

QUADRANT CONFERENCE

AUGUST 1943

PAPERS
AND
MINUTES OF MEETINGS

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OFFICE, U. S. SECRETARY
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1943

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C.C.S. 222/4

FUTURE CONVOY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ATLANTIC

References:

CCS 115th Meeting, Item (11)

CCS 116th Meeting, Item (4)

C.C.S. 222/2, circulated a study prepared by the Combined Military Transportation Committee on its own initiative, which was presented for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 20 August 1943.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 116th Meeting approved the recommendations of an ad hoc committee (C.C.S. 222/3) as amended. Final approved paper subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 222/4.

C.C.S. 222/4

24 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
FUTURE CONVOY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ATLANTIC

Note by the Secretaries

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved the Enclosure regarding future convoy arrangements in the Atlantic.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE

FUTURE CONVOY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ATLANTIC

1. a. C.C.S. 222/2 indicates that convoy UGS 16, sailing 26 August, has 91 firm presenters as against a convoy limit of 80 ships.

b. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been requested by the Combined Military Transportation Committee to give a decision on one of two alternatives:

(1) To raise the limit of UGS convoys.

(2) To indicate the priority which should be assigned the presenters involved so that 80 ships can be selected.

2. a. With regard to alternative (1), the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, has established the limit on the number of ships in UGS convoys at 80 for security reasons.

b. The immediate problem in priorities has been solved in large part by the withdrawal of six U.S. Army vessels and two B.M.W.T. vessels from the list of presenters. The convoy limitation of 80 ships now is exceeded by three.

c. It is quite possible that, of the remaining 83 vessels at least three may fail to meet the convoy sailing date.

RECOMMENDATIONS

3. It is recommended that:

a. Three vessels be nominated for withdrawal from the convoy, if necessary, in the following priority:

First withdrawal — 1 B.M.W.T. vessel

Second withdrawal — 1 W.S.A. vessel

Third withdrawal — 1 B.M.W.T. vessel

Vessel or vessels to be selected by the agency concerned.

b. All vessels should be prepared to sail.

4. In view of the fact that indications point to a recurrence of this problem in subsequent months, it is recommended that the U.S. Navy fix the earliest practical date when a program of four *UGS* convoys per month will be established with due regard to the general set-up of convoys in the Atlantic.

5. It is further recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff delegate to the Combined Military Transportation Committee the executive authority to act on similar problems in the future with regard to *UGS* convoys in accordance with the following priority, unless otherwise agreed:

a. U.S. and British ships destined for forces commanded by the Allied Commander in Chief in Mediterranean.

b. U.S. and British ships destined for India.

c. U.S. and British ships destined for Allied forces in Middle East.

d. U.S. and British ships carrying civil supplies for occupied territories in Mediterranean.

e. Ships destined for Persian Gulf.

f. Lend lease to Turkey.

g. Miscellaneous.

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C.C.S. 246/1

MOVEMENT OF THE "QUEENS"

References:

C.C.S. 115th Meeting, Item (6)

C.C.S. 246/1 was circulated, 21 August, for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In their 115th Meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendation contained therein.

C.C.S. 246/1

21 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

MOVEMENT OF THE "QUEENS"

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

At the 94th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the *TRIDENT* Conference, approval was given to the "*QUEENS*" running on a 28 day cycle as at that time the urgency of lifting personnel was not as great as it is now.

It is understood that a situation is developing in which it is essential to lift as many personnel as possible, and in view of the longer nights we recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should now approve that the "*QUEENS*" should revert to running on a 21 day cycle.

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C.C.S. 252/2

TIDALWAVE AIR FORCE

References:

C.C.S. 109th Meeting, Item (3)

C.C.S. 252/2 was circulated on 12 August for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 109th Meeting considered this paper in connection with the progress report on *POINTBLANK* (C.C.S. 309) and deferred decision. Subsequently, by informal action the C.C.S. agreed that the three B-24 groups shall revert to the operational control of the 8th Air Force.

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C.C.S. 252/2

12 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

TIDALWAVE AIR FORCE

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure is a message received from General Eisenhower recommending further use of the *TIDALWAVE* Air Force in the Mediterranean. It has been referred to the Combined Staff Planners for study and will be placed on the Combined Chiefs of Staff Agenda when the report of the Planners is received.

H. REDMAN,
J .R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

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ENCLOSURE

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

U R G E N T

From: Algiers.
To: WAR W 7138NAF 319
USFOR London No.

12th August 1943.

In view of the critical situation in Italy we consider that the B-24 force which carried out the attack on *TIDALWAVE* and which is now awaiting suitable weather conditions for attack on *JUGGLER* coordinated with B-17 force from 8th Bomber Command should, immediately on completion of *JUGGLER*, be concentrated on targets in Italy. We consider that at this juncture every available force should be brought to bear against Italy and the German in Italy. Once we are established in Italy follow up attacks on *TIDALWAVE* will from every point of view be easier to carry out than they now are from African bases.

C.C.S. 270/5 and 270/6

LAND AIRPORT FACILITIES IN THE AZORES

Reference:

C.C.S. 111th Meeting, Item (8)

1st Citadel Meeting

2nd Citadel Meeting, Item (1)

A memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, C.C.S. 270/5, was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 9 August 1943. The reply from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, C.C.S. 270/6, was circulated, 11 August and both papers were considered at Quadrant in the 111th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Final action on the subject was taken in C.C.S. 319/5.

C.C.S. 270/5

9 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

LAND AIRPORT FACILITIES IN THE AZORES

*Memorandum by the Representatives
of the British Chiefs of Staff*

1. Further information has now been received from the British Chiefs of Staff in relation to the subject of the facilities in the Azores.

2. As you know, both diplomatic and neutral channels have been concerned and we feel that perhaps a brief summary of the action that has taken place in this matter may be of value.

3. As long ago as 29 June the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs handed the U.S. Ambassador in London a message from the Prime Minister for the President, informing him of the progress then made in connection with our request to the Portuguese for facilities and in particular of Salazar's stipulation that under no circumstances could he agree to admit forces other than British, except perhaps in the event of Portugal becoming fully involved in the war. In this message hope was expressed that in view of approach to the Portuguese being made on the basis of Anglo-Portuguese alliance, the President would agree that we should conclude an agreement with the Portuguese on the lines desired by Salazar. At a later stage it should be possible to secure Portuguese assent to the use of the facilities by the forces of other of the United Nations. No reply had ever been received previously, indicating the views of the President, and in the absence of any expression of disagreement, it was reasonable to assume that no serious U.S. objection was seen to any of the proposals. The U.S. Government have been kept fully informed of the trend of the negotiations.

4. Subsequently, you will remember, came the U.S. proposal set out in C.C.S. 270. This proposal, which was to the effect that landing rights should be granted to American land planes in the Islands, might have raised difficulties in the delicate negotiations that were then in progress and at the request of the British the U.S. Government agreed that their proposal should not to be pressed at the present time since no great difficulty was anticipated in arranging landing rights for American aircraft as soon as the negotiations were satisfactorily concluded. It was then decided on 16 July that this matter

of landing rights for American aircraft should be left over pending the conclusion of the present negotiations and a notification to this effect was given through both diplomatic and military channels.

5. It was in the light of the above, therefore, that the following decisions were taken:

a. To seek the inclusion of reference to transit facilities for aircraft of the United Nations in the agreement but not to press proposal so far as to risk breakdown on this issue.

b. Not at this stage to ask for full operational facilities in the Islands for U.S. military, air ferry and transport operations.

c. To seek to extend benefit of our arrangements to the U.S. immediately we ourselves have entered the Islands.

6. We hope that this will make the situation clear. We have every intention of insuring that such facilities as may become available shall be at the disposal of both the U.S. and the British. The approach, however, is a delicate one and is based on the long-standing Anglo-Portuguese alliance. Once the scruples and fears of the Portuguese have been overcome we feel that everything should soon progress steadily.

C.C.S. 270/6

11 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

LAND AIRPORT FACILITIES IN THE AZORES

Memorandum From the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

1. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff have noted the progress of the British-Portuguese negotiations and also certain decisions taken by the British regarding these negotiations which are set forth in C.C.S. 270/5. They wish to reiterate, with the approval of the President:

a. That any British-Portuguese agreement limiting the use of facilities in the Azores to British Empire aircraft is not acceptable to the United States.

b. That regardless of what may be agreed as to other United Nations forces, it is of vital importance that Azores facilities be made available for U.S. military, air ferry and transport operations.

2. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff are convinced that the sense of all discussions on this subject held at the *TRIDENT* conferences sustains the United States view. This is perhaps best expressed in the final report to the President and Prime Minister in Section IV, paragraph 1, as follows:

“The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the occupation of the Azores is essential to the efficient conduct of the anti-U-boat war for the reasons set forth in the annex. The preparation of this plan is a responsibility of the British, and accordingly plans are actively in preparation under their authority. The British Chiefs of Staff have made a preliminary examination of these plans. It is proposed that the expedition should be mounted from the United Kingdom and that, in the first place, the islands of Fayal and Terceira should be seized. It is expected that a force of about nine battalions will be required. The availability of landing craft is likely to be the limiting factor regarding date, and as far as can be seen at present, the earliest date for arrival of the force in the Azores will be about the end of August. It is agreed that the land, air, and sea facilities will be available to all United Nations forces.

“The possibility of an earlier move on the Azores will receive further study. Meanwhile, the political decisions involved will be settled by the two governments.”

3. In the recommendations sent from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister, the Combined Chiefs of Staff stated:

“In submitting this recommendation, the Combined Chiefs of Staff propose that while the diplomatic approach is being made, forces should be prepared for the prompt seizure and use of the Azores if diplomacy fails.”

4. From the above, it appears evident:

a. That the use of the facilities of the Azores was to be obtained by the forces of the United Nations.

b. That this end was to be attained by force if necessary, and that in any event force was to be used if diplomatic means failed.

c. That the political questions involved are to be settled by both the United States and British Governments.

5. From the information set forth in C.C.S. 270/5 the U.S. Chiefs of Staff feel that diplomatic negotiations have failed of achieving the results which it was agreed are necessary.

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C.C.S. 272/1

LOGISTIC ORGANIZATION TO IMPROVE
MOBILITY OF ANTI-SUBMARINE SQUADRONS

Reference:

C.C.S. 111th Meeting, Item (7)

C.C.S. 272/1 was circulated, 12 August 1943, for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at *QUADRANT*.

In their 111th Meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff contained in C.C.S. 272/1, and final action was noted in C.C.S. 319/5.

C C.S. 272/1

12 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

LOGISTIC ORGANIZATION TO IMPROVE
MOBILITY OF ANTI-SUBMARINE SQUADRONS

Reference: *a.* C.C.S. 101st Meeting, Item 5

Memorandum from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

1. There is transmitted herewith the report of the Allied Anti-Submarine Board submitted in obedience to conclusion *a* of reference *a*.
2. It is noted that the Board has so far concerned itself almost wholly with U.S. sea frontiers.
3. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the Board should complete its directive by appropriate survey and recommendations as to transfer of anti-submarine air units between the U.S., Canada, Great Britain, N.W. Africa, W. Africa, etc.
4. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff suggest that the services concerned (British, Canadian, U.S.) should take appropriate steps to implement, where applicable and not already in force, the recommendations of paragraph 22 of the report pending the survey and recommendations indicated in paragraph 3 above.
5. As to paragraph 23 of the report, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff are in accord with the view that if each service concerned plans and perfects its own supply and maintenance organization and promulgates this information to other services, all will have been accomplished that conclusion *b* of reference *a* was calculated to achieve, and they therefore recommend the cancellation of conclusion *b*.

ENCLOSURE

Secret

Serial: 0010

6 August 1943.

From: Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board.

To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Logistic Organization to Improve Mobility of Anti-Submarine Squadrons.

Reference: (a) Cominch Secret Serial 001425 of 15 July 1943.

1. In accordance with the reference the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board have considered conclusion (a) of the reference which is quoted:

“Agreed to refer this problem to the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Committee (Kauffman-Mansfield Committee) for study and recommendation as to the mobility requirements for anti-submarine squadrons.”

2. In considering this problem the Board has visited Norfolk and conferred with Commander Air, Atlantic and his staff.

3. Whatever type of U-Boat offensive is adopted by the enemy adequate and timely counter measures depend entirely on an organization which will permit newly threatened areas to be quickly and efficiently reinforced.

4. From the surface aspect quick reinforcement is now possible due to the establishment of the “Support Group” system. The air on the other hand has no support group system except for the “CVE” and must depend therefor on the mobility of individual squadrons or parts of them.

5. All Frontier Commanders are thus liable to have additional A/S air squadrons sent to them at short notice. Their prime consideration must be to ensure that these squadrons can be accommodated and become fully operative without delay.

6. In considering mobility generally operational authorities should bear in mind the fact that climatic conditions effect rapid movement. To winterize a squadron of B-24's for instance takes 7-10 days. Movements between extremes of temperature should be avoided, therefore, as far as the tactical situation permits.

7. From the logistic point of view the requirements necessary for improving the mobility of A/S squadrons are shown under the following headings:

- (a) Strategic Air Fields.
- (b) Supply and Maintenance.
- (c) Standardization of A/S aircraft.
- (d) Squadron Organization.

8. (a) *Strategic Air Fields.*

It is clear that each Frontier has certain A/S air fields which are best suited to handle reinforcements. The Board recommends that Frontier Commanders designate these air fields and make known the *maximum* number of A/S aircraft that each could (a) accommodate normally, and (b), operate in an emergency.

9. It is further necessary that the capacity of the remaining A/S air fields within each Frontier be carefully reviewed with the idea of being able to accommodate additional aircraft in an emergency.

10. (b) *Supply and Maintenance.*

With regard to supply and maintenance, this Committee has, during the course of its extended travels, seen for itself the general unsatisfactory position regarding aircraft spares. Before making any further recommendations under the above heading therefore it is desired most strongly to represent the action be taken at once by the High Command to improve the situation regarding "spares."

