOESTI

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he hoped the bombing of Ploesti would not be carried out if it meant a considerable inroad into the preparatory aerial bombardment for *HUSKY*.

GENERAL McNARNEY said that the bombers which would be taken from the North African Theater to bomb Ploesti would only be away for four or five days. It was the units which would come from the United Kingdom which would be absent for a longer period.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the type of aircraft to be used was the B-24, which was not of such value for the *HUSKY* preparatory bombardment as the B-17. He thought that if Ploesti could be seriously damaged, it would be a blow of tremendous importance in support of operations on the Russian Front. The decision depended upon the comments and recommendations of the Commander in Chief, North African Theater.

SECTION IV, PARAGRAPH 3 a - OPERATIONS IN THE BURMA-CHINA THEATER

THE PRESIDENT asked Mr. Hopkins what he thought the Generalissimo's reactions would be to these proposals.

MR. HOPKINS replied that he did not think that the Generalissimo should be told of the decisions reached in the Conference. He predicted that if he were told, he would not agree with them, although secretly he would not be unhappy about them. He would resent more than anything else not having been consulted. Mr. Hopkins suggested that Mr. Soong be told tomorrow that *ANAKIM* is to go on.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he thought the Chinese would have to be told a little more about the operations than was proposed by Mr. Hopkins. The Chinese were constantly pressing to see him concerning the decisions that were made, and he felt it wise to tell them everything except the details concerning the capture of Akyab and Ramree Islands.

THE PRESIDENT said in this regard they simply should be told that an occupation of a base on the Burma Coast by amphibious operations was included in the decision but that the details would have to be worked out after further consideration.

THE PRIME MINISTER proposed that the Chinese should be informed as follows:

'Further study of *ANAKIM* has lead to the following plan:

"1. A large scale build-up of air combat forces and a rapid build-up of the air transport route to China.

'2. A vigorous offensive in the northern part of Burma with the purpose of opening the Burma Road and regaining contact with China.

'3. Amphibious operations against the coast of Burma with the view to controlling communications in the Bay of Bengal."

THE PRIME MINISTER, however, indicated that he would prepare a written suggestion as to what should be told to the Chinese.

SECTION VI, PARAGRAPH 1 - EQUIPMENT FOR TURKEY

THE PRIME MINISTER said he wished it definitely understood that the Turks would be informed regarding the origin of any equipment that was given to them from United States production. He felt that the same rule should apply to equipment given to Russia.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in discussing the paragraph regarding equipment for Turkey, the United States Chiefs of Staff had been concerned more with the availability of the equipment and its effects on our training than they were with who received the credit for giving it to the Turks.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he understood the situation perfectly.

THE PRESIDENT went on to consider the remainder of the paper which was agreed to in all its details by both him and the Prime Minister.

THE PRIME MINISTER then said that he would like to give further consideration to the paper. He proposed to submit a suggestion regarding the post-*HUSKY* operations in the Mediterranean and also a proposal regarding the information that was to be given to the Chinese concerning the Burma decisions. He suggested, therefore, that the meeting adjourn at this time to meet again at 1130 on Tuesday morning, 25 May 1943.

This was agreed to.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

TRIDENT

MINUTES

6TH MEETING, THE WHITE HOUSE, 11:30 A.M., 25 MAY 1943

PRESENT

British

The Prime Minister
Field Marshal Sir John Dill
General Sir Alan F. Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles F. A. Portal
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay

U. S.

The President
Admiral Wm. D. Leahy
General G. C. Marshall
Admiral E. J. King
Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney
Mr. Harry L. Hopkins

SECRETARIES

Brig. General J. R. Deane
Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob

1. EMPLOYMENT OF THE POLES

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had had a strong appeal from General Sikorski for the employment of the Polish troops in battle in the near future. He hoped that these good troops could be made use of.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the Polish troops in the United Kingdom, which amounted to one armored division and one brigade, had been included in the forces earmarked for *ROUNDHAMMER*; and the two Polish Divisions and certain minor formations now in Iraq had been included in the 19 British and Allied Divisions available for further operations in the Mediterranean.

2. FINAL REPORT BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER (C.C.S. 242/4); AND AMENDMENTS THERETO SUGGESTED BY THE PRIME MINISTER (C.C.S. 242/5)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF reported that they were in entire agreement with the amendments proposed by the Prime Minister and would incorporate these in the final edition of the report.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that it would be necessary to give a version of the report to the Russians. This version could be drawn up in suitable form for handing to the Russians through the normal official channels. This would obviate the necessity for an explanatory telegram from the President and himself. The message could simply be sent saying that a full report would be reaching them through the American and British representatives in Moscow.

THE PRESIDENT and the *PRIME MINISTER*:-

- a. Gave final approval to the report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as amended in accordance with the Prime Minister's suggestions.
- b. Instructed the Secretaries to prepare for their approval a version of the report suitable for communication to the Russians through the normal official channels.

3. COMMUNICATION OF CERTAIN DECISIONS TO THE CHINESE

THE CONFERENCE had before them a suggested phraseology to be employed in communicating to the Chinese the decisions regarding

operations in the Burma-China Theater, which had been suggested by the Prime Minister. (Shown in the Annex to these Minutes.)

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had certain minor modifications to propose (which he read to the President and the Prime Minister), apart from which they were in entire agreement with the Prime Minister's suggestion.

After further discussion, it was agreed:-

That the President and General Marshall should make use of the form of words contained in the Annex to these minutes in conversation with Dr. Soong and General Chu respectively, and should hand them copies of the document for their retention.

4. OFFICIAL STATEMENT FOR THE PRESS

THE PRESIDENT said that it would be necessary to consider the terms of a statement to be given to the Press at a suitable moment after the Prime Minister had left Washington.

MR. HARRY HOPKINS said that he had drafted a statement, and he proceeded to read his draft to the Conference.

General agreement was expressed with the terms of the draft, and Mr. Hopkins was asked to prepare it in final form for issue.

5. VISIT OF GENERAL STILWELL AND GENERAL CHENNAULT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

THE PRIME MINISTER said that it would be of very great value if General Stilwell and General Chennault, with their unrivaled knowledge of the Burma-China Theater, could return to their posts via London. He understood that the route through London was actually three days shorter than the route across the Southern Atlantic; and since Field Marshal Wavell and Admiral Somerville would also be going to London, the visit of the two generals would serve to give a great impetus to the work necessary to enable the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for operations in the Burma-China Theater to be implemented.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he was entirely agreeable to this suggestion and would issue the necessary orders.

6. *POST-HUSKY OPERATIONS*

THE PRESIDENT said that the Prime Minister would shortly have an opportunity of talking to the Commanders in Chief in North Africa on post-*HUSKY* policy, and had suggested that it would be of great value if General Marshall could accompany him. He (the President) had accordingly spoken to General Marshall, and asked whether he could defer his visit to the Southwest Pacific in order to fall in with the Prime Minister's request. General Marshall had said that he was perfectly willing to do this.

THE PRIME MINISTER explained that he would feel awkward in discussing these matters with General Eisenhower without the presence of a United States representative on the highest level. If decisions were taken, it might subsequently be thought that he had exerted undue influence. It was accordingly a source of great gratification to him to hear that General Marshall would accompany him; and he was sure that it would now be possible to arrange everything satisfactorily in Algiers, and for a report to be sent back to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their consideration.

7. *CODE NAMES FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS*

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommended the adoption of certain code names, a list of which he handed to the President.

In discussion, certain modifications to the list were agreed upon.

The final list as approved has been given to those immediately concerned.

8. *THE PLOUGH SCHEME*

GENERAL MARSHALL read to the Conference a report which he had received upon the state of training and readiness for action of the

force which had been specially set aside and trained for the *PLOUGH* scheme. It was the firm opinion of all the United States and British officers concerned in the matter that this force, which numbered some 2,500 men, should be given battle experience as soon as possible. The force, which had been given amphibious training in addition to the special training for the *PLOUGH* scheme, had been worked up to a high pitch of readiness, and provided it were not uselessly dissipated, it would greatly benefit by coming into action. It could be reassembled for its proper role before the winter. There were a number of possible places where the force might be utilized, such as the Aleutians, or post-*HUSKY* operations, or for commando raids from the U.K. or even in the Azores. It was perhaps a pity that they had not been employed in the operations against Attu, but an opportunity might occur for using them in another operation in that area.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that the value of the force would be greatly increased by early participation in battle.

GENERAL McNARNEY said that the improved type of vehicle for use by the force would be ready about the middle of October.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that this force had been designed for a particular type of warfare and it would be a great pity to dissipate it if there were a chance of its real role coming to the fore. Nevertheless, he thought that it would be quite easy to create an opportunity for its employment if it was sent to the United Kingdom. It might be possible, for example, to repeat a raid on the coast of Norway of the type of the raid on the Lofoten Islands.

THE PRESIDENT suggested that it would be necessary also to consider the utilization of the Norwegian battalion now in the United States.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed. He suggested that the British Chiefs of Staff should consider this matter immediately and make specific proposals to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

This suggestion was agreed to.

9. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS

THE PRESIDENT asked whether any steps had been taken to concert measures with the Russians in case of an attack by Japan on Russia.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that an attempt had been made to discuss this eventuality with the Russians, and General Pradley had been sent to Moscow for the purpose. After three months' negotiation, it had been agreed that he should survey the air fields in Siberia, but the Russians had then reversed the decision and the whole proposal had fallen to the ground.

THE PRESIDENT said that the Russians naturally did not wish to permit any act which might compromise them in the eyes of the Japanese. Nevertheless, it would be a pity if the occasion arose and no plans had been made. It might be desirable, for example, to send forces to help the Russians to hold Kamchatka.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed, but thought the Russians would be unlikely to be forthcoming. He suggested that one way of making progress would be to say to the Russians that we would be prepared to send them so many squadrons of aircraft so many days after the outbreak of the war with Japan. We could tell the Russians that they could count on this reinforcement in making their plans. This might lead them on to discussion.

GENERAL McNARNEY said that this proposal had in fact been made, but the only Russian response had been to suggest that the aircraft should be given to them so that they could fly them themselves.

ADMIRAL KING said that a running study was in existence of the possibilities presented by a Russo-Japanese war, and this had been reviewed three months previously. Little, however, could be done without additional data.

THE CONFERENCE took note of the above discussion.

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10. ADJOURNMENT OF THE CONFERENCE

The Trident Conference then adjourned, the Prime Minister expressing his gratitude for the warm welcome which he had received and his appreciation of the work which had been accomplished.

ANNEX

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

PROPOSALS TO BE MADE TO GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK

The following are the proposals which will be made to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek with regard to operations in the *ANAKIM* Theater:

First, the concentration of available resources as supreme priority within the Assam-Burma area on the building up and increasing of the Air Route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons monthly by early fall, and the development of Air facilities in *ASSAM* with a view to:

- a. Intensifying Air operations against the Japanese in *BURMA*;
- b. Maintaining increased American Air forces in *CHINA*; and
- c. Maintaining the flow of air-borne supplies to *CHINA*.

Secondly, vigorous and aggressive land and Air operations will be begun at the end of 1943 monsoon from *ASSAM* into *BURMA* via *LEDO* and *IMPHAL* in step with an advance by Chinese forces from *YUNNAN*, with the object of containing and engaging as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the Air Route to *CHINA*, and as an essential step towards the opening of the *BURMA* Road.

Thirdly, amphibious operations against the Burmese coast with the purpose of interrupting Japanese communications between the coast and their northern front.

Fourthly, the interruption of Japanese sea communications into *BURMA*.

For the above purposes all possible measures will be taken to secure the Naval Command of the Bay of Bengal by an adequate force. No limits, except those imposed by time and circumstances, will be placed on the above operations, which have for their object the relief of the seige of *CHINA*.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
C.C.S. 83rd Meeting

TRIDENT

Minutes of Meeting held in
The Board of Governors Room,
Federal Reserve Building,
on Thursday, 13 May 1943,
at 1030.

PRESENT

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN	General Sir Alan Brooke
General G. C. Marshall, USA	Admiral of the Fleet
Admiral E. J. King, USN	Sir Dudley Pound
Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney, USA	Air Chief Marshal
	Sir Charles Portal

ALSO PRESENT

Commander W. L. Freseman, USN	Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Commander V. D. Long, USN	Lieutenant General
	Sir Hastings L. Ismay

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier H. Redman
Brigadier General J. R. Deane, USA
Commander R. D. Coleridge, RN
Lt. Colonel R. L. Vittrup

ADMIRAL LEAHY, on behalf of the United States Chiefs of Staff, expressed his pleasure at having the British Chiefs of Staff present for this series of meetings. He appreciated that they have come so far and left their duties for this purpose. He felt that it was important that by personal conferences the problems which had arisen since their last meeting should be resolved.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said he would like to outline brief proposals with regard to the conduct of the Conference. He suggested the meetings should take place daily, including Sundays, from 10:30 to 12:45, followed by a luncheon in the Map Room of the Public Health Building. If acceptable to the British Chiefs of Staff, the United States Chiefs of Staff would like to have with them at these meetings their three senior planning officers, together with one member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and two officers responsible for supply problems. These officers would not take part in the discussion nor sit at the table. He felt that many of the problems could be more quickly resolved if those involved were present and could hear at first hand the views of the Chiefs of Staff.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that the number should be kept down as much as possible but agreed with Admiral Leahy's suggestions. He would like the British Directors of Plans also to be present.

SIR JOHN DILL suggested that to assist the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff in their duties after the Conference itself had ceased, it would be helpful if they also could attend.

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed that this was an excellent suggestion.

ADMIRAL LEAHY further suggested that with regard to the recording of decisions, nothing in the minutes should be regarded as an agreed decision unless it were recorded as such in the conclusions. Agreed decisions should be taken as the first item at the subsequent meeting. With regard to the final report to the President and the Prime Minister, he suggested that any preliminary reports presented should be regarded

as tentative only and that in the final report an effort should be made to arrange approved existing and projected strategic undertakings in their order of priority. He suggested the first two sessions should be given up to a general discussion and exchange of ideas on global strategy, both in Europe and the Pacific; after that, post-*HUSKY* operations in 1943 and beyond, both in the Mediterranean and Western Europe; and finally a review of the China situation, operation *ANAKIM* and the Pacific. At the conclusion of these first two general discussions, the Combined Planners should be asked to prepare a detailed agenda. The war against Japan should perhaps be discussed first since the Commanders in Chief in the Far East might wish to return to their posts.

ADMIRAL LEAHY then read out a memorandum giving the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff on the global strategy of the war (Annex "A" to these minutes).

SIR ALAN BROOKE thanked Admiral Leahy for the warm welcome which he had given to the British Chiefs of Staff. He felt it was appropriate that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should meet at the conclusion of the successful operations in North Africa. It was also appropriate that he should choose this moment to express the admiration of the British Chiefs of Staff for General Eisenhower's conduct of these operations, and above all, for his success in obtaining and maintaining the utmost cooperation and harmony throughout his command and complete absence of friction.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he was in entire agreement with the proposals for the Conference suggested by Admiral Leahy. With regard to the memorandum on global strategy which Admiral Leahy had read, the British Chiefs of Staff would like time to consider this paper, since it embodied the foundations of our future strategy.

SIR ALAN BROOKE then read out a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff containing their views on the conduct of the war in 1943-1944 (attached as Annex "B" to these minutes). In reading this memorandum, he amplified in certain respects that part of paragraph 2 dealing with the directive to General Morgan. This directive included instructions

to prepare for a feint designed to bring about an air battle on the western front, an operation (a reverse Dunkirk) in which all available forces should be put forth onto the Continent by any possible method to take advantage of a crack in German morale, and finally, instructions to prepare for a full-scale assault against opposition. Shipping remained the stranglehold on all our operations. It would be necessary to keep this factor in mind in all considerations. It was suggested, however, that the desirability of possible operations from a military viewpoint should first be assessed, and when agreement had been reached on this, the possibilities of carrying them out should be related to the shipping position. As regards the order of discussion, he suggested that since there was no immediate urgency for the return of the Commanders in Chief to India, the global strategy should first be discussed, then European strategy (since Germany was agreed to be the main enemy) and finally the Pacific.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, *SIR ALAN BROOKE* said that if *HUSKY* was launched on the 10th of July, it was estimated that the operation should be completed within one month.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Planners had estimated that the revised *HUSKY* might take until the middle of September.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he considered that the new plan with its stronger lodgments should not take much longer than the old one since our air superiority should be able to cut the enemy's lines of reinforcement.

SIR JOHN DILL suggested that the rapid collapse of the Axis forces in Tunisia might be taken as indicative of what the future held for us.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the weakness of the new plan lay in its failure to seal the island to reinforcements. He agreed, however, that with our large air superiority, if sufficient pressure could be maintained, it would not be easy for the Axis to reinforce since they would find difficulty in keeping their ports open. The impression from General Eisenhower's signal on the revised plan was that it inferred

that he anticipated but little delay due to the changes made.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on the results to be expected on Germany by the progressive and cumulative effect of the combined bomber offensive this summer up to the fall.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he built great hope on these attacks if the build-up could be maintained. It was hoped to have between eight and nine hundred United States heavy bombers and four hundred United States medium bombers in the United Kingdom by the 30th of June.

GENERAL McNARNEY confirmed that this number of heavy bombers would be available, though there might be a slight diminution in the number of mediums.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the effect of some thousand day bombers and between 1,000 and 1,200 night bombers would be considerable. The results of day bombing had been most encouraging and must achieve the withdrawal of German fighters from other fronts since the Germans could not afford to ignore the material and morale effect of these attacks. The American day bombing plan aimed not only to shoot down enemy fighters but to destroy fighter factories.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked for the Chief of Air Staff's views on the effect of concentrating all available air power in support of a land battle.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that this largely depended on the targets offered. Our air superiority would be overwhelming within a circle of 120 to 150 miles. The Germans could only provide some two to three hundred bombers and five to six hundred fighters, whereas the British had some 1,500 fighters and the United States would have about a thousand. If replacements were available, this superiority after a few days would defeat the German fighter defense and enable the bombers to attack their targets relatively unmolested. The essential problem was to insure that the German Air Force gave battle.

GENERAL MARSHALL then raised the question of the results of turning our air power in North Africa onto the Italian fleet once bases were available in Sicily.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the present task of the Air in North Africa was to insure air superiority over Sicily. The northern Italian ports were out of range from the United Kingdom in the summer. The attack must be based either on Sicily or North Africa.

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that if they were bombed out of Spezzia, the Italian fleet might make for Toulon. The modern Italian battleships of the Littorio class had left Spezzia after the last bombing, but had then returned. The older battleships were at Taranto and were immobilized for the present since the necessary destroyers had been used for ferrying troops to Tunisia. There they had sustained considerable losses, but he believed that there were still enough destroyers available to escort the Italian fleet to sea.

ADMIRAL KING agreed with Sir Dudley Pound that it was desirable to drive the Italian fleet into the Adriatic but doubted if those in the northwestern Italian ports would run the gauntlet through the Straits.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, *SIR CHARLES PORTAL* said that the Italian fleet in the north was only vulnerable to day attack by U.S. bombers since the short nights did not permit of British night bombers being used. He did not believe that the Italian fighter defense was good but ships were difficult to sink, particularly since the vessels of the Littorio class had heavy deck armor.

GENERAL McNARNEY said that all Italian ports, including Toulon and Trieste, were in easy range of B-17 and B-24 aircraft based on North Africa. American bombers were developing a new technique for low altitude attacks. Experience in the South Pacific went to show that good results could be achieved in spite of heavy anti-aircraft fire, though the question of defense against fighters was another matter and must be taken into account since the Italian ships would be in ports out of range of our escorting fighters.

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GENERAL MARSHALL then asked for an estimate on a time basis of the vulnerability of the Ploesti oil fields to attack by aircraft based either on Aleppo or Libya.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said he did not believe that an adequate scale of attack could be brought to bear except from Turkey or the mainland of Italy or Greece. Only B-24's based on North Africa could reach the oil fields, and these were neither numerous enough nor were they as well able as the B-17's to beat off an attack. If Turkish, Italian or Greek bases could be used, an attack should produce a very serious effect on the refineries, and hence on Germany's petroleum situation.

GENERAL McNARNEY said that a plan which had great possibilities had been worked out for attacking Ploesti oil fields by low level bombing attacks from bases in Bengasi, using 500-pound delay action bombs, the force to consist of 153 Heavy Bombers. He believed that such an attack would render any further operations against the refineries unnecessary for a period of some six months. This attack could be carried out without waiting for the Turkish or Italian air fields to be available, and the numbers required could easily be built up of B-24's with some additional B-17's temporarily diverted from the United Kingdom.

GENERAL MARSHALL said it was important in considering our future strategy to carefully assess the possibilities and destructive capacity of air attacks. We should take advantage of this strength in planning our future operations, particularly in the Mediterranean where it should be possible to use air power rather than additional ground forces. The enemy must not be allowed to relax, however. Damage to the Italian fleet might prove sufficient to release British surface vessels for employment in the Far East. The plan for Ploesti outlined by General McNarnev seemed well worth the gamble. The destructive power against fighters shown by the B-17's had been encouraging, as had also their accuracy in bombing which had forced enemy fighter reaction to their attacks. Attacks on the Italian fleet, and on the oil fields of Ploesti could be undertaken. These would not be too heavy a logistical burden. All these possibilities had a bearing on what could be achieved to

hasten the collapse of Italy by air action alone. An Italian collapse might have a political reaction on the Turks which would enable us to get the use of their air bases. The results of our air superiority in Tunisia had proved crippling to the enemy.

Operation *HUSKY* should provoke further air fights which would weaken the enemy and might leave us in a position to bomb Italy almost unmolested. Since correct application of air power was all important, the Chiefs of Staff would deeply regret any failure to exploit a favorable opportunity which might be presented to use its cumulative effect in the Mediterranean at this time. Effective use of air power might enable us to economize in the use of ground forces in the Mediterranean Area. They would also deeply regret not being ready to make the final blow against Germany, if the opportunity presented itself, by reason of having dissipated ground forces in the Mediterranean Area.

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked for an estimate as to how long it would require to establish ourselves in a position in Turkey or in the *heel* of Italy to undertake air attacks on Ploesti.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said he estimated that from seven to nine weeks would be required before we could operate from Turkish air fields or from three to four weeks if a Turkish acceptance could be taken for granted and the necessary concentrations in Syria made beforehand. Air fields in Turkey sufficient to operate 25 squadrons were now available and air fields for another 20 squadrons should be ready by October. It was difficult to estimate the time factor if the *heel* of Italy was used, A considerable amount of shipping would be required, and the timing would depend on the amount of land forces engaged and requirements for tactical air forces which would take up the air fields otherwise available for the strategic bombing force. Broadly, he felt that it was unlikely that an air attack on Ploesti could take place from Italian bases sooner than from seven to nine weeks after the launching of the land operations against the *heel*. He feared that an initial ineffective attack on Ploesti might lead to great strengthening of the defenses. It was unwise to underestimate the meteorological and geographical

difficulties in attacking this target. A very high degree of training and good luck with regard to the weather were essential.

ADMIRAL LEAHY emphasized the importance of the time element in bombing of the Ploesti fields.

ADMIRAL KING said that the Russians might undertake an attack on Ploesti since they had large air forces and bases near the target.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said this had been suggested to the Russians, but he believed their air forces were too closely committed to the ground battle.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that permission had been sought from the Russians, prior to the first Ploesti raid, for the U.S. aircraft to land in Russia. This permission, however, had been received a week too late to be of any use, and the Russians had never agreed to permit U.S. aircraft to take off for the raid from Russian fields.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the British Chiefs of Staff had brought with them their study on the possibility of bombing Ploesti and the results which would be achieved. He suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should instruct the Combined Staff Planners to prepare a report on this matter.

ADMIRAL KING suggested that the Russians should again be approached on the desirability of bombing Ploesti or the use of their air fields by U.S. or British bombers for this purpose.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL concurred.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that full use must be made of air power in the Mediterranean but considered that this must be examined in relation to the whole picture of the value of knocking Italy out of the war.

GENERAL MARSHALL felt that in looking at the whole picture we should direct our attention to knocking Germany out of the war.

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SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the enemy were certain to resist to the best of their ability our plans for putting shipping through the Mediterranean, and this should produce heavy air attacks. The enemy's one hope of victory lay in the success of his operations by submarine and air against our surface ships. The capture of Sicily would help us to open the Mediterranean route, but even then Axis air based on Sardinia would endeavor to cut the line of communication.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff doubted if bombing by air alone would cause the collapse of Italy. If Italy collapsed, Germany would be faced with the necessity of taking over the garrisoning of the Balkans from the Italians. Some 43 Italian divisions were now employed on this task. The Germans might use fewer. If they used only 20, it would mean 20 less on the Russian Front. Further, unless Germany allowed us to occupy the whole of Italy, including her northern airports, Germany would have to send troops to resist our attacks. The Balkans were economically valuable to Germany. Troops could not be withdrawn from them altogether since Mihailovitch in Yugoslavia would rise and Greece and Albania would be inflamed. If we could knock out Italy and thus divert at least 20 divisions from the Russian Front, and if the Russians could keep up the pressure during 1943, the Germans might crack. It was essential, therefore, that we must use every means to insure a collapse of Italy.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that if Italy should crumble as a result of *HUSKY*, we must consider what action should be taken. Troops for the occupation of Italy would be necessary. He did not believe that Germany would try to control an Italy which was not fighting. Continental communications were designed for an east and west flow of traffic. Communications north and south were bad, as were lateral communications along the southern outposts of German power in the Mediterranean. German resistance in Tunisia had crumbled more quickly than we had been lead to expect from our previous knowledge of German

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troops. They had suffered a terrific defeat with loss of some 150,000 men. None of their North African troops were available to increase the defenses of Sicily. Operation *HUSKY* might be easier than we thought, and on the completion of a successful *HUSKY*, the Germans might be forced to divert troops to the various islands and threatened points in southern Europe.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he believed that German strategy on the Eastern Front would be mainly an offensive-defensive. They now only had 185 divisions on this front. No Italian divisions were left there and far fewer Hungarians and Roumanians. Action of ours in the Mediterranean, which would force the collapse of Italy, would necessitate the Germans withdrawing additional troops from Russia to meet Italian commitments, including the 7 Italian Divisions in southern France which would then be threatened by the Allies. An Anti-Fascist Government might request our support against the Germans or a state of anarchy might exist. The first alternative would be more difficult to deal with. In any event, German commitments resulting from the collapse of Italy would help our final re-entry into northern France, since only from there or from the Russian Front could the necessary additional troops be found.

The capture of Corsica and Sardinia would assist an attack on southern France, and since German forces would have to be diverted for the protection of this coast, the re-entry into north France would be assisted. He was entirely in agreement that air forces should be used to the maximum but linked with appropriate ground forces.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, *SIR DUDLEY POUND* said that the Germans now had a strong force including the *TIRPITZ*, *SCHARNHORST*, one pocket battleship, and one 8-inch cruiser concentrated in the north of Norway. An additional battle cruiser would not be fit for service for many months, and the aircraft carrier *GRAF ZEPPELIN*, although completed, would probably not be operationally fit for several months. Admiral Doenitz, on assuming command, had stated that the whole German Navy would be used for an attack on shipping. This might mean

that the crews of the surface ships might be used to reinforce the submarines or that the surface fleet itself would be used against our convoys. In this latter event the fleet could be more easily used to attack Russian convoys than to break out into the Atlantic. They were at present concentrated in the north in expectation of another convoy being run. The short nights of summer made it difficult for them to elude our very long range aircraft if they tried to break out in the Atlantic. No German tankers were known to have gone to sea, and this was usually the prelude to a breakout. He did not believe that a breakout was likely until the autumn. The degree of cooperation between the German and Japanese fleets was not known, but it was possible that the Japanese had convinced the Germans that the most useful purpose which their fleet could serve was to remain in harbor thus containing a superior British force.

Reverting to the revised *HUSKY* plan, *ADMIRAL KING* said that he appreciated the arguments in its favor. He was anxious, however, as to the lack of ports available in the early stages through which our forces could be maintained. The revised plan, however, had the merit of simplicity and concentration. He did not believe that the Italian fleet would try to pass through the Sicilian narrows though it was possible that it might attempt a passage through the Straits of Messina. He felt it unwise to overlook enemy naval potentialities in the Mediterranean. He asked for information with regard to the rehabilitation of the French fleet.

SIR DUDLEY POUND agreed with Admiral King as to the advantages of the new plan in that only one end of the island required cover. He believed that two French 6-inch cruisers and a few contre-torpilleurs were being repaired.

ADMIRAL KING, referring to *ROUNDUP*, stated that the results of *SICKLE* might prove to be overwhelming. We must be ready to exploit this by cross-Channel operations. It appeared to him that our large air forces could be used for destruction of critical bridges such as those across the Seine, ammunition and supply dumps and lines of communication. We must therefore be very firm in our determination to mount

ROUNDUP in April, 1944. He believed that the vast concentration of air forces available in the United Kingdom might prove the determining factor in the success of Continental operations.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that it was generally agreed that the elimination of Italy would have extremely valuable results, but he agreed with Admiral King's thought that it might be unwise to divert to or maintain in the Mediterranean forces which could be used in a cross-Channel assault or as a prelude to such an attack. If we weakened our potentialities for a cross-Channel assault by continuing to confine forces to the Mediterranean, it might preclude a major effort against Germany on the Western Front.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he believed that if we did not continue operations in the Mediterranean, then no possibility of an attack into France would arise. Even after a bridgehead had been established, we could get no further. The troops employed would for the most part be inexperienced. The force available, some 15 to 20 divisions, was small and could not be regarded in the same category as the vast Continental armies which were counted in 50's and 100's of divisions. Before undertaking operations across the Channel, it was essential that we should create the right situation to insure its success.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the discussion was now getting to the heart of the problem. Experience in *HUSKY* had shown that initial estimates of requirements were always exceeded. The only limit to *TORCH* had been the availability of shipping. The Tunisian campaign had sucked in more and more troops. Operations invariably created a vacuum in which it was essential to pour in more and more means. Once undertaken the operation must be backed to the limit. He felt deeply concerned that the landing of ground forces in Italy would establish a vacuum in the Mediterranean which would preclude the assembly of sufficient forces in the United Kingdom to execute a successful cross-Channel operation and Germany would not collapse unless this occurred from air bombardment alone. If further Mediterranean operations were undertaken, then in 1943 and virtually all of 1944 we should be committed, except for air attacks on Germany, to a Mediterranean policy. This would entail a very serious

state of affairs in the Pacific. It would mean a prolongation of the war in Europe, and thus a delay in the ultimate defeat of Japan, which the people of the U. S. would not tolerate. We were now at the crossroads-- if we were committed to the Mediterranean, except for air alone, it meant a prolonged struggle and one which was not acceptable to the United States.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the Pacific could not be neglected; it was too vital to the United States. Immediate action was necessary to maintain China in the war. The war in Europe must be brought to a rapid decisive close at the earliest possible date.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he agreed that the European war must be ended as fast as possible. He believed, however, that to cease Mediterranean operations on the conclusion of *HUSKY* would lengthen the war. The seizure of the Brest Peninsula, which was all we could now achieve, would merely lock up 20 divisions. Russia was the only Ally in possession of large ground forces, and our strategy must aim to help her to the maximum possible extent. Only by continuing in the Mediterranean could we achieve the maximum diversion of German forces from Russia. The transshipment of Allied Divisions from the Mediterranean to England was a difficult shipping commitment. A lodgment in the Brest Peninsula would not be a decisive blow. There were only some ten to twelve British Divisions available in England.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that if a maximum effort was made, some eleven U. S. Divisions could be made available in the United Kingdom by April, 1944.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that these combined forces would only be sufficient to hold a bridgehead and would not be large enough to debouch into the Continent. Now was the time when action was required to relieve the pressure on Russia. No major operations would be possible until 1945 or 1946, since it must be remembered that in previous wars there had always been some 80 French Divisions available on our side. Any advance towards the Ruhr would necessitate clearing up behind the advancing Army and would leave us with long lines of communications. Our air force in U.K. was at present largely on a static basis though it was

being converted now for use with the expeditionary force. The British manpower position was weak, and to provide the necessary rearward services for continental warfare, two of our twelve divisions now in U.K. would probably have to be cannibalized.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it appeared that *ROUNDUP* was still regarded as a vague conception. Did this mean that the British Chiefs of Staff regarded Mediterranean operations as the key to a successful termination of the European war?

SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained that the British Chiefs of Staff did not believe that a force of some 20 to 25 divisions could achieve important results across the Channel on the Continent of Europe unless almost the entire bulk of the German Army was in Russia or the Balkans. Our ability to operate across the Channel later was dependent on the extent to which we could help Russia now. This in turn was dependent on the possibilities of knocking out Italy this year. If this could be achieved, then in 1944 a successful re-entry into northwest Europe might well be possible, but a re-entry now with some 12 to 15 divisions against the German forces available could achieve nothing.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he did not visualize an increase in the existing ground forces in the Mediterranean. The only cost would be in shipping to mount subsequent operations.

GENERAL MARSHALL, referring again to the build-up for *ROUNDUP*, stated that if we were ever to get the forces in the United Kingdom, we must begin now. Further operations in the Mediterranean would, in his opinion, create a vacuum which would constitute a drain on our available resources.

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked if it was believed that the Russians would be satisfied with an attack on Italy if this meant postponement of *ROUNDUP*.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he was convinced that a Russian failure would prolong the war for many years. He believed it far better, from the Russian point of view, that we should attack Italy now rather than start preparing for cross-Channel operations which could not be of any

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real importance until 1944. What the Russians wished us to achieve was a withdrawal of German forces from their front. The problem was how this could best be done. He believed that only by attacking in the Mediterranean could we achieve immediate results and that this was more valuable than building up for a 1944 *ROUNDUP* which might not even then be possible.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he thought that Sir Alan Brooke forgot the fact that there would be continual air operations in the Mediterranean. Germany would not know when we were about to strike a blow, and her troops would be contained in the area. We had built great hopes of crippling Germany by air attack, and he felt, therefore, that this would be more successful against Italy where the resistance would be less. He believed that land operations in the Mediterranean Area would prolong the European war and hence the time when a decision could be achieved in the Pacific. The build-up of forces in Great Britain for *BOLERO* would constitute a threat which would demand a German reaction.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he would be satisfied with this plan if he believed that Italy could be knocked out by air alone and that we could thus gain the Italian air fields on the plains of Lombardy and the occupation of Sardinia and Corsica. He was doubtful, however, if air alone would achieve the desired result. It had never been claimed that Germany could be knocked out by air alone, but rather that it would reduce her power to such an extent that her forces available against Russia and ourselves would be so weakened as to permit of her defeat. Our object was to assist Russia, and we must achieve this object as early as possible.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that operations in the Mediterranean were important from the Turkish point of view. The Turkish attitude depended both on Russian successes and our operations against Italy. The additional shipping for operations in the Mediterranean could only be found at the expense of *BOLERO*. The reduction in *BOLERO* build-up resulting from the undertaking of operations in the Mediterranean would only be some three to four divisions in 1943 and none in 1944. Operations in the Mediterranean were not an unlimited commitment. We must take immediate advantage of the deterioration in Italian morale. Even if we occupied

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all Italy, a serious shipping commitment would not arise since the Italian ships would themselves be sufficient to bring nearly all the necessary food to Italy, and only some 10 ships a month would be required for coal.

ADMIRAL KING reminded the Chiefs of Staff of the danger of the lines of communication to the Mediterranean passing through the Straits of Gibraltar. The Germans had not yet taken action in this area, but we might be faced with a difficult position if they concentrated submarines in the approaches.

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that on a previous occasion when the Germans had operated in the actual approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar, they had suffered serious losses.

In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, *SIR ALAN BROOKE* said that the advantages of obtaining the Azores were obvious. An examination had been made of possible German reactions. A German advance into Spain and Portugal would require some 15 to 20 divisions and would be met with resistance, if only guerrilla. The Germans would then be faced with a difficult economic situation and the logistic problem of bad communications and different rail gauge. The British Chiefs of Staff did not believe that Germany would undertake this operation. A difficult situation, however, existed with regard to Portugal. If we ask the Portuguese to allow us the use of the Azores, she might well require a guarantee from us that she would be defended. This would be difficult to give since it would entail keeping forces and ships ready to meet this commitment. It would therefore be desirable, if possible, to give Portugal no guarantee and to assure her that the risk of a German reaction was very remote.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that this seemed largely a political question. It was unwise to offer guarantees and better to take the islands without previous notice, at the same time giving assurance that they would be returned to Portugal at the end of the war.

SIR HASTINGS ISMAY said that the British were in a difficult position since they had entered into negotiations with the Portuguese and had staff conversations with a view to assisting Portugal in defending the islands against attack. It might therefore be better for the United States to occupy these islands.

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that a possible timing for the occupation of the Azores might be just after *HUSKY* had been launched in order to utilize the shipping returning from this operation. There were sufficient troops in Northwest Africa for use in Portugal.

SIR HASTINGS ISMAY said that a telegram had just been received from the British Cabinet stating that the Foreign Secretary believed that the Portuguese might agree to an occupation of the islands. He offered to circulate to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a British study on the whole problem.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

a. Agreed:

- (1) That nothing be considered as an agreed decision during the Trident Conferences which does not appear in the conclusions of the minutes.
- (2) That during the Trident Conferences the conclusions of each meeting be read and approved as the first item of the succeeding meeting.
- (3) That when any Summaries of Conclusions are given to the President and the Prime Minister during the period of the Conference, it should be explained to them that these would only be tentative and that, at the end of the Conference, a final Agreed Summary of Conclusions would be submitted.
- (4) That in the preparation of the Final Summary of Conclusions, effort should be made to set out an order of priority of existing and projected strategic undertakings.

- (5) That at the end of the 84th Meeting the Combined Staff Planners should be directed to prepare a detailed agenda for the remaining Conferences.
- b. Agreed that the possibilities of launching a decisive air attack on the Ploesti Oil Fields from Russia should be explored by the Combined Staff Planners.
- c. Took note that a paper that had been prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff on the subject of the use of Portuguese Islands in the Atlantic would be circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as a basis of future discussion.

ANNEX " A "

GLOBAL STRATEGY OF THE WAR
(Views of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff)

1. It would appear that the first steps in an approach to our problem should cover the broad field of global strategy. Our two principal enemies, widely separated and constituting threats to our home theaters that differ in imminence and gravity, present problems that are inextricably interrelated. We are compelled, therefore, to view the problem as a whole, and in that light to test all proposals.

2. The United States concept of the global strategy of the war, reduced to its simplest terms, is to win the war as decisively and speedily as possible. We have stated this more formally, as follows:

a. In cooperation with Russia and the lesser Allies, to force an unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

b. Simultaneously, in cooperation with our Allies, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan in the Pacific and from China.

c. Thereafter, in cooperation with the other Pacific Powers and if possible with Russia, to combine the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to force the unconditional surrender of Japan.

3. The United States accepts the strategic concept that the war will be won most speedily by first defeating Germany, and thereafter by completing the defeat of Japan.

From our standpoint the concept of defeating Germany first involves making a determined attack against Germany on the Continent at the earliest practicable date; and we consider that all proposed operations in Europe should be judged primarily on the basis of the contribution to that end. Similarly, we believe that all proposed operations now or later in the Pacific should be judged primarily on the basis of their contribution to defeating Japan in the shortest practicable time.

It is the opinion of the United States Chiefs of Staff that a cross-Channel invasion of Europe is necessary to an early conclusion of the war with Germany, and that an early opening of communications with China is necessary in order to keep China in the war and to bring to a successful conclusion the war with Japan.

4. We recognize that we have before us a difficult problem in how best to employ our resources in support of these concepts. Any major course of action against one enemy has a direct effect upon the timing, scope, and objective of action against the other. The global concept must, therefore, be kept constantly in mind.

5. We believe that keeping Russia and China actively in the war effort is essential to our successful conclusion of the war in any reasonable time.

6. We are confident that this Conference will find common ground upon which to reach sound solutions for this basic global problem, and the more specific problems which will appear in connection therewith.

ANNEX "E"

CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943-44

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

1. We have asked for this meeting because we think the time has come to carry a stage further the combined plans agreed upon at Casablanca. We have no intention of suggesting any departure from the principles underlying the decisions taken at that Conference (see C.C.S. 155/1 and 170/2). We feel, however, that their application requires review and development in the light of the progress of the war in the last four months, the detailed studies which have been carried out, and the experience which has been gained.

OPERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER

2. The decisions reached at Casablanca (see C.C.S. 155/1, paragraphs 3, 4 and 5) were as follows:-

"Operations in the European Theater will be conducted with the object of defeating Germany in 1943 with the maximum forces that can be brought to bear upon her by the United Nations.

The main lines of offensive action will be:-

In the Mediterranean

(a) The occupation of Sicily with the object of:-

(i) Making the Mediterranean line of communication more secure.

(ii) Diverting German pressure from the Russian Front.

(iii) Intensifying the pressure on Italy.

(b) To create a situation in which Turkey can be enlisted as an active Ally.

In the United Kingdom

(c) The heaviest possible bomber offensive against the German war effort.

(d) Such limited offensive operations as may be practicable with the amphibious forces available.

(e) The assembly of the strongest possible force (subject to (a) and (b) above and paragraph 6 below (Operations in the Pacific and Far East)) in constant readiness to re-enter the Continent as soon as German resistance is weakened to the required extent.

"In order to insure that these operations and preparations are not prejudiced by the necessity to divert forces to retrieve an adverse situation elsewhere, adequate forces shall be allocated to the Pacific and Far Eastern Theaters."

3. So far as amphibious operations from the United Kingdom are concerned, the Combined Chiefs of Staff have since approved a directive to General Morgan to prepare plans, among other things, for a "full scale assault against the Continent in 1944 as early as possible." So far as operations in the Mediterranean were concerned, the Casablanca Conference did not look beyond the capture of Sicily. It is therefore now for consideration what action should be taken in the European Theater between the capture of Sicily and the mounting of the full scale offensive in 1944 - a period of anything up to nine or ten months - for the furtherance of the objects agreed at Casablanca which have just been referred to.

4. It seems to us unthinkable that we should be inactive during these critical months when Russia is engaging about 185 German divisions.* This is just the time when we ought to be exerting all the pressure that we can. It would be fatal to give Germany so long a breathing space in the west, and thus possibly enable her to avert collapse.

* This does not include 14 G.A.F. divisions on the Eastern Front.

5. In our view, the main task which lies before us this year in the European Theater is the elimination of Italy. If we could achieve this, it is our opinion that we should have gone a very long way towards defeating Germany. The break-up of the Axis would inevitably have a most serious effect on the psychological and material strength of Germany. The effects would be:-

(a) The withdrawal of some 35 Italian Divisions from Greece, Yugoslavia, and southern France. Germany would either have to let go of one or more of these countries, with all that this implies in loss of raw materials and prestige, and in the extension of the range of the Allied bomber offensive, or alternatively she would have to substitute German for Italian troops at substantial cost to the Russian Front.

(b) The elimination of the Italian Navy would enable us to transfer very considerable naval forces from the Mediterranean to the Pacific or to the Indian Ocean, whichever is thought preferable. If we were able to take over the Italian Fleet, the naval position would be still more favorable.

(c) We should be able to mount a threat through Sardinia and Corsica against the south of France in the spring of 1944, which would greatly increase the chances of success of cross-Channel operations from the United Kingdom.

(d) The collapse of Italy would have a big effect on Turkey, and hasten her readiness to make common cause with the Allies.

6. It is of course possible that we might eliminate Italy after the fall of Sicily by air action alone. We think, however, that it would be most unwise to bank on this or to transfer any substantial part of our bomber force from the United Kingdom. We therefore consider it essential that we should follow up a successful *HUSKY* by amphibious operations against either the Italian islands or the mainland, backed up, if possible, by operations in other parts of the Mediterranean. Only in this way can we reap the full benefit of our victories

in Africa and in *HUSKY*, and employ the powerful and experienced Anglo-American forces gathered in the Mediterranean Theater and their assault craft. We have considered various alternatives, and have formed provisional views as to which should be undertaken. We will explain these in detail later on.

7. The provision of the shipping required to deliver a second amphibious blow in the Mediterranean this year will of course have repercussions elsewhere and will affect *BOLERO*. But even if Italy collapses as a result of the first blow (*HUSKY*), we shall still need considerable shipping in the Mediterranean to exploit this success by installing air bases on the Italian Mainland and Islands, by increasing supplies to the Balkan resistance groups, and by speeding up our aid to Turkey. In either case some delay is likely to be caused to the build-up of *BOLERO*, but we believe that this disadvantage will be greatly outweighed by the fact that successful Mediterranean operations, and still more the elimination of Italy, will ease the task confronting an army landing in Europe from the United Kingdom.

8. We do not believe that there is any method of giving effectual help to the Russian Front throughout this year other than a continuance of Mediterranean operations, and the intensification of our bomber offensive. It was decided at Casablanca that the heaviest possible bomber offensive against the German war effort should be a feature of the campaign of 1943. Nothing has occurred in the interval to alter the wisdom of this decision, and we think that *SICKLE* should continue to have a high priority.

PACIFIC AND FAR EAST THEATER

9. At Casablanca it was agreed that certain operations should take place in the Pacific Theater (see C.C.S. 170/2 paragraph 5(a)), and that subject to certain reservations, plans and preparations should be made for the recapture of Burma to take place in the winter of 1943-44. The 15th November was approved as the provisional date for the *ANAKIM* assault. We do not know whether the experience of the last four months, and the studies which have been made by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff have caused them to confirm or modify the program for Pacific

operations which was drawn up. We should like to hear their views on this. As to *ANAKIM*, the position is that after Casablanca, the Commander in Chief, India, was at once invited to frame the best possible plan, and to state his requirements. We are prepared to explain this plan and its implications in detail if the U.S. Chiefs of Staff so desire. We think the plan represents the best that can be made having regard to the resources which will be available. But it is necessary to say straight away that we are of the opinion that the full operation should not be attempted in the winter of 1943-44. Our main reasons are:-

(a) The magnitude of the assault and the scope of the operations to which it would be the prelude, are such that we do not feel able to undertake them at a critical period in the war with Germany, on whom we cannot afford to relax the pressure.

(b) We are very doubtful of the feasibility of the operation at the present time. For any reasonable prospect of success it would demand a sufficiency of forces specially trained and equipped, and backed up by ample reserves of men and material. These conditions cannot be fulfilled in the coming winter.

(c) Until long-term plans for the ultimate defeat of Japan have been decided upon, it cannot be assumed that the re-conquest of Burma, however desirable the political effect, especially on China and India, is indispensable from the military point of view.

(d) Operation *ANAKIM*, even if successful in 1943-44, would not be likely to reopen the Burma Road until the middle of 1945.

10. Although we cannot do *ANAKIM* this year, we recommend that everything possible should be done, with the resources available to keep up the pressure on Japan from the west and to support China. We have various alternatives to propose, and would welcome discussion of any suggestions which the U.S. Chiefs of Staff may desire to put forward.

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11. The results of our examination of *ANAKIM* make us feel that we should together examine more closely the method by which the defeat of Japan is ultimately to be brought about. This is essential so that all preliminary operations can be arranged to fit into the ultimate design, and so that Commanders in Chief in the Far East Theater and Indian Ocean may have a firm basis on which to frame their long-term plans and preparations. This will insure that the right sort of equipment of all kinds will be available in the necessary quantities when the time comes.

SHIPPING

12. It is clear that the availability of shipping will be one of the main governing factors as to what can and what cannot be done in 1943 and also in 1944. We suggest, however, that before going into details on shipping, we should clear our minds on the strategical issues, and decide, on merits, on the course of action at which we should aim. Thereafter we should examine the extent to which the shipping available will enable us to fulfill our program. We think it essential that the shipping question should be examined in detail, and settled before the Conference breaks up.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

12 May, 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

C.C.S. 84th Meeting

TRIDENT

Minutes of Meeting held in
The Board of Governors Room,
Federal Reserve Building,
on Friday, 14 May 1943,
at 1030.

PRESENT

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN
General G. C. Marshall, USA
Admiral E. J. King, USN
Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney, USA

General Sir Alan Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles Portal
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay

ALSO PRESENT

Lt. Gen S. D. Embick, USA
Lt. Gen. J. W. Stilwell, USA*
Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA
Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, USN
Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett, USA
Maj. Gen. C. L. Chennault, USA*
Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN
Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA
Col. J. E. Smart, USA
Comdr. W. L. Freseman, USN
Comdr. V. D. Long, USN

Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell*
Admiral Sir James Somerville*
Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse*
Admiral Sir Percy Noble
Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready
Air. Marshal Sir R. Welsh
Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN
Brig. W. Porter
Air Commodore W. Elliot
Brigadier M. W. M. Macleod

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier H. Redman
Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA
Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, RN
Lt. Colonel R. L. Vittrup

* For discussion of Burma operations only.

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

Without discussion, the *COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF* accepted the record and conclusions of the 83rd Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. GLOBAL STRATEGY

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had examined the views of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff on the Global Strategy of the War.* There were certain points in this paper with which they were not in entire agreement. They adhered to the views agreed to at Casablanca as set out in C.C.S. 155/1.

The British Chiefs of Staff had two main points of difference which he would like to mention. Firstly, paragraph 2 *b* of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff paper referred to an extension of pressure against Japan. Such extension might well cause a vacuum into which forces would have to be poured and would thereby depart from the object set out in paragraph 2 *a* of the same paper, i. e., to force an unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe. Action in the Pacific must be coordinated with that in Europe and must not prejudice the defeat of Germany or the war would drag on indefinitely.

The second point of difference was in connection with paragraph 3 of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff paper, i. e., *ROUNDUP* and its possibilities. The British Chiefs of Staff believed that the possibilities of *ROUNDUP* were dependent on the success or failure of the Russians on the Eastern Front. Allied cross-Channel operations could only form a very small part of the whole continental land war, and our effort must be aimed therefore at supporting Russia and thereby creating a situation in which *ROUNDUP* was possible.

The views of the British Chiefs of Staff with regard to *ROUNDUP* might be summed up as follows:

* Annex "A" to C.C.S. 83rd Meeting.

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It was their firm intention to carry out *FOUNDUP* at the first moment when the conditions were such that the operations would contribute decisively to the defeat of Germany. These conditions might arise this year, but in any case, it was the firm belief of the British Chiefs of Staff that they would arise next year. They could be created only by the Russian Army. Our action, therefore, must consist of:

- a. Continuing our increasing bombardment of Germany; and
- b. Drawing off from the Russian Front as many forces as possible.

On the basis of this definition of *ROUNDUP* the British Chiefs of Staff had put forward their views on operations in the Mediterranean.

Paragraph 5 of the U. S. paper pointed out how essential it was that Russia should be kept in the war. The British Chiefs of Staff looked on the matter differently and regarded it as essential not only that Russia should be kept in the war but that we should create a situation whereby Russian victories could be achieved.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he was unable to see that the U. S. conception of global strategy differed materially from that set out at Casablanca. The intention was now and was then to prepare for and launch cross-Channel operations. The African venture was undertaken in order to do something this year while preparing for cross-Channel operations. Little preparations for the latter had, in fact, been made, since all available U. S. resources had been sent to North Africa. The North African campaign was now completed. If we launched a new campaign in the Mediterranean, then we should continue to use our resources in that area. This would again postpone help to Russia since we should not be able to concentrate forces in the U. K. and thus cause a withdrawal of German troops to western Europe. If new operations in the Mediterranean were the best way to bring the European war to a conclusion, then they must be undertaken; but if these operations would have the effect of prolonging the war, he saw great difficulties in committing U. S. resources to them.

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In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, *SIR ALAN BROOKE* confirmed that, in the British view, Mediterranean operations would shorten the European war.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the U. S. Planners in reporting to the U. S. Chiefs of Staff had pointed out the necessity of shortening the war in the Pacific and thus preventing Japan from consolidating her gains.

ADMIRAL LEAHY then read out a paper* giving the views of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff on global strategy.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had prepared two papers - one on operations in the European Theater and one on operations from India for 1943-1944, which he would like to hand over to the U. S. Chiefs of Staff at the conclusion of the meeting.**

ADMIRAL LEAHY drew attention to paragraph 11 of the British Chiefs of Staff paper contained in Annex "B" to C.C.S. 83rd Meeting with regard to a combined examination of the method by which the defeat of Japan was ultimately brought about. He thought it would be helpful if Field Marshal Wavell and General Stilwell were asked to give their views on this subject. An examination should be made of each plan and of what it would accomplish. He suggested that there should also be a combined examination as to how to bring about the ultimate defeat of Germany. He would like to have the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on the Pacific campaign as a whole.

E. OPERATIONS IN BURMA

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that after the Casablanca Conference, plans had been drawn up for operations from India. Field Marshal Wavell would outline the plan which had been decided on as being the best; but this plan did not, in his opinion, hold out great hopes. Even when Burma was cleared and the Burma Road opened, it would take from six to nine months to develop it to a capacity of 10,000 tons per month. Was *ANAKIM* the best plan? He believed that we should examine other lines of approach to

* C.C.S. 219

** C.C.S. 224 and C.C.S. 225

the problem and whatever action was decided on from India this should be coordinated as part of a complete plan for the defeat of Japan. One possibility was to seize the Kra Isthmus and to punch through to Bangkok, thereby cutting the main Japanese line of communications to Burma and obtaining bases from which to threaten Japanese oil traffic. There was no communication by rail with Bangkok from the west coast of the Kra Peninsula, and the roads were poor; but the principal difficulty was the lack of adequate port facilities on the Kra Isthmus.

Another alternative was to capture northern Sumatra and Penang. This operation again would give us air bases to cover the Japanese oil routes.

The third alternative would be to take the whole of Sumatra and then Java, the latter either from the east or west.

Only preliminary examination had been given to these plans. It was essential to decide whether one of these or operation *ANAKIM* held out the best hopes. The latter might prove to be the most valuable, but the very poor lines of communication through Assam must be remembered. The Brahmaputra River had to be crossed by train ferries since there was no bridge, and the only railways available were single track meter gauge. It was planned to use more shipping on the Brahmaputra when it could be returned from Iraq. Rather than undertake *ANAKIM*, it might be better to develop new airports and to increase the capacity of the air ferry service into China to the maximum.

Land operations would have to take place down the two roads from Imphal and Ledo at the end of which roads, when built, our forces would have to be maintained through the monsoon season, when no operations could take place. A thrust from the north would have to be accompanied by landings on the west coast designed to secure air fields. These landings would require carrier-based air support, and only relatively small forces could infiltrate over the mountains. To capture southern Burma an assault on Rangoon would be necessary. Owing to the delta and mangrove swamps, no landings on the coast were possible, so that a hazardous operation up the Irrawaddy was required. Even when Rangoon was cap-

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tured, there would be a continuous threat on our eastern flank; and once committed in this area, we might be drawn on into further operations against Thailand and the consequent difficulties of maintaining ourselves.

If on examination operation *ANAKIM* proved to be the best answer, it must be done; but any action we took must be coordinated with United States thrusts from the east. In any event, the air route to China should be developed. It must be remembered, too, that successful operations against Germany in Europe might well bring Russia to our assistance in the Far East.

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that the object of the Burma Campaign was to assist China by opening the Burma Road. Alternative operations did not appear to afford immediate relief to China.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that unless the Burma Road was opened, no immediate relief to China would be given except by air. He considered that the moral effect of recapturing Burma would be great both in China and in India; and it was, therefore, desirable to do this operation if possible; but from the material point of view we must consider whether operations to open the Burma Road would produce sufficient result to warrant the scale of effort which would be necessary and the commitments which would arise. The actual supplies which the Road could take through to China were relatively small.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that it was essential to do something for China. We must maintain the air route whose capacity was now relatively small and which would fall further during the monsoon season.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it was important to appreciate the fact that operations to recapture Burma would interfere with developing facilities for increasing the capacity of the air route.

ADMIRAL KING said that he understood that air fields in Assam were now being developed though slowly. As in Europe, where Russia's geographical and manpower position were regarded as vital to the defeat of

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Germany, so China's geographical position and manpower were vital to the defeat of Japan and must be used. A collapse of China would vastly prolong the war and vitally affect the whole situation vis-a-vis Japan.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he fully appreciated this point. The value of Russian bases for use against Japan was also great.

ADMIRAL KING said that he was attracted toward the Bangkok operation, but it must be remembered that this was of no direct assistance to China. The Japanese attitude toward the Puppet Government in Nanking had changed, and the people in the occupied area were being offered supplies and facilities which were not available to Free China. Morale was weakening, and if China went out of the war, the task of the United Nations in defeating Japan would be terrific.

(At this point, Field Marshal Wavell, Admiral Somerville, and the Air Chief Marshal Peirse entered the meeting)

ADMIRAL LEAHY stated that the Chiefs of Staff had just been discussing the Burma situation. They would like very much to hear Field Marshal Wavell's idea on the best methods of procedure.

FIELD MARSAL WAVELL said that, considering such operations, the first thing necessary to make clear was the administrative situation in India, which would of necessity be used as a base for operations in Burma. The communications in eastern India and Assam are very poor. One means of communication is the Brahmaputra River, but the value of the river ports is limited by the fact that the seasonal rise and fall is as much as 25 feet. On the other hand, the river constitutes a formidable barrier, as it is unbridged throughout its length and frequent changes of course make it difficult if not impossible to bridge. The result is that the bottleneck of transportation from India to Assam is the ferries which operate across this river. It has railroads on either side which are of meter gauge, single line, and in poor condition. A year ago this railroad carried only three or four trains a day, had no modern methods

for operation, and few crossings. Improvements have made it possible to operate 14 pairs of trains a day up as far as Manipur Road. Beyond that point 12 pairs a day is the maximum capacity. Unless this rail route is double tracked, which would be a tremendous undertaking and would take from two to three years, the present volume of traffic cannot be increased. There is one stretch of the railroad north of the Brahmaputra which runs along the south of the Himalayas. This part of the road is frequently broken by floods. Last year it was out of action for five months during the monsoon season. The only other approach to Assam was through Bengal, which is a single-track route. There were no satisfactory road communications between India and Assam. Such as there were, were poor in the dry season and impossible during the wet season. This necessitated sending by rail all vehicles for use in Assam or Burma. Before the Japanese entered the war, one of the principal tasks for India was to establish a line of communications to Russia through Iraq. Therefore, most of the steamers from the Brahmaputra were sent into Iraq for this purpose. It is now difficult and a long haul to get them back, but an effort was being made. The ultimate result is that the amount of supplies which can be sent into northeast Assam is limited. The scope of the operations which can be conducted is in turn dependent upon this volume of supplies.

In referring to conditions in Assam and northern Burma, *GENERAL WAVELL* stated that it was one of the rainiest spots in the world. Recently over 22 inches of rain fell in a period of three weeks, in the dry season. During the wet season it rains continuously. There are few roads, and those which do exist are in poor condition. There is very little stone or other suitable building material which could be used for the purpose of constructing roads or airdromes, and such as there is usually has to be carried great distances. The entire country is intensely malarial resulting in a high casualty rate. At present they are very short of engineer equipment such as bulldozers, rollers, etc., as well as qualified personnel to operate this machinery.

When the Japanese entered the war, there were approximately thirty air fields in India. Last year over 200 were constructed at a very great

effort, which demanded practically all of the resources which could be made available in India. The original layout of these air fields had to be defensive and therefore further back than now required. There were only a limited number in the forward area including Assam. The conditions there are therefore unfavorable for offensive operations.

Work is going on on three or four projects, but each of these projects demands the same thing. There are two bases being constructed, also the road from Manipur to Imphal and on to Tamu. This was originally a one-way road as far as Imphal only. It has now been made two-way as far as Imphal; and work is in hand to extend it as a two-way, all-weather road as far as Tamu. Beyond Tamu and into Burma it is at present a fair-weather road only. This project is not completed. Malaria is intense in the area. The road to Imphal, over 200 miles, all requires fill. It would have to be doubled in some places in order to bear the traffic. When this road gets into Burma, it will still have another seventy miles to go to get into the Chindwin Valley, across a route which a year ago was nothing more than a mule track.

The other base is at Ledo from which it is intended to construct a road by the Hukaung Valley to Myitkyina. Here again a road needs to be constructed approximately 200 miles in length, for most of which there has formerly been not even a mule track, although a road alignment had been surveyed for part of the way.

General Wheeler had taken over the construction of this road and had at present gone about 50 miles. In the Hukaung Valley section the only way to get a road through was to stick to the hills; otherwise in the rainy season this section will be covered with water. Whether or not a road could be constructed to open the line of communication from India to China was open to doubt. However, General Stilwell, who has recently seen General Wheeler, could give a more accurate report. The moral effect on the Chinese would be good if such a project were undertaken, even though the carrying capacity might prove small.

They had tried to run two roads from Imphal into the Chindwin

Valley. One is through, but the other is considered as being a much greater undertaking.

With regard to air fields, the original requirement had been three fields in the northeast corner of Assam. These were in use but not quite completed but had encountered various delays, particularly because of labor and equipment shortages. These air fields now are operating with runways complete. However, the standings are limited; and with the increase in the numbers of aircraft, the demands for standings are increasing proportionately. After the visit of Generals Arnold and Somervell, three more air fields had been requested. The sites had been selected. The target date for their completion was 1 October, but a great deal will depend on monsoons and the availability of labor. It was difficult to get native labor to work during the rainy season. It was proposed to use on these fields steel mats, which in turn mean an added burden on the railway - 6,000 tons per runway.

He had had another administrative survey made just before leaving India; the conclusion reached was that the facilities were not available both to establish communications for the maintenance of the large force necessary to invade Burma successfully and to provide sufficient air fields for the support of China. He had left instructions to put the construction of the air fields on top priority.

The land route to Akyab was extremely difficult. The sea landing could have been successfully made, but he did not have the shipping, landing craft, and other essential equipment available. Therefore he tried the operation overland down the coast. The essence of this operation should have been speed in order to arrive at Akyab before the Japanese were able to reinforce. However, the conditions encountered proved extremely difficult and provided the time necessary for the Japanese to reinforce and eventually drive the British out. Operations on a small scale against Akyab could not have had any major effect. The original plan was to have been coordinated with a Chinese offensive beginning in March. He had not been told that the Chinese had abandoned their operation until well into February, when his arrangements were already under way.