11. The arguments against any flattening in the curve of production and the high desirability at this stage of the war of keeping to a peak production are well known. It is however considered essential that a temporary adjustment be accepted in order that the spare parts situation may be improved.

12. The opposition that will be put forward by the War Production Board to this recommendation is also realized, but it is desired to emphasize in the strongest possible terms that until definite action is taken to ensure that the situation with regard to "spares" keeps pace with that of production, maximum availability of aircraft and *true Mobility of aircraft can NOT be obtained.*

13. Despite the above, the supply, maintenance, and repair organization necessary to fulfill the requirements of mobility, render it a matter of prime

importance that aircraft spares (to include engines), aircraft handling equipment, and ordnance stores, etc., be so situated that they can be made available to any air field with the minimum delay.

14. The distances over which A/S air forces are distributed on this side of the Atlantic are such that, under the present organization, an unacceptable delay will occur in transporting spares and equipment from the Supply Depot to the aircraft. In extreme cases it might be necessary to transport up to 2,000 miles. The Board recommends that this possibility be overcome by holding, at one particular air field within each frontier, a quantity of non-critical spares and articles of equipment. If the location of these Frontier supply centers is coordinated between Frontiers it should be possible to ensure that any air field is within, say 500 miles of a supply of necessary equipment.

15. *Transport of Spares.* The present general lack of transport aircraft is well known but there can be no doubt that if and when more planes become available, the ideal, to achieve best mobility, would be for a number of transport planes to accompany a squadron ordered to move at short notice to reinforce a certain area. Much benefit to the spare part situation would accrue were it possible, when more planes are available, to allocate two or three U.S. Navy transport planes for the specific purpose of supplying "spares," returning damaged parts to the overhaul centers and in general servicing squadrons located outside continental U.S.

16. (c) *Standardization of A/S Aircraft.*

It is considered that mobility of A/S squadrons should be confined to certain types of aircraft which are common to various Allied services. These should be Liberator (B-24, PB4Y), Ventura (PV-1), Mariner (PBM-3), Catalina (PBY5 or 5A). Aircraft peculiar to one country only (i.e. Sunderland) can only be truly mobile within the sphere of operations of its own service.

17. While the types of aircraft at present employed on A/S Warfare are few, the majority of individual types vary in internal layout to a marked degree and contain equipment which, although fulfilling one duty only, differs considerably in design or construction. The situation is being further complicated by squadrons continually embodying modifications of their own. This accentuates maintenance difficulties and is especially confusing to maintenance personnel employed in specialist trades such as Radar and Ordnance.

18. The Board recommends that the closest cooperation be maintained between operational planners, Aircraft Contractors, and Modification Centers, and that every effort be made to arrive at a definite policy regarding the

equipping and layout of A/S aircraft. While not in any way suggesting that squadrons be discouraged from experimenting locally, local experiments and improvements must be made known to higher authority so that they can be coordinated and, if found to be of value, adopted as standard.

19. Furthermore, it is understood that certain parts of B-24 aircraft produced by Consolidated and Ford are not interchangeable. It is therefore most desirable that all B-24 aircraft destined for A/S Warfare should come off the production line of the Consolidated Company, as a major proportion of Liberators now in service as A/S aircraft are from this line.

20. (d) *Squadron Organization.*

There is no doubt that mobility must also depend to a considerable extent upon the organization of the squadrons themselves. The Board recommends that, as far as possible, A/S squadrons be maintained on a mobile basis. By this the Board does not mean that each squadron should carry a vast amount of additional spares and equipment but that each squadron should have a plan which will enable it to pack up and get underway without delay. These plans should be evolved by squadron commanders in consultation with their tactical and base commanders. The importance of having such plans cannot be overstressed. Instances have occurred in which squadrons have been prevented from moving at short notice by such trivial deficiencies as a lack of packing cases.

21. Squadron Commanders must also assure that each aircraft when under orders to move takes with it the maximum possible number of key personnel, key spares and equipment. On no account should aircraft be loaded up with large amounts of personal equipment. All non-immediate equipment can follow.

22. The following recommendations are made:

(a) That definite and immediate steps be taken to rectify the existing deplorable situation in regard to aircraft spare parts at the expense, if necessary, of curtailing new production.

(b) That only types of aircraft in common use in various services be considered mobile, namely Liberator, Venturas, Catalinas and Mariners.

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(c) That Frontier Commanders designate the air fields in their commands best suited to handle emergency reinforcements.

(d) That all Frontier Commanders prepare plans immediately for the



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organization of the three countries. Moreover it is the Board's considered opinion that even with all the technical experts necessary it is unlikely that any common answer which would be satisfactory to all services could be arrived at. The only solution appears to be for the various services to plan and perfect their own individual supply and maintenance organization and to promulgate the results to all concerned.

/s/ J. M. MANSFIELD,
Rear Admiral, R.N.

/s/ J. L. KAUFFMAN,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.

Copy to:

First Sea Lord.

C.N.S. Ottawa.

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C.C.S. 286/2 and 286/3

**FORMATION BY U.S. ASSAULT FORCES FOR
OPERATION "OVERLORD"**

References:

CCS 112th Meeting, Item (4)
CCS 314 Series

Subsequent to the memorandum presented by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, 7 August 1943 (C.C.S. 286/2), the British Chiefs of Staff circulated their reply, 18 August, for consideration at *QUADRANT*.

In their 112th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed to the modified proposal put forward by the British Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 286/3.

C.C.S. 286/2

7 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
FORMATION BY U.S. ASSAULT FORCES FOR
OPERATION OVERLORD

Reference: C.C.S. 286/1

Memorandum by U.S. Chiefs of Staff

1. In C.C.S. 286/1 the British Chiefs of Staff advise that, in order to meet the manning stringency in *OVERLORD*, they find it necessary to ask that the American Navy take over and man the following British assault, support, and special craft designated by the Allied Naval Commander in Chief to Assault Force "O," the American Naval Assault Forces based in Plymouth Command:—

16 L.C.S. (M)
15 Hedgerow fitted L.C.A.
12 L.C.T. (2)
5 L.C.G. (L)
11 L.C.F. (L)
48 L.C.P. (L) fitted for smoke laying
60 L.C.A.

2. The personnel required to man the above craft, including flotilla and squadron staff, and reserve to scale, is 215 officers and 2283 ratings, of which 192 are communication ratings and 227 tradesmen (artificers).

3. It is presumed that the ship-borne types of the British landing craft listed above, namely, 16 L.C.S.(M)'s, 60 L.C.A.'s, and 48 L.C.P.(L)'s, will be carried on British combat loaders during assaults. If this is correct, the admixture of American boat crews on British ships would bring about a situation more undesirable than the one to be corrected.

4. The landing craft in question, British designed and fitted with British equipment, should be manned by crews trained with that type of craft. There is none of these types in this country available for training purposes. It would, therefore, be necessary to send personnel to the *UNITED KINGDOM* for training. At the same time the British are bringing officers and crews to the *UNITED STATES* to man and train themselves in the use of *UNITED STATES* built landing craft.

5. 110 LST's, U. S. manned, are allocated to *OVERLORD*,—83 are assigned to U.S. troop lift—, the remaining 27 to allow for casualties and, it now appears, to assist in British troop lift. From 20 to 24 of these should be available for the assault and, if assigned to British troop lift, this will result in about 168 officers and 1512 men of the U.S. Navy participating in the operation with British Assault Forces.

6. In C.C.S. 244/1 the British have indicated the need of additional L.C.I. (L)'s (the number dependent upon the losses in *HUSKY*) to be furnished from *UNITED STATES'* production for British use in *OVERLORD*. In furtherance of this need, the British have submitted a lend-lease requisition for 18 L.C.I.(L)'s from *UNITED STATES'* production.

7. In addition to delivery of the above-mentioned landing craft (as well as other landing craft), there are being delivered from *UNITED STATES'* production 20 merchant ships per month up to 150 to 200, to be manned by British personnel.

8. It would appear that the need of personnel for British produced landing craft should take precedence over the manning of craft requested from *UNITED STATES'* production.

9. In view of the above consideration, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff feel that subject landing craft should be manned and operated by British personnel.

C.C.S. 286/3

18 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

FORMATION OF U.S. ASSAULT FORCES FOR OPERATION "OVERLORD"

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

1. The British request that the Americans man all the craft allocated to Assault Force "O," the American Naval Assault Force for *OVERLORD* based in the Plymouth Command, was considered by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff who declined to undertake this commitment for the reasons given in C.C.S.286/2.

2. There has been an opportunity during *QUADRANT* for this matter to be further investigated by the Combined Staffs. As a result, we now wish to put forward a modified proposal. We withdraw the request that the U.S. should man the shipborne types of landing craft, namely 16 L.C.S.(M), 15 Hedgerow fitted L.C.A. and 60 ordinary L.C.A., as these will be carried in British ships. However, in view of the fact that the remaining craft will be assigned to, and will train with, the American Naval Assault Force under a U.S. Naval Commander, we suggest that it would be reasonable that U.S. crews be provided. The craft involved are 12 L.C.T.(R), 5 L.C.G.(L), 11 L.C.F.(L), 48 L.C.P.(L) fitted for smoke-laying and not hoistable, and the personnel required amount to 135 officers and 1,511 men.

3. We ask the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to reconsider the decision conveyed in 286/2 to this extent.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

C.C.S. 288/3

QUADRANT CONFERENCE

AGENDA

Reference:

C.C.S. 106th Meeting, Item (3)

C.C.S. 288/3, Agenda for the Quadrant Conference, was prepared by the Combined Secretariat at the direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 106th Meeting.

C.C.S. 288/3

14 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
QUADRANT CONFERENCE
AGENDA

Note by the Secretaries

The following subjects will be considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the sequence in which they are listed. A detailed agenda will be issued daily.

A. EUROPEAN THEATER

1. **STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE**
(C.C.S. 303)
2. **"OVERLORD"**
 - a. Outline Plan and Covering Note by British Chiefs of Staff.
 - b. Air and Naval Command.
3. **"POINTBLANK"**
(Paper by the Chief of the Air Staff)
4. **MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS**
5. **"RANKIN"**
(Progress Report)

B. THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

6. **APPRECIATION AND PLAN (LONG TERM)**
7. **OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN 1943-44 (Short Term)**
(In the Pacific.) (Paper by U.S. Chiefs of Staff, C.C.S. 301)
8. **OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN 1943-44 (Short Term)**
(From India)
9. **SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND**
(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff)
10. **DECEPTION PLAN FOR THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN**

C. THE U-BOAT WAR

- 11. **GENERAL**
- 12. **"ALACRITY"**

D. MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

- 13. **"HABBAKUK"**
(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff)
- 14. **LANDING CRAFT**
 - a. Allocation.
 - b. Manning.
- 15. **USE OF "PLOUGH" FORCE**
(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff.)
- 16. **EQUIPPING ALLIES, LIBERATED FORCES, FRIENDLY NEUTRALS**
- 17. **CIVIL AFFAIRS MATTERS**

E. FINAL STAGES

- 18. **RELATION OF RESOURCES TO PLANS**
- 19. **FINAL REPORT TO PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT**
- 20. **PREPARATION AND APPROVAL OF ANY DIRECTIVES ARISING FROM QUADRANT DECISIONS, AND OF ANY REPORTS TO OTHER ALLIES**

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

C.C.S. 300

**ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, 1943-44,
PACIFIC-FAR EAST AREA**

Reference:

CCS 107th Meeting

C.C.S. 300 was circulated, 6 August 1943, for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and as a basis for discussion at *QUADRANT*.

6 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, 1943-44,
PACIFIC-FAR EAST AREA

Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff submit herewith an estimate of the enemy situation, 1943-44, Pacific-Far East Area for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the *QUADRANT* Conference.

ENCLOSURE

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, 1943-44
PACIFIC-FAR EAST AREA

(As of 20 July 1943)

1. *BASIC FACTORS IN THE JAPANESE SITUATION.*

a. Japan's basic objective is to establish undisputed control of an area in East Asia and the Western Pacific which shall be militarily secure and as nearly self-sufficient economically as possible. The area now occupied by her approximates the territorial requirements of this objective, but is deficient in three respects, as follows: (1) the possession of eastern *SIBERIA* by a latently hostile power; (2) the existence in *CHINA* of unoccupied areas within bombing range of Japan and of important Japanese communications; and (3) the presence of United Nations forces in the Japanese defensive perimeter in the *MELANESIA* area and the *ALEUTIANS*. Other territories beyond the limits of present occupation may be objects of ultimate Japanese aspiration, but only those specified are essential to the immediate basic objective.

b. Relationship to the Axis. Japan's connection with the Axis is a matter of expediency only. Her action will be coordinated with that of Germany only insofar as she estimates that such coordination will contribute to the realization of her basic objective or — in the long run — to her security.

c. Relations With Russia. There exists between Russia and Japan a basic conflict of interest. Japan cannot enjoy complete strategic security without gaining control of the eastern region of Siberia. Russia is determined to hold that region, the strategic security of which requires the ultimate expulsion of Japan from the mainland of Asia and from southern Sakhalin. For the present, however, both Russia and Japan desire to avoid war with each other in order to be free to direct their efforts against their respective enemies. Russia is likely to intervene in the war against Japan at some stage, but not before the German threat to her has been removed. After that, she will make her decision in the light of her own interests and will intervene only when she reckons that Japan can be defeated at a small cost to her.

d. Time. Japan will take maximum advantage of such time as is left to her to consolidate and, if possible, to improve her present position, hoping that, in the eventual reckoning, the United Nations, wearied by the war in Europe and perhaps divided among themselves, will attack her ineffectively or compromise to her advantage. We estimate that from mid-1943 to mid-1944 total Japanese industrial production will increase approximately ten per cent. However, the production of many critical categories — notably merchant ships, aircraft, trucks, and armored vehicles — will increase by more than ten per cent. Japan should expect that ultimately greatly superior forces can be directed against her.

2. THE EXISTING OVERALL SITUATION.

a. General. Japan is on the strategic defensive. We estimate the present strength of her armed forces to be as follows: (1) *NAVAL*, 10 BB, 6 CV, 4 ACV, 14 CA, 16 CL, 81 DD, 84 SS; (2) *AIR*, 1400 fighters, 1450 bombers, 850 other types. Of the total, 390 fighters and 120 bombers are ship-based; (3) *GROUND*, 64 divisions, 17 independent mixed brigades, 1 infantry brigade, 3 cavalry brigades, 18 tank regiments and many independent units, totaling in round numbers 3,000,000 men (this total includes naval, ground, and air personnel, but not Puppet Troops).

Japan's position, facing United Nations forces from the North Pacific around to India, is one of great natural strength but requiring secure and sufficient ocean transport over long lines of communication. At this time, her position in China is secure because of the present inability of either China or the other United Nations to mount large-scale operations there. Russian commitments in Europe and Japanese strength in Manchuria insure for the time being the security of Japan's northern flank. Japan is

able at present to direct her maximum effort toward building up her economic and military strength.

b. Limitations on Japanese Striking Power.

(1) *Shipping.* The margin of Japanese shipping, after allowing for essential trade and the maintenance of Japan's many distant overseas commitments, is small and continues to fall. Additional tonnage might still be found for new operations by diverting it from trade, and, provided such diversions were temporary, this need not have serious effects on Japan's capacity to wage war. Since, however, Japan's rate of building, though on the increase, cannot keep pace with the present rate of sinkings, she would be reluctant to risk adding further to her shipping commitments or incurring losses such as she would have to expect from any further large-scale sea-borne offensive operations. Although attempts are being made to improve the position by building a large number of small and medium-size wooden ships, the general shipping position is becoming increasingly difficult and may well become precarious in 1944.

The situation in regard to tankers is more critical. Japan is attempting to meet a deficiency in this respect by the use of dry-cargo ships as oil carriers.

(2) *Air Power.* We believe that lack of sufficient air strength will prevent Japan from engaging in more than one major operation at one time.

(3) *Naval Requirements.* Japan's naval strength is adequate for present requirements, but must be carefully husbanded for future decisive action. Her extended lines of communication already entail a large commitment of naval strength for the protection of essential shipping. Their further extension, or indecisive action entailing heavy attrition, might well be unacceptable.

(4) *Military Requirements.* A large proportion of Japanese ground forces is required for occupational duties and for concentration in Manchuria to balance Russian forces in Siberia. Japan, however, has ample ground forces for any probable combat requirements, inasmuch as the insular character of much of the occupied area and the topography of New Guinea, the Indo-Burmese frontier and China limit the scale of ground operations in those areas. Her ability to move her strategic reserve is limited by shortage of shipping.

3. THE EXISTING LOCAL SITUATION ON VARIOUS FRONTS.

a. North Pacific. Japan holds an exposed outpost at Kiska, but will not risk major forces in order to prevent its fall. We believe the Japanese are preparing for a determined defense in the Kuriles.

b. Manchuria. Japanese forces in Manchuria and Russian forces in eastern Siberia-Outer Mongolia are roughly in balance. Japan has the advantage in strategic position, equipment, and supply, but is deterred from aggression by a healthy respect for Russian armed forces; the vulnerability of Japan to bombing and submarine attack; and the additional strain which such a commitment would impose on her resources in general, including the strain on her shipping.

c. China (Except Yunnan). The front has been largely stabilized for years, with the Japanese in possession of the country's principal productive areas and communications lines. The Japanese are deterred from further expansion primarily by logistical difficulties and secondarily by Chinese resistance. On occasion the Japanese engage in minor offensive operations to season inexperienced troops and accomplish limited objectives such as the temporary denial of facilities to the Chinese. Although nominally in overwhelming numerical strength, the Chinese forces are at present so poorly equipped, supplied, and trained that they are unable to prevent these forays or to undertake other than local aggressive action. This Chinese military weakness springs in large part from China's generally anemic condition, which has resulted from loss of productive areas, disruption of internal communications, isolation from outside support, and war-weariness. Although a formal separate peace is highly improbable, it is possible that, if China's condition is not effectively relieved, an "undeclared peace" may eventually result.

d. Yunnan. Active operations are not indicated. The inconsiderable Japanese forces on the Indo-China and Burma frontiers are separated from Kunming by extremely rugged terrain. Malarial conditions in the area would impose a high rate of attrition on any troops operating there.

e. Burma. The wet monsoon precludes major operations from May to October. Present Japanese strength is sufficient for only local offensive action.

f. Southwest Pacific. The build-up of ground and air strength in the Timor-Inner Seas area and northeastern New Guinea appears to

have been defensive in character. No important ground force movements have occurred since 1 March.

g. Central Pacific. Of the heavy naval units withdrawn from Truk to Japan at the time of the capture of Attu, some have returned to Truk. Air strength in Micronesia is being reinforced, but attrition and reinforcement are approximately in balance.

h. Strategic Reserves

(1) *Naval.* Normally Japan maintains her battleship and carrier strength in home waters and at Truk, shifting the center of gravity according to circumstances. A formidable striking force, which can reach any threatened point of the defensive perimeter in from six to nine days, can be quickly assembled in either of these central areas. However, destroyer shortage is becoming critical.

(2) *Air.* We believe no strategic reserve exists as such, but Japan's ability to fly even fighter planes to practically any part of her position enables her to reinforce quickly any threatened front at the expense of other theaters.

(3) *Ground.* Surplus ground strength in Central China constitutes Japan's initial reserve. If hard pressed, she can also draw surplus strength from Japan and North China and in extremity from Manchuria.

i. Puppet Troops.

(1) *Manchuria, Strength.*

(a) In Manchuria there are reported to be 328,000 Puppet Troops. They are organized both as combat divisions and as garrison troops. Only in recent years have they received automatic weapons and artillery and, in view of apparent Japanese shortages in both these categories of weapons, it is not thought that the puppet units are completely equipped.

(b) *Disposition.* About 12,000 Manchurian Puppet Troops are reported to be in China. The mass of Manchurian Puppet Troops are stationed along the Siberian border, near the larger cities, and in strategic locations generally but never without sufficient Japanese units in the vicinity to keep them under control.

(c) *Effect on Japanese Strategy.* In the past the Manchurian Puppet Army has been maintained principally for political reasons,

to maintain internal order, and to prevent former soldiers from resorting to banditry. However, in the event the Japanese-Soviet situation remains unchanged Japan may replace two or three of her divisions in Manchuria with Puppet Troops.

(2) (a) *China and Mongolia. Strength.* At present there are reported to be 366,000 Nanking Government Puppet Troops in China. They consist mainly of numerous small commands readily controlled by the Japanese. There are indications that these troops are now being reorganized into infantry divisions of three regiments each with a divisional strength of about 6,000. It is reported that light artillery and heavier machine guns will now be issued to Puppet Troops whereas these weapons were denied them in the past. Because of the unreliability and defection of Nanking Puppet Troops in the past, we believe that the Japanese will hesitate to increase them beyond 500,000 during 1943-1944. Rather than increase the Nanking Puppets, it is more likely that Manchurian Puppets will be brought south for garrison duties.

(b) *Disposition of Puppet Troops.* About 209,000 Puppet Troops are located in Central China, 93,000 in North China, 48,000 in South China, and 16,000, mostly cavalry units, in the Chahar-Suiyuan area. Future dispositions will not change radically except that the distribution of new contingents will be influenced by the location of the Japanese troops which they relieve.

(c) *Effect on Japanese Strategy.* Nanking Puppet Troops have been used as garrison troops for maintaining internal order and have been employed in no offensive to date. We believe that the Japanese may by the end of 1944 further reduce their forces by four divisions in North China and by two divisions in Central China, replacing them with Nanking and Manchurian Puppet Troops. At all times a nucleus of Japanese forces must remain in all strategic centers to keep the Puppet Troops in line.

4 CHINA.

a. *Strength.* While China is reported to have over 300 divisions including Communist divisions, of about 7,000 men each, problems of equipment, training, leadership, supply, and loyalties to local military leaders make it improbable that one-fifth of that number are better than fairly reliable troops capable of defensive operations on any front. Even fewer are sufficiently well equipped, trained, and led to undertake offensive operations. If

sufficient supplies get through and the United Nations program for equipping and training some of the Chinese is successful (the 30 division plan), the situation may improve and more of China's tremendous manpower may be effectively available for United Nations operations. However, it is improbable that the effect of this, at best, could be felt strategically before the summer of 1944.

China's guerrillas, estimated at some 500,000 men, in addition to many of her divisions are rendering excellent service in compelling Japan to keep a large occupational force in China.

b. Capabilities. If given adequate United Nations air support China may be able to defend her own strategic areas against anything but an all-out Japanese offensive. If given strong United Nations air support China might be able to execute a very limited objective offensive. It is doubted that she would have the ability to hold such an objective, if attained, against a determined Japanese counter offensive.

c. Probable Intentions. The Chinese probably intend to remain on the defensive and concentrate on reequipping and retraining their army for offensive action at a later date.

5. PROSPECTIVE OVERALL DEVELOPMENTS THROUGH 1944.

a. Naval strength. Disregarding attrition, we estimate that Japanese naval strength should increase as a result of new construction, as follows:

	BB	CV	ACV	CA	CL	DD	SS
15 June 43	10	6	4	14	16	81	84
1 Nov. 43	12	8	7	16	18	93	102
1 May 44	13	10	10	18	20	105	120

b. Air strength. Aircraft production is expected to continue to increase gradually during 1943 and 1944. Present increase is balanced by present attrition.

c. Ground strength. It is expected that by the end of 1944 the strength of the Japanese army will have increased to 72 divisions and 14 independent mixed brigades, three cavalry brigades, and 20 or more tank regiments.

d. War production. During 1944 Japanese munitions and other war production is expected to show a substantial increase over 1943, provided that ocean shipments can be maintained and that industrial plants escape

bombing. The overall rate of industrial production may increase by about 10 per cent. In addition to overall increased production, Japan is continuing to develop uneconomic production of materials in the "Inner Zone"* (such as oil, coal, iron, aluminum) for strategic reasons. This work should be well advanced by the end of 1944.

e. Shipping. Despite Japan's strenuous shipbuilding efforts estimates of the rate of loss and rate of construction of steel ships indicate that the Japanese may suffer a net loss of 1,500,000 G.R.T. of steel operating tonnage from 1 June 1943 to the end of 1944. However, construction of wooden vessels and further substitution of land transport may offset a part of the estimated net loss of steel ships.

f. Morale. Japanese morale will remain high until, through an effective attack on vital areas or a major defeat which cannot be concealed, faith in their leaders has suffered severe impairment.

6. FORECAST FOR 1944.

a. General. Japan will probably remain on the strategic defensive except in one or more of the following circumstances: (1) if convinced that Russia had decided to attack her or to grant to the other United Nations the use of Siberian air bases, Japan would strike first; (2) if convinced that there was real danger of serious United Nations operations against her from China, Japan would strike first; (3) if Japan had inflicted a severe defeat upon United Nations forces operating against her in the Pacific, she might follow up offensively; (4) if Russia met with serious reverses on the Western Front, Japan might take the opportunity to attack the Soviet.

b. North Pacific. We believe that Japan will continue to strengthen her defenses in the Kuriles as means become available, but is not likely to depart from the defensive except in case of war with Russia, in which case she would probably try to seize Kamchatka.

c. Manchuria. We believe that Japan will continue to seek to avoid war with Russia in all circumstances except those indicated in *a* (1) above. She will continue to match Russian strength in Siberia, reducing her forces in Manchuria only in case of extreme necessity.

d. China (including Yunnan). We believe that Japan will continue to seek a satisfactory solution in China by political means, but will probably

* Japan Proper, Korea, Manchuria, North China, Formosa, and Karafuto (Japanese Sakhalin).

engage in no decisive military operations there except in the circumstances indicated in *a* (2) above. In that case, her most likely objective would be Kunming and probably the determining factor would be relative air strength there.

e. Burma. We believe that Japan will remain on the strategic defensive.

f. Southwest and Central Pacific. We believe that Japan will remain on the strategic defensive, continuing to build up her local defensive forces and facilities and her naval striking force.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

C.C.S. 300/1

**ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION 1943-1944
EUROPEAN-MEDITERRANEAN AREA**

Reference:

C.C.S. 106th Meeting, Item (4)

C.C.S. 300/1 was circulated, 7 August 1943, for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and as a basis for discussion at **QAUDRANT**.

C.C.S. 300/1

7 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, 1943-1944,
EUROPEAN-MEDITERRANEAN AREA

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

The enclosure is submitted for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the *QUADRANT* Conference.

ENCLOSURE

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, 1943-1944,
EUROPEAN AREA

(As of 30 July 1943)

NOTE: In view of very recent developments in Italy, the ultimate consequences of which are as yet unpredictable, related paragraphs of this paper must be regarded as tentative.

1. *BASIC FACTORS IN THE EUROPEAN SITUATION.*

a. Predominance of Germany. The enemy situation in Europe must be estimated in terms of the German situation. Italy, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Finland are merely satellites of Germany and, to a considerable degree, prisoners of circumstances. None of them could offer prolonged resistance without effective German support; any of them would now dissociate itself from Germany if it could do so without fear of Germany or of the U.S.S.R. Italy's special position as a nominally equal partner with Germany would, however, make her surrender more impressive than that of any of the others.

b. Germany's Basic Task is now to defend "Festung Europa,"* with such assistance as she can extort from satellite and occupied countries.

* As herein conceived, "Festung Europa" consists of an essential core (roughly Germany itself, most of Poland, Hungary, and Rumania), surrounded by outer defensive and auxiliary areas.

Although she may no longer expect to impose her will on the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and the United States in combination, she can still hope to avert surrender and even to gain an advantageous negotiated peace by dividing her enemies politically (in particular, by dividing the U.S.S.R. from Great Britain and the United States), by beating off their attacks, or by making her defeat so costly as to dissuade them from the task. This hope, as long as it persists, will justify and support a determined resistance.

c. "*Festung Europa*." Germany now controls, directly or indirectly all of continental Europe west of the Russian front, except the territories of five neutral states (Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey). This control extends to include the Baltic, Adriatic, and Aegean Seas and the Mediterranean islands of Corsica, Sardinia, Crete and Rhodes. This whole area is encircled by blockade, but contains within itself the requisites of a practical military self-sufficiency.