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way. He had continued with the operation, but the Japanese had been able to move reinforcements from Upper Burma and use them against his force. While Akyab had not been captured, the Japanese had suffered heavily, and air operations against them had been effective.

Further north, it had been the intention that one brigade should advance from the Fourth Corps Area and penetrate deeply beyond the Chindwin Valley to cover work taking place on the road and to help Chinese operations. This brigade had been specially trained to live on the country and operate without communications. When he had learned that the Chinese did not intend to take any action, he had decided to send the brigade in to gain experience in this form of fighting. They crossed the Chindwin early in February and went through to the Irrawaddy, cut the railway in 75 places, and put it out of action for several months. The commander of the brigade then decided to try to operate against Japanese communications near Lashio. However, in crossing the Irrawaddy, he had lost many of his transport animals and some of the remainder had died of disease. After being in action with the Japanese, he decided to break up the brigade into small columns, as had been arranged, and up to date some 1,500 of the original 2,500 had gotten back. Of the remainder, some were still on their way back while some were making for China. Casualties amounted to some 18 percent. The brigade consisted of British, Burmese and Ghurka troops. The Burmese had been included to assist the command with their local knowledge, and some had been deliberately left behind for future use. As a result of the experience gained, it had been decided to train one or possibly more brigades for this type of fighting.

The operations on the Arakan coast had proved disappointing, and we had failed to capture Akyab. This failure, together with the possible loss of Maungdaw, had strategic disadvantages in that it gave the Japanese an advance base for air attack on India and denied us bases.

In view of the difficulties of warfare in Upper Burma, it would never be possible to complete the conquest by land alone and a sea-borne

invasion of Lower Burma was essential. Landings on the Arakan Coast down to Cape Negrais would be cut off from the mainland by the Arakan Hills, through which there was only one bad road to Prome. It was impossible to land in the delta of the Irrawaddy; and, though landing at Moulmein was possible, these forces would be separated from Rangoon by big rivers and a flank guard against Siam would be essential.

Operations down the Arakan coast were designed to obtain air bases to give air cover for successive landings and finally for assault on Rangoon, but the latter town could not thus be captured in one season.

When Generals Arnold and Somervell had arrived from Casablanca with the proposal that a plan to capture Burma in one campaigning season should be drawn up, it was decided that the object could only be achieved in one way.

An advance by land must be made in Upper Burma to contain Japanese forces. This must be followed by landings on the Arakan coast to provide bases for air cover for a direct assault on Rangoon by going up the river. Forces from Assam and the Chinese from Yunnan would join up. The final assault up the Rangoon River was extremely difficult and hazardous. Though the river was not at present heavily defended, this could quickly be done if the Japanese learned of our intentions.

Certain conditions were essential if this plan was to be successful. Sufficient forces must be available, fully trained and fully equipped with all the necessary supplies and specialized equipment, and be ready to start operations at the beginning of the dry season during the first fortnight of November. Planning and Operational staffs were gotten together to prepare for the operation; and it was estimated that 180,000 tons of supplies a month, loading during March, April, May and June, were essential in order to mount the operation. In fact, in March and April only 70,000 and 65,000 tons respectively had been loaded. This was approximately half the normal maintenance requirements, and the operation was thus put back from two to three months.

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The operations on the Arakan coast had proved that the Japanese were as good in defense as in attack and that our troops would require careful and lengthy training. Training in India was a difficult process due to the climate, and took longer than elsewhere. It was unlikely that the necessary shipping or naval forces would be available and therefore *ANAKIM* as originally planned was not possible of execution in full during the coming cold weather season. He was prepared to undertake the operation only if fully trained and equipped troops were available with the necessary amphibious transport assault and landing ships and specialized equipment. However much shipping was sent now it would not be in time for the forces to be ready in early November.

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked Field Marshal Wavell what he considered to be the best practicable action which could be taken to keep China in the war.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that he fully realized the political importance of the recapture of Burma, both on China and on India. Even if operation *ANAKIM* was undertaken in full and was successful the Burma Road was unlikely to attain a capacity of 20,000 tons per month until June 1945. He believed the U. S. Air Force was now ferrying some 6,000 tons per month into China and hoped to work up to 10,000 tons per month. This was a greater capacity than the road would have for a long time and it might be possible to raise even this figure. He believed that the best way to help China was to increase the strength of General Chennault's forces and that this, together with an increase of air-borne supplies, would have more material results than operation *ANAKIM*. An unsuccessful operation into Burma would be almost worse than no operation at all. General Chennault's forces could bring pressure to bear both against Japanese air and their shipping and port facilities. These were their weak links. It was not easy to construct more air fields in Assam since the requirements of gasoline and of construction material, including steel tracks, were heavy. If large-scale operations into Burma were not undertaken, then it would be easier to construct the air fields required to increase the flow into China. Thus it would be feasible to

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increase General Chennault's forces which could then achieve bigger results.

ADMIRAL LEAHY thanked Field Marshal Wavell for his description of the position in Burma.

ADMIRAL LEAHY explained that it was essential that we should find some method of giving assistance to China so that we could take advantage of Chinese manpower and eventually have bases in China for direct attack against Japan proper. He asked General Stilwell for his views on this subject.

GENERAL STILWELL stated that in his opinion it was absolutely necessary that we give the Chinese assistance in the near future. Their economic situation is rapidly deteriorating and the morale of the people and the army is bad. At present there is a great need to build up ground forces to make the route safe to the bases in China we hope eventually to establish. He had been worried since last summer lest the Japanese should undertake operations for the purpose of seizing Kunming. If the Japanese could successfully accomplish this, even a recaptured Burma would be of no use to us, and China would be lost. He was firmly of the opinion that Yunnan Province must be held and at present saw no way to accomplish this except by the use of the Chinese Army. He felt that if a route for supplying China could be made safe, everything else would follow; and conversely, if the route were lost, all of China would be lost. Therefore, the fundamental necessity was to insure the retention of our present route and its terminals and to conduct offensive operations to improve the supply situation. He stated that other things which we might undertake against the Japanese from China, such as conducting air offensives against their shipping and ground installations, would hurt the Japanese to some extent, but could not be decisive. On the other hand, they might provoke violent and fatal reaction on the part of the Japanese. In referring to Field Marshal Wavell's statement with reference to 6,000 tons per month being moved into China by air, he stated that 3,400 tons per month was the greatest air load yet shipped over the hump, and that was under the most favorable conditions. He was of the opinion that this volume could not be materially increased within

the next six months. If all the tonnage of the air transport were devoted to air effort, that is, for use by the 14th Air Force, it would hearten the Chinese to some extent, but with the means available, nothing really effective could be done to help the Chinese. He believed that the 14th Air Force should continue on a defensive mission in order that the minimum essential equipment could be supplied the Chinese troops in Yunnan. There were now 32 divisions in Yunnan, and the goal set was to try to carry 10,000 tons of equipment for this force. That, together with what could be scraped together in China, would enable this force to be put in the field at least partly equipped by the fall. He was firmly of the opinion that the best way to help the Chinese situation was to reassure the Chinese that a main effort was being made to reopen the supply route from India. If this were not done, he believed the Chinese reaction would be very serious. There were certain pro-Japanese elements in China that were taking advantage of an increasing feeling in the minds of some Chinese that no material help could be made available. Unless this condition could be remedied promptly, the situation would become dangerous. Delay might make it impossible for us to seize the bases which we needed in south and east China.

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked General Stilwell what he meant by "something must be done."

GENERAL STILWELL replied that we must open the road to China--undertake operation *ANAKIM*.

In reply to a question asked by Sir Alan Brooke as to when he considered it essential to have the road opened, *GENERAL STILWELL* replied, by January, '44 or as soon as possible. The limiting date is a year from now. China can not be expected to hold out for another year and a half, if for that long.

ADMIRAL KING suggested that General Stilwell meant that although the road might not actually be completed or in a condition to carry an appreciable volume of traffic, the psychological reaction on China in allaying their fears would keep them from cracking.

GENERAL STILWELL agreed.

SIR ALAN BROOKE asked whether or not it was correct that if we were to undertake operations to open the Burma Road, the cost would have to be borne by the air effort in China and if he recommended undertaking such operations at the expense of the air effort.

GENERAL STILWELL replied that the air effort could be supported with 3,000 tons a month. That amounted to only one train a day at most. The bases at Imphal and Iedo were pretty well stocked by now, and he did not see why any material reduction in the air effort should be caused. If 10,000 tons per month could be made available to the Chinese Divisions in Yunnan, they would be in suitable state for use in the fall.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL stated that he had never intended to convey that limited ground operations could not be carried out at the same time as full-scale air operations.

In answer to a question by Admiral Leahy as to whether or not limited operations would help the situation in China, *GENERAL STILWELL* stated that such operations would help materially. Any way in which the line of communications could be improved would provide appreciable assistance. It was his opinion that operations to clear Burma, north of a northeast and southwest line through Lashio, should be undertaken.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that he gravely doubted the ability to maintain forces in that area during the rainy season unless they were able during the dry season, in addition to conducting the offensive, to build approximately 200 miles of road.

GENERAL STILWELL stated that he was fully aware of this condition and that the plans called for building the road.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL pointed out the enormous effort involved and stated that it would utilize practically all of the engineering personnel and equipment. He stated that the basic objection to seizing northern Burma was that once occupied it could not be maintained, especially

if we were to go as far as Mandalay. The Japanese have railroad, river, and road communications from Rangoon and can develop and support a much larger force. Also they would be operating out of a dry area, which extends to the north of Prome, where movement and operations are possible during the wet season. We, on the other hand, could reach only the northern edge of this dry area from which the Japanese would be operating and would be confronted with immense supply problems; in addition, we would have no air support unless air fields could be constructed in northern Burma. This would be a gigantic undertaking.

AIR MARSHAL PEIRSE pointed out that the movement of supplies for the air force used in support of the ground operations in north Burma would be of such volume that it would cut down materially supplies by air to China.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that part of the plan called for a pipeline to Imphal and Ledo to supply gasoline for the support of the operations. This would effect a great reduction in the load on rail, river and road and also on the amount of trucking. However, at present there was only a limited amount of pipe available.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that a limited operation for the purpose of opening a road in northern Burma would require practically the whole of the force involved to protect the road and in turn demand a greater volume of supplies over the road for the support and maintenance of troops. He believed that the only effective way of opening a supply route to China was to recapture the whole of Burma.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that if the present air route could be shifted further to the south, where the mountains were not so high, each of the planes could carry a greater load and therefore materially increase the volume of supplies.

ADMIRAL LEAHY stated that, of course, we could expect the Japanese to attack the road, but would they have enough troops available to attack it in greater strength than we could support in the same area?

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ADMIRAL KING, referring to a possible operation against Bangkok previously mentioned by Sir Alan Brooke, stated that he felt that such an operation would get at the root of the Japanese communications, and if undertaken, would cut their supply.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he believed that an operation against Bangkok would develop a vacuum, and that we should not launch such an operation until we were ready to carry it through to completion. He agreed with Admiral King that it was a vital spot in the center of the Japanese communications system.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the whole problem of maintaining China in the war was one of logistic difficulties which must be linked to our capabilities of overcoming them. He would like Field Marshal Wavell to prepare his views on this so that the U. S. Planners, General Stilwell and General Somervell could examine them. The object of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff was to maintain China in the war since they assigned immense strategic importance to this in relation to the ultimate outcome of the war with Japan.

ADMIRAL LEAHY stated that all of this discussion on Burma had been very interesting. It was clearly indicated that we had a very difficult problem before us and that we must do something to improve the conditions in China. This resolved itself into a study of the logistic problems incident to her supply. He agreed with General Marshall that the best line of approach would be to study these logistic problems which should indicate a line of action to be followed.

4. FUTURE BUSINESS

SIR ALAN BROOKE, in answer to a question by Admiral Leahy, suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff have one more meeting before directing the Planners to prepare an agenda.

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed that after the discussion with the President and the Prime Minister that afternoon, the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be better able to give the Planners instructions for the preparation of the agenda. It may well prove desirable to discuss the Oriental

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problem first. He suggested that the question of the agenda be taken as the first item at tomorrow's meeting.

ADMIRAL LEAHY expressed his appreciation to Field Marshal Wavell and General Stilwell for the information presented at the Conference.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:

a. Approved the conclusions of the 83rd Meeting as recorded in the minutes.

b. Agreed:

- (1) That, with reference to Conclusion a(5) of the 83rd Meeting, the Combined Planners would require general directions to enable them to prepare an agenda for the remaining Conferences.
- (2) That these directions should be considered at the beginning of their next meeting.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
C.C.S. 85th Meeting

TRIDENT

Minutes of Meeting held in
The Board of Governors Room,
Federal Reserve Building,
on Saturday, 15 May 1943,
at 1030.

PRESENT

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN	General Sir Alan Brooke
General G. C. Marshall, USA	Admiral of the Fleet
Admiral E. J. King, USN	Sir Dudley Pound
Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney, USA	Air Chief Marshal
	Sir Charles Portal
	Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay

ALSO PRESENT

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA	Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, USN	Admiral Sir Percy Noble
Vice Admiral Russell Willson, USN	Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready
Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett, USA	Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh
Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN	Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN
Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA	Brigadier W. Porter
Col. J. E. Smart, USA	Air Commodore W. Elliot
Comdr. W. L. Freseman, USN	Brigadier M. W. M. Macleod
Comdr. V. D. Long, USN	

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier H. Redman
Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA
Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, RN
Lt. Colonel R. L. Vittrup

1. *CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING*

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF: -

Approved the conclusions of the 84th Meeting as recorded in the Minutes.

2. *FUTURE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE*

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the Committee had not yet directed the Planners to prepare an agenda for future work. He suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should first consider various courses of action open to achieve the defeat of the Axis in Europe and then similarly the defeat of Japan.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff held much the same views. He felt that *ROUNDUP* should first be considered, and for this it would be desirable to have expositions of the U.S. conception of this operation and a study of conditions and feasibility; next, operations in the Mediterranean might be discussed based on the British Chiefs of Staff memorandum; and, lastly, the war with Japan, considering operations in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, and their coordination.

When the scope and requirements of operations in the theaters had been defined, the Combined Chiefs of Staff would then proceed to examine the extent to which our demands for shipping resources could meet what was proposed. After that, the Committee would consider the global strategy in terms of concrete facts and deal with miscellaneous points such as the Portuguese islands and Ploesti.

ADMIRAL KING felt that the first step should be to set out agreed basic fundamentals: for instance, the vital importance of Atlantic and Pacific lines of communications, security of the citadel of Britain, and the fact that the full weight must be thrown first on the defeat of Germany. To this might be added others. Was China essential as a basis for the defeat of Japan? These fundamentals, when agreed, would constitute a point of departure and yardsticks by which our strategy

could be judged. Many of these points had been contained in previous papers, but he felt it important that a fresh statement should be got out as early as possible.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed with Admiral King's views and suggested that the Planners should be instructed to prepare a document on those lines.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed:

a. That the Combined Staff Planners should prepare for consideration on Monday morning, 17 May:

- (1) A statement of agreed essentials for the effective prosecution of the war, which would serve as a background for the formulation of future plans, e.g., security of essential sea communications; security of the citadel of Britain; etc.
- (2) A draft agenda for the remaining conferences in the light of the discussion which had taken place.

3. OPERATIONS IN BURMA

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that at the White House the previous day it had been agreed that the staffs should, in consultation with the U.S. and British commanders in the area, examine the best means of expanding the air route to China and of opening a land route from India.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he considered it important that the commanders concerned should be consulted so that the orders the Combined Chiefs of Staff would give as a result of their deliberations would be related to practical possibilities.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that it would be desirable that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should offer Dr. T. V. Soong and General Chu an opportunity to express the views of General Chiang Kai-shek at an early date.

THE COMMITTEE then discussed a draft directive to the Combined Planners with reference to a study of operations in Burma.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed:

a. That the Combined Staff Planners, in consultation as necessary with the British and U.S. Commanders in Chief, India and China Theaters, should examine and report on:

(1) The potentialities of the air route from Assam to China given complete priority for its development except for the minimum requirements of the forces defending the air field areas, and whether any further steps can now be taken to enable these potentialities to be realized.

(2) The most promising operation, having regard to the various considerations brought to light in previous discussions, for the opening of a land route to China, and what resources and conditions are necessary for carrying it out without prejudicing the development of the air route.

b. That Dr. T. V. Soong and Major General Shih-ming Chu should be invited to appear at the meeting on Monday, 17 May, and express the views of the Generalissimo regarding operations in the Burma-China Theater.

4. OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

SIR ALAN BROOKE considered the possibilities of undertaking *ROUND-UP* should be examined in relation to the results which would accrue from the shutting down of future operations in the Mediterranean. United States views on the possibilities of the *BOLERO* build-up and their conception of the scope and results of cross-Channel operations would be of value. Similarly, operations in the Mediterranean should be examined with the British Chiefs of Staff paper as a basis for discussion.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then discussed the acceptance of General Eaker's plan for the build-up of *SICKLE* as one of the fundamentals of our agreed strategy.

SIR ALAN BROOKE believed that at this stage *SICKLE* should not be accepted as a fundamental since it might on further examination be found to tie our hands with regard to future plans.

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After further discussion, the *COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF* were in general agreement that *SICKLE* should not at this stage be accepted as a fundamental, though it was obvious that the intensity of our air bombardment would have a material effect on any land operations, whether undertaken across the Channel or in the Mediterranean and should not therefore be reduced except after critical examination.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the most important point was to decide whether the defeat of Germany would be brought nearer by immediate Mediterranean operations at some expense to *BOLERO*, or, alternatively, by stopping operations in the Mediterranean in order to build up at the maximum rate for cross-Channel operations. The Planners should examine this problem with a view to a combined assessment of the effect on Germany of the two alternatives.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that both the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff were agreed that *ROUNDUP* must be undertaken as early as possible, but in the British view it was necessary, before *ROUNDUP* could be successful, to create a suitable situation by diversion of German forces. The United States view was that the war could be won by cross-Channel operations in 1944, but he was not clear as to the exact plan by which decisive results would be achieved.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that great faith was being pinned to the results of the bomber offensive. We must be ready to take advantage of these results. He was concerned lest any delay in building up forces in the United Kingdom would result in our not being ready when the moment presented itself. The British believed that operations in the Mediterranean would not materially slow up the *BOLERO* movement. The exact results of the air attacks might be problematical, but the availability of tonnage to move troops could be calculated.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it was estimated that further operations in the Mediterranean would only result in some three to four fewer U.S. Divisions being available in the United Kingdom.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had last year considered the necessity of undertaking operation *SLEDGEHAMMER* to

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relieve pressure on the Russian Front, but the situation there was now very different. The landing of 25 divisions in France at that time might have been suicidal, but now there was the possibility of concentrating our vast air superiority in direct support of the land forces in the bridgehead, thereby materially altering the balance of force in our favor.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that our air power could be withdrawn from attacks on German industry and transferred to the direct aid of our land forces, but even if the area of ground operations could thereby be isolated, the penetration of these forces inland could not be assisted since the British Air Force was not yet fully on a mobile basis.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that certain U.S. fighter units in the U.K. were on a fully mobile basis. He stressed the psychological effect of a landing in France. He did not believe that the effect of overwhelming air superiority on the Continent had been appreciated, whereas great stress had been laid on its value in the Mediterranean.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that in considering the results to be expected from air support of ground operations, it must be remembered that, in North Africa, though we had had air superiority since El Alamein, Rommel had been able to move his army back into Tunisia relatively intact. Similarly in Tunisia the enemy had been able to reinforce by some 100,000 men.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out the outstanding results achieved by the use of air power in Tunisia as soon as the weather had improved.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out with regard to air power that fighter cover was essential.

GENERAL McNARNEY agreed but said that he believed that a bridgehead in France would enable us to move forward the necessary fighter cover. Air power must be related to our ground power. For instance, it might well be that the correct application of air power might halve the number of divisions required to overcome a given resistance. The seizure of the bridgehead would insure that the fighter line could be

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advanced and air power applied at the correct moment in support of ground operations.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he entirely agreed in the abstract with General McNarney's last statement but it was important that in considering the seizure of, say, the Brest Peninsula, the Planners should carefully work out the rate at which fighter cover could be developed in that area in order that the plan could be assessed on a sound tactical and logistic basis.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out the further limitations of port capacity in the bridgehead.

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed to the study suggested by Sir Charles Portal. The U. S. Chiefs of Staff had prepared a brief outline plan for *ROUNDUP* which would be circulated for the information of the British Chiefs of Staff. He believed that the results expected from the air bombardment of Germany should be taken into consideration both in connection with cross-Channel and Mediterranean operations.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that one of the main features of the air plan outlined by General Eaker was not only its tremendous effect both on production and morale, but also, and perhaps most important, the elimination of the German fighter force. This would have an immense effect on any operations against Germany, whether across the Channel, in the Mediterranean, or on the Russian Front. He did not maintain that the utmost priority should continuously be accorded to *SICKLE*, but it must be realized that its value was fundamental. The longer the destruction of the German fighter force was delayed, the longer would the ultimate defeat of Germany be delayed.

ADMIRAL KING said that operation *ROUNDUP* must be carefully examined. While it had originally been believed that cross-Channel operations could be undertaken in 1943, April of 1944 now appeared to be the earliest possible date. This must be fixed as a firm date, or we should never come to grips with Germany by cross-Channel operations in 1944. He appreciated the value of operations in the Mediterranean, but they would, he believed, render cross-Channel operations in 1944 impossible.

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SIR ALAN BROOKE said that only by Mediterranean operations to draw off and hold German forces could a situation be achieved in which a successful *ROUNDUP* is possible. Otherwise at best only *SLEDGEHAMMER* could be undertaken and we should then be committed in France and pinned down to a bridgehead.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that all were agreed that *ROUNDUP* was essential and that a strategy should be adopted which would produce the earliest possible successful invasion of the Continent. The British believed that Mediterranean operations were first necessary, whereas the United States Chiefs of Staff believed in piling up forces in the United Kingdom to give more strength to the blow. The British Chiefs of Staff believed that the balance of force on the Continent would alter more rapidly in our favor if Mediterranean operations were undertaken.

ADMIRAL KING said that he did not believe it would be possible to build up sufficient forces in the United Kingdom if Mediterranean operations were undertaken, since these would cause a vacuum into which our forces would be sucked.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said it must be remembered that this vacuum would suck in not only Allied Forces, but also Axis Forces.

With regard to General Morgan's plans, *GENERAL MARSHALL* said that these, without forces to implement them, were of little value. He feared that unless we concentrated on the United Kingdom build-up, we should lack the necessary punch to undertake cross-Channel operations when the critical moment arose.

SIR ALAN BROOKE undertook to circulate a note giving an estimate of the shipping commitment to meet the economic situation that would arise in the event of an Italian collapse.

ADMIRAL KING drew attention to the dangers of tying down forces and equipment to await eventualities. If a definite date was not decided on for *ROUNDUP*, valuable equipment, such as landing craft, which was urgently required in the Pacific, would be lying idle in England.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that this also applied to air-borne forces which were also essentially offensive and absorbed much air power which might well be used in active attack, but he believed that both with landing craft and air-borne troops their use was so essential to achieve success at the critical moment that their inactivity until this moment arrived must be accepted.

GENERAL McNARNEY said that he regarded *SLEDGEHAMMER* as a preliminary to *ROUNDUP*. Even a bridgehead was valuable in that it would bring ground and air forces into active contact with the enemy, diverting German forces from the Russian Front and inducing attrition. When, during operation *TORCH*, it had been obvious to the Germans that no cross-Channel operations were possible, they had sent part of their garrison from Western France to the Eastern Front at a critical moment.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the commitment of our forces to a bridgehead such as the Brest Peninsula would enable the enemy to concentrate rather than force him to disperse.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that on two previous occasions the forces which it had been believed would be available for cross-Channel operations had dwindled to very small numbers due to the demands of operations *TORCH* and *HUSKY*, which had exceeded expectations. Unless *BOLERO* build-up was now given priority over operations in the Mediterranean, similar results might be expected and no forces would be available to undertake the operation at the critical moment.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that it had always been agreed that the build-up in the United Kingdom should take place subject to the requirements of the agreed operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean. These requirements had not greatly exceeded expectations but rather the availability of shipping had not proved so large as had been expected.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

- a. Agreed that the Combined Staff Planners should prepare for consideration on Monday morning, 17 May, two papers as follows:

(1) A plan for the defeat of Germany (showing the course of operations and their feasibility) by concentrating on the biggest possible invasion force in the U.K. as soon as possible. This paper to be prepared by the U.S. planners in consultation with the British.

(2) A plan for the defeat of Germany (showing the course of operations and their feasibility) which accepts the elimination of Italy as a necessary preliminary. This paper to be prepared by the British Planners in consultation with the U. S.

In the preparation of the above plans cognizance should be taken of the effects of a full-scale *SICKLE*.

In submitting the above two papers, the Combined Staff Planners should make such recommendations as they feel able to on the respective plans.

- b. Took note that a paper which had been prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff on the economic results of the defeat of Italy would be circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

5. *DIRECTIVE TO ALLIED AUTHORITIES IN THE FAR EAST*

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed the terms of a directive to the U.S. and British authorities in the Far East on the expansion of the capacity of the air route to China.

In the course of discussion, *GENERAL MARSHALL* outlined certain steps which General Wheeler, in cooperation with the British authorities concerned, was taking for the improvement of these facilities. He mentioned the difficulties with which General Stilwell was faced, and in this connection paid tribute to the outstanding success achieved by Sir John Dill on his visit to Chungking, in convincing the Chinese of British good will.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF: -

Agreed:

That the following telegram should be despatched forthwith by the appropriate Chiefs of Staff to the appropriate Commanders in Chief:

"Give first priority to effort to prepare Assam air fields in order that not less than 7,000 tons per month may be transported to China by 1 July 1943.

"It is considered essential that facilities for the monthly transportation of 10,000 tons should be provided at the earliest practicable date and not later than 1 September, and that adequate defensive measures for the air field area must be maintained."

6. *THE AZORES*

ADMIRAL KING, in stressing the urgency of action with regard to the Azores as a vital factor in the battle of the Atlantic, asked if any further developments had taken place.

7. *GENERAL ISMAY* stated that the British Chiefs of Staff had prepared a paper on this subject which had been submitted to the Prime Minister and which he had invited them to discuss with the United States Chiefs of Staff. This paper will be circulated. The military desirability of obtaining these islands was generally agreed. He believed that the Prime Minister and President were discussing means of achieving our object.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF: -

Agreed that the paper on the Portuguese Atlantic Islands, by the British Chiefs of Staff, which is now being circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, should be considered at the meeting on Monday, 17 May.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
C.C.S. 86th Meeting

TRIDENT

Minutes of Meeting held in
The Board of Governors Room,
Federal Reserve Building,
on Monday, 17 May 1943,
at 1030.

PRESENT

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN	General Sir Alan Brooke
General G. C. Marshall, USA	Admiral of the Fleet
Admiral E. J. King, USN	Sir Dudley Pound
Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney, USA	Air Chief Marshal
	Sir Charles Portal

ALSO PRESENT

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA	Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, USN	Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay
Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA	Admiral Sir Percy Noble
Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett, USA	Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready
Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN	Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh
Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA	Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN
Col. J. E. Smart, USA	Brigadier W. Porter
Comdr. W. L. Freseman, USN	Air Commodore W. Elliot
Comdr. V. D. Long, USN	Brigadier M. W. M. Macleod

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier H. Redman
Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA
Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, RN
Lt. Colonel R. L. Vittrup

1. *VISIT TO ANNAPOLIS*

ADMIRAL KING invited the Combined Chiefs of Staff to visit Annapolis on Sunday, 23 May, leaving Washington at approximately 9 A.M.

2. *CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING*

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that with reference to Item 5 of the 85th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the British Chiefs of Staff, in telegraphing to the appropriate British authorities in the Far East, had thought it wise to add to the last sentence of the draft telegram the words "including air fields necessary for maintaining air superiority."

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

- a. Approved the conclusions of the 85th Meeting as recorded in the Minutes.
- b. Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff, in telegraphing the British authorities in the Far East, had added to the last sentence of the draft telegram contained in the conclusion to Item 5 of C.C.S. 85th Meeting the words "including air fields necessary for maintaining air superiority."

(At this point Dr. T. V. Soong and General Shih-Ming Chu entered the meeting.)

3. *SITUATION IN CHINA*

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked Dr. Soong to give the Combined Chiefs of Staff the benefit of his views on the Chinese situation, with particular reference to Chinese needs and the opening of a land route to China.

DR. SOONG said that it must be remembered that China had been in a state of siege for five years. The Japanese had seized the Chinese coast, then Indo China and finally, with the occupation of Burma, the investment had been completed save for the air route. The resultant economic pressure, deterioration of morale and lack of supplies made

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the situation very grave. After Casablanca Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had been informed in a message from the President and Prime Minister, firstly, that the U.S. Air Force under General Chennault would be strengthened with a view not only to attacking the Japanese in China but also Japan itself, and secondly, that a combined *all-out* assault on Burma by naval, ground and air forces would be undertaken at the conclusion of this year's monsoon. These assurances were naturally very welcome to the Generalissimo.

It was appreciated that the existing air route, with a capacity of only a few thousand tons per month, would not permit the implementation of a strong air offensive from China and, at the same time, the supply of the Chinese troops in Yunnan. The Generalissimo had therefore asked the President that for the next three months all supplies carried by the air route should be those for General Chennault's air force. The General had worked out a plan for attacking the Japanese air forces, their lines of communication, and most important of all, for providing air support for the Chinese ground forces. So far these forces had received no air support, and this was vitally important. The Japanese not only had better lines of communication but also better equipment, and were assisted by their air. Recent Japanese attacks in the neighborhood of Ichang had enabled them to capture territory on the south of the Yangtze. This provided them with an excellent line of communication via the Yangtze; and unless they were dislodged, it would enable them to attack Chang Sha and Chungking itself, since their logistic situation was far more favorable than that of the Chinese, whose lines of communication, now that the use of the Yangtze could be denied them by Japanese air power, were over most difficult mountainous country. Air power, and air power alone, would be of any value in the present situation, and it was for this reason that the Generalissimo asked that, for three months, supplies to General Chennault's air forces should take priority over everything else so that these could be used in support of the Chinese Army.

The situation was, frankly, very bad. General Chiang Kai-shek's military views had been guided over a period of years not only by United States and British advisers but by a series of outstanding German and Russian general officers. General Chiang Kai-shek was the Supreme

Commander in the Chinese Theater of War, and for this theater he was responsible. On him depended the safety of China. His military views, therefore, must, unless he were absolved of this responsibility, be given overriding consideration.

With regard to the first promise made by the President and Prime Minister, i.e., the strengthening of General Chennault's air forces, the Generalissimo regarded this as all-important. Japan had changed her policy vis-a-vis China. She had now given the puppet government in Nanking many concessions, including the control of currency. She had restored factories in the occupied area. This new policy of conciliation was far harder for the national government to combat than her previous line of action and called for strong positive steps.