The western and southern faces of this position are subject to invasion only by difficult amphibious attack (assuming the continued neutrality of Spain and Turkey). The western face has been strengthened by extensive fortification; the southern face is backed by formidable mountainous terrain. Major industrial areas in western territory under German control, however, are subject to heavy aerial attack.

The eastern face of "*Festung Europa*" is without clear natural definition. For that reason, and because of the immense forces deployed by the U.S.S.R., the eastern front must continue to be Germany's chief preoccupation in land operations.

Despite the best efforts of German propaganda, the inhabitants of "*Festung Europa*" are not united in its defense. That fact entails not only the employment of considerable occupational forces, but also the necessity of bolstering wavering allies.

2. *THE EXISTING OVERALL SITUATION.*

a. *Ground Forces.* The Axis armies are now all at or near peak strength in number of combat divisions — German, 311; Italian, 74; Rumanian, 27; Hungarian, 21; Bulgarian, 20; Croat, 8; Slovak, 4; total, 465. The German Army in particular has been brought to such strength only by lowering

physical standards, combing out industrial personnel hitherto deferred, and enlisting considerable numbers of non-Germans. In consequence, the average quality of German divisions has declined and war production will be adversely affected. Replacement of future losses will augment those tendencies and may be inadequate to maintain existing strength.

b. Air Forces. We estimate that the total first-line strength of the German Air Force (as of 31 July 1943) is approximately 4,600 aircraft. Of these, approximately 1,500 are on the Western Front, 1950 in the Russian Front and 1125 in the Mediterranean. In addition, approximately 450 are in Germany for refitting. In structure the German Air Force lacks strength in depth because it has no substantial Stored Reserves of aircraft to back up the first-line units. Opposed upon all fronts by United Nations air forces greatly superior in numbers and in offensive power, the German Air Force has been forced to adopt a defensive role but this defensive role is rendered even more difficult due to its extended commitments. In an effort to meet this situation its defensive strength has been increased by concentration upon production of fighter types at the expense of other categories. Because of the comparative ease of manufacture of the fighter type, this has resulted in a slight upward trend in total production and has improved the defensive power of the German Air Force while the offensive power has further deteriorated. Due largely to the shortage of trained crews, the efficiency of the long-range bomber force is at its lowest point since the beginning of the war. In equipment some improvement in present types is noted, but no important production of radically new types is expected.

We estimate that the total first line strength of the Italian Air Force (as of 31 July 1943) is approximately 1,400 aircraft, of which 1,050 are disposed in the Central Mediterranean and 350 in the Eastern. In addition approximately 250 are in Italy for refitting. During the past year this air force has been deteriorating in numerical strength, in rate of new production, in pilot and crew training, and in combat efficiency. Due to these factors the figures given should be discounted by at least 30% for purposes of comparing the fighting effectiveness of the Italian Air Force with that of the German. Under existing conditions continuance of this downward trend in overall effectiveness is to be expected.

c. Naval Forces.

(1) *Submarines.* As of 27 July 1943, the estimated numbers of European Axis submarines were 436 German and 74 Italian. Of these 211 German and 45 Italian were operational and were in the Atlantic or Mediterranean or in waters accessible to those areas, 43 German were

used only for training purposes, and 176 German were undergoing trials, training, or repairs in the Baltic. The average rates of completion of new submarines are estimated to be 25 German a month, or possibly a few more, and between one and two Italian (if construction still continues).

(2) *Surface Vessels.* As of 27 July, all effective *German* major units (2BB, 4 CA, and 4 CL) were divided between the Baltic and Norwegian waters. All effective German light forces (40 DD, and perhaps 150 PT) were in waters from the Bay of Biscay northward, except for perhaps 45 PT in the Mediterranean. It is possible that the experienced personnel have been largely transferred from the major units other than *TIRPITZ*, *SCHARNHORST*, *LUETZOW* (the three in northern Norwegian waters) to the submarine service and that the newly completed aircraft carrier *GRAF ZEPPELIN* has been laid up. Subject to that, the effectiveness of both the major units and light forces, especially the latter, is believed to be high. The new construction of combatant surface vessels is believed to be confined to about 21 DD and a large but uncertain number of PT.

As of 27 July, the larger portion of the effective *Italian* surface forces (consisting of 2/3 BB, 1 CA, 5 CL, 15/20 DD, and perhaps 40 PT) were in the Western Basin of the Mediterranean. Except for a few motor torpedo boats in the Black Sea, the rest (consisting of 3/4 BB, 1 CL, 15/20 DD, and perhaps 60 PT) were in the Eastern Basin. The effectiveness of the major units is believed to be low. The effectiveness of the light forces, especially the motor torpedo boats, is believed to be fairly high. Repair work on combatant surface vessels and new construction (if still continuing) is believed to cover 0/1 BB, 1 CA, 3 CV (under conversion from other types), and 1 CL — all in the Western Basin; 1/2 BB and 2/3 CL — all in the Eastern Basin; and an uncertain number of DD and PT in each basin.

d. Munitions Production. There is no reason to believe that decline in munitions production has as yet affected German tactical efficiency. However, labor shortage and bomb damage have more than balanced German progress in organizing the exploitation of non-German labor and facilities. Even with further civilian sacrifices, output of finished munitions may have declined about five percent net from the 1941-42 peak. The capacity of the area integrated under German control would have permitted a substantial expansion of output if the manpower shortage and bomb damage had not interfered.

A scale of military activity involving attrition at 1942 rates could be maintained only by drawing on stocks of most major items. Output of

fighter aircraft, however, is increasing and has been well in excess of wastage in recent months. Fighter wastage could increase by one-third to one-half during the coming year without occasioning a decline in fighter strength.

e. German Morale. The two big factors in German morale are the attitude towards (1) the outcome of the war and (2) the treatment of Germany in the event of her defeat. There is evidence that a considerable part of German military personnel still believe that Germany will not be defeated, but belief in total victory seems to be fading. Civilian morale is undoubtedly lower than military morale, but has demonstrated no positive tendency toward defeatism. Morale is supported by the widespread conviction that Germany would be ruined if defeated and German propaganda zealously engenders this belief. In consequence, most German civilians appear reconciled to the prevailing standard of living, which is far from intolerable, for as long as is necessary to secure an acceptable peace. Morale is being increasingly affected by air attack. There are indications of growing uneasiness over the presence of so many foreign workmen and prisoners of war in Germany. Continuation of reverses may weaken German morale further by spreading conviction of inevitable defeat.

3. THE SITUATION BY FRONTS.

a. The Russian Front. Since early spring two-thirds of Germany's ground strength (203 divisions) has been on the Russian front, with very heavy offensive concentrations near Orel and Belgorod. It is believed that the Germans planned an early operation to pinch off the Kursk salient at least, but that it was suspended on account of the sudden collapse in Tunisia. On 5 July, the Germans launched a violent attack northward and eastward from Belgorod, which failed, apparently with severe losses. A complementary attack southward from Orel made no headway. The Russians seized the initiative and launched a heavy converging attack on Orel, where the German position now appears to be precarious. This situation, if not preliminary to more extensive operations (as was the Russian Kharkov offensive in the spring of 1942), marks a new phase in the war in the east, with the Russians conducting a mid-summer offensive and the Germans professing to welcome a positional battle of attrition.

On the whole front, Russian ground strength is to the German as three to two. The superiority of German communications, staff work, and fighting skill may yet compensate for this disparity. Russian staff planning, however, has improved since 1941-42.

Germany has, on the Russian front, some 2,000 aircraft, of which 1,170 are bombers of all types. Available information indicates that the U.S.S.R. air strength is numerically superior in the ratio of approximately two to one. But due to a large proportion of obsolescent aircraft and to a low rate of serviceability its overall effectiveness has until recently been low. As a result, the Germans have been able to prevent the U.S.S.R. from establishing effective air superiority in any large sector. This advantage is rapidly being lost as the proportion of first-line aircraft is increased and combat efficiency improved.

b. Mediterranean Front. The Axis forces available for the defense of this front are for the most part Italian, although Germany has recently sent ground reinforcements to both Italy and the Balkans. Axis ground strength in this area is believed to be disposed as follows (28 July) :

	Italian divisions		German divisions	Bulgarian divisions
	Field	Coastal		
French Coast	5	2	6	—
Corsica	2	2	—	—
Sardinia	3	2	1	—
Sicily	5*	2**	3½	—
Italy	11	6	3	—
Balkans-Aegean	31	—	18***	20

* Four badly depleted. One fresh regiment has arrived.

** Three others have disintegrated.

*** Six defensive.

Axis air strength in this area was approximately as follows (24 July) :

	Italian		German	
	Total	(Fighter)	Total	(Fighters)
Central Med.	1050	(475)	945	(320)
Eastern Med.	350	(100)	180	(45)

The Italian battleships and cruisers seem likely to continue inactive. Naval defense will depend primarily on Italian and German submarines, motor torpedo boats, and possibly destroyers.

Movement of German ground forces into and within Italy has hitherto indicated an intention to defend the peninsula. Twelve additional divisions are available in France for reinforcement. However, the apparent reluctance of the Italians to fight, and the instability of the internal situation in Italy

brings the capability into question. The repercussions of an Italian collapse would be particularly serious in the Balkans.

c. Western Front. Germany has fortified the coast from Hendaye to Petsamo and can offer formidable resistance to any attempted landing. She cannot, however, prevent heavy aerial bombardment of the industrial bases of her military power in western Germany.

The coastal defenses are particularly strong and in depth from Brittany to Holland (the area in which a landing could be supported by land-based fighters) and are backed by two interior defensive zones in advance of the reversed Maginot Line and the West Wall. There are in France and the Low Countries 44 German divisions, 14 more than the estimated defensive minimum.

In Norway (exclusive of the Kirkenes area) there are 12 German divisions supported by approximately 200 aircraft. German defensive capabilities are enhanced by the presence of major naval units (*TIRPITZ*, *SCHARNHORST*, and *LUETZOW*).

d. The Bomber Offensive. The scale of bombing attacks on Germany's vital centers is steadily increasing. Due to improvements in equipment and bombing technique the weight of bombs now being dropped monthly is more than three times that of a year ago. Far greater precision, penetration and saturation of targets is being achieved. This rising scale of effectiveness must be considered in any assessment based upon past results.

In the Ruhr, where German heavy industry is principally concentrated, the bomber offensive has effected a reduction of about 30% in normal production. In Axis Europe as a whole, it is believed to have effected a gross reduction in mine and manufacturing output of between 5 and 10%. Due to the fact that the reduction in industrial production to date has been largely confined to primary and semi-fabricated materials, its effect upon the military potential cannot be expected to be immediate and direct. However, since no considerable relocation of vital war industries is practicable, and since the range of bombing flights is increasing, the results so far achieved justify the expectation that the long-range effects of bombing attacks, if continued and intensified, will seriously impair the ability of the Axis to equip and supply its forces in the field.

The possibility of offsetting production losses in part by utilizing spare capacity exists in the coke and iron and steel industries as well as certain branches of the chemical industry; cuts in non-military consumption of some chemical products can be made without serious sacrifice.

Of great importance in a general assessment of the results of the offensive, is the consideration of the imponderable effects upon the civil population. Increasing casualties, extensive destruction of housing (about 16% of the population of the Ruhr have already been made homeless), disruption of transportation and public services with consequent food and water shortages, constant fear and nights of sleeplessness, have greatly increased the strain upon the people. With no prospect of relief from continuous and more intense bombing, and with hope of ultimate victory waning, further deterioration in morale may be expected.

e. The War Against Shipping. The destruction of shipping by the European Axis, after rising to almost two million G.R.T. during the second quarter of 1942 and continuing near that level during the two remaining quarters of the year, dropped sharply to 1.3 million G.R.T. during the first quarter of 1943 and to 0.6 million during the second. Attacks by German and Italian submarines accounted during each of these periods for 80 to 95% of the destruction of tonnage by the European Axis — 90% or more during the last three — and for 70 to 80% of the combined destruction of tonnage by the European Axis and by Japan.

The net results of all efforts at destruction by the European Axis and by Japan, of the losses of vessels from all other causes, and of new construction, on the tonnage available to the United Nations have been approximately as follows:

(1) The *tanker* tonnage available on 1 July 1943 was less by 700,000 G.R.T. than at the beginning of 1942, but was greater by 400,000 G.R.T. than at its low points reached during that year. This tonnage increased 300,000 G.R.T. during the second quarter of 1943 (new construction of 470,000 less losses of 170,000 G.R.T.).

(2) The *non-tanker* tonnage available was greater by nearly four million G.R.T. on 1 July 1943 than at the beginning of 1942. This tonnage increased 2.6 million G.R.T. during the second quarter of 1943 (new construction of 3.3 less losses of 0.7 million G.R.T.).

A great increase has unquestionably occurred during the past year or more in the difficulties and hazards experienced by Axis submarines in locating and attacking suitable shipping targets. This has resulted, not only in a marked downward trend in the rate of destruction of shipping, but also in a marked upward trend in the rate of loss of submarines. During May, June, and July of this year the losses of German submarines may have equalled their average rate of production; and the losses of Italian sub-

marines probably exceeded theirs. Another result in evidence during July has been a marked shift of German and Italian submarines from the main convoy routes to other areas where targets, though fewer, tend to be less well protected by anti-submarine forces.

No marked drop in the morale of German submarine personnel can be said to have occurred, though there have been various indications of some degree of deterioration, especially in security consciousness. There are many indications of a shortage of well trained personnel.

Whatever steps Germany may now take to overcome her loss of headway in the war against shipping must be taken in face of large increases in the advantage and momentum gained by the United Nations and in face of the persistent tendency of technical developments to be more favorable to the anti-submarine forces than to the submarine. But by continuing her submarine warfare against shipping Germany can at least prevent the United Nations from diverting to other channels the huge amounts of manpower, energy, and materials which they must then devote to counter measures.