With regard to the second promise, i.e., that the United Nations would undertake a full-scale offensive in Burma towards the end of 1943 the official record of the meeting held in Calcutta between the British, American and Chinese representatives gave a clear picture of the situation.

This discussion was regarded as one to insure that the decisions reached at Casablanca and Chungking should be perfectly clear to all concerned. General Ho had outlined the action to be taken by the Chinese forces. All had agreed that the provision of naval forces was essential and that success would be impossible without them. The importance of air superiority had been emphasized and General Arnold had pointed out that, even if the Japanese Air Force were as strong as believed by the Chinese representatives, the British/American air force would be considerably stronger. The Chinese representatives had agreed to provide three extra air fields at the China end and additional facilities to match those provided by the British at the Indian end. Field Marshal Wavell had said he had not had time to work out details. He must consider the needs of his own troops in the area who were dependent on difficult lines of communication. The Generalissimo might be assured that he would do his utmost to meet his request. He was confident that it would be possible to carry up to the air fields as as much as the ferry service could carry forward.

From all this it was clear that the Burma plan for 1943 was a definite U.S./British commitment and he must therefore ask for its fulfillment and would be interested to know further details of it.

As a background to this request the Chinese situation must be borne in mind. Inflation had taken place; there was economic distress; China had borne long years of war; and the Japanese were adopting the policy of *wheeling* rather than *terrorizing* the people. Throughout the Chinese Army and indeed the people, the plan to retake Burma in 1943 was an open secret. If not undertaken, they would believe themselves abandoned by the Allies and suspect that the latter did not intend to achieve the unconditional surrender of Japan by force of arms.

Prior to the Casablanca Conference other plans had been suggested for limited operations and General Stilwell, who had a profound knowledge of China, had in January proposed the launching of an offensive by Chinese troops in North Burma at the beginning of March, with the object of opening an all-land route to China. The Generalissimo, however, both then and now, was in disagreement with this plan believing it to be logistically impracticable since, while the Allied forces would be operating from very limited lines of communication from Ledo onwards, the Japanese would have the use both of the Irrawaddy River and the railroad. The Generalissimo felt that even if this plan achieved initial success, we should eventually be faced with the Japanese being able to maintain stronger forces at the ends of their good lines of communication than could we.

With regard to the state of preparedness of the Chinese troops, everything possible had been done to fulfill their commitment for a full-scale attack on Burma, and forces had been drawn from many parts of the area, some having marched 2,000 kilometers. The troops required for the full Burmese operation were now all available within one week's march of Kunming. The promised air fields in China had been built, and though painfully constructed by manual labor, the preparations at

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the Chinese end were further forward than those in India. General Chen-Cheng, considered by General Stilwell as the ablest Chinese commander under the Generalissimo, had been placed in command of the Chinese forces in Yunnan. The general situation in China was bad. The Yangtze had been cut; Chang Sha, and Chungking which was of immense economic, moral and military importance, were threatened. The Chinese would do everything possible to meet their share of the operation. He hoped to be informed of the availability of the Allied forces. He asked only that the decisions taken at Casablanca with regard to the offensive in Burma be implemented.

ADMIRAL LEAHY thanked Dr. Soong for his most interesting talk on the situation in China. He asked how many Chinese troops would be available for the Burma operation.

DR. SOONG said that there would be 32 divisions, though these would not be at full strength and would amount to the equivalent of some 22 full-scale divisions, i.e., about 220,000 men. In addition, there were the Chinese forces training at Ramgarh and further troops held in readiness for holding operations to prevent the Japanese attacking Kunming from the south.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, *DR. SOONG* said that the operations near Ichang were being undertaken by the 5th and 6th Armies. These forces were short of artillery since the Chinese had received no additional guns except Polish artillery captured by the Russians. In spite of the general lack of artillery, the Chinese ground forces would be able to undertake their part in the proposed operations, and their degree of readiness was evinced by the fact that in January General Stilwell had been prepared to launch an offensive in March.

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked General Chu if he wished to add anything to Dr. Soong's statement.

GENERAL CHU stated that he had nothing to add at this time but would be available later if the need should arise.

4. *PORTUGUESE ISLANDS*

(C.C.S. 226)

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that paragraph 7 of C.C.S. 226, with a short preamble explaining the vital military needs for these islands as aids to maintaining the security of our Atlantic communications, should be used as a basis of a recommendation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister.

ADMIRAL POUND presented a chart showing the vital role which the Portuguese Islands would play in maintaining the security of our sea routes.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested alternatively that it might be wiser to delay the approach to the Portuguese Government until such time as sufficient forces were available in the U.K. to seize the Islands in the event of Portuguese refusal. If necessary, a European front in Portugal could be opened.

ADMIRAL KING suggested that since all were agreed on the strategic importance of the Islands and since time was of the essence, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should make plans and agree, during the course of the Conference, that the Islands must be seized by force if diplomatic action failed.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that this possibility should be examined and a decision taken as to whether the operation was better undertaken by U.S. or British forces and as to the strength of the forces required. With regard to the opening of a second front in Portugal, he saw certain advantages in this course, but it must be considered in relation to projected operations in the whole of the European Theater.

ADMIRAL KING then explained that his proposal had been that the possibility of seizing the Islands without diplomatic negotiations should be considered since this course might render it easier for the Portuguese to say that action had been taken against their will, and therefore action in defense of Portugal itself might be avoided. The time factor was vital. More and more traffic would be routed through the Mediterranean. The Portuguese Islands were very important to the security of the U.S.-U.K. sea lane, but vital to the U.S.-Mediterranean route.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, *SIR DUDLEY POUND* said that he could see no advantage in postponing action with regard to the Islands. They were vitally important at all times of the year but more particularly so in the winter. The use of the southern route, with its better weather, was important and only escort carrier air protection could be given unless we held the Azores.

Discussion then took place on the strength and source of forces required in the light of possible resistance.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:

a. Agreed to recommend to the President and the Prime Minister:

- (1) That the acquisition of the Azores Islands should be accomplished as soon as possible and, in any event, early enough for them to be utilized by the United Nations during the winter of 1943-1944.
- (2) That an effort should first be made to secure the use of these islands by diplomatic means without making military commitments to the Portuguese Government.

b. Agreed:

- (1) That the British Chiefs of Staff should bring before the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for the occupation of the Azores Islands. This plan, when approved, should be submitted to the President and Prime Minister with a covering note showing suggested timings, and the effect of the plan on other military commitments now in view.
- (2) That as soon as these plans have been approved preparations should be made to implement them in case diplomatic efforts should fail.

c. Directed that the secretaries, in consultation with the Chief of the British Air Staff, should prepare for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff a draft letter for submission to the President and the Prime Minister which would include the above recommendations and proposals.

5. AGREED ESSENTIALS IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

(C.C.S. 85th Meeting, Item 2 a (1))

(C.C.S. 232)

THE COMMITTEE considered a report by the Combined Staff Planners. The British Chiefs of Staff presented a memorandum suggesting certain amendments to the paper. In the course of discussion on paragraph 2 b of the paper, on the desirability of relating the extension of unremitting pressure against Japan to the agreement that the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe must be brought about at the earliest possible date, ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he believed that this British suggestion would not be acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff. The defeat of Japan was a matter of vital importance to the United States. A situation might arise in which an extension of effort against Japan, if necessary, even at the expense of the European Theater, would be essential to maintain the integrity of the United States and her interests in the Pacific.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the so-called adequate forces for the Pacific had always been a matter susceptible to differences of opinion. It must be remembered that while the Casablanca Conference dealt only with operations in 1943, the present deliberations aimed at deciding on the strategy to be adopted to bring the war as a whole to a successful conclusion. In his view, C.C.S. 155/1 did, in fact, visualize the extension of pressure against Japan.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that operations in the Pacific had actually been extended since Casablanca and there was no doubt that adequate forces for further extension were available. The only shortage was of shipping. If an unfavorable situation arose in the Pacific, all would realize that whatever agreements were in existence, the United States would have to divert forces to meet this eventuality.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that shipping alone prohibited an equal effort in the Pacific Theater. He was convinced that it was not possible to achieve the defeat of both Germany and Japan at the same time, and the maximum effort must be made against one or the other. There was no possibility of holding Germany while concentrating on Japan, and

therefore it was essential that the defeat of Germany should first be accomplished. This would be the best method of ending the war as a whole at the earliest possible date.

With regard to paragraph 3 *b*, it was generally agreed that this paragraph should be recast in order to clarify its intention.

With regard to paragraph 3 *d*, *GENERAL McNARNEY* agreed on the importance of both the air offensive against the Axis Powers and of relieving pressure on the Russian Front, but considered that concentration of air effort was essential. The British proposals left the way open to a dispersal of air forces from Norway to Greece which, while it might take pressure from the Russians, would not be the best application of our air power.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:

- a. Agreed to the following changes in C.C.S. 232:
 - (1) In the third line of paragraph 3 delete the word "fixed" and substitute the word "first" therefor.
 - (2) Delete the captions "Priority Group 1" and "Priority Group 2" immediately preceding paragraphs 3 *a* and 3 *e*, respectively.
 - (3) Delete the words "in the Atlantic and Pacific" from paragraph 3 *c*.
- b. Agreed that paragraphs 2 *b*, 3 *b*, 3 *d*, and 3 *f* of C.C.S. 232 should be considered further.
- c. Directed the secretaries to publish an amended version of C.C.S. 232 which will show the items of agreement and disagreement. (Subsequently published as C.C.S. 232/1.)

6. AGENDA FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE CONFERENCE
(C.C.S. 233)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a note by the Combined Staff Planners setting forward a tentative agenda for the remainder of the conference.

With regard to Item 6, *SIR JOHN DILL* reminded the Committee of the importance of discussing the action being taken with regard to rearming Turkey in relation to our plans for the conduct of the war in Europe.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

- a. Agreed to the agenda for the remainder of the conference shown in C.C.S. 233, with the following exceptions:
 - (1) Delete paragraph (1), discussion on Global Strategy.
 - (2) Delete reference to the report of the Kauffman-Mansfield Committee under the heading of U-boat Campaign in paragraph (4).
 - (3) Insert a new item immediately following paragraph (5) entitled "Turkish Situation, General Discussion."
(Revised agenda subsequently published as C.C.S. 233/1.)
- b. Agreed that the papers being prepared by the U.S. and British Planners on "The Defeat of Germany" would, in order to save time, be circulated as C.C.S. papers without receiving prior approval of their respective Chiefs of Staff.
- c. Agreed that if necessary the Combined Chiefs of Staff would meet in an afternoon conference on Friday, 21 May, to consider papers receiving their attention which have no special reference to the subject matter of the Trident Conference.

(At this point the following left the meeting:

General Somervell	Admiral Noble
Admiral Horne	Lt. General Macready
General Fairchild	Air Marshal Welsh
General Streett	Captain Lambe
Admiral Cooke	Brigadier Porter
General Wedemeyer	Air Commodore Elliot
Colonel Smart	Brigadier Macleod)
Commander Freseman	
Commander Long	

7. OPERATION "HUSKY"

SIR ALAN BROOKE informed the Committee of certain information which pointed to the desirability of advancing the date of Operation 'HUSKY.

The Committee discussed the advisability of asking General Eisenhower to consider the mounting of an earlier operation against 'HUSKYland, but it was pointed out that General Eisenhower had already given his views on this matter and had received all the available information referred to above. It was generally agreed that any specific action to draw General Eisenhower's attention to this information might suggest a lack of confidence in his judgment, which most certainly did not exist.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed that they should take no action on this matter.

8. OPERATION "UPKEEP"

SIR CHARLES PORTAL outlined Operation UPKEEP and the results which it was hoped had been attained.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note with interest of this statement.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
C.C.S. 87th Meeting

TRIDENT

Minutes of Meeting held in
The Board of Governors Room,
Federal Reserve Building,
on Tuesday, 18 May 1943,
at 1030.

PRESENT

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN
General G. C. Marshall, USA
Admiral E. J. King, USN
Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney, USA

General Sir Alan Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles Portal

ALSO PRESENT

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA
Lt. Gen. S. D. Embick, USA
Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, USN
Maj. Gen. W. B. Smith, USA
Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett, USA
Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN
Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA
Col. J. E. Smart, USA
Comdr. W. L. Freseman, USN
Comdr. V. D. Long, USN

Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay
Admiral Sir Percy Noble
Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready
Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh
Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN
Brigadier W. Porter
Air Commodore W. Elliot
Brigadier M. W. M. Macleod

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier H. Redman
Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA
Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, RN
Lt. Colonel R. L. Vittrup, USA

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the U. S. Chiefs of Staff did not consider that the conclusion to Item 5 of the 86th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was correctly worded. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had not approved C.C.S. 232 subject to the deletion of certain paragraphs, but rather had accepted certain paragraphs, had amended others, and agreed to reconsider those upon which there was disagreement.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the conclusions as shown in the Minutes of the 86th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, held on Monday, 17 May 1943, except that the conclusions under Item 5 were changed to read as follows:

"THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

a. Agreed to the following changes in C.C.S. 232:

(1) In the third line of paragraph 3 delete the word 'fixed' and substitute the word 'first' therefor.

(2) Delete the captions 'Priority Group 1' and 'Priority Group 2' immediately preceding paragraphs 3 a and 3 e respectively.

(3) Delete the words 'in the Atlantic and Pacific' from paragraph 3 c.

b. Agreed that paragraphs 2 b, 3 b, 3 d, and 3 f of C.C.S. 232 should be considered further.

c. Directed the Secretaries to publish an amended version of C.C.S. 232 which will show the items of agreement and disagreement. (Subsequently published as C.C.S. 232/1.)."

2. PORTUGUESE ISLANDS

(Previous Reference: C.C.S. 85th Meeting, Item 6)

(C.C.S. 226/1)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a draft memorandum for the President.

and Prime Minister prepared by the Secretaries in collaboration with the British Chief of the Air Staff.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he considered that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide who should be responsible for providing the necessary forces and preparing a plan for seizing the Islands should this be necessary. The Azores were in a British sphere of responsibility. There was available a British Royal Marine Division which could undertake the task though the availability of landing craft and shipping would have to be further considered. If the U. S. Chiefs of Staff accepted British responsibility for the planning of this operation and for the provision of the troops, then he suggested that conclusion b (1) of Item 4 of the 86th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be altered to read:

"That the British Chiefs of Staff should bring before the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for the occupation of the Azores Islands. This plan, when approved, should be submitted to the President and Prime Minister with a covering note showing suggested timings, and the effect of the plan on other military commitments now in view."

ADMIRAL KING suggested that in view of the British alliance with Portugal, it might, for diplomatic and psychological reasons, be better for U. S. troops to undertake the operation even though the Azores were in a British sphere of responsibility.

The U. S. Chiefs of Staff agreed that the British should undertake this commitment, but *GENERAL McNARNEY* pointed out in connection with the alternative conclusion suggested by Sir Alan Brooke that, since the Azores should be put to the earliest possible use, plans must be prepared to provide the necessary facilities in the Islands. He suggested therefore that the words "and use" should be inserted after the words "for the occupation" in the draft.

In discussing the draft memorandum to the President, it was generally agreed that the urgency of obtaining facilities in the Portuguese

Islands should be stressed and that it should be made clear that the Combined chiefs of Staff proposed that, while the diplomatic approach was being made, they should prepare forces for the prompt seizure of the of the Islands in the event of this approach failing.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF: -

- a. Agreed to amend the conclusion in paragraph b (1) of Item 4 of the Minutes of the 86th Meeting to read as follows:

"That the British Chiefs of Staff should bring before the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for the occupation and use of the Azores Islands. This plan, when approved, should be submitted to the President and Prime Minister with a covering note showing suggested timings and effect of the plan on other military commitments now in view."

- b. Approved the draft memorandum to the President and the Prime Minister, shown in C.C.S. 226/1, subject to the following changes:

(1) Insert the words "earliest possible" before the word "use" at the beginning of line 3.

- (2) Change the first sentence of the second paragraph to read:

"In submitting this recommendation the Combined Chiefs of Staff propose that while the diplomatic approach is being made, forces should be prepared for the prompt seizure and use of the Azores if diplomacy fails."

(Amended version, as prepared for the signature of Sir Alan Brooke and Admiral Leahy, subsequently published as C.C.S. 226/2.)

3. FUTURE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE

With regard to future discussions on the essentials to the conduct of the war, *SIR ALAN BROOKE* said that he believed the Committee should consider and first agree on European and Pacific strategy, and it would then be found that global strategy and agreed essentials could more easily

and quickly be set out.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he believed it was wise to agree on the essentials prior to considering theater strategies.

ADMIRAL KING said that he considered that it was necessary that the U. S. views on the existing points of difference with regard to the essentials should at least be stated as early as possible.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note that the United States Chiefs of Staff would wish to discuss C.C.S. 232/1 at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to be held on Wednesday, 19 May 1943.

4. POLICY FOR COMING OPERATIONS REGARDING PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

(C.C.S. 185/3)

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that this matter was one of urgency and should receive the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as early as possible. It might be necessary to consult the Foreign Office and State Department. The views of the theater commander must, he felt, be given full weight.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to consider C.C.S. 185/3 at their meeting to be held on the following day.

5. DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE

(C.C.S. 234)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a memorandum by the British Joint Planning Staff prepared after consultation with the U. S. Joint Planners.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff were in general agreement with the views set out in this paper.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in the short time he had had to examine

this paper he hesitated to bring out points of detail. The general impression he received was that in the early part of the paper it was pointed out that a cross-Channel operation in April 1944 would be impossible, not only on account of the shortage of landing craft, but also because the risks would be unacceptable. Later on, however, it appeared that if Mediterranean operations were undertaken in the interval, a target date for April 1944 should be agreed on for cross-Channel operations.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it was believed that April 1944 as a target date would not be possible of achievement unless Mediterranean operations were undertaken. These would influence the strength of the opposition and should create a situation permitting cross-Channel operations. Landing craft alone were not the bottleneck, and one of the difficulties was the provision of the necessary personnel to man them. The rate of build-up of German forces in western Europe would greatly exceed our own build-up on the Continent unless Mediterranean operations were first undertaken to divert or occupy German reinforcements. If these operations were undertaken, April 1944 might well be right for a target date, though the actual operation would be more likely to be possible of achievement in May or June. The knocking of Italy out of the war would be the greatest factor in using up Germany's reserves and enabling our own build-up to exceed the enemy's.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he appreciated that it was the British view that by continuing *SICKLE* and by undertaking Mediterranean operations, a situation would be created permitting of a reasonable chance of successful cross-Channel operations in the spring of 1944. The point on which he was extremely doubtful was whether if these Mediterranean operations were undertaken, sufficient forces would be available in the United Kingdom to exploit the situation which the Mediterranean operations might have created. It might well be that operations in the Mediterranean would of necessity exceed in magnitude those now visualized, and that therefore the forces available in the United Kingdom would be correspondingly diminished. Thus when the moment to strike across the Channel arrived, we should be unable to reap the benefits of the effect of Mediterranean operations and of the vast concentration of air forces, and our resources in the U. K. would permit of nothing more than an unopposed landing.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that the cost of Mediterranean operations on the build-up in the United Kingdom was estimated to be no more than from three and a half to four divisions, and this he believed was a cheap price to pay for the immense advantages and consequent diversion of German troops which knocking out Italy would insure. Italy might drop out of the war as a result of a successful *HUSKY*, but at any rate the elimination of Italy was, he believed, the best and only way of helping Russia this year. If we caused the Germans to disperse their forces and therefore to slow up their possible rate of build-up against cross-Channel operations, the loss of three and a half divisions would be more than counterbalanced. The Mediterranean operations visualized were not interdependent, and each or any of them could be undertaken separately as the situation developed. For instance, it might be desirable, though perhaps not essential, to go into western Greece with the object of rallying General Mihailovitch and the partisans. The cost value of each operation could be assessed at the appropriate time. Landings in Italy or in Sardinia were alternatives. If the situation on the Russian Front was bad and the Germans stronger in the Mediterranean, we might have to forego a direct attack on Italy and capture Sardinia and possibly Corsica instead. These latter would prove valuable air bases for increasing the air bombardment of Italy, as well as being stepping stones for an invasion of southern France. In any event, all calculations had been made on the basis of the *SICKLE* build-up remaining unaffected.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he would like further time to examine the figures given in the British paper. He feared that the cost had been assessed too low since the wish might have been the father to the thought. If the ends could be achieved as cheaply as was visualized in the British paper, then the plan was worthy of further consideration, but he feared that the momentum consequent on the launching of Mediterranean operations would be difficult to check.

Both *ADMIRAL LEAHY* and *GENERAL MARSHALL* said that they wished further time to consider the British paper before expressing definite opinions and to have available to them at the same time the United States paper with regard to cross-Channel operations.

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Deferred action on this paper pending further study by the United States Chiefs of Staff.

6. RE-ARMING OF THE FRENCH IN NORTH AFRICA

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that it was his personal opinion that in order to utilize the French forces to the maximum, they should be provided with equipment and instructed in its use as rapidly as possible. At present somewhat more than three divisions had been equipped, but the remainder of the existing 11 divisions were almost without modern equipment. Early action to supply these seemed wise in view of their potential value in the invasion of France.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed as to the importance of re-arming the French, but considered that it was a matter of timing and of the availability of shipping. French forces fighting in North Africa had shown themselves to be good soldiers. They would certainly prove useful in continental operations, but particularly as garrison troops in North Africa, Corsica and Sicily. It was important, however, not to use shipping to reequip the French at the expense of a build-up of Allied forces for important operations.

GENERAL MARSHALL reminded the Committee of the Presidential memorandum given to General Giraud, which the latter had in some ways misinterpreted. He asked General Smith to give his views on the reequipment of the French.

GENERAL SMITH said that Allied Force Headquarters had been guided by the ANFA decisions. 25,000 tons of shipping per month had been made available for reequipping the French forces and 35,000 tons a month for civilian supplies. A possible use for French troops was for the assault of Corsica, if this and an attack on Sardinia were undertaken simultaneously. For this operation there would be available two divisions, one of them trained in mountain warfare. No armored division would be fit for combat duty until September, and no other troops could be prepared for offensive fighting in 1943. Captured German and Italian equipment was being issued to accelerate the rate of reequipment and certain

of this was found to be of French manufacture. It was hoped that the lines of communications and the majority of the anti-aircraft defenses in North Africa could be manned by the French at an early date. French troops used in the recent fighting had not been issued new equipment from America, but had had their existing equipment made up by allotments from the British and United States forces. In general, the French had fought excellently.

General Giraud used the equipment shipped to train and equip those divisions which were not actively engaged in operations. General Eisenhower's policy was, in general, to equip as many French troops as possible for garrison and line of communication duties. French Divisions were being provided with equipment on a 50 to 60 percent basis for training. General Giraud, on the other hand, was naturally anxious to equip on an expeditionary force basis. He (General Smith) believed that in three to four months sufficient French Divisions would be available to undertake the defense of Morocco. Equipment was arriving at a rate sufficient to provide 50 percent of the equipment for one division every convoy. Though this rate did not satisfy General Giraud, it was the maximum which, at present, could be achieved. He believed that though the French must be equipped as rapidly as possible, it would be unwise to sacrifice any tonnage required for our own forces for the benefit of the French since it was unwise to count on an adequate return in combat value in the near future. 25,000 tons per month was the maximum which could be found from the shipping resources allocated to General Eisenhower. Unless the Combined Shipping and Adjustment Board could provide additional tonnage, General Giraud's requirements of 100,000 tons per month could not be met.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that in the event of the U. S. Divisions being moved to the U. K., their equipment would be turned over to the French.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that in general the correct policy was initially to equip the French forces for a static role to enable them to relieve Allied forces for offensive operations. At a later stage the French could be equipped as an expeditionary force.

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GENERAL SMITH pointed out that in general this was being done but that General Giraud was not anxious that all his troops should be assigned to defensive roles. Coast and A.A. defenses were being taken over by the French.

SIR JOHN DILL asked if the possibility had been considered of supplying captured material to the Turks, particularly that of French manufacture, since they already possessed ammunition of this type.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed that the rearming and reequipping of the French forces in North Africa should be proceeded with as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipment will allow, but as a secondary commitment to the requirements of British and U. S. forces in the various theaters.

*7. PLAN FOR COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM
(C.C.S.217)*

SIR CHARLES PORTAL suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should consider giving their approval to General Eaker's plan for the combined bomber offensive outlined in C.C.S. 217. He invited General McNarney to explain the main points of this plan.

GENERAL McNARNEY explained that a committee of Industrial and Engineering Experts with first-hand experience of Germany had thoroughly surveyed the German industrial organization with a view to selecting systems of targets which, if destroyed, would produce the maximum reduction of the German war potential. A plan based on this survey had then been worked out by General Eaker and had been shown to and agreed with by the Royal Air Force Staff in London. To implement the plan certain minimum forces were required. These were set out in paragraph 4 of C.C.S. 217. The most important feature of the plan was the reduction of the German fighter force which would be achieved not only by air fighting but by systematic precision bombing of air fields, aircraft manufacturing plants, and ball-bearing factories. Fifty percent of German ball-bearing manufacturing capacity was in two plants, one in Germany and one in Paris.

The plan was in four phases which were described in maps 1, 2, 3 and 4 and legends thereon, C.C.S. 217. The whole plan was based on 6 raids per month backed up by R.A.F. night bombing on the same objectives. The United States Planners had estimated that the necessary forces could be made available except for a minor deficiency in the first phase. One important point was, that, unless the plan was approved and put into immediate effect, the German fighter strength would expand. The Germans had switched over much of their productive capacity from bombers to fighters, and unless the German fighter potential was attacked at once, not only the task of the bombers in carrying out the plan would become more difficult but also German air strength would render all our operations against them more hazardous. The ground echelons required for this plan were estimated to amount to some 375,000 men by the first of April, 1944. He believed, however, that this figure might be exceeded and the total ground echelons for air forces in the U. K. might amount to some 400,000 to 425,000 men.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained that General Eaker's plan had been based on all the information available to the Air Ministry. He (General Eaker) had worked out the plan himself and had then put it to the Air Ministry for consideration. In spite of the most critical examination by all available experts, the Air Ministry was convinced that, if given the resources asked for, General Eaker would achieve the results he claimed. He (Sir Charles Portal) was one hundred percent in favor of the plan. The figure of 6 raids per month had been based on weather statistics collected over a period of years, but it was hoped that by the use of special equipment (H2S) which General Eaker proposed to fit to his leading bombers, attacks through overcast or cloud could be made on targets the size of a city. Raids undertaken under these conditions would be in addition to the 6 precision attacks per month in clear weather. He had no doubt that the result of a salvo of bombs falling from some one hundred unseen B-17's in daylight would be tremendous. General Eaker hoped to use these methods beginning in the autumn. It must be remembered that when bombing from above the clouds, reaction from German fighters was to be expected, with resulting fighter attrition. A somewhat similar device to the H2S was already in use for night bombing but,

since once discovered by the enemy it would have no further value to us, it was only employed in Mosquito aircraft used to lead in night attacks.

GENERAL McNARNEY suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should give their approval to the plan for the combined bomber offensive set out in C.C.S. 217 and agree to the provision of the necessary forces to implement it.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the plan for the combined bomber offensive from the United Kingdom which is set forth in C.C.S. 217.

8. *BOMBING OF PLOESTI*

Referring to the plan for the attack on the refineries at Ploesti by heavy bombers operating from North Africa or the Middle East, *GENERAL McNARNEY* stressed the importance of timing in particular reference to the German commitment on the Russian Front. An early and successful attack on the refineries would, he felt, be the greatest single contribution which could be made to assist the Russians this year. If we waited to capture bases nearer the objective, the delay would detract from the decisive value of the operation. The ranges from Ploesti of possible bases now available were:

Tobruk.....	857 miles
Aleppo.....	835 miles
Alexandria.....	963 miles
Cyprus.....	755 miles
Tripoli.....	1,080 miles

From all these bases Ploesti was within range of B-24 D's with a load of 6,000 pounds; B-24 C's with 3,000 pounds and B-17 F's. It was estimated that a total of 155 aircraft were required. More than sufficient were available in North Africa and the United Kingdom. An early decision to carry out the attack was necessary since not only was the weather best in June and early July, but also an attack at this time would interfere less with air preparations for *HUSKY* and possible subsequent operations. The exact defenses of Ploesti were not known but it was

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believed that only a few, if any, fighters were available and the main defense was provided by a balloon barrage, mainly to the south. If bombers operated from Tobruk, it was estimated that they could pass northward out of radar range of Crete and might thus achieve surprise without interference from fighters. If the attack took place at dusk they could return in darkness.

The method of attack would probably be low level bombing with delay action bombs. If command of these forces were given to General Doolittle, who was available and in whom he had great confidence, he, General McNarney, was convinced that success would be achieved. Losses might be heavy, but would be more than offset by results. If the raid could be carried out prior to *HUSKY*, this example of overwhelming Allied air power would have profound effects, both on the Russian Front and Italian morale.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he would be prepared to recommend the operation if he were certain that a large proportion of the attacking aircraft armed with 6,000 pound bombs would reach the objective before dusk, but he was doubtful if this could be achieved since the operation was essentially dependent on accurate weather forecasting.

GENERAL McNARNEY said that this point had been carefully considered and it was believed that in June or early July a forecast could be made of the weather at Ploesti and en route twenty-four hours ahead with 85 percent accuracy.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that if this accuracy of forecasting could be achieved, the operation should have good prospects of success. Its effect, however, on *HUSKY* and other operations must be borne in mind. He would like to ask the commanders in the theater for their views on the advisability of undertaking this operation in the light of the necessity for concentrating our air resources in support of operation *HUSKY*.

SIR ALAN BROOKE also stressed the disadvantage of the dispersal of air forces prior to operation *HUSKY* and the great results it was hoped to achieve by the concentration of our air power on Italy. If Italy could be knocked out, bases closer to the Ploesti objective could

be obtained, enabling us to undertake sustained bombing of the refineries.

GENERAL McNARNEY pointed out that the attainment of these bases in Italy might be delayed for some six or seven months, and by then the weather would be far less favorable.

THE COMMITTEE then discussed the availability of aircraft and the periods during which they would be diverted either from the United Kingdom or their tasks in the Mediterranean.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that if the operation succeeded, it would certainly have more effect than almost any other on softening up Germany for operations in 1944. There was, therefore, a case for careful examination of this project, even though it might reduce our air preparations prior to *HUSKY*.

GENERAL McNARNEY undertook immediately to arrange for the necessary special sights to be sent to North Africa together with personnel fully conversant with the plan who could discuss it with General Eisenhower, Air Marshal Tedder, and their staffs.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

- a. Agreed that the United States Army Air Forces should send representatives, without delay, to present to the Commander in Chief, North African Theater, the plan which they have prepared concerning the bombing of the Roumanian Oil Fields, and that the Commander in Chief of the North African Theater should be asked to submit appropriate comments and recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- b. Took note that special bomb sights and instructor personnel needed for such an operation would be sent to the North African Theater by the United States Army Air Forces as soon as practicable.

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9. OPERATION "UPKEEP"

ADMIRAL LEAHY, on behalf of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff offered Sir Charles Portal congratulations on the success of the R.A.F. force in this operation.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL, in thanking Admiral Leahy, said that the success attributed to the operation in the newspapers was borne out by aerial photographs.

10. MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

ADMIRAL LEAHY informed the Committee that the President and Prime Minister wished to meet the Combined Chiefs of Staff at 6 P.M. tomorrow, Wednesday, 19 May, for a short discussion on the schedule for the future work of the Conference. The Prime Minister and President also wished to meet the Combined Chiefs of Staff on Friday, 21 May, and for final meetings on Monday and Tuesday, the 24th and 25th.

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

C.C.S. 88th Meeting

TRIDENT

Minutes of Meeting held in
The Board of Governors Room,
Federal Reserve Building,
on Wednesday, 19 May 1943,
at 1030.

PRESENT

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN
General G. C. Marshall, USA
Admiral E. J. King, USN
Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney, USA

General Sir Alan Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles Portal

ALSO PRESENT

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA
Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, USN
Vice Admiral Russell Willson, USN
Maj. Gen. W. B. Smith, USA
Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett, USA
Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN
Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA
Col. J. E. Smart, USA
Comdr. W. L. Freseman, USN
Comdr. V. D. Long, USN

Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Admiral Sir Percy Noble
Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready
Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh
Maj. Gen. N. G. Holmes
Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN
Brigadier W. Porter
Air Commodore W. Elliot
Brigadier M. W. M. Macleod

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier H. Redman
Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA
Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, RN
Lt. Colonel R. L. Vittrup, USA

1. *CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING*

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that it might be preferable to eliminate the words "and in the light of the probable operation and employment of the French forces" in the conclusion to item 6 of the 87th Meeting.

THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF agreed with this view.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Approved the conclusions as shown in the Minutes of the 87th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held on Tuesday, 18 May 1943, subject to the deletion of the words "and in the light of the probable operation and employment of the French forces" at the end of the conclusion to item 6.

2. *AGREED ESSENTIALS IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR*

(C.C.S. 87th Mtg., Item 3)

ADMIRAL LEAHY stated that the United States Chiefs of Staff wished to defer consideration of C.C.S. 232/1.

3. *DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE*

(C.C.S. 234 and 235)

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked for the comments of the British Chiefs of Staff on the United States Planners' paper, C.C.S. 235.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it appeared from the two papers before the Committee that there were certain basic factors on which the U. S. and British Staffs were in agreement. On others there were differences of opinion which must be eliminated.

With regard to the target date for cross-Channel operations, April 1 had been selected for two reasons. This date coincided with the conclusion of the fourth phase of the bomber offensive, and it was the earliest practicable from the point of view of weather. He would like to suggest, however, that April 1 might be too early a date to select. At that time the Russian Front was likely to be static since it was the period of the thaw. The weather conditions in western Europe would not be as favorable on that date as later, say the end of May or early June.

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which would also coincide with the end of the thaw in Russia. If the first of May or the first of June was accepted as the target date, the build-up in the United Kingdom would also be further advanced.

Though in the United States paper the elimination of Italy was considered and accepted as a possibility, yet no appreciation was given as to the steps necessary to deal with this or to take advantage of it. We might be called upon by some political party other than the Fascists to enter Italy, or we might be confronted with complete collapse and a state of chaos. In either case we should be faced with a decision as to what action was necessary to take advantage of this situation, and the result such action would have on other operations. There were obvious advantages in going into Italy which could be used as a naval and an air base, but how far we should be drawn in was a matter for discussion. There were great advantages in obtaining the northern plains for use as an air base. German air defense was not organized on this sector, and its occupation would force the Germans to detach forces to protect the northern and western frontiers of Italy. We should also examine the possibility of limiting the extent of our occupation of Italy and examine the magnitude of the commitments and the action required to implement our plans.

The next point in the United States proposals was the period of inactivity on land for a period of some six to seven months after *HUSKY*. In paragraph 5 c it was pointed out that Germany intended to concentrate on the defeat of the Russian armed forces in 1943 and that Germany would either fail or succeed in Russia this summer. This year was the most critical time for Russia, and we must take all possible steps to assist her. It would, he felt, be most difficult to justify failure to use available forces for this purpose.

Without crippling *ROUNDUP* in 1944, we could, he believed, with the forces now available in the Mediterranean achieve important results and provide the greatest measure of assistance to Russia in this critical period and at the same time create a situation favorable for cross-Channel operations in 1944.

It was difficult from paragraph 17 of the paper to visualize the shape of operations to defeat Germany, but it appeared that it was proposed to capture ports to enable a direct build-up from the United

States. This concept, he believed, would present considerable difficulties since a study of this problem had shown that the sustenance of the forces used to cover these ports would absorb the larger part of their capacity. After the capture of a bridgehead, Cherbourg might be seized, but the provision of the necessary forces to cover this would be difficult unless the Germans were greatly weakened or unable to find reserves. For this reason active Russian operations were essential. If the Russians suffered defeats in 1943, the possibility of any landing was bad.

In conclusion, he felt that the first of May or the first of June was a better target date for *ROUNDUP* since this would be the period when the summer fighting in Russia would be starting. By maintaining pressure with limited forces in the Mediterranean, German troops estimated at some 20 to 30 divisions would, by the elimination of Italy, be dispersed and tied down.

He would like to add one minor point. The United States' build-up envisaged would, he believed, require at an early date additional S.O.S. troops, possibly even at the expense of *SICKLE*, to prepare the depots to receive them. This was necessary since the manpower situation in England was very serious.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he understood the British proposal to be for Mediterranean operations and a *magnified SLEDGEHAMMER*. He was interested to know what effect the British proposals had on the *ANAKIM* operation since he believed some form of operation to help China to be essential.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the British proposals for Mediterranean operations contemplated only a deduction of some 3-1/2 to 4 divisions from the forces available for *ROUNDUP*. Landing craft was a critical item, and the shortage would anyhow necessitate the assault going in on a relatively narrow front. In any event it was not proposed to move any forces from the Mediterranean for use in *ANAKIM* since all the troops required were already in India, but any operations in Burma would be hampered by a shortage of shipping, naval covering forces, and landing craft. If it was decided only to open the Ledo Road to China,

then, of course, naval operations could be dispensed with, but this operation would probably be at the expense of the capacity of the air route. Before discussing Burmese operations in detail, he felt it wise to await the report of the Combined Staff Planners.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he personally believed that the postponement of the target date for *ROUNDUP* to the first of May would be acceptable in view of its relation to Russian operations, and the extra time given for the build-up. He agreed also that the action required in the event of the collapse of Italy must be studied and preparations made to meet it.

He agreed with Sir Alan Brooke's view on the importance of helping Russia in 1943, but he believed that it would take some time to mount any operation subsequent to *HUSKY* which itself might not be completed until September. We should, therefore, be helping Russia up until the end of the period of the German campaign.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that he considered that operations in the Mediterranean, with a consequent diversion of German forces, were important throughout the entire year.

GENERAL MARSHALL, commenting further on the British plan, believed that the calculated build-up through the ports was pessimistic. Experience had shown that estimated port capacities were likely, in practice, to be doubled.

In general he believed that the British plan magnified the results to be obtained by Mediterranean operations and minimized the forces which would have to be used and the logistic requirements. It was too sanguine with regard to the results of enemy reaction, and in this connection it must be remembered that in North Africa a relatively small German force had produced a serious factor of delay to our operations. A German decision to support Italy might make intended operations extremely difficult and time consuming.

GENERAL MARSHALL, then turned to detailed comments of the British plan. Paragraph 2 *a* visualized it as essential for invasion that the

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initial assault must be on a sufficiently large scale to enable the rate of our build-up to compete with that of the enemy. In this connection a deteriorating German situation was visualized earlier in the paper. As he saw it, the first step was aimed, not at the immediate defeat of the German Army, but at the establishment of a bridgehead which would have results not only psychologically, but on the U-boat campaign, and would provide air fields, giving better bases for operations against the enemy which in turn would result in the destruction of a growing percentage of the enemy's air fighting capacity. These were immediate and important results, and these, rather than an immediate advance to the Rhine, should be our first objective. He did not believe that the British paper gave sufficient weight to the devastating effect of our air bombardments with the resulting diminution not only of Germany's power but of her ability rapidly to build up forces in western Europe. The effects of the bombing offensive were becoming more and more apparent daily.

Paragraph 7 of the British paper, while showing the limitations imposed on cross-Channel operations by lack of landing craft, did not sufficiently stress the expenditure of these craft in Mediterranean operations. The limitations of landing craft production in the United States must be remembered. In addition, the need for these craft for operation *ANAKIM* was not brought out.

In paragraph 27 it was suggested that Ploesti could not be attacked except from bases in Italy. This matter had, of course, been discussed at the previous meeting when it had been agreed that an attack could be carried out from bases already in our hands.

In paragraph 35 he believed that the Italian people's will to deal with the Allies was overestimated. If Germany decided to support her to the full, serious delay might be imposed on our plans, our resources would be sucked into the Mediterranean, and we should find ourselves completely involved in operations in that theater to the exclusion of all else.

With regard to the proposal in paragraph 38, that, during the period of confusion after the collapse of Italy, we should secure a

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bridgehead at Durazzo, he believed that such an operation would so commit us that through shipping and landing craft limitations no other important operations would be possible.

The summary of commitments contained in paragraph 42 might be an accurate estimate but it was axiomatic that every commander invariably asked for more troops than were originally estimated as being necessary. We should, he believed, if Mediterranean operations were undertaken, find ourselves overwhelmed with demands for resources over and above our original estimates.

He had read the British estimate on the shipping requirements to sustain Italian economy in the event of her collapse. He believed that these were too optimistic and that some 32 to 40 sailings a month would be required. It must be remembered that there was a large Italian element in the United States who were politically powerful and who would not permit the undue curtailment of supplies to Italy.

He believed that the shipping requirement for the *BOLERO* build-up was larger than had been estimated. Even if the personnel and cargo shipping required was available, the limitations of escorts would curtail the full *BOLERO* build-up if operations in the Mediterranean continued. If operations in any magnitude were undertaken in the Mediterranean after *HUSKY* there would, in all probability, be no landing craft available to be returned to the United Kingdom for cross-Channel operations.

In general, he considered that the British paper throughout was over-pessimistic with regard to the possibilities of cross-Channel operations, particularly in so far as the results of our vast air power and its relation to ground operations. On the other hand, in considering Mediterranean operations, the British paper was very optimistic with regard to the forces required, the Axis reaction and the logistic problem.

ADMIRAL KING, with reference to the suggestion that the target date for *ROUNDUP* should be postponed to the 1st May or 1st June, agreed that the weather would be better at a later date but considered that to achieve the maximum results in relation to the operations on the Eastern

Front, it should take place before the thaw finished. The target date was seldom met, but he believed that it would be wise to plan the target date for 1 May which would be reasonable in all the circumstances.

(At this point all officers with the exception of the Combined Chiefs of Staff themselves, left the meeting.)

After a full discussion the Secretaries were recalled.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

- a. Informed the Secretaries of the lines on which draft resolutions were to be drawn up.
- b. Instructed the Secretaries to prepare these draft resolutions for their consideration at a meeting to be held later that day.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
C.C.S. 89th Meeting

TRIDENT

Minutes of Meeting held in
The Board of Governors Room,
Federal Reserve Building,
on Wednesday, 19 May 1943,
at 1630.

PRESENT

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN	General Sir Alan Brooke
General G. C. Marshall, USA	Admiral of the Fleet
Admiral E. J. King, USN	Sir Dudley Pound
Lt. General J. T. McNarney, USA	Air Chief Marshal
	Sir Charles Portal
	Field Marshal Sir John Dill

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier H. Redman
Brig. General J. R. Deane, USA
Commander R. D. Coleridge, RN

1. DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE

(C.C.S. 237)

(Previous Reference: C.C.S. 88th Meeting, Item 3)

THE COMMITTEE considered the draft resolutions contained in C.C.S. 237 and agreed to certain amendments which are incorporated below.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Resolved:

- a. That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944:

Assault:	5	Infantry Divisions (Simultaneously loaded in landing craft)
	2	Infantry Divisions - Follow-up
	<u>2</u>	Air-borne Divisions
Total	9	Divisions in the Assault

Build-up	20	Divisions available for movement into lodgment area
Total	<u>29</u>	Divisions

- b. That the Allied Commander in Chief, North Africa, should be instructed to mount such operations in exploitation of HUSKY as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Each specific operation will be subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for his operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British Divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the

Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for *HUSKY* will not be considered available.

- c. The above resolution shall be reviewed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at a meeting in July or early in August, the date to be decided later, in order that the situation may be examined in the light of the result of *HUSKY* and the situation in Russia.

(These resolutions to be subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 237/1.)

(At this point the Secretaries entered the meeting.)

2. OPERATIONS FROM INDIA

In reply to a question by Sir Charles Portal, *ADMIRAL LEAHY* said that he understood the term *ANAKIM* to mean operations in Burma and not to cover other operations based on India against such places as Sumatra or the Malayan Peninsula. The Chinese believed that they had received a firm promise that the British and Americans would, towards the end of 1943, undertake operations in Burma aimed at opening a road to China. He personally now accepted that the original operations which included the capture of Rangoon were impracticable, but he believed nevertheless that an operation to open a land route to China must be undertaken. This might take the form of attacking in North Burma with a view to capturing Mandalay and opening a route through Ledo, at the same time seizing Akyab and Ramree Island.

In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, *SIR ALAN BROOKE* said that the Andaman Islands contained only one small air field and their capture, except as part of large scale operations, was not worth while.

3. PROVISION OF TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT FOR HUSKY

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that despite the additional aircraft promised there was still a deficiency of 80 transports for the new *HUSKY* plan. He had discussed the subject with General Smith who was most anxious that every possible step should be taken to provide them. If trained crews were the bottleneck the Royal Air Force could provide them. He suggested that this matter might be further discussed at a future meeting, say Friday, of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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GENERAL McNARNEY said that crews were not the limiting factor. The additional 80 aircraft required could only be provided at the expense of the South Pacific. He believed that if the air-borne troops visualized were essential to the success of the plan, these could all be dropped by using the same aircraft for two drops. He fully appreciated the timing of these drops would not be perfect, but was convinced that by this means all the air-borne troops required could be put across.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the theater commander must be and had been backed to the limit but in this case the limit had been reached and the aircraft required were not available.

GENERAL McNARNEY agreed.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
C.C.S. 90th Meeting
TRIDENT

Minutes of Meeting held in
The Board of Governors Room,
Federal Reserve Building,
on Thursday, 20 May 1943,
at 1030.

PRESENT

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN	General Sir Alan Brooke
General G. C. Marshall, USA	Admiral of the Fleet
Admiral E. J. King, USN	Sir Dudley Pound
Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney, USA	Air Chief Marshal
	Sir Charles Portal

ALSO PRESENT

Lt. Gen. J. W. Stilwell, USA	Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA	Field Marshal
Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, USN	Sir Archibald Wavell
Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett, USA	Admiral Sir James Somerville
Maj. General C. L. Chennault, USA	Air Chief Marshal
Maj. General M. S. Fairchild, USA	Sir Richard Peirse
Maj. Gen. W. B. Smith, USA	Admiral Sir Percy Noble
Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN	Lt. Gen. G. N. Maccready
Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA	Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh
Col. C. P. Cabell, USA	Maj. Gen. N. G. Holmes
Comdr. W. L. Freseman, USN	Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN
Comdr. V. D. Long, USN	Brigadier W. Porter
	Air Commodore W. Elliot
	Brigadier M. W. M. Macleod

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier H. Redman
Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA
Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, RN
Lt. Colonel R. L. Vittrup, USA

1. *CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETINGS*

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the conclusions as shown in the Minutes of the 88th and 89th Meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held on Wednesday, 19 May.

2. *POLICY FOR COMING OPERATIONS REGARDING PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES*

(C.C.S. 185/3)

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that at the meeting at the White House on the previous day, the President and Prime Minister had signified their disagreement with certain points in General Eisenhower's proposals put forward in NAF 221.

The U. S. Chiefs of Staff recommended therefore that General Eisenhower should be informed that his proposals were not approved and that he should continue to base his propaganda policy on the previous directive.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that this matter had been referred to the Foreign Office and he would like to await their reply before giving any instructions to General Eisenhower. Until such instructions were issued General Eisenhower would, of course, continue to act on his previous directive.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to defer action on C.C.S. 185/3 pending the receipt of the views of the Foreign Office.

3. *STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN*

(C.C.S. 220)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had examined this plan with great interest. The plan was, however, not in any great detail. The ways and means of achieving the various courses outlined had not been examined nor their possibilities assessed. He suggested that machinery should be set up at once to examine the proposals and to draw up a more detailed plan.

ADMIRAL LEAHY explained that C.C.S. 220 was not intended to be a detailed plan. He suggested that it might be accepted as a basis for study and elaboration.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that it was very important to examine carefully this great field of operations. He believed that a full appreciation should be prepared. The facts should be assembled, the objects set out, together with alternative courses of action to achieve these objects with full facts and arguments for and against each course. Only by starting from first principles could we decide on the most advantageous plan.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he was in entire agreement with Sir Charles Portal's views.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

- a. Accepted C.C.S. 220 as a basis for a combined study and elaboration for future plans.
- b. Directed the Combined Staff Planners to initiate a study and prepare for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff an appreciation leading up to an outline plan for the defeat of Japan including an estimate of the forces required for its implementation.

*4. OPERATIONS IN BURMA TO OPEN AND SECURE AN OVERLAND ROUTE TO CHINA
(C.C.S. 231)*

SIR ALAN BROOKE said the British Chiefs of Staff believed there was great danger in extensive operations from Ledo and Imphal, which would be dependent on two very precarious roads, whereas the Japanese forces would be supplied by road, rail and river, and would be operating out of a relatively dry area. The maintenance of our forces at the ends of their lines of communication would be particularly difficult during the monsoon season. Even if a road to China were opened, he believed that the Japanese could bring stronger forces to bear than we could maintain to defend it. With regard to operations on the coast, he believed that the capture of Akyab and Ramree was feasible but we had not the resources or the necessary landing craft to undertake the

two more southerly amphibious assaults. The danger, as he saw it, was that by aiming both to build up the air route to the maximum capacity and to undertake a land offensive, we should do neither very efficiently. The undertaking of land operations would limit the amount of supplies which could be taken up to the air bases. He believed that the right course was to expand the air route to the maximum in order to increase the strength of the air forces operating in China and to provide limited maintenance of the Chinese ground forces. Dr. T. V. Soong, in his memorandum, had emphasized the necessity for maintaining General Chennault's force at the highest possible level. Sir Alan Brooke believed that operations aimed at the capture of Mandalay were not possible of achievement and that instead we should concentrate on building up the air route and at the same time undertake limited operations from Ledo and Imphal in order to protect it, and capture Akyab and Ramree.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said he had only had a short time to examine the paper under discussion and was therefore not in a position to comment in detail. In general, however, he believed the possibilities outlined in the paper to be far too optimistic. He reminded the Committee of the administrative difficulties in connection with operations in Burma. The lines of communication were bad, heavy casualties had to be expected from malaria, trained lorry drivers were scarce, and, in general, the administrative difficulties invariably exceeded paper calculations of their magnitude. A margin of some 50 to 100 per cent had to be allowed on this account.

There were obviously great advantages to be derived from the capture of Mandalay and the control of Upper Burma to the northward of it. A land route would be open to China with consequent effect on Chinese morale, though it would be but an indifferent route and would carry but little for a long time. He was quite certain that even if Mandalay could be captured, it would be impossible, certainly during the monsoon season, to maintain there forces large enough to withstand the scale of attack which the Japanese, with their better lines of communication, could bring against them.

In planning, his personal tendency had always been to be optimistic, but after 18 months' experience in the area, he felt it only right to warn the Committee that he believed it unlikely to be feasible to maintain forces as far south as Mandalay. In his opinion, the correct and possible courses of action were: Firstly, to make every effort to increase the air ferry route to its maximum capacity and to build up our own air superiority over Burma. These two objects should be our first charge. Then if the required resources, engineering facilities, boats and vehicles were made available, it should be possible to make attacks by land into Upper Burma from Yunnan on Lashio, from Ledo on Myitkyina and Bhamo, and from Imphal into the Chindwin Valley whence touch would be gained to the eastward with the Chinese moving in from Yunnan. These three advances must keep step, and our first objective should be a line from a point where the Burma Road crossed the Burma-Chinese border, through Bhamo, Katha, Pinlebo, Kalewa, and thence to the west. To gain a line of that kind might well be possible, and it would give sufficient cover to the Myitkyina air fields and the route to Burma. If on achieving this line the Japanese were weakened, we should then consider the possibility of going further south, but any idea, at this stage, that the capture of and subsequent maintenance of our forces in Mandalay was possible was likely to be falsified. We must decide our future operations in the light of events.

With regard to coastal operations, he believed we should most certainly try to capture Ramree and Akyab, though this was a difficult proposition since it was now heavily defended. It was not, in his view, worthwhile to endeavor to capture Sandoway and Taungup since they would be difficult to maintain during the monsoon owing to sea conditions and would be cut off from the rest of Burma by the Arakan range. The paper suggested the use of the long-range penetration brigade on An and Mimbua. He would examine this, but he believed that a better use for this unit would be in Upper Burma to maintain contact between the Chinese and the British. The possibility of an attack on Rangoon through Bassein had been examined by his Planning Staff, but they had reported adversely on its practicability, since it entailed a long and difficult advance through thick jungle country interspersed with creeks.

Another possibility was to proceed up the railroad from Bassein to Henzada, using trucks on the railway, but from that point there were 40 miles of difficult jungle before the good road north of Rangoon was met. It had been judged that a direct assault on Rangoon up the river was less hazardous and more likely to succeed than either of these two plans.

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL PEIRSE said that he wished to emphasize that wherever operations in Burma were undertaken air superiority was essential, both to defend the air route and to assist in land operations. Additional air fields for the fighting air force would therefore be required. If land operations were undertaken stronger air forces would be required including transport aircraft to maintain ground forces, particularly during the monsoon season. This necessity would probably cause a diversion of transports from the air ferry route.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that as he understood it, the British proposals consisted of a maximum concentration on the air route and limited ground operations, including the capture of Ramree and Akyab.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he was impressed both with General Wavell's comments on the magnitude of the logistic problem and Air Marshal Peirse's on the air diversion resulting from land operations. In his view, however, a great increase in the air route alone without offensive ground operations would produce a strong Japanese reaction. He believed ground operations to be essential for their effect both on Chinese morale and on operations in the South and Southwest Pacific. If no aggressive action were undertaken in Burma the results on Pacific operations would be most unfortunate. Similarly, if no aggressive action were taken in the Pacific it would have a serious effect on the Burmese operations.

Operations in New Guinea and Guadalcanal under somewhat similar conditions, with disease, monsoon and logistic difficulties had been successfully accomplished. Bombers had been used for supplies when transports had not been available.

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He believed that lack of real aggressive action in Burma would be unfortunate for the South and Southwest Pacific and fatal to China. He did not believe that we should bank all on the attractive proposition of *do everything by air*. He realized that full-scale ground operations might limit supplies to China by air, but the Japanese must be threatened on the ground and this could only be achieved by hard fighting. Results on other theaters must be considered. Adequate shipping must be provided to build up the necessary resources. He was in no doubt as to the difficulties of the operations but equally he was in no doubt as to their vital importance.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he believed that without aggressive action by ground forces we should lose the air route. How far it was possible to go was a matter of some doubt but he believed that we should direct our attack on Mandalay in order to occupy the Japanese to the full, to save the air route and to insure Japanese withdrawals from other theaters. It must always be remembered that Japanese communications were open to sea and air attack. The two Governments were, he believed, decided that operations in North Burma must be undertaken.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the main difference of opinion appeared to be as to whether or not limited land operations could succeed in insuring the safety of the air route. He believed that the maximum effect against the Japanese could be achieved by air superiority and the build-up of the air route into China, thus freeing our lines of communications and our air forces from the need to support and feed troops engaged in extensive ground operations. He firmly believed that we should put all our resources into the air and that the problem as a whole must be regarded as a military one, the object of which was to achieve the maximum effect on the Japanese.

GENERAL McNARNEY said that he had always been surprised that the Japanese had not made more effort to cut the air supply route, particularly Myitkyina where it was very exposed to fighter attack. He believed that they would do this as soon as the air effort being built up in China was sufficient to cause them serious worry. To prevent the air line being cut, it was necessary to advance our fighter bases as far as

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Myitkyina and the air warning line still further. Unless Mandalay and Lashio were captured, we should not have sufficiently far advanced bases for the air warning system to cover the fighters at Myitkyina. He did not believe that the necessity for supplying ground forces by air would necessarily limit the supplies taken into China. There were some 90 C-47's in India used for this purpose, and this number could possibly be increased. Further, heavy bombers could be used for this purpose.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL pointed out that he was concerned not only with the problem of maintaining the supplies to our forces as far south as Mandalay, but also with the fact that the Japanese could bring and maintain stronger forces to bear at that point.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL, with regard to the vulnerability of the air route to China, said that he believed if adequate airdromes were available in Assam, the Japanese fighters could be bombed out of their bases.

GENERAL CHENNAULT said that he believed it to be practicable to defend the two terminals of the air route with the air forces now available, since these could prevent the Japanese from concentrating and maintaining heavy air forces within range of these terminals. The major attack which had occurred at the Chinese end was against Kunming on the 8th of May, when 40 fighters and 36 bombers had attacked. Out of these, 13 fighters and 2 bombers had been shot down, with 10 further probables. No confirmed attacks on transports had been made. Occasional fighter patrols were flown from both ends, with an overlap at the center. The Japanese could, in any event, only maintain sporadic attacks on the route, and the forces available to the 10th and 14th Air Forces could reach all the Japanese airdromes within range of the route. If attacks developed, the route could be moved some 60 miles further north in the area of Myitkyina, which, though over higher mountains, would only increase the distance by 15 miles.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that General Chennault had expressed his own views exactly.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he was in entire agreement that some sort of aggressive action was required and the forces available used, but, if

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operations were carried beyond a certain point, we should face a possible defeat with its consequent bad effects both on China and in the Pacific. An advance far to the south would put us at a severe logistic disadvantage with regard to the Japanese. In Assam we were relatively safe since the Japanese would have to operate over bad lines of communication to reach our own forces.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the Japanese now possessed an air barrier from Bougainville to Burma, along which they could rapidly effect concentrations in any area. The Japanese had not yet concentrated at the Burma end, but he believed that when powerful bombing from China was undertaken, the Japanese reaction against the air route would be strong, unless the Japanese air forces were tied down by active operations elsewhere.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said the Japanese must be prevented from attacking the air line to China. The maintenance of China was essential to successful operations against Japan, and therefore we must conduct operations toward Mandalay.

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that General Wavell's calculated requirements were some 180,000 tons per month. A large part of this, however, had no relation to the operations envisaged. There were 33 divisions in India, with a further 10½ overseas, but only 12 engaged in the operation. He believed there was no real justification for a tonnage greater than 90,000 per month for *ANAKIM*. 27,000 tons a month of the requirement was for civilian supplies.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL and *SIR ALAN BROOKE* pointed out that India must be maintained and this could not be divorced from the operational requirement. India's requirements had already been cut in order to make good the British import program. If the so-called civilian requirements were not met, India's output of munitions could not be maintained.

With the aid of a map, *GENERAL SOMERVELL* then outlined the amounts which he believed could be supplied over the various routes.

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GENERAL SOMERVELL said that he believed that the industrial capacity of India could be maintained without the figure of 180,000 tons per month being met. Many of the requirements would not bear examination in detail and some could be cut in half. For instance, the Indian requirement of 4,000 amphibious or special vehicles appeared excessive. It was greater than the number available to the entire United States Army.

He believed that the river route to Ledo had not been expanded to its maximum capacity. He outlined his views on the logistic possibilities of the routes to Mandalay and Lashio. The Japanese had only some four or five divisions in Burma and he saw no reason why stronger forces could not be maintained on the Mandalay line against them.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he could not agree with this estimate. The Japanese had excellent lines of communication available to them. It was not wise to decide on operations which were not feasible. These operations had to be carried out by the British. He believed that the maximum possible land operations should be undertaken but it must be appreciated that these would encroach upon the air route tonnage. An advance to a line through Bhamo and Kalewa was as far as the Commander in Chief considered possible.

In reply to a question, *GENERAL STILWELL* said that if they moved at all, he believed that the Chinese forces could get as far as Mandalay. He could see no object in stopping operations on the edge of the good road network. If the British forces could be supplied at Katha and Kalewa, the two rivers would permit their supply at Mandalay. The Chinese had been promised a major effort in Burma. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would probably make any action by his forces conditional on the recapture of the whole of Burma.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that the Chiefs of Staff should project the campaign towards the seizure of Mandalay, and proceed as far as possible with this object in view. The Japanese might stop us, but he believed it to be a wasted effort to limit the objective to Kalewa.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that he was prepared to go as far as he could while maintaining a force equal to the Japanese. If the Japanese proved weaker than was expected, or, if he found he could maintain a stronger force than he believed, he was naturally prepared to advance further, but he believed it useless to accept a liability until he was certain he could carry it out. Any operations he undertook were dependent on the action taken by the Chinese forces since, if they did not advance, his eastern flank would be exposed. The Chinese and British must keep in step.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Agreed to postpone further discussion on this matter until a later meeting to be held in closed session at 3:30 p.m. the same day.

5. *POTENTIALITIES OF THE AIR ROUTE FROM ASSAM TO BURMA*
(C.C.S. 229)

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that all reference to the expansion of the air route to more than 10,000 tons should be deleted from the paper. The possibilities of any increase above 10,000 tons was problematical.

In reply to a question by Sir Charles Portal as regards the limiting factor to the expansion of the air route, *GENERAL McNARNEY* said that the Planners' estimate had been based solely on the availability of aircraft from factories and not in relation to other demands for them. It would be dangerous to put forward a figure of 20,000 tons based on the premise that no other commitments existed for these aircraft. Further, an examination had shown that to increase the air route to 20,000 tons would mean getting some 50,000 tons per month into Assam which would require a large number of additional transports. The total requirements were higher than could be met by the end of December.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that although there might be a limit to the aircraft, he considered it wise for the terminals to be developed on the basis of a load of 20,000 tons/month. The development of the air route terminals would take far longer than the provision of additional transport aircraft. It might be possible for the British to provide certain of these.

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ADMIRAL KING said that it appeared to be the suggestion that the Generalissimo should be offered 20,000 tons a month by air as an alternative to the opening of the Burma Road. His fear was that the increased bomber effort from China; resulting from the increased capacity of the air route, would force the Japanese to take strong action and the terminal points would be attacked. Even if the bases in Assam were secure those in Kunming were open to attack. The retention of China as a base for the defeat of Japan was as essential as the continuance of Russia in the war as a factor in the defeat of Germany.