4. *THE SITUATION IN THE SATELLITE COUNTRIES.*

a. Italy. The fall of Mussolini is indicative of the unstable situation in Italy. The immediate purpose of Badoglio's appointment appears to have been to arrest serious internal disintegration. Although he may succeed in rallying the Italians for the time being, increased resistance, even with German reinforcement, cannot now protect Italy from the ravages of war, and so offers no escape from the predicament which produced the internal crisis. On the other hand, the presence of German forces and absence from the peninsula of the greater portion of the Italian Army (45 out of 57 first-line divisions) may prevent Badoglio from escape by negotiation with the United Nations. If effective relief from Allied attack is not soon obtained, the internal situation will continue to disintegrate.

b. Hungary and Rumania. Because of the vital importance to her of Rumanian oil and of Hungarian communications and oil, Germany will maintain a firm grip on both countries as long as she is able, but each would be glad to escape (unless the tide turns toward Germany). Both fear the U.S.S.R. Each is hostile toward the other. Each would seek terms guaranteeing protection against the other and against the U.S.S.R. as well as against Germany.

c. Bulgaria has undertaken no more than the defense of her sphere of interest in the Balkans (including Greek and Yugoslav territory) and particularly has insisted on maintaining diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.

d. Finland is bound to Germany by her fear of the U.S.S.R., her dependence on Germany for essential supplies, and the presence of German troops. She would willingly withdraw from the war if these problems could be solved. She maintains contact with the United Nations through continued relations with the United States.

5. *THE SITUATION IN OCCUPIED COUNTRIES.*

a. *Norway.* Strong undercover resistance to German occupation continues unabated.

b. *Denmark.* Although Denmark has been set up as a model for the "New Order," receiving exceptionally mild treatment, anti-German sentiment continues in relatively passive form.

c. *The Low Countries.* Hostility toward Germany exists in both countries, although less bitter in Belgium than in Holland.

d. *France.* Although the puppet regime at Vichy is being forced into closer collaboration, hostility toward Germany is general and underground resistance appears to be well organized.

e. *Poland.* Although an effective national underground organization exists, the situation is complicated by a boundary dispute with the U.S.S.R. and the presence of Russian guerrillas and various Russian-influenced underground organizations independent of the Polish government in London.

f. *Yugoslavia.* German and Italian forces have conducted extensive operations to eliminate guerrilla activity, but such resistance continues on a reduced scale. Although guerrilla forces which recognize the government-in-exile and others which are influenced by the U.S.S.R. have clashed, latest reports indicate that some degree of coordination between them may have been established.

g. *Greece.* Some underground and guerrilla activity exists, but the country is so exhausted that little effective military assistance can be expected. There is considerable opposition to a restoration of the government of King George II.

h. Occupied Russia. Considerable guerrilla activity continues behind the German lines. German efforts to organize anti-Communist Russian forces have had only limited success.

6. THE ATTITUDES OF EUROPEAN NEUTRALS.

a. Sweden is firm in her neutrality and is taking a stronger attitude than formerly in her relations with Germany. Public expression of sympathy with the United Nations, especially with Norway, is increasingly permitted.

b. Switzerland. Despite their isolation, the Swiss have succeeded in maintaining a firmly neutral attitude.

c. Spain. The steadily mounting show of power of the Western United Nations in the Mediterranean area has impressed the high command of the Spanish Army that Franco's past alignment was wrong. The Falange is very unpopular with the people in Spain. Liberals and conservatives including those elements in favor of a restoration of the monarchy have been estranged by Franco pronouncements and it is now clear that the Army holds the key to the Spanish situation.

Franco himself has given no indication of abandoning his proposed belief in the Spanish types of totalitarianism which he has rechristened "Unitarianism" and which he claims is peculiarly suited to the Spanish people. He has maintained that all nations, including the United Nations, will emerge from the war with some form of totalitarianism. Whether these beliefs arise from sincere conviction or whether it is that he has been so sheltered and isolated that he has recently been unable to gauge the sentiments and strength of the United Nations or the feeling of his own people cannot be ascertained.

The Army high command, convinced of the change in the international and domestic situation, have let it be known that they intend to confront Franco with the true picture, and call for an immediate restoration of the monarchy with a liberalized constitution before it is too late.

Franco has said that he would resist any invasion of Spanish soil, whether by the Western United Nations or by the Axis, and it is generally believed that he would keep his word. A *junta* of generals representing the most popular element in the army are reported to have agreed that they would resist any such invasion, irrespective of Franco's decision, and would depose him if he declined to take the leadership or showed signs of aligning himself more closely with the Axis.

It is therefore considered possible that under increasing pressure of events, Franco may, in order to hold his position, seek United Nations support.

d. Portugal. Although remaining neutral, Portugal now leans toward the United Nations.

e. Turkey. Although well disposed toward Great Britain and the United States, Turkey is not apt to make an early departure from her position of neutrality. Her fear of Soviet domination of the Balkans, however, will probably lead her to active participation in the war, when it can be done at minimum cost, in order to obtain a voice in the peace settlement.

7. SUMMARY OF THE EXISTING SITUATION. The situation of the European Axis has definitely deteriorated during the past year. The war against shipping, which was to prevent effective support of United Nations operations from overseas, has failed to accomplish that purpose. German air strength has proved insufficient to meet all defensive requirements; in particular, the G.A.F. has been unable to challenge Allied air superiority in the Mediterranean or to prevent devastating aerial bombardment of western Germany. Although the German Army has been brought to peak strength by scraping the bottom of the manpower barrel, it has not been able, at that strength, to eliminate the Russian threat in time to gain for Germany freedom of action in dealing with attack from the west and south. As a result of aerial bombardment and manpower shortage, German war production has begun to decline. Italy is reeling under direct attack, and the other satellites cannot be relied upon in similar circumstances.

Although Germany cannot now impose her will on the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and the United States in combination, the High Command, the armed forces, and the German people still hope to gain an acceptable and even advantageous negotiated peace by stubborn resistance and by diplomacy.

8. COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO GERMANY, 1943-44.

a. To Continue the War Against Shipping. Germany will follow this course to the end, to the best of her ability, regardless of what other courses she may adopt.

b. To Seek a Decision in Russia. Only by the destruction of the Soviet armies can Germany completely free herself of her huge commitment in the east in order to concentrate her forces against her enemies in the west.

The lateness of the season and the course of operations around Kursk would seem to indicate that she cannot accomplish this in 1943. In 1944 she will have less force available for the purpose.

c. To Seek During 1943 to Improve Her Defensive Position in th U.S.S.R. and to Impair or Destroy Soviet Offensive Capabilities. This would be the best alternative to *b* as a means of reducing her commitment in the east in order to meet attack in the west in 1944. It may be the object of current German operations in Russia. So far the Germans have failed to straighten their Russian front by the recapture of Kursk. They may hope that the battle of attrition at Orel will significantly impair Soviet strength. Attrition, however, is double-edged.

d. To Undertake Offensive Operations in the West or South. Such a course would sacrifice her advantage of position and expose the forces engaged to destruction. Moreover, she lacks the requisite air and naval strength to conduct such an operation. The present deployment of the German Army indicates that this course has been discarded for 1943. It will be even less feasible in 1944.

Since an invasion of Spain is the only overland operation which Germany can undertake in this direction, we examine that capability in greater detail.

By crossing the Pyrenees, where the rail net changes to a different gauge from that standard in central Europe, and where both road and rail communications are subject to interdiction by aerial attack, any forces so committed are subject to denial of supply and reinforcement.

At present Germany is believed to have 186 operational aircraft (mostly long-range bombers) now disposed in Southern France. Any build-up of air support for an invasion of the Iberian Peninsula at this time could be made only by a transfer of operational aircraft from other theaters where German air strength is inadequate to meet, successfully, its commitments. The Germans *have* the capability of increasing the strength now in Southern France to from 500 to 600 aircraft by withdrawals from Italy and the Western front. In the event such an undertaking were accepted as a calculated risk, the complications of supply and maintenance will reduce effectiveness to below 30% by the end of the first month. Germany could presumably divert 250 transport aircraft (JU-52) to this zone of operations within a week, from her strength of 1250 transports (of which 40% are non-operational in Central Germany), and possibly another 250, including 25 Me 323's, within two weeks; but this would leave her practi-

cally without transport aircraft on other fronts. The JU-52 has a range of about 780 miles, which would enable it to be flown from southern France (Bayonne) to Madrid and return without refueling. It is not believed that, except for limited offensive strikes, the German Air Force could advance through a hostile Spain any more rapidly than the ground force, owing to logistical problems and inability to protect advanced airdromes. The available airdromes, though scattered, are believed to be adequate for such aircraft as might be used, apart from logistical considerations.

It is estimated that 12 German divisions will be required in Italy, Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica. Seven divisions have actually been identified in those areas and there are indications that an additional five are "ear marked" for Italy. In France, where we believe the German strategic reserve to be stationed, there will then remain 11 divisions available for use in Spain above what we believe to be the minimum defensive commitment there. To these could be added one division from Germany and another from Denmark. We believe that none of these 13 divisions are up to pre-Stalingrad standards in training and combat efficiency. We further believe that to successfully accomplish an invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, even with no Spanish resistance, would require 12 German divisions. We believe that the Spanish will not cooperate. We believe that to accomplish this mission at least 20 German divisions would be required against Spanish resistance augmented by United Nations forces as they become available. We believe that such an operation would originate from Southern France where, along the Spanish border there are now only two divisions disposed.

The German comb-out and call-up of the fall of 1942 has we believe, extracted practically all available German man-power except oncoming classes. If casualties continue at approximately the same rate as 1941 and 1942, Germany will not be able to maintain existing Army strength. As the Western United Nations continue to expand their capabilities in England and the Mediterranean, German defensive commitments will increase and in consequence less force will be available in 1944 for such an invasion.

Such a course of action might, in desperation, be adopted by Germany, in order to create a situation for the negotiation of an acceptable peace with the United States and Great Britain. The poorly equipped Spanish ground forces, with practically no air support, are not presently deployed to resist Axis penetration. Even if the military successes or diplomatic pressure of the United Nations should bring about the redistribution of these Spanish forces essentially to block the Pyrenees, German forces would probably still be capable of occupying strategic areas threatening the

Straits of *GIBRALTAR* unless United Nations' forces intervene. From bases in southern Spain, the German Air Force might temporarily interrupt the passage of our convoys through the Straits of Gibraltar. Should the United Nations increase their commitments in the Central Mediterranean and penetrate deeper into the Axis Citadel from this area, the temptation to interdict their vital artery of communication correspondingly increases.

e. To Stand on the Strategic Defensive. This is the present German attitude in the west and south and may be forced upon Germany in the east as well. It is a negative course which cannot bring victory, but may serve to avert complete defeat. Its adoption would not preclude counter-offensive action to destroy or expel any United Nations force which gained a lodgment on the continent.

f. To Abandon Outlying Territory (e.g., Norway, France, Italy, Greece, portions of Russia, Finland) in order to conserve and concentrate strength. The consequent impairment of her military, economic, political, or psychological situation will not permit Germany to adopt this course voluntarily.

g. To Sue for Peace. Germany is probably already willing to accept a negotiated peace, but is unable to obtain acceptable terms from the United Nations. In this situation, if she cannot conduct a successful defense on all fronts, she will seek to divide her enemies and obtain an acceptable negotiated peace with one party in order to concentrate against the other. Although a separate peace with Great Britain and the United States might be preferable to her, one with the U.S.S.R. might be more practicable and might appear to be advantageous.

Actual or virtual surrender will remain unacceptable so long as there is hope of achieving a stalemate or a negotiated peace. Should the High Command conclude that surrender is inevitable, it may try to yield to the U.S.S.R. or to Great Britain and the United States separately, whichever course offers the better prospect at that time, meanwhile trying to hold off the other party.

9. *GERMANY'S MOST PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION, 1943-1944.*

a. To continue the war against shipping.

b. To endeavor, during 1943, to improve her defensive position in Russia and to impair Soviet offensive capabilities by attrition.

c. To stand on the strategic defensive in the west and south during 1943 and on all fronts during 1944.

d. To abandon outlying territory only under compulsion.

e. If surrender becomes inevitable, to yield to either the U.S.S.R. or to Great Britain and the United States, whichever course offers the better prospect at that time.

10. *FORECAST FOR 1943-1944.*

a. The German war against shipping will continue, but probably with diminishing effect.

b. The bomber offensive against Germany will have cumulative effect destructive of the German industrial potential, the G.A.F. fighter force, the air defenses, and morale. It may create conditions within the country which will facilitate and hasten complete military defeat.

c. Germany will continue to resist as long as hope persists that thereby she may gain a negotiated peace. When surrender becomes inevitable, she may seek to yield to either the U.S.S.R. or Great Britain and the United States, whichever course offers the better prospect to her at that time.

d. The German satellites (Italy, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Finland) will collapse or come to terms whenever forced to bear the brunt of direct and sustained attack or whenever relieved of fear of Germany and of the U.S.S.R.

C.C.S. 301/3

27 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST, 1943-44

References:

C.C.S. 110th Meeting, Item (4)

C.C.S. 114th Meeting, Item (4)

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure is a revision of C.C.S. 301 (circulated 9 August 1943) to include a new paragraph 8 i, which was proposed in C.C.S. 301/2 and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 114th Meeting. Except for the added paragraph, C.C.S. 301 has not received specific approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, although pertinent extracts from it have been approved in C.C.S. 319/5.

H. REDMAN,

J. R. DEANE,

Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN THE
PACIFIC AND FAR EAST, 1943-44

Report by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

PROBLEM

1. Prepare an outline plan for specific operations in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST in 1943-44 to be in consonance with the Strategic Plan for the Defeat of JAPAN.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. It is assumed that ITALY is eliminated from the war in 1943; GERMANY will be defeated in the fall of 1944; JAPAN and RUSSIA remain at peace.

*ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION,
1943-44 PACIFIC-FAR EAST AREA*

3. An estimate of the enemy situation is contained in C.C.S. 300. This concludes that:

a. General. JAPAN will probably remain on the strategic defensive except in one or more of the following circumstances: (1) if convinced that RUSSIA had decided to attack her or to grant to the other UNITED NATIONS the use of Siberian air bases, JAPAN would strike first; (2) if convinced that there was real danger of serious UNITED NATIONS operations against her from CHINA, JAPAN would strike first; (3) if JAPAN had inflicted a severe defeat upon UNITED NATIONS forces operating against her in the PACIFIC, she might follow up offensively; (4) if RUSSIA met with serious reverses on the Western Front, JAPAN might take the opportunity to attack the SOVIET.

b. North Pacific. We believe that JAPAN will continue to strengthen her defenses in the KURILES as means become available, but is not likely to depart from the defensive except in case of war with RUSSIA, in which case she would probably try to seize KAMCHATKA.

c. Manchuria. We believe that JAPAN will continue to seek to avoid war with RUSSIA in all circumstances except those indicated in *a* (1) above.

She will continue to match Russian strength in *SIBERIA*, reducing her forces in *MANCHURIA* only in case of extreme necessity.

d. China (including Yunnan). We believe that *JAPAN* will continue to seek a satisfactory solution in *CHINA* by political means, but will probably engage in no decisive military operations there except in the circumstances indicated in *a* (2) above. In that case, her most likely objective would be *KUNMING* and probably the determining factor would be relative air strength there.

e. Burma. We believe that *JAPAN* will remain on the strategic defensive.

f. Southwest and Central Pacific. We believe that *JAPAN* will remain on the strategic defensive, continuing to build up her local defensive forces and facilities and her naval striking force.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

4. The Strategic Plan for the Defeat of *JAPAN* (C.C.S. 220) envisages the actual invasion of *JAPAN* following an overwhelming air offensive from bases in *CHINA*. This requires the opening of lines of communication to *CHINA* which, in turn, involves the early recapture of *BURMA* and the seizure of a port in *CHINA*. This requires a westward advance by the *UNITED STATES* through the Central and South-Southwest *PACIFIC*. Operations during this period must have as their objectives those stated in C.C.S. 242/6: "to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against *JAPAN* with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced." An analysis of our capabilities prior to 1945 indicates that we can conduct operations in the Pacific and Asiatic Theaters which will be in consonance with the above objective.

5. A phase in the North *PACIFIC*, now drawing to a close, deals with the ejection of the Japanese from the *ALEUTIANS*. Consideration is being given to plans for an operation against *PARAMUSHIRU* in 1944 considering means available and feasibility in connection with our other operations in the *PACIFIC*.

6. In the Central and South-Southwest *PACIFIC* during 1943-44, we can continue our objective of reaching positions for an all-out effort against *JAPAN* by attaining a line that runs roughly through the *PALAUS* and the *VOGEL-KOP* in western *NEW GUINEA*. At the same time we will constantly be restricting Japanese communications. It may be found desirable or necessary to seize *GUAM* and the Japanese *MARIANAS*, possibly the *BONINS*, in conjunction with the seizure of the western *CAROLINES*, and in particular with the attack

on the *PALAU*s. The *MARIANA-BONIN* attack would have profound effects on the Japanese because of its serious threat to the homeland.

7. In the Asiatic Theater, during this period, the British will begin the ejection of the Japanese from *BURMA*. This will constitute a further pressure against the Japanese and will increase the attrition of their military power. The early increase in assistance to *CHINA* is of the utmost importance in keeping her in the war. In addition to assisting *CHINA* materially, our air efforts in *CHINA* will be furthered. The British forces are scheduled to complete the conquest of *BURMA* with operations beginning in late 1944.

8. The various operations required in the several theaters, during 1943-44, together with a brief statement of the concept of each operation, are listed below. These operations further the objectives stated in C.C.S. 242/6 and, as will be shown later, are within our capabilities during the period under consideration. Outline plans for these operations are available.

a. Gilberts.

This is a plan for the seizure and consolidation of the *GILBERTS* preparatory to a further advance into the *MARSHALLS*. *NAURU*, *TARAWA*, and *MAKIN* are to be captured by simultaneous assault followed by the rapid development of air fields in the forward (*TARAWA-MAKIN*) area and staging fields along the *GILBERT* line.

b. Marshalls

This is a plan for the seizure of the *MARSHALL ISLANDS* (including *WAKE* and *KUSAIE*) preparatory to a westward advance through the Central *PACIFIC*. Initial operations envisage either the seizure of the center nucleus by simultaneous assault or a step-by-step advance up from the *GILBERTS* through *JALUIT* and *MILI*.

c. Ponape

This is a plan for the capture of *PONAPE* preparatory to operations against the *TRUK* area. The main effort is to be against the northern (*PONAPE* Town) area. Subsequent operations provide for the elimination of enemy forces by successive seizure of their positions.

d. Carolines (Truk area)

This is a plan for the seizure of the eastern *CAROLINES* as far west as *WOLEAI* and the establishment of a fleet base at *TRUK*. Atolls to the South-eastward of *TRUK* are to be captured first, followed by the rapid development of airfields in the area. These will provide bases for a sustained fighter-

supported bombing offensive against *TRUK*. Subsequent operations provide for capture of *TRUK* and the reduction as necessary of the remaining enemy positions as far west as *WOLEAI*.

e. Palau Islands

This is a plan for the capture of the *PALAU*S including *YAP*. The plan calls for the initial capture of *YAP* and other suitable islands in the neighboring atolls from which to conduct a more intensified air attack against the *PALAU*S. The initial phases of the final assault against the *PALAU*S center largely on the *MALAKAL-KOROR* Harbor area, with the objective of seizing airfields. Subsequent operations provide for the capture or neutralization of all the islands.

f. Operations against GUAM and the Japanese MARIANAS
(in preparation)

This is a plan for the seizure of *GUAM* and the Japanese *MARIANAS*.

g. Operations in the NEW GUINEA-BISMARCKS-ADMIRALTY ISLANDS subsequent to CARTWHEEL

This is a plan for the seizure or neutralization of eastern *NEW GUINEA* as far west as *WEWAK* and including the *ADMIRALTY ISLANDS* and *BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO*. *RABAUL* is to be neutralized rather than captured. Airfields are to be developed throughout the area and advanced naval anchorages are to be established at *KAVIENG* and *MANUS ISLAND*. The plan envisages: (1) an advance to *WEWAK*, (2) the seizure of *NEW IRELAND* and the outlying islands of *NEW HANOVER* and *ST. MATTHIAS*, and (3) the seizure of the *ADMIRALTY ISLANDS* in the order listed. Concurrently with these operations, *RABAUL* is to be neutralized by an air offensive of increasing intensity.

h. Operations in NEW GUINEA subsequent to the WEWAK-KAVIENG Operation

This is a plan for an advance along the north coast of *NEW GUINEA* as far west as *VOGELKOP*. It provides for step-by-step airborne-waterborne advances. Each successive offensive is predicated on the consolidation of earlier seizures, including the activation of airfields from which to provide close land-based aircraft support for subsequent operations.

i. Air Route into China

Present plans provide for first priority of resources available in the China-Burma-India Theater, in the building up and increasing of the air routes and air supplies to China, and the development of air facilities, with a view to:

- (1) Keeping China in the war.
- (2) Intensifying operations against the Japanese.
- (3) Maintaining increased U.S. and Chinese Air Forces in China.
- (4) Equipping Chinese ground forces.

j. Operations in BURMA at the end of 1943 monsoon (to be presented by British)

These are plans for advances, with limited objectives, in both north and southwest (*ARAKAN coast*) *BURMA* in November 1943. The northern advance will be made by Chinese troops from *YUNNAN* and *LEDO* and by British forces from *IMPHAL*. The objective of this operation is to clear the Japanese from northern *BURMA* and allow the completion of the *LEDO* Road to a junction with the *BURMA* Road. The operation in the southwest is to be an overland advance and an amphibious assault against *AKYAB*. The capture of *AKYAB* will be followed by operations for the seizure of *RAMREE ISLAND*. The objective of these operations is to place our forces in a position to interdict *RANGOON*, and Japanese lines of communication into *BURMA*.

k. Operations in BURMA at the end of 1944 monsoon (to be presented by British)

These are plans for an overseas operation to drive the Japanese from *BURMA*, with the objective of opening additional routes to *CHINA* and increasing the flow of supplies at the earliest practicable date.

1. Operations in CHINA

These operations are of a continuing nature, being increased as our resources permit. They envisage the maximum possible flow of supplies to *CHINA* and the maintaining of increased American Air Forces in *CHINA*.

m. Operations against PARAMUSHIRU

A plan for operations against *PARAMUSHIRU* is under consideration.

9. Increased bombing of the *KURILES* from the *ALEUTIANS* and possibly an amphibious movement against *PARAMUSHIRU* would have a measurable effect on other operations against the Japanese. The *KURILES* are a part of the Japanese Archipelago and a threat against them also threatens the Empire and will tend to pin down forces at home.

10. The two areas where operations come nearest to being mutually supporting are the Central *PACIFIC* and South-Southwest *PACIFIC*. An advance in either of these two Theaters will either increase the threat to the other or

increase the difficulties of its logistic support. Our seizure of the *BISMARCKS* would place *TRUK* under threat. Our seizure of *TRUK* would tend to flank western *NEW GUINEA*, thereby increasing the difficulties of its supply. The fleet can operate to support operations in both Theaters simultaneously. Diversions can frequently be made from one Theater to the other without adversely affecting planned operations.

TARGET DATES

11. The target dates shown below are for the most part tentative and are listed only for planning purposes.

Target Dates	Central <i>PACIFIC</i>	Southwest <i>PACIFIC</i>	<i>CHINA-BURMA-INDIA</i>
15 Aug. 1943	<i>KISKA</i>	—	—
1 Sep. 1943	—	<i>LAE-MADANG</i>	—
15 Oct. 1943	—	<i>BUIN-FASI</i>	—
1 Nov. 1943	—	—	(1) Upper <i>BURMA</i> (2) <i>AKYAB-RAMREE</i>
15 Nov. 1943	<i>GILBERTS</i>	—	—
1 Dec. 1943	—	(1) <i>W. NEW BRITAIN</i> (2) <i>KIETA</i> (3) <i>BUKA</i> (Neutralize)	—
1 Jan. 1944	<i>MARSHALLS</i>	—	—
1 Feb. 1944	—	(1) <i>RABAU</i> (Neutralize) (2) <i>WEWAK</i>	—
1 May 1944	—	<i>KAVIENG</i>	—
1 June 1944	<i>PONAPE</i>	<i>MANUS</i>	—
1 Aug. 1944	—	<i>HOLLANDIA</i>	—
1 Sep. 1944	<i>TRUK</i>	—	—
15 Sep. 1944	—	<i>WADKE</i>	—
15 Oct. 1944	—	<i>JAPEN</i>	—
1 Nov. 1944	—	—	Complete <i>BURMA</i>
30 Nov. 1944	—	<i>MANOKWARI</i>	—
31 Dec. 1944	<i>PALAU</i>	—	—

AVAILABILITY OF MEANS

12. An analysis indicates that, provided the shipping needs of the *PACIFIC* will continue to be fulfilled, the requirements for the above operations can be met by presently planned deployments.

CONCLUSION

13. Specific operations in the *PACIFIC* and *FAR EAST* for 1943-44 should include the recapture of *BURMA* and the opening of a land route to *CHINA* through Northern *BURMA*, meanwhile furnishing all possible logistic and air support to China in order to insure the availability of Chinese areas suitable for operations of United Nations forces against Japan, and a westward advance in the *PACIFIC* to the *PALAU-VOGELKOP* line. An analysis of the separate operations indicated in paragraph 11 above shows that sufficient means can be made available for their accomplishment in 1943-44. The completion of these operations will place the *UNITED NATIONS* in a position to use most advantageously the great air, ground, and naval resources which will be at our disposal after *GERMANY* is defeated.

C.C.S. 303, 303/1 and 303/3

STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT
OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE

References:

- CCS 108th Meeting, Item (3)
- CCS 109th Meeting, Item (1)
- CCS 110th Meeting, Item (1)

C.C.S. 303 was circulated, 9 August 1943, for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Following the discussion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 109th Meeting, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff presented a memorandum circulated as C.C.S. 303/1.

C.C.S. 303/2 set forth extracts from C.C.S. 303 with certain amendments proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 110th Meeting, agreed upon certain resolutions which were circulated as C.C.S. 303/3 and which were also included in C.C.S. 319/5.

C.C.S. 303

9 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT
OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE

Memorandum by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

The enclosed memorandum by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff is presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

ENCLOSURE
STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT
OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE

THE PROBLEM

1. To develop a strategic concept for the defeat of the *AXIS* in *EUROPE*.

DISCUSSION

2. *AXIS Strategic Situation and United Nations Strategy.* From the *AXIS* point of view, objective evaluation of the events of the past year must present a discouraging picture. At sea, the effectiveness of the U-boat campaign has decreased sharply. In the air, the *AXIS* has seen its enemies achieve varying degrees of superiority on all fronts. Meanwhile, the Combined Bomber Offensive accelerates. On the ground, the *AXIS* has seen initial successes in both *EGYPT* and *RUSSIA* degenerate into a steady series of military reverses: *EL ALAMEIN — STALINGRAD —* winter defeat in *RUSSIA — TUNISIA — BELGOROD — SICILY —* and now *OREL*.

Due primarily to inadequate air power, the *AXIS* now lacks the capability of destroying the Russian armed forces, particularly while engaged in containing or parrying the blows of the increasing Anglo-American sea, air, and ground forces in Western *EUROPE*. As long as the bulk of the German forces is contained on the Russian front, the *AXIS* has very limited offensive capabilities, including invasion of the *IBERIAN PENINSULA*, which is now considered unlikely.

It is difficult to believe that current *AXIS* strategy still visualizes total victory, as once conceived. There are as yet no definite indications, but it is reasonable to suppose that the *AXIS* leadership may now seek a satisfactory negotiated peace. Failing in this, an "honorable" surrender might be the next *AXIS* objective. The *AXIS*, however, still retains strong defensive power. A defensive strategy on the part of the *AXIS* might develop into a protracted struggle and result in a stalemate on the Continent. It is imperative, therefore, that the Allied Powers penetrate to the heart of the fortress of Europe, come to grips with the enemy and thus bring about the early and decisive defeat of the *AXIS*.