GENERAL McNARNEY said that he saw no objection to expanding the facilities for the air route to 20,000 tons. The present limiting factor was hard standings rather than air fields.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL agreed that the date for the achievement of 20,000 tons might be optimistic, but believed that it should be laid down as the ultimate objective.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the President had laid down, and the Prime Minister concurred in, a figure of 10,000 tons a month for the air route being achieved by November. Anything we could do above this figure would provide a cushion which could be used for the support of ground operations against Mandalay. Though the opening of the Burma Road was a symbol to China, it might be possible to convince them that an air route would achieve the same results.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to consider C.C.S. 229 further at 3:30 p.m. that afternoon in closed session.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
C.C.S. 91st Meeting
TRIDENT

Minutes of the Meeting held in
The Board of Governors Room,
Federal Reserve Building,
on Thursday, 20 May 1943,
at 1530.

PRESENT

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN	General Sir Alan Brooke
General G. C. Marshall, USA	Admiral of the Fleet
Admiral E. J. King, USN	Sir Dudley Pound
Lt. General J. T. McNarney, USA	Air Chief Marshal
	Sir Charles Portal

ALSO PRESENT

Field Marshal
Sir John Dill

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier H. Redman
Brig. General J. R. Deane, USA

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF met in closed session and resolved on:

a. The concentration of available resources as first priority within the Assam-Burma Theater on the building up and increasing of the air route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early fall, and the development of air facilities in Assam with a view to -

(1) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in Burma;

(2) Maintaining increased American Air Forces in China;

(3) Maintaining the flow of air-borne supplies to China.

b. Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma Road.

c. The capture of Akyab and of Ramree Island by amphibious operations.

d. The interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF also directed that C.C.S. 229, C.C.S. 231, and C.C.S. 238 be withdrawn from the agenda.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
C.C.S. 92nd Meeting

TRIDENT

Minutes of Meeting held in
The Board of Governors Room,
Federal Reserve Building,
on Friday, 21 May 1943,
at 1030.

PRESENT

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN
General G. C. Marshall, USA
Admiral E. J. King, USN
Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney, USA

General Sir Alan Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles Portal

ALSO PRESENT

Commander V. D. Long, USN

Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay
(For Items 4 and 5)
Admiral Sir Percy Noble
(For Items 4 and 5)
Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready
(For Items 4 and 5)
Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh
(For Items 4 and 5)
Field Marshal Sir Archibald
Wavell
(For Item 4)
Admiral Sir James Somerville
(For Item 4)
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Richard Feirse
(For Item 4)
Capt. C. E. Iambe, RN
(For Item 4)
Brigadier W. Porter
(For Item 4)
Air Commodore W. Elliot
(For Item 4)

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier H. Redman
Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA
Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, RN
Lt. Colonel R. L. Vittrup, USA

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE MINUTES OF THE 90TH AND 91ST MEETINGS

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

- a. Approved the conclusions of the Minutes of the 90th Meeting subject to substituting the words "an outline plan" for the words "a plan" in paragraph b, Item 3.*
- b. Approved the conclusions of the 91st Meeting.*

2. SELECTION OF CODE NAMES

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

- a. Agreed that for purposes of the Trident Conference only, the word *ROUNDHAMMER* should be used to designate cross-Channel operations.*
- b. Directed the Secretaries to obtain recommendations from appropriate military security agencies in the U.S. and U.K. regarding code names for all operations agreed upon in the Trident Conferences.*

3. MILITARY SUPPLIES FOR TURKEY

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that at the *ANFA* Conference (C.C.S. 63rd Meeting), it was agreed that Turkey lay within a theater of British responsibility and that all matters connected with Turkey should be handled by the British. It was also agreed that the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to both Assignments Boards all bids for equipment for Turkey. He pointed out that no decision has been recorded by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to the priority to be accorded to the supply of equipment for Turkey as compared with other commitments and no instructions have yet been issued by the American Chiefs of Staff to their representatives on the various Assignments Committees in Washington as to the attitude to be adopted towards British bids for equipment on behalf of Turkey. As a result, there had been some inclination to treat Turkish requirements as unimportant.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that in C.C.S. 206, dated 30 April, the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff informed the American

Chiefs of Staff of the British view with regard to the provision of equipment for Turkey, and enclosed a list of the proposed supplies. This list has recently been somewhat increased.

GENERAL MARSHALL questioned what was included in the words "important commitments" in the conclusion proposed by the British. He said the proposal was acceptable to him with the understanding that requirements for training of U.S. forces and the rearmament of French forces were considered as "important commitments."

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

- a. Took note of the action already taken or proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff with regard to the provision of military supplies for Turkey.
- b. Agreed that, with due regard to other important commitments, the assignment of the equipment as proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff should be made with the least possible delay.

(At this point the following entered the meeting:

Field Marshal Dill	Admiral Somerville
General Ismay	Air Chief Marshal Peirse
Admiral Noble	Captain Lambe
General Macready	Brigadier Porter
Air Marshal Welsh	Air Commodore Elliot
Field Marshal Wavell	Commander Long)

4. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST IN 1943-44

ADMIRAL KING first related C.C.S. 239 to C.C.S. 168 and C.C.S. 155/1, and then gave a statement of the proposed strategy in the Pacific.

ADMIRAL KING stated that the remarks he would make would give a general outline of the situation in the Pacific and the scope of the operations visualized in the paper which had been submitted for consideration (C.C.S. 239).

During the past 30 or 40 years, since acquisition of the Philippines, the United States had been studying the possible courses of action which might have to be undertaken in the Pacific. A great number of studies prepared at the Naval War College had been premised on the necessity for supporting or recovering the Philippines. Briefly, there were three routes, one straight through from the Hawaiian Islands, the others detouring to the north or south of that line. The increase in the capabilities of aircraft had necessitated a revision of some of the previous plans. In any case, decisive action against the Japanese Fleet and the seizure of the Marianas Islands were of primary importance.

On December 30, 1941, when he took office as Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet, there were numerous plans in existence for operations in the Pacific. He had, however, immediately sent a dispatch to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet stating that his mission was first to hold the Hawaiian-Midway line and the communications with the Pacific Coast, and, secondly, to hold the remainder of the line of communications to Australia and New Zealand. Prior to the fall of the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies, plans for the employment of naval forces presumed fueling in that area; however, with their loss, it was essential to establish safe bases elsewhere. One of the most urgent uses of naval forces during the early stages of the war in the Pacific had been in the support of the lines of communication from Hawaii to Australia. The U.S. Navy had, therefore, established refueling points in Bora Bora, in the Fijis and in New Caledonia. Ground forces had been sent for the protection of these bases. Operations during the recent months had rendered these lines of communication to Australia relatively safe, except in the case of Samoa, which was still exposed to some possibility of attack.

All operations in the Pacific should be directed toward severing the Japanese lines of communication and the recapture of the Philippines. The Philippines could be captured by a flank action, whereas the capture of the Netherlands East Indies must of necessity be the result of a frontal attack. The intermediate objectives should be

Rabaul, Truk and thence to the Marianas. Regardless of which route might be taken, the Marianas are the key to the situation because of their location on the Japanese lines of communication.

In referring to the situation in the Aleutians, he stated that the United States had bided its time in undertaking the operation against Attu. He considered that there was little danger to Alaska or the western part of the North American continent unless the Japanese should succeed in reaching Kodiak Island. This probability, in his opinion, was remote. An effort on our part to reach Japan by way of the northern route and the Kurile Islands would be beset with difficulties because of the rugged nature of the latter. According to reports received from our submarines, the Japanese were now actively engaged in fortifying the Kurile Islands.

The ultimate defeat of Japan would be accomplished by blockade, bombing, and assault. Of these measures, attacks on warships and shipping along enemy lines of communication were inherent in all offensive operations. It has been our purpose to work toward positions of readiness from which Japan can be attacked. Allied offensive measures comprise continued and intensified attacks on enemy ships and shipping, in cutting or threatening to cut enemy lines of communication between Japan and Japanese holdings and in attack on enemy sea, air, and ground forces, thereby obliging them to fight to retain their holdings and to retain their lines of communication. The scope and intensity of the Allied war effort in the Pacific must insure that the means at hand are actively employed to the best advantage.

The general capabilities of the Allied effort comprise:

- a. Keep Japan from further expansion and from consolidating and exploiting her current holdings.
- b. Maintain the vital Midway-Hawaii line (key to the Pacific).
- c. Secure the lines of communication to Australia and New Zealand.

d. Block the enemy approaches to Australia from the northward by way of Rabaul and from the northwestward by way of the Malay barrier.

e. Attain positions which menace enemy lines of communication with the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, and the South China Sea.

f. Open the line of communications with China by way of Burma.

g. Make ready to support Russia in case of war with Japan.

h. Continue to intensify attrition of enemy strength by land, air, and sea (including submarine) action.

In referring to Japan's potentialities for offensive action, he listed as possibilities:

a. The Maritime Provinces, Eastern Siberia-Russia.

b. Alaska by way of the Aleutians.

c. Midway-Hawaii line (key to the Pacific).

d. The Hawaii-Samoa-Fiji-New Caledonia line which covers the line of communication to Australia and New Zealand.

e. Australia and New Zealand -- by way of the Bismarck Archipelago and/or the Solomons.

f. Australia by way of Malay barrier.

g. India -- by way of Burma.

h. China.

He summed up his comments on Japan's potentialities and their probable courses of action with the general statements:

a. That there was an impending threat to the Maritime Provinces; why action had not been precipitated only the Japanese could answer.

b. That the developing situation may dictate that the Japanese undertake completion of the conquest of China.

c. That it was unlikely that the Japanese would undertake major operations against Alaska.

d. That, since the decrease in the scale of activity in the Solomon area, Japan had not given any definite indication of where she would strike next. Her reserve potentialities were certainly great enough to permit offensive action. It was, therefore, necessary that the United Nations be alert to anticipate the direction of this attack.

He stated that it was necessary to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan, particularly by intensifying action to cut her lines of communication and to attain positions of readiness from which a full-scale offensive could be launched as soon as the full resources of the United Nations could be made available. The yardstick which must be used in measuring any operation undertaken in the Pacific was:

a. Would it further threaten or cut Japanese lines of communication;

b. Would it contribute to the attainment of positions of readiness from which a full-scale offensive could be launched against Japan.

It was with these objects in mind that the conclusions reached in C.C.S. 239 have been set out; namely, offensive operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943-44 have the following objectives:

a. Conduct of air operations in and from China.

b. Operations in Burma to augment supplies to China.

c. Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.

d. Seizure of the Marshalls and Caroline Islands.

e. Seizure of the Solomons-Bismarck Archipelago and Japanese held New Guinea.

To these should be added: "Intensification of operations against Japanese lines of communication."

ADMIRAL KING, in response to several questions, explained briefly the methods used by the Japanese in employing their submarines and the results which had been attained by the United States submarines operating against Japanese shipping.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved C.C.S. 239 subject to the following amendments:

Deletion of the word "retain" on pages 1 and 2;

Deletion of subparagraph 2 b (6) on page 2 and substitution for it of:

"(6) Intensification of Operations against Enemy Lines of Communication

"All the foregoing operations are essential to the attainment of positions which enable the intensification and expansion of attacks on the enemy lines of communication in the Pacific."

Addition of subparagraph 3 a (6) as follows:

"(6) Intensification of Operations against Enemy Lines of Communication."

(At this point the following withdrew from the meeting:

Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell	Captain C. E. Lambe, RN
Admiral Sir James Somerville	Brigadier W. Porter
Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse	Air Commodore W. Elliot)

5. REPORT TO PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Directed the Secretaries to prepare a report to the President and Prime Minister on the results of the Conference thus far.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
C.C.S. 93rd Meeting

TRIDENT

Minutes of Meeting held in
The Board of Governors Room,
Federal Reserve Building,
on Saturday, 22 May 1943,
at 1030.

PRESENT

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN
General G. C. Marshall, USA
Admiral E. J. King, USN
Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney, USA

General Sir Alan Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles Portal

ALSO PRESENT

Lt. Gen. S. D. Embick, USA
Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA
Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, USN
Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN
Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett, USA
Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA
Col. C. P. Cabell, USA
Comdr. W. L. Freseman, USN
Comdr. V. D. Long, USN
Major F. S. Wildman, USA

Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Admiral Sir Percy Noble
Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready
Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay
Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN
Brigadier W. Porter
Air Commodore W. Elliot
Brigadier M. W. M. Macleod

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier H. Redman
Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA
Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, RN
Lt. Colonel R. L. Vittrup, USA

1. *CONCLUSIONS OF THE MINUTES OF THE 92ND MEETING*

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the conclusions as shown in the Minutes of the 92nd Meeting held on Friday, 21 May.

2. *ANTI-U-BOAT WARFARE*

(C.C.S. 241 and 241/1)

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, after examining the British paper (C.C.S. 241), were contained in C.C.S. 241/1.

ADMIRAL POUND, in discussing the British proposals, emphasized the importance of the support groups and of their flexibility. He believed that the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board, since they were continually examining the situation, were in the best position to advise on the transfer of the support groups north or south of 40° North. They could, of course, only make recommendations and the final decisions for such transfers would rest with Admiral King and himself.

ADMIRAL KING said that he accepted the importance of the principle of flexibility, but he did not believe the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board should be charged with the responsibility for recommending transfer of support groups, nor that the Admiralty and Navy Department should await such recommendations before taking action.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he believed that the Admiralty and Navy Department, rather than the Survey Board, were in the best position to review the situation and decide on the necessary allocation of means. He considered the duties of the Survey Board were to study and make recommendations with regard to facilities and methods of attack.

ADMIRAL POUND said that it had been suggested that unified control over the whole of the North Atlantic should be instituted by the appointment of a supreme commander. This was, however, in his view, impracticable since no one commander could have sufficiently detailed knowledge of all the areas concerned. The Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board, on the other hand, since it could continually travel and thus

cover the whole area, should have an intimate knowledge of conditions throughout, and would be in a better position to assess the requirements of all areas and recommend the transfer of forces. He believed this to be an important part of their functions, but, of course, their recommendations would not tie either Admiral King or himself, with whom the final decision would rest. While the Admiralty and Admiral King's headquarters each had an intimate knowledge of the requirements and conditions on their own side of the Atlantic, neither was in a position to assess completely the situation on the other's side. The whole picture, however, was available to the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board

ADMIRAL KING said that he could not agree with Admiral Pound's views. The Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board had done, and would continue to do, most useful work but they were in no better position than the First Sea Lord and himself to assess the transfer of forces. He was apprehensive that, if the responsibility for recommending transfers was placed on the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board, the Admiralty and Navy Department would feel tied down by their recommendations, and no action to transfer would be taken without such recommendations. The function of the Board was to survey conditions and not to exercise the function of command as regards the allocation of forces. The Survey Board was not an executive agency. As he saw it, the British proposal tended to delegate executive responsibility to the Board.

ADMIRAL POUND said that this was not the intention. It would not be necessary for the executive authorities to await recommendations from the Board before taking action to transfer forces.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out with regard to V.L.R. aircraft that the arguments put forward in the British paper were misleading since the 26,000 hours flown in the Gulf and Eastern Sea Frontiers in February were largely done by short-range aircraft and those of the civilian air patrols. Only 4,500 hours had been flown by L.R. and V.L.R. aircraft. Further, he was in general opposed to a mixed command which was envisaged in the British paper.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he appreciated that only 4,500 of the 26,000 hours flown in the Gulf and Eastern Sea Frontiers in February had been flown by V.L.R. or L.R. aircraft. Even on the figure of 4,500 there was, however, still a case for the transfer of aircraft from this area to the Bay. He would be interested to know in which areas it was proposed to relieve British aircraft in order that these could then operate in the Bay. He appreciated the advantages derived from the maintenance of homogeneous forces, but a firm decision to insist on this would be disappointing since it would cut across the principle of flexibility. A committee was now drawing up a simple standard procedure for the operation of A/S aircraft which should increase the efficiency of mixed forces and thus improve flexibility. There were disadvantages in mixed commands but he did not feel that too much importance should be attached to these.

ADMIRAL KING said that he agreed that homogeneous forces were not essential, but mixed forces, in his opinion, should be avoided as much as possible.

ADMIRAL POUND explained that after a review of the advantages of an increased air effort over the Bay of Biscay, all possible British aircraft had been transferred to this duty. Squadrons had been removed from the East Coast and the North of Scotland. No further aircraft could be provided except at the expense of Bomber Command, a diversion from which, he believed, was not justifiable.

ADMIRAL KING said that it was essential to maintain a certain irreducible minimum of A/S air forces on the East Coast of America, even though their proportion of sightings was lower than that in other areas. The locality of submarine activity could be more rapidly transferred than could aircraft. Certain U.S. PBM's were not yet operational but drastic measures were being taken to render them effective. When this had been done, they could be used to release aircraft for the Bay. He was fully in agreement with the principle that the Bay provided an excellent hunting ground for anti-submarine operations.

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ADMIRAL LEAHY then suggested certain amendments to paragraph 4 of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff paper (C.C.S. 241/1).

ADMIRAL POUND explained that the British proposals with regard to the Bay offensive should not be taken to mean that action would only be effective if the full number of 72 aircraft were provided. Every aircraft would be of great value.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Deferred action on these papers until the next meeting.

3. POLICY FOR COMING OPERATIONS REGARDING PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

(C.C.S. 185/3)

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that this was largely a political matter. The views of the Prime Minister had not yet been received.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the President had expressed the following views. We certainly could not tell the Italians that if they ceased hostilities they would have *peace with honor*: we could not get away from unconditional surrender: all we could tell them was that they would be treated by the United States and the British with humanity and with the intention that the Italian people should be reconstituted into a nation in accordance with the principles of self-determination: this latter would, of course, not include any form of Fascism or dictatorship.

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that on receipt of this message from the President, he had prepared a draft telegram to General Eisenhower based on the President's views and instructing General Eisenhower to adhere to his original directive with regard to propaganda. He would like to send this message to the President for his approval.

GENERAL ISMAY explained that this matter had also been put in very similar terms to the Prime Minister whose decision was awaited.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained that the Foreign Office considered that, if too soft a line were taken now, its effects would wear off before operation *HUSKY* and even further promises would then be required.

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GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that he should send the President the draft reply to General Eisenhower with a notation that it had not as yet received the concurrence of the British Chiefs of Staff nor of the Prime Minister.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to defer action on this paper pending reference to the the Prime Minister and the President by General Ismay and General Marshall respectively.

4. SONIC WARFARE

(C.C.S. 240)

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that it was important that this form of warfare should be designated by a code name.

ADMIRAL KING said he believed that it might be found necessary that sonic warfare should be used for the first time in operation *HUSKY*.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

- a. Approved the recommendations contained in this paper.
- b. Directed the secretaries to request the security authorities to recommend a code name to cover this type of warfare.

5. MOVEMENT OF THE "QUEENS"

ADMIRAL POUND said that from his experience on the trip over, he was convinced that the *Queens* should not be allowed to pass through the submarine area except in dark periods. This would entail the cycle for the *Queens* being opened out to 28 days. The loss in troop lift which this would entail had been estimated at 15,000 for the third quarter of the year and 31,000 for the fourth quarter, making a total of 46,000 for the remainder of the year. If one of these ships were torpedoed, the resulting loss to our troop lift would far exceed 46,000.

In reply to a question by General Marshall as to the extra degree of safety which could be expected from his proposal, *ADMIRAL POUND* said that, when considering the possibilities of the Prime Minister travelling in one of these ships, he had taken the view that, while

U. S. SECRET

BRITISH MOST SECRET

it was a fair risk during a dark period of the moon, he would have strongly advised against it being undertaken during a light period. Similar considerations applied to the movement of 15,000 troops. In an emergency, he believed that one of these ships could be used in a light period, but only as a very special case. Boats were available for only 3,000 of the 15,000 passengers carried. Owing to the congestion on board and the fact that there might be no vessels capable of rescuing the personnel within several hundred miles, the loss of life, if a *Queen* were sunk, would be appalling.

The United States Chiefs of Staff stated that they would like to examine the implications of the British proposal.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would present a paper recommending a change in the cycle of military transport vessels of the *Queen* type with a view to lessening the risk of passage.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
C.C.S. 94th Meeting

TRIDENT

Minutes of Meeting held in
The Board of Governors Room,
Federal Reserve Building,
on Sunday, 23 May 1943,
at 1400.

PRESENT

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN
General G. C. Marshall, USA
Admiral E. J. King, USN
Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney, USA

General Sir Alan Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles Portal

ALSO PRESENT

Lt. Gen. S. D. Embick, USA
Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA
Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, USN
Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN
Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett, USA
Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA
Col. C. P. Cabell, USA
Comdr. W. L. Freseman, USN
Comdr. V. D. Long, USN
Mr. Lewis Douglas, WSA
(For Items 1-5)

The Right Hon. Lord Leathers
(For Items 1-5)
The Right Hon. Lord Cherwell
(For Items 1-5)
Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay
Admiral Sir Percy Noble
Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready
Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh
Maj. Gen. N. G. Holmes
Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN
Brigadier W. Porter
Air Commodore W. Elliot
Brigadier M. W. M. Macleod

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier H. Redman
Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA
Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, RN
Lt. Colonel R. L. Vittrup, USA

1. *CONCLUSIONS OF THE MINUTES OF THE 93RD MEETING*

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the conclusions as shown in the Minutes of the 93rd Meeting held on Saturday, the 22nd May.

2. *ANTI-U-BOAT WARFARE*

(C.C.S. 241 and 241/1)

Previous Reference: C.C.S. 93rd Meeting, Item 2.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that C.C.S. 241 and 241/1 should each be altered in certain respects and then noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL suggested a minor amendment to paragraph 4 of C.C.S. 241/1.

ADMIRAL LEAHY read out a draft conclusion with reference to the work of the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

- a. Took note of C.C.S. 241 and deleted the phrase "and that the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board should be responsible for recommending any such transfer" at the end of the last paragraph of page 1. (Subsequently published as C.C.S. 241/3.)
- b. Took note of C.C.S. 241/1 and directed that the words "relieve British planes in certain areas" should be deleted and the words "provide planes" substituted. (Subsequently published as C.C.S. 241/4.)
- c. Agreed that in view of the fact that the directive under which the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board operates requires them to report on any aspect of the Allied Anti-Submarine Organization in which they consider the Allied resources are not being used to the best advantage, it is not considered necessary that the Board should have any special responsibility laid on them in the case quoted in C.C.S. 241.

3. *MOVEMENTS OF THE "QUEENS"*

(C.C.S. 246)

Previous Reference: C.C.S. 93rd Meeting, Item 5.

Without discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted the proposals for the future movement of the "QUEENS" as set out in paragraph 6 of C.C.S. 246.

4. *POLICY FOR COMING OPERATIONS REGARDING PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES*

(C.C.S. 185/4)

Previous Reference: C.C.S. 93rd Meeting, Item 3.

GENERAL ISMAY informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the Prime Minister had agreed to the draft telegram to General Eisenhower, contained in C.C.S. 185/4.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

a. Took note that the President and Prime Minister had decided that the policy set forth in C.C.S. 185/2/D should be adhered to.

b. Agreed to send the message contained in C.C.S. 185/4 to General Eisenhower.

5. *IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSUMED BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943-1944*

(C.C.S. 244)

THE COMMITTEE had before them C.C.S. 244 together with an addendum and corrigendum to it containing Annex VII, and a summary of conclusions and a corrigendum to Annex II.

Certain amendments to the paper were suggested and accepted.

LORD LEATHERS said that Annex VII represented the agreed views of himself, Mr. Lewis Douglas and General Somervell and was a submission of the shipping position for the period under discussion. He and his

colleagues believed the deficiencies were relatively small and, if properly spread over all the programs concerned, the effect would not be unmanageable. The requirements set out in the paper had, in most cases, been cut as far as was possible. The deficiency was only a small percentage of the total. This small percentage of deficiency when taking into consideration the various assumptions, including losses, building rates, etc., was so small that it could be spread and absorbed and gave, in his opinion, no grounds for anxiety.

LORD LEATHERS then suggested a minor amendment to the note following paragraph 3 of Annex VII, Part I.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the reduced troop lift due to the proposed opening out of the cycle of movement for the "QUEENS" had been taken into account -- the bottleneck was dry cargo and not personnel shipping.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, *LORD LEATHERS* explained that shortly after the Casablanca Conference the loss rate had been carefully examined and agreed rates accepted. These were 2.39 percent per month for the first half of the year and 1.9 percent per month for the second half. The present paper had been based on these calculations, though in fact the loss rate so far this year had worked out at slightly less than 1.9 percent. An agreed and accurate loss rate was a most important factor in all calculations dealing with shipping requirements and availability. He agreed with Admiral King that the loss rate should be subjected to frequent review.

MR. DOUGLAS said that he agreed with Lord Leathers that the deficit with regard to dry cargo shipping was not unmanageable.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, *GENERAL SOMERVELL* said that he agreed with Lord Leathers and Mr. Douglas that shipping was available for the undertakings set out in C.C.S. 244, subject to the slight deficit which he considered could be absorbed by spreading it over the entire period.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt sure the Combined Chiefs of Staff would wish to express appreciation of the excellent work accomplished in so short a time by the Combined Staff Planners and shipping experts, both civil and military. All present agreed.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved C.C.S. 244, as amended in Annex "B" to these Minutes,* except that paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Summary of Conclusions should be taken note of as recommendations only.

6. *DESPATCH OF U. S. SERVICE AND ENGINEER TROOPS TO THE UNITED KINGDOM*

SIR ALAN BROOKE read out a brief memorandum** on the importance of the early despatch of certain service and engineer troops to the United Kingdom. This movement would not interfere with the scheduled *SICKLE* build-up but was essential due to the shortage of manpower in England.

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that he entirely agreed with Sir Alan Brooke's view that the early arrival of S.O.S. and engineer troops was essential to prepare for the arrival of the fighting forces.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the present plan already provided for the movement of 40,000 men per division which included a large proportion of service units. The required priority could be arranged for early sailing of necessary service elements.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he was prepared to accept this movement provided that it was not at the expense of *SICKLE*, the priority of which must not be disturbed.

ADMIRAL KING said that the picture as a whole must be considered. It might prove necessary for the *SICKLE* movement to be modified slightly in the light of these requirements.

LORD LEATHERS pointed out the necessity for port battalions for discharging the ships at the landing points.

* Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 244/1.

** Annex "A" to these minutes.

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Both General McNarney and Sir Charles Portal pointed out that *SICKLE* was an essential prelude to and an integral part of cross-Channel operations as a whole and that the ground operations could not be undertaken without it.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed that the necessary service troops for the build-up of the *BOLERO* force will be given priorities in sailings as necessary to service the build-up of the combat troops without prejudice to *SICKLE*.

(At this point Lord Leathers, Lord Cherwell, and Mr. Douglas left the meeting.)

7. *OPERATION "BRISK"*

Previous Reference: C.C.S. 87th Meeting, Item 2.

THE COMMITTEE had before them a draft report by the British Planning Staff. (J.P.(T) 17 (Final))

In the course of discussion it was pointed out that the Prime Minister and President had made it clear that the decision with regard to diplomatic action should rest with them, and had asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff to prepare a statement of the military reasons necessitating the occupation of the Portuguese Islands, a military plan to effect their capture and to give a target date on which this operation could be undertaken.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then discussed certain alternative proposals for obtaining the use of these Islands at an earlier date than that indicated in the plan.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note that the British Staff Planners were preparing a statement for inclusion in the final report to the President and Prime Minister, which would set forth the urgent military reasons for this operation.

8. *THIRD SOVIET PROTOCOL*

(C.C.S. 243)

Without discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed that this matter should be considered after the conclusion of the *TRIDENT* Conferences.

ANNEX "A"

1. In order to obtain the maximum intake of U.S. troops and their equipment into the United Kingdom, it is essential that certain Service and Engineer troops should be despatched between now and November.

2. The troops required are as follows:

a. Army Service Force personnel to activate existing depots.

b. Engineer personnel to construct new depots. (This will take about six months.)

c. Port battalions to assist in the discharge of *SICKLE/BOLERO* vessels.

3. The rate at which these troops must be despatched from U.S.A. if the maximum flow of *SICKLE/BOLERO* movement is to be obtained is as follows:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Detail</u>
June	14,000 —)	A.S.F. troops required to operate at maximum capacity 16 million square feet of depot space now in existence for U. S. forces.
) —	
July	12,000 —)	
August	52,000	5 Port Battalions required.
	—)	10 Engineer Battalions required to put in hand extra depots during August and September
September	48,000) —	
	—)	
October	29,000	
November	45,000	

4. The above allocation does not interfere with the scheduled *SICKLE* build-up.

ANNEX "B"

AMENDMENTS AGREED UPON BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
TO C.C.S. 244

1. On the cover sheet delete the last paragraph with regard to Annex VII.

2. *Page 3, paragraph V(6)*

At the end of the sentence add the words "with due regard to other important commitments."

3. *Page 4, paragraph 1, second subparagraph*

Insert the words "the equivalent strength of" between the words "to" and "36."

4. *Page 5, paragraph 5*

Delete the word "latter" in the third line and substitute the word "Indian" therefor.

5. *Page 6, paragraph 6*

In the listing of American Divisions delete the figure "14" and substitute "12½" therefor.

Under "American" insert an extra item: "1 ex Iceland."

Delete the figures "33 - 37" in the grand total and substitute "32½ - 36½."

6. *Page 6, paragraph 7, line 4*

Delete the word "three" and substitute the word "two."

7. *Page 10, paragraph 1, line 5*

Delete the words "the resumption of" and after the word "convoys" insert the words "should they be resumed."

8. *Page 11*

At the end of paragraph 6 add a new sentence to read as follows:
"The above is dependent on the losses sustained in #USKY."

9. *Page 14*

Delete all Appendices listed except "A," "B" and "E₁"; delete the Appendices themselves and all subsequent references to them in the body of the paper.

10. *Page 14, paragraph 2*

At the end of the last sentence insert a comma and add "and for other purposes."

11. *Page 18, Appendix "A," line 3*

Insert the words "night fighter" after the word "TEF."

12. *Page 18, lines 4 and 5*

Delete "for cross-Channel operations" and substitute "in the U. K. by 1 May 1944 subject to the provision of accommodation, which requires further study."

13. *Page 19*

In the last column of the first table, the first entry should read "1846" rather than "1826."

14. *Page 20*

In the table in subparagraph C(k), bracket the first two items and opposite the bracket insert the word "squadrons." Bracket the next four items and opposite the bracket insert the word "aircraft."

15. *Page 25, Appendix "E₁"*

In the next to the last column, change the first entry from "67" to "91."

16. *Page 32*

Delete paragraph 6.

17. *Page 37, last paragraph in c(3)*

Delete the whole paragraph and substitute the following therefor: "Landing craft in adequate numbers can only be furnished provided the correct projected rate of production can be maintained."

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18. *Page 43, Note (Annex VII)*

Insert at the beginning of the note the words "the foregoing is based on the assumption that" before the words "each *BOLERO* cargo ship..."

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

C.C.S. 95th Meeting

TRIDENT

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 240,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
on Monday, 24 May 1943,
at 1130.

PRESENT

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN
General G. C. Marshall, USA
Admiral E. J. King, USN
Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney, USA

General Sir Alan Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles Portal

ALSO PRESENT

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA
Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, USN
Vice Admiral R. Willson, USN
Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN
Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett, USA
Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA
Col. C. P. Cabell, USA
Comdr. W. L. Freseman, USN
Comdr. V. D. Long, USN

Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay
Admiral Sir Percy Noble
Lt. Gen. G. N. Maccready
Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh
Maj. Gen. N. G. Holmes
Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN
Brigadier W. Porter
Air Commodore W. Elliot
Brigadier M. W. M. Macleod

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier H. Redman
Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA
Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, RN
Lt. Colonel R. L. Vittrup, USA

1. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE 94TH MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the 94th meeting except that the conclusion under Item 6 was changed to read as follows:

"Agreed that the necessary service troops for the build-up of the *BOLERO* force will be given priorities in sailings as necessary to service the build-up of the combat troops, without prejudice to *SICKLE*."

2. DRAFT REPORT TO PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

(C.C.S. 242/2)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF considered C.C.S. 242/2 paragraph by paragraph and agreed to certain amendments.

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that the British proposal relating to the extension of pressure in the Pacific for the earliest defeat of the Axis was, in his opinion, unacceptable since, should the situation in the Pacific become dangerous to U. S. interests or to U. S. itself, it would be necessary to supplement U. S. forces in this theater even at the expense of the early defeat of Germany.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the British proposal was not intended to restrict operations in the Pacific but rather to insure that any surplus forces which might become available could be concentrated on the early defeat of Germany, thus bringing the war as a whole to an end more rapidly.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that with regard to air forces, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed to put into the United Kingdom the maximum number of groups which could be maintained there. If, therefore, there was a surplus of air forces he believed that they should be sent to the Southwest Pacific which at present was operating on a *shoestring* and where great results could be achieved by relatively small additions to the forces in that area.

The U. S. Air Staff were more than anxious to implement the *SICKLE* plan since they believed that air superiority properly applied would produce devastating results. They were reluctant, therefore, to divert forces elsewhere at the expense of *SICKLE*. On the other hand, in the Pacific the Japanese with their good interior lines of communication could more rapidly concentrate their air forces and it was essential, therefore, to have a numerical as well as a combat ascendancy. No major concentration of Japanese forces had yet taken place in the Pacific; but if this should occur, our own forces might find themselves in a most difficult situation from which they would have to be retrieved. Public opinion in the United States would not permit the acceptance of major reverses in the Pacific. If, therefore, there was any surplus of forces above those required to undertake agreed operations, he believed that they should be sent to the Southwest Pacific to exploit and improve our position in that area.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he entirely agreed that any surplus forces, which might exist, should be sent to the Pacific, either for agreed operations or to defend the United States; but what he had meant to imply was that if operations in the Pacific were going well, it would be wiser, in order to eliminate Germany from the war, to send any surplus there might be either to the United Kingdom or to the Mediterranean.

THE COMMITTEE then accepted the addition of certain words to paragraph II *b* suggested by Sir Dudley Pound.

In discussing the subparagraph of paragraph III dealing with the concentration of maximum resources in a selected area, *SIR CHARLES PORTAL* said that the words "in a selected area" might prove restrictive, since, as regards air forces, a saturation point might be reached in the United Kingdom. He believed that if additional forces were available they should attack the citadel of Europe from bases on all sides.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that it had already been agreed that the air offensive in Europe should be intensified without restricting the bases from which the forces should operate. He believed that all

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the decisions of the Conference must be reviewed at the next meeting or earlier if necessary, since, should Russia fall or make peace with Germany, it would be impossible to accomplish *ROUNDHAMMER*. It might therefore be necessary to reorient our strategy with a view to undertaking the defeat of Japan prior to that of Germany.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed as to the necessity of reviewing at the next conference all the decisions now taken, since it was vital to exploit any opportunities which arose. The position in southern Europe might well be such that we should take advantage of it.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that paragraph VII *b* dealing with the next meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be amended to make it clear that the decisions reached at the present conference should be examined in the light of the situation then existing.

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested certain amendments to the Annex aimed at strengthening the case, on military grounds, for obtaining the Islands.

In discussing the amendment to paragraph III *i* of the Annex, which pointed out that the Islands provided the most direct all-weather air supply routes to Europe, Africa and the Far East, *SIR CHARLES PORTAL* said that he would like it to be agreed that the requirements of anti-U-boat warfare must take first priority.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

- a.* Agreed to the draft report to the President and Prime Minister as amended in C.C.S. 242/3.
- b.* Agreed that with reference to Section IV, paragraph 3 a (5), no additional administrative or logistic commitments would be entered into without the prior approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- c.* Agreed that the security control agencies of the U. S. and U. K. should arrange for the necessary machinery for the production of deception policy and the coordination of cover plans

for operations in the Pacific and Far Eastern Theaters (Including Burma).

d. Agreed, with regard to paragraph 3 *i* of the Annex to C.C.S. 242/2, that when the use of the Azores is obtained, first priority must be given to the needs of anti-submarine warfare.

3. *DIRECTIVE ON ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR HUSKY*

(C.C.S. 247)

Without discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed that consideration of this matter should be deferred until after the Trident Conference.

4. *PROVISION OF NEW L.S.I.(L)'S*

(C.C.S. 248)

SIR DUDLEY POUND asked that the following amendments should be made to this paper:

Paragraph 5 *b* (1), first sentence, to read:

"the allocation for use by the British services of as many *Jay* ships as are suitable for conversion to L.S.I.(L)'s."

The final sentence of paragraph 5 *b* (2) to read:

"and then after conversion temporarily allocated to British control."

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Chiefs of Staff would like further time to consider this paper.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF: -

Agreed:

a. That certain amendments should be made to C.C.S. 248 as incorporated in C.C.S. 248/1.

b. That action on this paper should be deferred.

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5. REQUIREMENTS TO EXPAND THE CAPACITY OF THE AIR ROUTE TO CHINA

GENERAL MARSHALL presented a memorandum setting out certain requirements to enable the capacity of the air route to China to be expanded.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that in view of the fact that a directive setting out the priority to be accorded to the expansion of the air route had already been sent to the U. S. and British authorities concerned in India and China, these requirements should also be transmitted
x (to the authorities concerned.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Agreed that the suggestion at x above should be implemented by the U. S. and British Air Staffs in direct collaboration.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
C.C.S. 96th Meeting

TRIDENT

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 240,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
on Tuesday, 25 May 1943,
at 1030.

PRESENT

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN	General Sir Alan Brooke
General G. C. Marshall, USA	Admiral of the Fleet
Admiral E. J. King, USN	Sir Dudley Pound
It. Gen. J. T. McNarney, USA	Air Chief Marshal
	Sir Charles Portal

ALSO PRESENT

It. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA	Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, USN	Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay
Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA	Admiral Sir Percy Noble
Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN	Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready
Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett, USA	Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh
Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA	Maj. Gen. N. G. Holmes
Col. C. P. Cabell, USA	Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN
Comdr. W. L. Freseman, USN	Brigadier E. I. C. Jacobs
Comdr. V. D. Long, USN	Brigadier W. Porter
	Air Commodore W. Elliot
	Brigadier M. W. M. Macleod

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier H. Redman
Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA
Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, RN
Lt. Colonel R. L. Vittrup

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE MINUTES OF THE 95TH MEETING

ADMIRAL KING suggested an amendment to Conclusion c of Item 2.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the Conclusions of the 95th Meeting as recorded in the Minutes, but with the substitution of the word "Pacific" for "Indian" in Conclusion c of Item 2 and the addition of the words "(including Burma)" after the words "Far Eastern Theaters."

2. FINAL REPORT TO PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER
(C.C.S. 242/4 and 242/5)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them C.C.S. 242/4, together with certain amendments suggested by the Prime Minister (C.C.S. 242/5).

Certain other minor amendments were suggested and approved.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the final report to the President and Prime Minister, as modified by C.C.S. 242/5 and as amended in the course of discussion.

3. IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISIONS REACHED AT THE TRIDENT CONFERENCE
(C.C.S. 250)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners covering suggested directives and instructions to General Eisenhower and General Morgan, prepared in the light of the decisions reached at the *TRIDENT* Conference.

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested an amendment to paragraph 1 c of the Memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF considered certain amendments to the draft directives contained in Enclosures "A" and "B."

GENERAL MARSHALL presented a proposal that an additional statement be added at the end of paragraph 1 of C.C.S. 250 to the effect that shipping available for Post-*HUSKY* Mediterranean operations would amount to 15 combat loaders and 90 cargo ships.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL indicated that he thought that before the British Chiefs of Staff could agree to specify an exact number of ships the matter would have to be explored further.

ADMIRAL KING suggested adding the statement at the end of paragraph one: "Further instructions will be issued as to the availability of combat loaders and cargo ships."

ADMIRAL KING'S proposal was agreed to.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that the recommendations in the covering Memorandum to the Combined Staff Planners, as amended, be approved, but that the final directives be prepared by the Secretariat in the light of the discussion and of the latest decisions.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF: -

- a. Approved the covering memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners as amended in the course of discussion.
 - b. Approved the draft directive to General Eisenhower (Enclosure "A") and the draft supplementary directive to the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (Designate) (Enclosure "B"), subject to the incorporation therein by the Secretaries of the agreed decisions that had been arrived at subsequent to the preparation of these draft directives.
4. *SUGGESTED STATEMENT TO BE MADE TO THE CHINESE*
(Unnumbered C.C.S. Memorandum dated 25 May 1943)

GENERAL MARSHALL said that since he had a meeting with the Chinese Representatives at 3 p.m. that afternoon he would like guidance from the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to the form in which the decisions of the Conference should be conveyed to the Chinese. He urged that the de-

isions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with reference to Burma be presented as *proposals* since it would be improper to imply a decision had been made regarding the use of the Generalissimo's forces.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF were of the opinion that the formal transmission of the decisions to the Chinese should be made by the President and Prime Minister to the Generalissimo.

Certain amendments to the draft contained in the memorandum under discussion were then inserted in order to conform to this conception.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved with minor amendments, the suggested statement* to be made to the Chinese.

5. *PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING COMBINED PLANNING*
(C.C.S. 251)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF considered a Memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners containing certain proposals for improving Combined Planning.

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested an amendment to paragraph 2 a of the Memorandum designed to make it clear that the war against Japan should be considered as a whole.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that paragraph 2 b should be eliminated since, in his view, the function of the Combined Staff Planners was to advise the Combined Chiefs of Staff on plans prepared by theater commanders and not to personally assist theater commanders. He felt that the presence of the Combined Staff Planners at theater headquarters might interfere with the function of theater commanders and their staffs.

ADMIRAL COOKE and *CAPTAIN LAMBE* explained that this paragraph had been inserted since it was believed that the Combined Staff Planners could, if they visited General Eisenhower's headquarters, prove useful

* Subsequently published as Annex to the White House Minutes, 25 May 1943

by imparting information and data as regards resources which would assist him in drawing up his plans and, at the same time, themselves learn at an early stage of the possible plans and requirements.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the proposals put forward by the Combined Staff Planners, subject to certain amendments which have been incorporated in C.C.S. 251/1.

6. CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that, on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff, he would like to express most heartfelt thanks for the kindness, both official and unofficial, which the British Chiefs of Staff had received during their visit. They had been met in a spirit of cooperation which had proved most helpful. The fundamental value of the exchange of views between the Chiefs of Staff of the two Nations had been proved by the fact that they had agreed to hold the next Conference at an early date. Short periods between meetings were, he felt, essential. If the lapse of time between successive meetings was too long, the views of each nation were more likely to become divergent.

SIR ALAN BROOKE paid tribute to the Combined Staff Planners who had worked at great pressure and whose high standard of work had gone far to assist the Combined Chiefs of Staff in reaching rapid decisions.

With regard to the results of the Conference, agreement had been reached on all vital points and through the process of reaching agreement, each side had achieved a clearer appreciation of the outlook and conception of the other. Finally, the Conference had strengthened those ties of friendship between the two Staffs, which was so essential to true cooperation in the war.

ADMIRAL LEAHY, on behalf of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff, said that they too had an equal appreciation of the value of this conference and looked forward with assurance to equally successful results from future conferences. Frequent meetings were, in his opinion, essential. It had been a great pleasure to him to assist, for the first time, in personal

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consultation with the British Chiefs of Staff. This Conference had enabled the Chiefs of Staff to clarify the outlook for the immediate future and subsequent conferences would enable them to deal as successfully with future problems.

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MINUTES OF A MEETING

held at

GENERAL EISENHOWER'S VILLA, ALGIERS,
at 1700 hours, 29 May 1943.

PRESENT

British

The Prime Minister
General Sir Alan F. Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Andrew B. Cunningham
General Sir Harold Alexander
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Arthur Tedder
Lieut. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay
Major General Humphrey Gale
Major General J. F. M. Whiteley
Brigadier C. S. Sugden
Commodore R. M. Dick

U. S.

General G. C. Marshall
General D. D. Eisenhower
Major General W. B. Smith
Brig. General L. W. Rooks

SECRETARIES

Lieut. Colonel Frank McCarthy
Major Carter L. Burgess

1. *HOBGOBLIN*

GENERAL EISENHOWER explained that *HOBGOBLIN* was the code name of the island and that the code name of the operation for capturing it was *CORKSCREW*.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that a telegram had been received from the British Vice Chiefs of Staff asking a number of questions about the operation -- what was the date? What were its military advantages? Would it prejudice surprise in *HUSKY*?, etc.

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that the date was 11 June; the military advantages of capturing *HOBGOBLIN* were obvious from a glance at the map; the possession of the airfield was almost essential to enable the necessary air cover to be given to the southern assault on *HUSKY*; there was no reason to suppose that it would prejudice surprise in *HUSKY*, since the operation could be represented as a necessary step in clearing the Sicilian narrows. General Eisenhower continuing said that the result of failure at *HOBGOBLIN* would be very bad, materially and morally, and he described the various precautions which were being taken to insure that failure did not occur.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that his present plan was to use 6-inch cruisers, but he was ready to bring in a 14-inch battleship if this appeared desirable.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that the operation would provide a very useful experiment as to the extent to which coast defenses could be neutralized by aerial bombardment. There was a school of thought in the United Kingdom which thought that air forces could knock out coast defenses sufficiently to admit of practically unopposed landings. *SIR ALAN BROOKE* said that the difficulty lay in the fact that there was a time lag between the end of the aerial bombardment and the arrival of the assaulting troops and that this time lag gave the enemy time to recover. *THE PRIME MINISTER* drew attention to the possibility of following up the bombardment by dropping harmless bombs which would deceive the enemy into thinking that they were still under fire and thus keep their heads down.

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SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that eight destroyers would go right in with the landing craft and cover the landings at point-blank range.

BRIGADIER SUGDEN, in reply to the questions of the Prime Minister, said that nineteen Sherman tanks were included in the assaulting force in the hope that their morale effect would be considerable. The Italians' strength was alleged to be about 10,000, including coast defense troops, together with about 100 tanks, but this information was based on deduction, not on direct evidence.

2. *HUSKY*

GENERAL EISENHOWER, in reply to a question from the Prime Minister, said that all resources required for *HUSKY* seemed to be coming forward punctually and in adequate numbers. He then gave a brief description of the plan.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that five American and four or five British cruisers, together with a considerable number of destroyers, would be used to cover the assault. There would also be numerous small gunboats and three large monitors.

SIR ARTHUR TEDDER, in reply to a question from the Prime Minister, said that the principal preoccupation of the Air Force would be to obtain and retain command of the air over the convoys and landings.

3. *POST-HUSKY OPERATIONS*

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that he had had a long talk with Sir Alan Brooke on the subject of the war situation as a whole and that Sir Alan had emphasized that the Russian Army was the only land force that could yield decisive results. Any Anglo-American force that could be put upon the Continent was merely a drop in the bucket. Sir Alan Brooke had therefore urged that the efforts of our armies must be directed towards diverting German strength from the Russian Front in order to enable the Russian Armies to inflict a decisive defeat upon them. He himself (General Eisenhower) thought that if we had command of the air, an Anglo-American force of, say, fifty divisions would probably be able to hold a force of seventy-five German divisions on the Continent.

If it was generally accepted that a Second Front in Western Europe is unnecessary and that our main object was to divert German strength from the Russian Front, the conception of sending seven divisions away from the Mediterranean seemed to him to be somewhat faulty. If we were going to knock out Italy, we ought to do so immediately after *HUSKY* and with all the means at our disposal. *HUSKY* would give a good indication of the type of resistance likely to be encountered on the mainland of Italy itself; and if *HUSKY* proved to be an easy proposition, we ought to go directly into Italy. This would yield far greater prizes than any attack on the islands.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that there was no chance of our putting into Europe an Anglo-American Army in any way comparable in size to that of the Russians, who are now holding 218 German divisions on their front. By the first of May, 1944, we should have an expeditionary force of twenty-nine divisions in the United Kingdom, seven of which would have come from North Africa. Continuing, the Prime Minister said that the United Kingdom must be the assembly point of the largest force which we could accumulate, and it was necessary to have plans ready to cross the Channel in force at any time in case the Germans were to crack. As General Marshall had frequently pointed out, Northern France was the only theater in which the vast British Metropolitan Air Force and the U.S. Air Forces in the United Kingdom could be brought into full play. It was not, in any event, intended that the Anglo-American force in the United Kingdom should continue to accumulate beyond May, 1944, and it was our intention to launch a considerable operation which was likely to be accompanied by very heavy fighting and casualties at that time. The Prime Minister emphasized that both the British people and the British Army were anxious to fight across the Channel.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that a definite date for the cross-Channel operation had been settled by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and that five divisions would be used in the assault phase. The difficulty in the accumulation of the tremendous Air Force required lay not so much in the number of airplanes that could be delivered, but in the ability

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of the United Kingdom to absorb them. General Eisenhower had asked for information as to when he should submit his plan for knocking Italy out of the war. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff felt that no decision could be made until the result of *HUSKY* had been determined and the situation in Russia was known. The logical approach would be to set up two forces, each with its own staff, in separate places. One force would train for an operation against the islands of Sardinia and Corsica, and the other for an operation on the mainland of Italy. When the situation was sufficiently clear to enable a decision to be taken as to which of these operations was to go forward, the necessary air forces, landing craft, etc., would be made over to the force charged with implementing the selected plan.

THE PRIME MINISTER foresaw that if *HUSKY* went too quickly, there might be a long interlude of inactivity. *GENERAL EISENHOWER* said that if *HUSKY* were polished off easily, he would be willing to go straight to Italy.

SIR HAROLD ALEXANDER thought that if the *HUSKY* struggle were bitter and prolonged, we should be fighting hard in the island and there would not be any inactive interlude. If, however, *HUSKY* proved easy, we should immediately establish a bridgehead in Italy.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that a hard struggle between the Russians and Germans was imminent and that we should do all in our power to help the former and disperse the latter. The Germans were subjected to threats in many points in Europe. We had already caused a dispersal of their forces by our presence in North Africa and the skillful use of cover plans. *HUSKY* would be another step in the right direction. The Germans were faced with operations in Russia, with possible trouble in the Balkans, and with dangers in Italy, France and Norway. Their forces were already widely stretched and they could not further decrease their strength either in Russia or in France. The place where they could most conveniently reduce their commitments is Italy. We should, therefore, base our decisions on the result of *HUSKY* and on the situation then existing. If the foot of Italy were packed with troops, we

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should try elsewhere. If Italy were to be knocked out of the war, Germany would have to replace the twenty-six Italian divisions in the Balkans. They would also require additional strength in the Brenner Pass, along the Riviera, and on the Spanish and Italian frontiers. This dispersal of German forces is just what we require for a cross-Channel operation and we should do everything in our power to aggravate it. The defenses on the coast of France would present no difficulty unless they were held by determined men and the Germans had mobile reserves with which to counterattack.

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that the discussion had seemed to simplify his problem. If *HUSKY* were to succeed, say, within a week, he would at once cross the Straits and establish a bridgehead. The coast defenses of Southern Italy would probably be easier to crack than those of *HUSKY*.

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed the personal view that *HUSKY* would be finished by August 15.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that we ought to have a good idea of how long the operations would last by the end of July. In the meanwhile, we should prepare for various operations, give our troops the best of training, and postpone the final decision until the result of *HUSKY* was known.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that if *HUSKY* had proved successful by August and the strain had not been too heavy, we should at once go for the toe of Italy, provided that not too many German divisions had been moved there. He thought that the Balkans represented a greater danger to Germany than the loss of Italy. In case of trouble in the former, Turkey might react to our advantage. Continuing, he said that he liked the idea of two forces and two staffs, and of preparing for alternative operations. He suggested that further consideration should be given to the matter and that there should be another meeting next Monday.

GENERAL EISENHOWER drew attention to the fact that going to Italy after *HUSKY* would mean the execution of yet another amphibious operation.

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SIR ALAN BROOKE asked what should be done if during *HUSKY* we should receive evidence of a crack-up in Italy. Certainly we should have some definite scheme.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that such a scheme would be largely a naval proposition.

SIR ALAN BROOKE felt that General Eisenhower should give some thought to this matter and suggested consideration of armistice terms and how far up into Italy we should go.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that there are nine U.S. divisions in North Africa, including an airborne division. Seven divisions, including some British and U.S., will soon begin to leave around the first of November. There are two and one-half well-armed Polish divisions in Persia, and they wish to take part in any move directed against Italy. The New Zealand Parliament agreed that their division should be available by September, and that an armored brigade would be ready by October. The Poles and the New Zealanders would thus provide four divisions.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the strength would amount to twenty-seven British and Allied Divisions, nine U.S. Divisions and four French Divisions; allowing ten percent casualties for *HUSKY* and subsequent operations, the total would be thirty-six. This would further be reduced by the seven divisions to be sent to the United Kingdom and two to cover the British commitment to Turkey. The final total would thus be twenty-seven divisions in the Mediterranean area. (Re C.C.S. 244) *Sir Alan Brooke* then stated what the total liabilities would be for these divisions.

THE PRIME MINISTER said it probably would not be necessary to leave much strength in *HUSKY*, since its inhabitants were known to be disloyal to Mussolini. The Prime Minister called attention to the fact that the strength of our division is almost double that of the German Division, which is little more than a glorified brigade group.

THE PRIME MINISTER again stated that it would be bad if nothing happened between August or September and next May. Unless we should be repulsed at the beaches in *HUSKY*, we should make plans and decide which to use when *HUSKY* has been started.

BRIGADIER SUGDEN stated that landing craft and shipping might impose a limitation on our further movements in the Mediterranean.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that we should be in good condition once we seized ports. Distances are short in the Mediterranean, and it is just as easy to feed troops in *HUSKY* as in North Africa.

THE PRIME MINISTER added that he hoped that he and General Marshall could make a report to the President within the next few days.

THE CONFERENCE:-

a. Took note of General Eisenhower's opinion that there are three possibilities to be provided for. These are:

(1) A quick Sicilian collapse. In this event, immediate operations against the Italian Mainland would be undertaken as a logical follow-up of *HUSKY* without awaiting formal decision. This is being planned by AFHQ.

(2) Stubborn resistance encountered in *HUSKY* but success foreseeable by, say, August 15. The specific post-*HUSKY* operation in this eventuality cannot be decided in advance. Accordingly, it was his intention to designate two separate Headquarters, each with its own staff, to plan and, so far as possible, to mount post-*HUSKY* operations. One of these Headquarters primarily will plan and partially mount operations to the west of *HUSKY* (*BRIMSTONE - FIRE-BRAND*) and secondarily support bridgehead operations from *SICILY*. The other Headquarters will plan and partially mount operations against the Mainland of Italy, primarily the toe and ball.

The recommendation of the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, is to be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of

Staff as soon as possible after the launching of *HUSKY* in order to have the advantage of experiences gained in the initial phases of the *HUSKY* Operation and the decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff may be taken in the light of the general situation existing at the time. As soon as the decision has been taken as to which operation is to be launched, the Air Forces, landing craft, etc., necessary to implement the selected operation will be turned over to the force charged with its execution. The implications of the above are immediately to be studied by General Eisenhower's staff to determine how far it is practicable to carry this plan into effect with the means available.

- (3) Prolonged and bitter resistance which will tie down our aircraft and landing craft for an indefinite period. This would leave no resources available for any immediate post-*HUSKY* Operation which can now be determined upon.

It will be seen from the above that it is only in the second eventuality that a formal decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff will be required.

- b. Agreed that the Conference would reassemble at 1700 Monday, 31 May, to discuss the results of the above examination.

MINUTES OF A MEETING

held at

GENERAL EISENHOWER'S VILLA, ALGIERS,
at 1700 hours, 31 May 1943.

PRESENT

British

The Prime Minister
The Right Hon. Anthony Eden
Admiral of the Fleet
 Sir Andrew B. Cunningham
General Sir Alan F. Brooke
General Sir Harold Alexander
Air Chief Marshal
 Sir Arthur Tedder
Lieut. General
 Sir Hastings L. Ismay
Brigadier C. S. Sugden
Commodore R. M. Dick
Captain T. M. Brownrigg, RN

U. S.

General G. C. Marshall
General D. D. Eisenhower
Major General T. T. Handy
Major General W. B. Smith
Brig. General L. W. Rooks

Secretaries

Lieut. Colonel Frank McCarthy
Major Carter L. Burgess

THE PRIME MINISTER opened the meeting by asking General Eisenhower for his comments on the completeness of the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the Trident Conference in Washington. *GENERAL EISENHOWER* stated that as far as he was concerned, there was nothing to be added or subtracted. He and his forces would be ready to do all they could in exploitation of *HUSKY*. In case of rapid destruction of enemy forces in *HUSKY*, there could be only one course of action; namely to cross the Straits of Messina and seize the largest possible bridgehead. The final decision, however, as to whether we should go on further into Italy or to Sardinia must depend upon circumstances and must be reserved to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated his most sincere wish and hope was that we should be able to go from *HUSKY* directly into Italy. He had circulated some notes (Appendix "A"), which gave his own views, as a background for today's conference.

GENERAL EISENHOWER stated that the term "quick collapse" had often been used and that he wished to define the term. He understood a quick collapse as being a situation which would not require the use of all the forces which we had set up for *HUSKY*. He estimated that we should be able to predict the outcome of *HUSKY* fairly accurately within ten days after the initial assault, although some enemy forces might hold out in mountain fastnesses considerably after that time.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed generally, stating that an accurate prediction might not be made until a fortnight after the first blow. At least it would not be necessary to make a prediction on the basis on the first day's action. His heart lay in an invasion of southern Italy, but the fortunes of battle might necessitate a different course. At any rate, the alternative between southern Italy and Sardinia involved the difference between a glorious campaign and a mere convenience.

GENERAL MARSHALL requested clarification of the meaning of "quick decision".

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GENERAL EISENHOWER said that by the word "decision" he did not mean conclusion of action, but rather the arrival of a time at which a fairly accurate forecast could be made.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that if, by the first of August, we could predict that the conquest of *HUSKY* would be complete by 15 August, an attack on the mainland of Italy should be made.

GENERAL MARSHALL introduced the view that a much better decision could be made as to post-*HUSKY* after the initial phases of *HUSKY* had been completed. He felt it would be necessary to know something of the German reactions to *HUSKY* in order to determine whether there would be real resistance in southern Italy; whether the Germans would withdraw to the Po for example; whether they could organize and handle the Italians with any finesse; of the preparations that might have been made on Sardinia, Corsica, or in the Balkan Peninsula; what readjustments they would make on the Russian Front. All of these things would be factors in deciding our post-*HUSKY* plans. There were two or three different ways in which Italy might fall, and careful consideration would have to be given to the matter of what would be done with such divisions, along with their transport, as might not be used there; how far north we should go in Italy and the rate at which we should become involved. It was his opinion that we should not commit ourselves until we knew as much as possible, but at the same time we should take measures to avoid a serious delay in exploiting *HUSKY*. While the minutes of the meeting of 29 May explained clearly what alternatives we might have after *HUSKY*, a great deal could happen between now and July. He, General Eisenhower, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff were fully aware of the Prime Minister's feelings regarding a movement into Italy, but their only desire was to select the post-*HUSKY* alternative which would be productive of the largest results. We should choose that alternative only after the experiences and intelligence resulting from *HUSKY* enabled us to make the best possible decision.

GENERAL EISENHOWER wished it understood that small detachments might be sent across the Straits of Messina as a test, and he hoped

that the action of putting out these detachments would not be considered in exploitation of *HUSKY*, but rather a part of the operation itself.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the conclusions of the minutes of the last meeting did not represent his whole feeling, since he very passionately wanted to see Italy out of the war and Rome in our possession. He would be willing to send eight additional divisions if these were needed for the realization of this result.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that the additional divisions would not be full divisions, but equivalent divisions satisfactory for garrisoning and the like.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked what extra service and anti-aircraft troops would be needed for use in Italy if we held *HUSKY* and moved on to the mainland.

GENERAL SMITH replied that a flash estimate indicated a requirement of 30,000 United States troops and 33,000 British troops, to be provided from outside the North African Theater of operations for operations in the toe and ball, but not in the heel, of Italy. These would be supporting and administrative units and would include about six United States and five British anti-aircraft battalions. The toe and ball area could be defined as extending from Reggio to a point somewhat beyond Mt. Etna.

GENERAL MARSHALL inquired why the total of divisions in North Africa prior to the *ROUNDHAMMER* build-up was set at thirty-six and asked whether this limitation was imposed by shipping or by availability of defense.

SIR ALAN BROOKE answered that both factors influenced the limitation and reminded that many of the divisions within this quota would be equivalent rather than actual.

GENERAL MARSHALL remarked that the need for 63,000 troops above those already scheduled for the impending operations had not been mentioned before and seemed to involve a new shipping commitment. He asked Sir Harold Alexander to comment.

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SIR HAROLD ALEXANDER stated that the figure seemed high, but that we should be well prepared for whatever decision might follow a quick success in *HUSKY*.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked what difference there would be in the need for troops other than those which would be in the North African Theater if *HUSKY* were to come into our hands very quickly.

BRIGADIER SUGDEN replied that there would be very little difference as far as North Africa is concerned, since enemy air threats would still exist at many points. *SIR ARTHUR TEDDER* concurred in this view.

SIR HAROLD ALEXANDER expressed the opinion that, while there might not be a great difference in the need for anti-aircraft, there should be a difference in the need for other troops, since forces on *HUSKY* would leave there and move on to other places.

GENERAL SMITH, in answer to a question by General Marshall, stated that in earlier planning for a move against Sardinia, it had been estimated that 67,000 troops other than those already in the North African Theater would be required.

GENERAL MARSHALL expressed the understanding that General Eisenhower was to have available for post-*HUSKY* all troops in the North African Theater at the time of *HUSKY* except seven divisions which were to move to the United Kingdom beginning 1 November; air force loaned for *HUSKY* with the understanding that they would be withdrawn, and possibly certain naval warcraft whose availability was to be decided after the completion of *HUSKY*. He inquired whether the figure of 63,000 was to apply exclusive of these exceptions.

GENERAL SMITH answered in the affirmative. Some of these additional troops might be found in the Middle East. There was a great need for additional anti-aircraft unless we proposed to take longer risks in North Africa, where we are already cutting down. However, he pointed out that the figure of 63,000 was only an approximation. About one-third would be anti-aircraft and the remaining two-thirds would be Services of Supply and Signal troops.

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THE PRIME MINISTER stated that if we secured more ports, we must certainly have more anti-aircraft. It would be absolutely essential to guard ports used for our forward movements. As the enemy rolled away, however, we should be able to lessen the anti-aircraft in ports which became more remote as a result of their retreat. It would be possible to secure some anti-aircraft from the Eastern Mediterranean, and this matter should be looked into carefully, along with the proposition of taking more anti-aircraft strength from England itself. He would be willing to take additional punishment at home in order to see the operations through successfully.

SIR ALAN BROOKE commented that anti-aircraft strength in the United Kingdom had already been considerably lessened, as it had been in Suez, in West Africa, and in a number of other places. He pointed out that the cost of the operations planned would be colossal if we were not prepared to reduce defenses in the rear as we move forward.

GENERAL SMITH re-emphasized the point that a maximum of protection would be necessary at points of departure for landing craft. On the Tunisian coast, for instance, it would be necessary to double the present anti-aircraft strength, as anti-aircraft units intended for the operation would be ineffective while loading and during shipment. Once the landing craft had sailed, however, it would be possible to strip down port anti-aircraft defenses considerably. Airdromes have already been stripped in the interest of port protection.

GENERAL MARSHALL raised the point that meeting the requirement for 63,000 additional troops would raise a new shipping problem and one which had not previously been considered.

GENERAL SMITH stated that the staff would break down the 63,000 service troop item and see what could be secured from the Middle East.

THE PRIME MINISTER indicated that certain divisions, including some of those of the 8th Army, had moved back without taking all of their service troops and said he believed that some of these could be used as a part of the 63,000. For example, the 8th Army had motor

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transport sufficient to maintain it over an immense stretch of communications, and it should be possible to make some of this available. He also suggested that we should be able to draw upon some of the administrative services, particularly signal units, of the First Army when that organization was disbanded.

BRIGADIER SUGDEN said that the IX Corps signal units were being absorbed in North Africa and that all of them would be used in *HUSKY*. The need for troops over and above those already set up for North Africa was due to the fact that if post-*HUSKY* was to continue immediately upon *HUSKY*, there would be no time for reorganizing units used during *HUSKY* and throwing them immediately into the next operation unless there was to be a time lag between *HUSKY* and post-*HUSKY*.

SIR ALAN BROOKE reiterated his view that a movement into the toe of Italy should be considered a part of *HUSKY* and that the same troops which went into the latter could continue their advance into the former.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that if it took until 14 August to foresee a successful conclusion of *HUSKY* by 28 August, we should not wait until the latter date to start post-*HUSKY*, but should rather start it on 14 August. If we found it necessary to deliver extra strength to the North African Theater for the purpose of effecting post-*HUSKY*, we should do it. Some of the additional anti-aircraft units needed could be secured from the United Kingdom and it would not be thought unreasonable to take for this purpose certain of the units which were being held for *ROUNDHAMMER*. These units could be used for post-*HUSKY* and still be brought back for their rendezvous in May 1944. *THE PRIME MINISTER* added that if General Eisenhower wished to move from *HUSKY* into Italy, there should be no interval between the two operations which would permit the enemy to pull himself together and prepare himself for the second.

GENERAL MARSHALL spoke of the careful planning which lay behind the shipping arrangements made at the Trident Conferences in Washington and to the small deficit in shipping which had been encountered. He reminded his colleagues that the ball and toe of Italy, which it was

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proposed to take, was only a small part of the entire nation. The shipping situation was so serious that, under plans already formulated and without provision for the 63,000 additional troops, it would be necessary for us to let some divisions fall below strength and for the British to consider the elimination of certain units. He wished to be perfectly sure that the price in shipping was carefully considered and that it did not involve resources in an operation calling for more ships than we could actually secure. He re-emphasized that we should not set our hearts too fully on one operation or another until the early results of *HUSKY* had been tabulated.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated it would be hard for him to ask the British people to cut their rations again, but he would gladly do so rather than throw away a campaign which had possibilities of great success. He could not endure to see a great army stand idle when they might be engaged in eliminating Italy from the war. Parliament and the people would become impatient if the Army were not active, and he was willing to take almost desperate steps in order to prevent such a calamity.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he was not arguing against the broad commitment made in Washington to aim at the fall of Italy. He only wished to emphasize that we must exercise great discretion in the selection of an operation to follow *HUSKY*, calculating closely what would be required and basing calculations upon an accurate knowledge of what was to be faced.

MR. EDEN, upon the question of the Prime Minister, commented on the Turkish situation. He said it should be borne in mind that prospects for bringing Turkey into the war through persuasion were not good and that perhaps the time had arrived for more forceful measures. Knocking Italy out of the war would go a long way towards bringing the Turks in. They would become much more friendly when our troops had reached the Balkan area.

THE PRIME MINISTER intervened to observe emphatically that he was not advocating sending an army into the Balkans now or in the near future.

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MR. EDEN said that it would not be necessary to put an army into the Balkans, since the Turks would begin to show favorable reactions as soon as we were able to constitute an actual and immediate threat to the Balkans. Continuing, he said that a feeling was growing up among the Italians that Germany was not giving them the help that their plight necessitated. If this state of affairs continued, there was a good chance of Italy going out of the war.

SIR ALAN BROOKE gave an analysis of the problem of the Germans as he saw it. A great battle in Russia was imminent, with the Russians well situated and probably planning to attack if the Germans did not do so, although they would actually prefer to wait for colder weather before assuming the offensive. It was reported that there had been some minor successes in the Kuban. He did not anticipate a large withdrawal of German troops from Russia. On the other hand, the Germans must certainly have foreseen the signs of an attack to be made by Great Britain and the United States. As a result of the arrival of our landing craft and of other signs pointing to offensive action on our part, the Germans were probably nervous about committing themselves heavily in Russia. Falling back in Russia would cause them to expose some vital areas to Russian bombing. Thus it appeared that they would either give up Italy or withdraw from the Balkans. It appeared unlikely that they would choose the former course. He felt that their problem was a very difficult one.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that certain units were already being moved away from *HUSKY* and that the Germans may have already made up their minds as to what they should abandon.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said he believed the units moved from *HUSKY* were motor torpedo units. They were moved to the southern coast of France but they might return. While such movement might be a straw in the wind, it was a small straw, since there would be no use for these units along the French coast and since *HUSKY* was the only place where they would be of any value. It seemed likely that the Germans had moved their main repair bases to France and that the motor torpedo units were going in for repairs.

SIR HAROLD ALEXANDER, upon the request of the Prime Minister, stated his general impression regarding our forthcoming operations. After examining intelligence on the defense of *HUSKY* and after recent fighting against Germans and Italians, he was optimistic. The fighting value of our troops and equipment was excellent. Our chances of success were excellent, although it might take a fortnight of very bitter fighting to attain it. Once we joined battle, he continued, the slogging generally lasts from ten days to a fortnight or even three weeks. Then the end comes quickly. He said that the most important points in connection with *HUSKY* were the air fields, in the southeast corner of the island, and the ports. Once we had a firm grip on these, we could ignore the remainder of the island for the time being. It should be possible to cross the Straits of Messina and secure a foothold on the opposite shore, which was the very windpipe of *HUSKY*. He repeated his statement made in the meeting of 29 May that securing a bridgehead on the Italian mainland should be considered as a part of *HUSKY*. It would be impossible for us to win a great victory unless we should exploit *HUSKY* by moving ahead, preferably up into Italy. All this, however, will be clarified as the *HUSKY* operation moves along. It is not impossible, although it seems unlikely, that the toe of Italy will be so strongly held as to require a complete re-staging of operations. We should be prepared, however, to continue moving with no stop at all once *HUSKY* is inaugurated. Modern warfare allows us to forge ahead very rapidly with radio controlling troops at a great distance and with air providing protection and support over a great area.

The going may become more difficult as we move up the Italian mainland, but this is no argument against going as far as we can on the momentum of the *HUSKY* drive. He stated that none of the possibilities he had discussed could be accurately foreseen. In war the incredible often occurred. A few months ago it would have been impossible for him to believe what has actually happened to Rommel and his Afrika Korps. A few weeks ago he would have found it difficult to believe that 300,000 Germans would collapse in a week. The enemy air forces had been swept out of the skies so completely that we could

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have a parade, if we chose, of all our North Africa forces on one field in Tunisia without any danger from enemy aircraft.

SIR ARTHUR TEDDER said that we could not, in the initial phase of *HUSKY*, expect the degree of air superiority which had been attained in the final phase of the Tunisian campaign. The air threat to the shipping and landing craft should however be greatly eased once we have seized the air fields.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM, in answer to the Prime Minister's request that he offer comments on *HUSKY* and post-*HUSKY*, stated his view that we had every chance for success; that, after backing and filling, a good plan had been produced, and that sufficient time had been allowed for preparation. He agreed with Sir Harold Alexander that if all went well with *HUSKY*, we should go directly across the Straits. He pointed out that *HUSKY* was different from Tunis in that it will be impossible to put an absolute stop to enemy supply. There was no doubt that we should lose some ships, but because of our excellent air support he did not fear bombing as much as he feared the action of E-boats. Enemy air attacks would probably not pay because of the high degree of confidence which the crews of our small ships had developed in aerial support. They themselves had shot down many enemy aircraft. There did not seem to be much cause to worry about losses in naval vessels, he said, and although we might feel losses in merchant ships, they should not be too large.

SIR HAROLD ALEXANDER stated that at the moment the Germans did not have much strength in the places we proposed to attack, although they did have some artillery and tanks. Communications in Italy, he said, were bad and getting worse. It was his feeling that if the Germans did not move quickly into Italy in larger force, they might be too late.

SIR ARTHUR TEDDER said that the air forces had been blasting Italian communications for weeks, the pressure on the enemy windpipe of which Sir Harold had referred was already being exerted. We knew that the enemy was already in serious difficulties in maintaining his supplies and reinforcing.

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THE PRIME MINISTER said he thought the German High Command might have gone to Hitler and advised him they did not wish another Tunisia in Sardinia. He added that the discussions in Algiers had enabled him to form an opinion and provided material for a report to his Government.

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that he thought everything was well understood and that he appreciated the trip which the Prime Minister and General Marshall had made to clarify for him what the Combined Chiefs of Staff had done. He understood it was his responsibility to get information regarding the early phases of *HUSKY* and forward them to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in time for the latter to make a decision regarding a plan which would follow upon *HUSKY* without a break or a stop. He would send not only information, but also strong recommendations based upon the conditions of the moment. He hoped that his three top commanders would have an opportunity to comment more formally on these matters, although he concurred completely in what they had said thus far.

It was agreed that there would be another meeting at General Eisenhower's villa on Thursday afternoon, 3 June, at an appropriate time.

APPENDIX " A "

31 May 1943

BACKGROUND NOTES

BY

THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE

1. The troops in the table attached (Annex I) are in the Mediterranean. Of these the British or British controlled units which are under General Eisenhower's Command or earmarked for *HUSKY* are shown in Annex II.

From 1 November three British and four United States Divisions must begin their successive movement into the *BOLERO* area. Apart from sending drafts to existing units His Majesty's Government is prepared to reinforce General Eisenhower's Command, at such dates as may be found convenient or necessary, by the units shown in Annex III.

2. His Majesty's Government feel most strongly that this great force, which comprises their finest and most experienced divisions, and the main part of their army, should not in any circumstances remain idle. Such an attitude could not be justified to the British nation or to our Russian allies. We hold it our duty to engage the enemy as continuously and intensely as possible, and to draw off as many hostile divisions as possible from the front of our Russian allies. In this way, among others, the most favorable conditions will be established for the launching of *BOLERO* in 1944.

3. Compelling or inducing Italy to quit the war is the only objective in the Mediterranean worthy of the famous campaign already begun and adequate to the allied forces available and already in the Mediterranean basin. For this purpose the operation *HUSKY* is an indispensable preliminary, and the invasion of the mainland of Italy and the capture of Rome are the evident steps. In this way the greatest service can be rendered to the allied cause and the general progress of the war, both here and in the Channel Theater.

Appendix " A "

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4. We cannot tell at present what degree of resistance the enemy will oppose to our action. Germany may make the strongest effort to defend *HUSKYLAND* and *ITALY*. We are told one Division a week could be transported to *HUSKYLAND* or the southern part of *ITALY*. It is desirable that this possibility should be reviewed in the light of the latest information, and stated in precise terms, i.e., the strength, gross and net, of the German Divisions, the number of guns, tanks and vehicles accompanying them, the areas from which they would most likely be drawn during the next 12 weeks and whether they will come by rail, march or sea. There are no signs at present of any movement of this character or on this scale. In order to have six Divisions in *HUSKYLAND* before the operation, the enemy decisions and preparations must already have been made and their movement should already now be apparent. Moreover, if these six Divisions are to move to *HUSKYLAND* the southern parts of Italy must remain denuded. It is asked that the most searching re-examination of the German movements and capacity to move in the direction mentioned should be made by the Staffs.

5. If the Germans decide to move forces of the order of between 6 and 12 Divisions into *HUSKYLAND* and *ITALY* we shall certainly have achieved part of our task in drawing, directly or indirectly, forces off our Russian allies. If they do not do so, but only send one or two Divisions to stimulate Italian effort the tasks mentioned in paragraph 3 should not be beyond our strength in the next three or four months. If, on the other hand, the Germans elect to fight a major battle for *HUSKYLAND* or for the Italian toe, or both, our armies will be fully engaged and we shall bring about that intensity of air fighting which from our growing relative strength is so greatly to our advantage. If after we have established ourselves in the southern parts of Italy, Italy still continues to fight and the Germans send belated reinforcements on a large scale we might have to withdraw towards the tip, forcing them to attack successive prepared positions at heavy cost with all the advantages of a procured diversion and of the air battle aforesaid. There would be no reason to regard this as a disaster. As long as we are fighting heavily with the Germans or even with the Italians we shall be playing our part.

Appendix " A "

6. The present believed distribution of the Italian Army is set out in Annex IV. (Not included in this volume.) It will be seen that there are only 11 Italian Divisions in the mainland of Italy, about 4 in *HUSKYLAND* and 5 along the Riviera, and that no fewer than 28 are tied up in Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece. To these 28 must be added 8 Roumanian and 11 German Divisions, making a total of 47 held in the Balkan Peninsula by the guerrilla activities of the Serbian Michailovitch, the Croatian partisans, the general disorders in Greece and the unrest in these enslaved countries.

7. Should Italy be made to quit the war, the following practical advantages would be gained by us. The Germans would be forced to provide troops to occupy the Riviera, to maintain a new front along the Po or on the Brenner and, above all, to fill the void in the Balkans caused by the demobilization and withdrawal of Italian Divisions. Up to the present the guerrillas, etc., have only been nourished by parachute packets dropped from less than a dozen airplanes. Nevertheless, they are accomplishing the prodigious feat of immobilizing 47 enemy Divisions. The occupation of the southern parts of Italy, or even merely of the whole of the toe or heel would give us access to the Adriatic and the power to send shiploads of munitions to Adriatic ports, and also Agents and possibly small Commando bands. We should not have the troops to engage in any serious operations there, and His Majesty's Government do not contemplate or desire the provision of any organized armed force for the Balkan theater, either this year or in any period with which we are now concerned. Nevertheless, the aiding within the limits proposed of the patriot bands in Yugoslavia, the fomenting of revolt in Greece and Albania are measures of high importance all of which, together with our main operations, will influence the action of Turkey when, (provided the necessary conditions are established) she is subjected to our demands later in the year. In this way the utmost aid in our power will be given to Russia and also to *BOLERO*. It is only when and if these prospects are decisively closed to us that we should consider secondary or minor alternatives for Mediterranean action.

Appendix "A"

8. All attempts to forecast the German action in the Mediterranean are, of course, highly speculative. Importance should however be attached to the painful impression certainly sustained by the German High Command of the complete destruction of an Army of over a quarter of a million men. In the light of this event it may be doubtful whether they would court the repetition in *HUSKYLAND* of a similar disaster though on a smaller scale. Our situation has vastly improved. First by the inspiring of the allied armies through their recent victories. Secondly, by the fact that only a few hundred of the enemy escaped from *TUNISIA* to *HUSKYLAND*. Thirdly, the psychological effects produced on Spain and Portugal, on Metropolitan France, in Italy and in Turkey and, indeed, throughout the whole area of the war. The German position has proportionately deteriorated. The series of immense battles impending on the Russian front must absorb their main strength. If the Germans do not attack, the Russians certainly will, and may indeed even forestall their enemy. We cannot foretell the results of these battles, but there is no reason to suppose that the conditions are not more favorable to the Russians than they were this time last year. It must therefore be considered unlikely:

a. that the Germans will attempt to fight a major battle in *HUSKYLAND*; or

b. that they will send strong forces into the leg of Italy. They would be wiser to fight only delaying actions, stimulating the Italians in these regions and retiring to the line of the Po, reserving their strength to hold the Riviera and the Balkans, which are of value as a supply area. If the battle goes against them in Russia and if our action upon or in Italy is also successful the Germans may be forced by events to withdraw to the Alps and the Danube, as well as making further withdrawal on the Russian front and possibly evacuating Norway. All these results may be achieved within the present year by bold and vigorous use of the forces at our disposal. No other action of the first magnitude is open to us this year in Europe.

Appendix " A "

ANNEX I TO APPENDIX " A "
 Reference Para 1 of " BACKGROUND Notes "

31 May 1943

TROOPS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Notes:- 1. This list includes troops in *NORTH AFRICA, TRIPOLITANIA, CYRENAICA, EGYPT, PALESTINE, SYRIA AND CYPRUS*, plus formations allotted ex U.S.A. and U.K. for *HUSKY*, and one division on call from *PAIC*.

2. Certain divisions including those marked * will not become available for operations until a later date.

3. No account is taken of the possibility of having to break up one or more British divisions to provide reinforcements.

		Equivalent Subtotal	Divisions Total
<i>a. U.S.</i>			
Inf. Divs.	1, 3, 9, 34, 36, 45	6	
Armd. Divs.	1, 2	2	
Airborne Div.	82	1	9
<i>b. French</i>			
Inf. Divs.	three	3*	
Armd. Bdes.	one	1/3	3 1/3
<i>c. British and British Controlled</i>			
Inf. Divs.	1, 5, 46, 50, 51, 56, 78, 1 Cdn, 4 Ind, 8 Ind, 10 Ind, 3 Carpathian,* 5 Pol- ish,* Free French	14	
Divs.	4, N.Z.*	2	
Armd. Divs.	1, 6, 7, 10, 6 S.A.* 31 Ind.	6	
Airborne Div.	1	1	
Independent Inf. Bdes.	231, 1 Greek, 2 Greek, Belgian, SDF, Libyan Arab Force	2	

(Table Continued on Next Page)

Independent Tank Bdes.	1 Cdn, 1 & 25 Army Tank Bdes, 8 & 23 Armd. Bdes, 4 Lt. Armd. Bde, 2 Polish*	2-1/3	27-1/3
Independent Para. Bde.	4	1/3	1/3
	Grand Total		<u>40</u>

Annex I to Appendix " A "

ANNEX II TO APPENDIX " A "
 Reference Para 1 of " BACKGROUND Notes "

31 May 1943

BRITISH AND BRITISH-CONTROLLED UNITS UNDER GENERAL
 EISENHOWER'S COMMAND OR EARMARKED FOR HUSKY

		Total Equivalent Divisions
Inf. Divs.	1, 5, 46, 50, 51, 78, 1 Cdn	7
Div.	4	1
Armd. Div.	6	1
Airborne Divisions	1	1
Independent Inf. Bde.	231	1/3
Independent Tank Bdes.	1 Cdn, 25 Army Tank Bde.	2/3
Independent Para. Bde.	4	1/3
	Total	<u>11-1/3</u>

Note:- Three of the above divisions will be earmarked for return to U. K. after HUSKY.

Annex II to Appendix " A "

ANNEX III TO APPENDIX " A "
Reference Para 1 of " BACKGROUND Notes "

31 May 1943

BRITISH AND BRITISH-CONTROLLED UNITS WHICH COULD BE
TRANSFERRED TO GENERAL EISENHOWER'S COMMAND

Note: Allowance has been made in this table for internal security and other commitments of Middle East Command, but as there has been no opportunity to discuss these requirements with representatives of Middle East, figures and in particular nominations must be taken as approximate.

		Total Equivalent Divis
Inf. Divs.	56, 4 Ind, 8 Ind, 3 Car- pathian, 5 Polish	5
Divs.	N.Z.	1
Armd. Divs.	1	1
Independent Tank Bdes.	1 Army Tank Bde, 4 Lt. Armd, 8 and 23d Armd, 2 Polish	1-2/3
	Total	<hr/> 8-2/3

Annex III to Appendix " A "

MINUTES OF A MEETING

held at

GENERAL EISENHOWER'S VILLA, ALGIERS,
at 1700 hours, 3 June 1943

PRESENT

British

The Prime Minister
The Right Hon. Anthony Eden
Admiral of the Fleet
 Sir Andrew B. Cunningham
General Sir Alan F. Brooke
General Sir Harold Alexander
Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder
General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery
Lieutenant General
 Sir Hastings L. Ismay
Brigadier C. S. Sugden
Commodore R. M. Dick

U.S.

General G. C. Marshall
General D. D. Eisenhower
Major General T. T. Handy
Major General W. B. Smith
Brig. General L. W. Rooks

SECRETARIES

Lieut. Colonel Frank McCarthy
Major Carter L. Burgess

1. OPERATION "SOAPSUDS"

GENERAL ISMAY said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had asked for General Eisenhower's recommendations on SOAPSUDS and inquired whether the conclusions of these minutes should be submitted to them.

GENERAL EISENHOWER replied in the affirmative.

After a general discussion of the proposed operation,

THE CONFERENCE:-

a. Agreed:

- (1) That SOAPSUDS is an important and desirable operation which should be undertaken by General Eisenhower at the earliest possible moment provided that:
 - (a) It does not detract from the weight of HUSKY; and
 - (b) Adequate time is allowed for training and preparation. This would not be possible by June. The precise moment for this execution must be left to General Eisenhower.
- (2) That two groups of B-24's now in the U.K. and one group of B-24's now enroute to the U.K. from the United States by Africa should be assembled in North Africa as soon as possible for training. That during this period they will be available for operational use.
- (3) That it is inadvisable to withdraw for SOAPSUDS a heavy bombardment group from India.

b. Took note that the Prime Minister and General Marshall would present their conclusion to the British War Cabinet and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, respectively, and that General Eisenhower's recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff would conform thereto.

2. MARSHALLING YARDS AT ROME

THE PRIME MINISTER requested Sir Arthur Tedder to comment upon air force activities in connection with HUSKY.

SIR ARTHUR TEDDER stated that our air forces were trying to keep enemy aircraft down and press them back. We are attacking the enemy's main bases. Several days ago we attacked Bari, from which he moved to Foggia. He has now moved farther away to Fiazensa. We are interfering with his shipping and supply lines by hitting ports and railroads. Our attacks are telling. Recent photographs indicate that the enemy is using ferries for taking supplies into Italy.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he understood it was our object to build up in a steady crescendo, employing eventually all the air forces for bombing *HUSKY*.

THE PRIME MINISTER, upon inquiry from General Marshall, stated his feeling that some discussion of a proposal to bomb the marshalling yards near Rome would be appropriate. After seeing Archbishop Spellman, he had told the President that we would not bomb Rome for the present because of possible political repercussions. He now felt, however, that there was no tenable objection to the proposition, and for his own part he was ready to agree to bombing the marshalling yards. He pointed out that since daylight precision bombing was quite accurate, it was probable the yards could be attacked with small chance of damage to Rome itself and none to the Vatican. He not only would raise no objection to the bombing, but he would even suggest that it should be done.

MR. EDEN said that Rome, like Naples, was on the *HUSKY* supply line. He inquired as to the location of the marshalling yards with respect to Vatican City.

SIR ARTHUR TEDDER replied that, as he remembered, the marshalling yards were to the Southeast.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM indicated that since the yards and Vatican City were on different sides of the Tiber, there was a clear line between them.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that he considered the marshalling yards a purely military objective, and that while their destruction would be of material benefit to the *HUSKY* operation, the psychological effect

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would be even more important. The bombing should be executed by a very large force of aircraft.

MR. EDEN said he was amazed at the accuracy of the bombing of Tunis and at the fact that very few bombs dropped anywhere except in the port area.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that he would like to see the British War Cabinet and the President empower General Eisenhower to go ahead with the bombing whenever such action would assist *HUSKY*.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that if we were to bomb the marshalling yards, we should be prepared to have Cairo bombed in retaliation.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that a declaration of war by Egypt might follow a bombing of Cairo. He recalled he had often said to Parliament that we were in no way inhibited from bombing Rome although we had not yet done it. He doubted actually whether there would be a bombing of Cairo. There had never been any agreement to refrain from bombing Rome if the enemy refrained from bombing Cairo.

GENERAL EISENHOWER suggested that consideration might be given to the proposition of bombing other rail junctions further south in order to make the marshalling yards useless without direct attack and inquired as to the actual military value of destroying the yards.

SIR ARTHUR TEDDER replied that the operation would constitute another step in pushing the enemy farther back and making the maintenance of his communications more difficult.

THE CONFERENCE:-

a. Agreed:

- (1) That marshalling yards of Rome are an important and necessary military objective within our bombardment plan.
- (2) That there is no valid reason for refraining from bombing this target, provided that the attacks be made by day and that due care is taken to prevent damage elsewhere.

- b. Took note that the Prime Minister and General Marshall would report the above conclusions to the British War Cabinet and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, respectively, with a view of getting authority from the U.S. and British Governments empowering General Eisenhower to take action against the marshalling yards at the moment that he thinks best for the successful prosecution of *HUSKY*.

3. OPERATION " HUSKY "

SIR BERNARD MONTGOMERY, upon request of the Prime Minister, outlined his views on *HUSKY*. He said that all his commanders had complete confidence in the present plan, and that troops would be filled with enthusiasm when they stepped ashore. Risks were involved, but they had been gone into very carefully and he felt that they were justified. He pointed out that although he had two airborne divisions, he had only enough air transport for one. In the early stages, he would be able to employ only about one-third of his airborne strength; the remainder to be brought in on D + 2 or D + 3. With 140 more aircraft, he could employ another airborne brigade at the very first. However, he understood that these were not available and the limitation was accepted. His officers were completely happy about the whole thing. As regards post-*HUSKY*, he felt it important that we decide in what direction we wanted to go and use our military strength to make the battle move that way.

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether there was any great danger that bad weather might seriously interfere with the operation.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM stated that although we now usually had a number of calm, flat days in succession, there might possibly be a strong northwesterly breeze which would necessitate postponing the operation for a day.

SIR HAROLD ALEXANDER said it would be dangerous to put the operation off, and *SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM* replied that, in the event of unfavorable weather, it would be even more dangerous to put it on. He stated the belief that the enemy would see a vast armada of hundreds

of ships and would know by 1800 hours the night before the attack that the ships were going to *HUSKY*. In answer to an inquiry by the Prime Minister, he said that it would be possible to mark time if the weather were not suitable for landing, provided the decision were taken 24 hours in advance. A fairly good prediction of weather conditions should be possible 24 hours before the landings.

4. *POST-HUSKY*

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed his satisfaction at the great measure of agreement which he had found in these meetings. He did not think we should attempt to draw up a formal post-*HUSKY* plan at this time. It was understood that post-*HUSKY* would be in General Eisenhower's hands and that he would recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff whichever operation seemed best. However, he felt everyone agreed that it would be best to put Italy out of the war as soon as possible. The capture of Rome, with or without the elimination of Italy from the war, would be a very great achievement for our Mediterranean forces. We could only tell about the possibilities of this project after the launching of *HUSKY*, when General Eisenhower would report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. If there should arise differences as to post-*HUSKY*, they would be settled between the two Governments. He had not been conscious of expressing in the meetings of 29 May, 31 May, and today, anything not in harmony with his background notes, and that the minutes should be read with this understanding. During these meetings he had been most solidly encouraged and he would take home a feeling of confidence and comradeship which characterized actions in this Theater. He had never received so strong an impression of cooperation and control as during his visit here. It would be impossible to embark on an undertaking under better augury. He should not like to go away without reaffirming his full confidence in General Eisenhower and without expressing his admiration of the manner in which the General had handled his many great problems.

GENERAL EISENHOWER replied that any praise which might be given belonged to the officers around the table and stated that, while there might be differences of opinions and discussions in his Headquarters,

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these were never based upon national differences.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff concurred in the Prime Minister's statement of the accomplishments and the success of General Eisenhower and his officers. The fine support given to General Eisenhower by the British, and especially by Admiral Cunningham, General Alexander, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, General Montgomery, and General Anderson, was deeply appreciated. He felt the greatest discomfort the Germans must have experienced came not so much from their loss of troops as from the fact that Great Britain and the United States have worked so well as a team.

GENERAL BROOKE said that he particularly appreciated the manner in which General Eisenhower and his staff had cooperated with the British War Office.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he, Mr. Eden, and General Brooke would report these discussions to the British Government upon their return to London, and he understood that General Marshall would report orally to the President and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that he would also give an account of the discussions to the Chief of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington.

ANNEX TO MINUTES, AFHQ

3 June 1943

PARAPHRASE OF A TELEGRAM FROM
WAR CABINET OFFICE, LONDON

Joint Intelligence Staff appreciate situation as follows:

1. Axis obtain 3 million tons per annum from Roumania of which 2 million tons goes to Germany and 1 million tons to Italy.

2. Capacity of 6 main active Ploesti refineries is 5 million tons per annum and present production thereof is 4 million tons per annum.

3. If 6 major Ploesti oil refineries were destroyed, Germany would endeavor to transfer load to other oil refineries in Roumania and occupied Europe. In absence of firm information about present serviceability of these other refineries, difficult to estimate total delay involved, but we think that no Roumanian oil supplies via these other refineries can be recommenced before 6 weeks and only half date for next 6 weeks. Result would be loss to Axis supplies of about 550,000 tons over three months after raid.

4. Following estimate however, of strategic effect assumes that effect of attack is to deny at least 250,000 tons over three months. The attack 1st July might have any of following strategic effects:

a. To cripple Italy's war effort.

b. To frustrate any German offensive then current in Russia.

c. To prevent such offensive from taking place.

d. To cause German failure to resist a Russian offensive which might otherwise have been withstood.

5. Not possible to calculate strategic effect with certainty since it would depend on other elements in total situation at the time especially

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degree of Russian activity. We remain of opinion that whatever the situation a really successful attack on Floesti could not fail to have a major effect either on German strategy or on the outcome of her operations then in progress.

6. Substantial increase in Germany's synthetic capacity may well not take place before 1944 though this cannot be confirmed without further photographic reconnaissance now pending. In any case an unexpected major curtailment of supply during operations as result of attack whether on 1st July or 1st September coupled with apprehension which it would induce about effect of further attacks against Roumanian and other oil targets must in our opinion have effects described above.

7. If Italy goes out of the war before the attack effect will require recalculating in light of all changed factors including diversion to Germany of Roumanian supplies at present going to Italy.

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