In the early stages of the present war, the United Nations of necessity pursued an opportunistic strategy forced upon them by their comparative weakness. However, the present rapidly improving position of the United Nations in relation to the Axis in Europe demands an abrogation of opportunistic strategy and requires the adoption of and adherence to sound strategic plans which envisage decisive military operations conducted at times and places of our choosing — not the enemy's.

IF PRESENT CONDITIONS JUSTIFY OUR PRINCIPAL EFFORT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should approve plans:

- a. That would require the concentration of our strength in that area, and concurrently.
- b. That would provide only sufficient forces in the British Isles to secure this important base and to make available opportunistic forces to cross the channel if a German collapse should occur.

HOWEVER, CONDITIONS HAVE NOT SO CHANGED AS TO JUSTIFY ON SOUND MILITARY GROUNDS THE RENUNCIATION OF THE TRIDENT CONCEPT. We must not jeopardize our sound over-all strategy simply to exploit local successes in a generally accepted secondary theater, the Mediterranean, where logistical and terrain difficulties preclude decisive and final operations designed to reach the heart of Germany.

A careful evaluation of the march of events in the world and particularly in the European-Mediterranean area indicates that the strategy enunciated in *TRIDENT* is sound — specifically:

- a. That Operation *OVERLORD*, carefully synchronized with the Combined Bomber offensive, if given *whole-hearted* and *immediate support*, would result in an early and decisive victory in Europe;

b. That continued operations in the Mediterranean should be conducted with available Allied resources as stipulated in *TRIDENT* in order to cause the collapse of Italy, to create diversions of enemy forces, and to destroy vital *AXIS* installations on the Continent.

It is on this basis that the strategic concept for the defeat of the *AXIS* in Europe is developed in the present paper.

3. *OPERATIONS IN RUSSIA*

It is assumed that *RUSSIA* will continue to exert increasing and eventually crushing pressure against the German armies massed against her. In the unlikely event of either a separate Russo-German armistice or peace, the strategy of the *UNITED NATIONS* will require reexamination. In that case, the defeat of *JAPAN* would probably take priority over the defeat of *GERMANY*.

4. *EUROPEAN STRATEGIC CONCEPT 1943-44*. For the purposes of clarity and analysis, the concept of operations here recommended is outlined first in its entirety; thereafter, its component elements are discussed.

a. *Operation POINTBLANK*

The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive is a prerequisite to *OVERLORD* (barring an independent and complete Russian victory before *OVERLORD* can be mounted). This operation must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority.

b. *Operation OVERLORD*

(1) This operation will be the primary U.S.-British ground and air effort against the *AXIS* in *EUROPE*. (Target date 1 May 1944.) After securing adequate *CHANNEL* ports, exploitation will be directed toward securing areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy. Following the establishment of strong Allied forces in *FRANCE* operations designed to strike at the heart of *GERMANY* and to destroy her military forces will be undertaken.

(2) Balanced ground and air force build-up for *OVERLORD*, and continuous planning for and maintenance of those forces available in

the *UNITED KINGDOM* in readiness to take advantage of any situation permitting an opportunistic cross-*CHANNEL* move into *FRANCE*.

(3) As between the operation *OVERLORD* and operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN*, when there is a shortage of resources *OVERLORD* will have an overriding priority.

c. Operations in ITALY

(1) *First Phase*. The elimination of *ITALY* as a belligerent and establishment of air bases at least as far north as the *ROME* area, and, if feasible, to include the *ANCONA* area.

(2) *Second Phase*. Seizure of *SARDINIA* and *CORSICA*.

(3) *Third Phase*. The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German forces in northern *ITALY*, and the creation, *with available MEDITERRANEAN* forces, of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the reequipped French Army and Air Force into southern *FRANCE*.

d. Operations in Southern FRANCE

Offensive operations against southern France, utilizing available *MEDITERRANEAN* forces (to include trained and equipped French forces), should be undertaken to establish a lodgment in the *TOULON-MARSEILLES* area and exploit northward in order to create a diversion in connection with *OVERLORD*.

e. Air Operations

(1) Strategic bombing operations from central *MEDITERRANEAN* bases, complementing *POINTBLANK*.

(2) Support for ground operations with land and carrier-based air forces.

(3) Development of an air ferry route through the *AZORES*.

(4) Air supply of *BALKAN* guerrillas (see *g* below).

f. Operations at Sea

(1) Intensified anti-submarine warfare, including operations from the *AZORES*.

- (2) Security of our sea communications.
- (3) Continued disruption of *AXIS* sea communications.
- (4) Support of amphibious operations.

g. Operations in the BALKANS

Operations in the *BALKAN* area will be limited to supply of Balkan guerrillas by air and sea transport, and to the bombing of *PLOESTI* and other strategic objectives from Italian bases.

h. Garrison Requirements and Security of Lines of Communication in the MEDITERRANEAN

Defensive garrison commitments (Appendix "A") in the *MEDITERRANEAN* area will be reviewed from time to time, with a view to effecting economy of force. The security of our lines of communication through the Strait of *GIBRALTAR* will be assured by appropriate dispositions of our forces in Northwest *AFRICA*, so long as there remains even a remote possibility of the Germans invading the *IBERIAN PENINSULA*.

5. *OPERATION OVERLORD*

This is the main U.S.-British ground and air effort against the *AXIS* in Europe. In consonance with the decisions made at *TRIDENT* and reaffirmed for *QUADRANT* (par. 5, Section III, Basic Undertakings in Support of Over-all Strategic Concept), maximum resources will be concentrated in the U.K. "as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the *AXIS* citadel." Target date for execution of plans now being prepared by *COSSAC* is 1 May 1944. After a firm lodgment has been established and adequate channel and Atlantic ports secured, exploitation will be directed toward securing areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy.

By *TRIDENT* decisions, *OVERLORD* will consist of 29 divisions of which seven are to be *HUSKY* veterans withdrawn from the *MEDITERRANEAN*. If only three of these divisions were moved to the U. K., enough personnel shipping would be available to move four additional U.S. divisions to the U.K., and thus our strength in the *MEDITERRANEAN* would be increased by four divisions without decrease in the planned number for *OVERLORD*. However, there would then be only three instead of seven battle-tested divisions for *OVERLORD*, a disadvantage which cannot be accepted. The maximum support

should be given the main effort. Hence, the *TRIDENT* decision to move seven divisions to the U.K. should not be changed.

6. OPERATIONS IN ITALY AND HER POSSESSIONS

a. General Objectives. Our immediate objective (*TRIDENT*) in the *MEDITERRANEAN* is to knock *ITALY* out of the war. This will open the door to the accomplishment of many other important objectives. These are:

(1) The progressive establishment of air bases in *ITALY*, at least as far north as the *ANCONA* area, and the initiation of a strategic bombing offensive therefrom against the Reich and the *BALKANS*, coordinated with and complementing *POINTBLANK*.

(2) The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German forces in Northern *ITALY*, and the creation, *with available MEDITERRANEAN forces*, of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the reequipped French Army, into Southern *FRANCE*.

(3) The final elimination of the Italian fleet as a military factor in the war.

(4) The acquisition of the Italian merchant fleet.

(5) The occupation of *SARDINIA* and *CORSICA*.

b. Specific Operations. The elimination of *ITALY* as a belligerent does not necessarily mean that the Germans will withdraw behind the *ALPS*. The more likely German reaction will be to defend on the *RIMINI-PISA* line. Regardless of where *GERMANY* may defend in *ITALY*, our strategy must contemplate maintaining steady pressure against her forces. In our view, however, the mere maintenance of pressure on German forces remaining in *ITALY* does not constitute an adequate mission for the powerful forces we will have in the *MEDITERRANEAN* after *ITALY* is knocked out of the war. Including the French, there will be approximately 4,500 combat aircraft and at least 24 offensive divisions above and beyond garrison and security requirements. Our strategy must provide an appropriate task for these forces in the *MEDITERRANEAN*. Such a task should, if possible, lend support to our main effort across the *CHANNEL*. Broadly speaking, there are but three places where the ground element of these forces could be utilized. The *BALKANS*, the *TRIESTE-VIENNA* region, or in Southern *FRANCE*. Each of these warrants brief discussion:

(1) *Balkans*. The *BALKANS* are unsuitable for large scale offensive operations, due to terrain and communication difficulties. This course, therefore, is rejected. (We do recommend special operations in the *BALKANS*. These are discussed in paragraph 9 below).

(2) *Trieste-Vienna*. Offensive operations, either limited or unlimited in their scope and objective, along the *TRIESTE-VIENNA* line would strike directly at the German heartland. Consequently, such operations would insure a swift and positive German reaction. The nature of the terrain, however, is such that great German forces would not be required to halt our advance. There is no reason to believe that a limited-objective operation in this area would contribute materially to *OVERLORD* success by drawing significant German forces out of *FRANCE*. The establishment of a new front, moreover, in this area would undoubtedly guarantee the continuous separation of our forces between the *MEDITERRANEAN* and Western *FRANCE* for the duration of the war. Lastly, and by no means of least importance, the French Army wants to fight in *FRANCE* and will have little stomach for operations in the *TRIESTE-VIENNA* region. Consequently this course is also rejected.

(3) *Southern France*. Southern *FRANCE* is retained as being the only suitable area in which ultimately to utilize the forces that will be available in the *MEDITERRANEAN* after *ITALY* is knocked out of the war. Our concept for the eventual operations in Southern *FRANCE* is developed in paragraph 7, below.

c. *Elimination of the Italian Fleet*. The final elimination of the Italian fleet as a military factor in the war will release the larger units of the British fleet for use in other theaters.

d. *Italian Merchant Fleet*. The acquisition of the Italian merchant fleet will be of assistance to the *UNITED NATIONS* in the rehabilitation of *ITALY*.

e. *Occupation of Sardinia and Corsica*. Our forward advance on the mainland of *ITALY*, before *ITALY* is knocked out of the war, need not be restricted by continuing *AXIS* occupation of *SARDINIA* and *CORSICA*. These two islands are very likely to fall when *ITALY* goes out of the war. If not, their reduction and occupation must be accomplished before operations in Southern *FRANCE* are undertaken.

7. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN FRANCE

a. After *ITALY* is eliminated and the Germans are forced back into Northern *ITALY*, *FRANCE* becomes a vulnerable salient to *GERMANY*. At

first glance, this salient appears most formidable, bounded as it is on the three exposed sides by heavily-defended seacoasts and neutral Spanish territory. If, however, Russian pressure continues undiminished, the intensity of *POINTBLANK* is augmented from bases in *ITALY*, our pressure in *ITALY* remains steady, and appropriate political and economic measures are taken with regard to *SPAIN*, the adequate defense by the *AXIS* of the French salient will have become a confounding problem. Exposed to steady and increasing pressure, *GERMANY* will not have the air power required to adequately maintain her perimeter and internal defense. The German air force will be stretched some 3,000 to 4,000 miles around three sides of the continent of *EUROPE*. In view of present estimates that the over-all German strategic situation will continue to deteriorate, we believe that operations for the conquest of *FRANCE* can be initiated in the spring of 1944.

b. On the assumption that conditions are substantially as stated in paragraph *a* above, operations in Southern *FRANCE* coordinated with *OVERLORD* are believed feasible, with the first objective the establishment of a firm lodgment in the *MARSEILLES* area. The sequence of operations is envisaged as follows:

- (1) Holding attack with strong ground forces in Northern *ITALY*.
- (2) Amphibious invasion of Southern *FRANCE*, under carrier and land-based air support, with relatively small forces. Due to the distances involved, only limited land-based air support can be expected for this operation.
- (3) Security of the lodgment by rapid introduction of strong reinforcements, overland if feasible, from Northern *ITALY*, and by sea within the limits of available shipping.
- (4) Exploitation to secure the Port of *MARSEILLES*, and airfields in the area.
- (5) Offensive operations designed to assist *OVERLORD* by containing maximum German forces.

c. For available means see Appendices "A," and "B." Exclusive of garrison and security requirements in the *MEDITERRANEAN* area and the seven divisions transferred to the *UNITED KINGDOM* for *OVERLORD*, and assuming that 10 divisions will be adequate to maintain pressure against the Germans in Northern *ITALY*, it is estimated that the following forces

will be available for offensive operations against Southern *FRANCE*:

10 U.S. and British divisions.

4 French divisions.

4,500 U.S. and British combat aircraft.

Approximately enough amphibious lift for at least two reinforced divisions (44,000). (If LCM's can be used, the lift can be increased to three divisions.)

Adequate Naval escort vessels are now allocated for Mediterranean operations.

8. *AIR OPERATIONS*

a. The main effort of our Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom progresses and should accomplish the expected results in the destruction of German air power, air defenses, war-making resources, and general morale. This bomber offensive will be carefully integrated with *OVERLORD* and should be directed so as to reach its greatest effectiveness in the spring of 1944 and thereby create conditions favorable for the *OVERLORD* operation.

b. A strategic bombing offensive from Italian air bases as far north as *ANCONA* and from other *MEDITERRANEAN* air bases would complement the *POINTBLANK* offensive. With our *MEDITERRANEAN* air power advanced to bases in the *ANCONA* area of *ITALY*, many critical *AXIS* war industries and resources, including fighter aircraft and oil production, would be within operating radius of our medium as well as heavy bombers.

c. Provision for air support of surface operations requires careful and timely planning. Carrier-borne air cover will probably be required in support of amphibious operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN* beyond the radius of action of land-based fighters.

d. The necessity for air staging points and anti-submarine bases in the *AZORES* was recognized at *TRIDENT*. Reduced flying time and better weather along this route would result in combat units in the *EUROPEAN*, *MEDITERRANEAN*, and *FAR EAST* theaters receiving initial and replacement equipment more expeditiously and in better condition. Anti-submarine bases would complete the air and surface coverage of the central and north Atlantic. Hence, air and naval bases in the *AZORES* should be secured as early as possible.

9. OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS

The *BALKANS* are unsuitable for large-scale offensive operations, due to terrain and communication difficulties. Nevertheless, as long as Germans occupy the *BALKANS* there remains a problem as to how to deal with them. It is our view that our strategy is best served if *GERMANY* should continue to hold the *BALKANS*, provided *GERMANY* can be forced to garrison heavily and be made to pay a high price in attrition of personnel and materiel.

Therefore, our strategy should be to supply the *BALKAN* guerrillas by air and sea, with the object of enabling them to compel the Germans to maintain not only present forces of 12 divisions in that region, but also to provide additional divisions to replace the 30 Italian divisions now there.

10. POLICY TOWARD SPAIN AND TURKEY

a. Spain

SPAIN is assisting the *AXIS* with her economic resources and even with armed forces. The *UNITED NATIONS* have endured Spanish official approval of *AXIS* war aims and denunciation of our own with an attitude of conciliation. At the present moment we find Spanish troops defensively disposed against us, with little or no disposition facing our enemy. We are forced by this disposition to maintain large forces ready to protect our life-line through the Straits of *GIBRALTAR* and constantly to plan for immediate provision of additional forces to hold *GIBRALTAR* should *SPAIN* permit a German offensive through her territory. Indications are that Franco is realizing the final *UNITED NATIONS'* victory and is tending toward a position of real neutrality.

The time is now ripe to take full advantage of our present position and adopt a stern and frankly demanding policy toward *SPAIN*. The *UNITED NATIONS* should require *SPAIN*, for the price of wartime economic assistance and postwar friendship, to:

(1) Shift the bulk of her defensive forces from *MOROCCO* and Southern *SPAIN* to Northern *SPAIN*.

(2) Cease military and economic aid to *GERMANY*.

b. Turkey

To date, the *UNITED NATIONS* have devoted — and, by *TRIDENT*, are continuing to devote — considerable effort toward bringing *TURKEY*

into the war as an ally. This effort takes the form of very sizeable economic aid and involves a *UNITED NATIONS* military commitment of considerable proportions. This policy toward *TURKEY* has not been fruitful. The current estimate is that the Turkish attitude is unlikely to change. It is believed, therefore, that the continuation of aid to *TURKEY*, at the present scale, is not warranted.

11. *RELATIONS WITH PATRIOT FORCES IN EUROPE*. Within the limits of available means and without prejudice to major operations, patriot forces, everywhere within enemy-occupied territory in *EUROPE*, should be furnished supplies to enable them to conduct sabotage, propaganda, intelligence, and guerrilla warfare. Since our strategy contemplates the conquest of *FRANCE*, the French underground can be expected to make a very important and direct contribution to the U.S. and British effort in Western *EUROPE*. The supply of the French underground, and the development of plans for the use of these Patriot Forces, therefore, should have a relatively high priority in our program.

12. *OPERATIONS IN LIBERATED AREAS*. Should *GERMANY*, of her own volition, withdraw her forces from *NORWAY* or the Southern *BALKANS*, our policy will be limited to the economic and military supply of the liberated nations to the extent of our capabilities without prejudice to military operations in more vital areas. The advisability of conducting military operations in and from *NORWAY*, in the event of German withdrawal therefrom, will be assessed in the light of the then-existing over-all strategic situation.

APPENDIX "A"

SUGGESTED DEPLOYMENT OF GROUND FORCES IN THE
 MEDITERRANEAN AFTER THE CONQUEST OF ITALY

	<u>British & Others</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>French</u>	<u>Total</u>
Available in divs. and equivalent divs.	28	9	5	42
<i>Garrisons and Commitments</i>				
Sicily and So. Italy	2			2
Central Italy	2			2
Sardinia	1			1
Corsica			1	1
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica	1			1
Egypt and Palestine	2			2
Syria and Cyprus	1			1
North Africa (Tunisia, Algeria, and French Morocco)		1	*	1*
Recommended commitment to <i>OVERLORD</i>	3	4		7
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	12	5	1*	18*
Available for operation in North <i>ITALY</i> and Southern <i>FRANCE</i>	16	4	4	24

* Six additional French divisions, begin equipped and trained in North Africa.

APPENDIX "B"

DEPLOYMENT OF AIR FORCES IN MEDITERRANEAN

Unit equipment and total airplanes available as of August 2, 1943:

TYPES	U.S.		R.A.F.		FRENCH	
	UE	Total	UE	Total	UE	Total
Heavy Bombers (D)	262	393	—	—	—	—
Heavy Bombers (N)	—	—	48	72	—	—
Medium Bombers (D)	389	588	—	—	—	—
Medium Bombers (N)	—	—	183	275	—	—
Light Bombers	57	86	384	576	—	—
SEF, TEF, Ftr Bombers	1,069	1,604	942	1,413	60	90
TEF (N)	24	36	120	180	—	—
Recn and Photo	78	116	72	108	3	3
T/C	364	546	—	—	—	—
Torpedo Bombers	—	—	160	240	3	3
TOTALS	2,246	3,369	1,909	2,864	66	96

GRAND TOTALS — Unit Equipment 4,221
Total Airplanes 6,329

Less for garrison and security
in Mediterranean (fighters only) :* Unit equipment 1,164
Total Airplanes 1,747

Balance remaining for offensive operations: Unit equipment 3,057
Total Airplanes 4,582

* Figures based on Trident Estimates.

- NOTES: a. Total R.A.F. strength is figured as follows: Number of squadrons x authorized strength plus 50% reserve. There is not a definite figure set as a reserve but 50% is known to be very conservative as far as fighters are concerned.
- b. It is contemplated that the number of U.S. planes will be reduced 365 by Jan. 1944 if proposed planning is carried out.
- c. Reductions or additions in R.A.F. strength not included.

CC.S. 303/1

16 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE

Memorandum from the United States Chiefs of Staff

The discussion in the Combined Chiefs of Staff Meeting yesterday made more apparent than ever the necessity for decision now as to whether our main effort in the European Theater is to be in the Mediterranean or from the United Kingdom. The United States Chiefs of Staff believe that this is the critical question before the conference and that the effective conduct of the war in Europe makes this decision now a must.

We propose the following:

The Combined Chiefs of Staff reaffirm the decisions of the *TRIDENT* Conference as to the execution of *OVERLORD* including the definite allotment of forces thereto and assign to it an overriding priority over other operations in the European Theater.

The United States Chiefs of Staff believe that the acceptance of this decision must be without conditions and without mental reservation. They accept the fact that a grave emergency will always call for appropriate action to meet it. However, long range decision for the conduct of the war must not be dominated by possible eventualities.

C.C.S. 303/3

17 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE

Note by the Secretaries

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved the following strategic concept of operations for the defeat of the Axis power in Europe, 1943-44.

2. *OPERATION "POINTBLANK"*

The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive is a prerequisite to *OVERLORD* (barring an independent and complete Russian victory before *OVERLORD* can be mounted). This operation must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority.

3. *OPERATION "OVERLORD"*

a. This operation will be the primary U.S.-British ground and air effort against the *AXIS* in *EUROPE*. (Target date 1 May 1944) After securing adequate *CHANNEL* ports, exploitation will be directed toward securing areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy. Following the establishment of strong Allied forces in *FRANCE*, operations designed to strike at the heart of *GERMANY* and to destroy her military forces will be undertaken.

b. Balanced ground and air force build-up for *OVERLORD*, and continuous planning for and maintenance of those forces available in the *UNITED KINGDOM* in readiness to taken advantage of any situation permitting an opportunistic *cross-CHANNEL* move into *FRANCE*.

c. As between operation *OVERLORD* and operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN*, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be distributed and employed with the main object of insuring the success of *OVERLORD*. Operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN* Theater will be carried out with the forces allotted at *TRIDENT* except insofar as these may be varied by decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. OPERATIONS IN ITALY

a. First Phase. The elimination of *ITALY* as a belligerent and establishment of air bases in the *ROME* area, and, if feasible, farther north.

b. Second Phase. Seizure of *SARDINIA* and *CORSICA*.

c. Third Phase. The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German forces in Northern *ITALY*, and the creation of the conditions required for *OVERLORD* and of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the reequipped French Army and Air Force into Southern *FRANCE*.

5. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN FRANCE

Offensive operations against Southern France (to include the use of trained and equipped French forces), should be undertaken to establish a lodgment in the *TOULON-MARSEILLES* area and exploit northward in order to create a diversion in connection with *OVERLORD*.

6. AIR OPERATIONS

a. Strategic bombing operations from Italian and central *MEDITERRANEAN* bases, complementing *POINTBLANK*.

b. Support for ground operations with land and carrier-based air forces.

c. Development of an air ferry route through the *AZORES*.

d. Air supply of *BALKAN* guerrillas (see paragraph 8 below).

7. OPERATIONS AT SEA

a. Intensified anti-submarine warfare, including operations from the *AZORES*.

b. Security of our sea communications.

c. Continued disruption of *AXIS* sea communications.

d. Support of amphibious operations.

8. OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS

Operations in the *BALKAN* area will be limited to supply of *BALKAN*

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guerrillas by air and sea transport, and to the bombing of *PLOESTI* and other strategic objectives from Italian bases.

9. *GARRISON REQUIREMENTS AND SECURITY OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN*

Defensive garrison commitments (Appendix "A" to C.C.S. 303) in the *MEDITERRANEAN* area will be reviewed from time to time, with a view to effecting economy of force. The security of our lines of communication through the Strait of *GIBRALTAR* will be assured by appropriate dispositions of our forces in Northwest *AFRICA*, so long as there remains even a remote possibility of the Germans invading the *IBERIAN PENINSULA*.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

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C.C.S. 304

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
OPERATION "OVERLORD" — OUTLINE PLAN

Reference:

C.C.S. 108th Meeting, Items (4) and (5)

C.C.S. 113th Meeting, Item (2)

1st Citadel Meeting

2nd Citadel Meeting, Item (3)

C.C.S. 304 circulated, 10 August 1943, a covering note by the British Chiefs of Staff, pointing out certain observations relative to the Outline Plan for Operation *OVERLORD* (Annex "B"), which was presented for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 108th Meeting, approved the outline plan as presented and endorsed the action taken by the British Chiefs of Staff in authorizing General Morgan to proceed with the detailed planning and with full preparations.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OPERATION "OVERLORD" — OUTLINE PLAN

Covering Note by the British Chiefs of Staff

1. We have examined carefully the outline plan for operation *OVERLORD* which General Morgan has submitted. We have the following observations:—

a. It will be observed that General Morgan lays down three main conditions which must be created if the operation is to have a reasonable prospect of success. These are:—

(1) There must be an overall reduction in the strength of the German Fighter forces between now and the time of the assault.

(2) German reserves in France and the Low Countries as a whole, excluding Divisions holding the coast, G.A.F. divisions, and training divisions, should not exceed on the day of the assault 12 full strength, first quality, divisions. In addition, the Germans should not be able to transfer more than 15 first quality divisions from Russia during the first two months.

(3) The problem of beach maintenance over a prolonged period in the Channel must be overcome.

We entirely agree with General Morgan that these conditions are essential, and we shall have certain proposals to make during the *QUADRANT* discussions with a view to their fulfillment.

b. The annexed table (Annex "A") shows:—

(1) The Allied rate of build-up as planned by General Morgan.

(2) The maximum rate of German build-up which General Morgan considers acceptable.

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From this table it will be seen that our margin of superiority over the maximum acceptable rate of German build-up, particularly during the first two critical days, is small. Moreover, the figures in the Table do not sufficiently reflect the handicap under which our newly-landed divisions must suffer when engaging the enemy's divisions which have all along been established on land. We think it important, therefore, that the scale of German reserves should be reduced by some means below the maximum specified by General Morgan in his second condition. Otherwise, the operation may not succeed.

c. We think the general rate of advance planned by General Morgan is optimistic. Recent experience in Sicily shows that if the enemy is resisting fiercely, and if the country lends itself to defense, the advance is bound to be slow. The country south of the Caen beaches is in many respects admirable for delaying actions. We think that this part of General Morgan's plan should be carefully re-examined.

2. Subject to the above observations, we recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should approve General Morgan's outline plan and authorize him to proceed with detailed planning, and with full preparations. We gave instructions to this effect before leaving England, in order that no time should be lost, and we ask the Combined Chiefs of Staff to endorse our action.

S. S. QUEEN MARY,
10TH AUGUST, 1943.

ANNEX A
COMPARISON OF OUR OWN BUILD UP WITH THE GERMAN RATE OF REINFORCEMENT, WHICH G.O.S.S.A.C. STATES CAN BE ACCEPTED.

DAY	COSSAC'S BUILD-UP Detail	GERMAN RATE OF REINFORCEMENT THAT CAN BE ACCEPTED	TOTALS. (equivalent Allied German divs.)	COMMENTS	
()	()	()	()	()	
0 Day	Three assault divs. One bde, gp. Three tk. bdes. 2/3 airborne div.	One def. div. (coastal) Three divs. (one armd.)	5	4	
D+1	Three assault divs. One follow-up div. Three tk. bdes. 1-1/3 airborne div.	One def. div. Five divs. (two armd.)	6 1/3	6	There will be one additional British follow-up div. actually landed but not operational until D+2.
D+2	Three assault divs. Two follow-up divs. Three tk. bdes. Two airborne divs.	One def. div. Five divs. (two armd.)	8	6	There will be one additional British follow-up div. and one build-up div. actually landed but not operational until D+3.
D+3	Three assault divs. Three follow-up divs. Three tk. bdes. One build-up div. Two airborne divs.	One def. div. Seven divs. (four armd.)	10	8	There will be one and one-third additional British build-up divs. In addition, actually landed, but not operational until D+4.
D+4	Three assault divs. Three follow-up divs. Three tk. bdes. Two-third build-up div. Two airborne divs.	One def. div. Seven divs. (four armd.)	11 2/3	8	There will be two tk. bdes. and two-third British build-up div. In addition, actually landed but not operational until D+5.

ANNEX B
OPERATION "OVERLORD."

The Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee,
Offices of the War Cabinet.

15th July, 1943

1. In my original Directive (C.O.S. (43) 215 (O)) I was charged with the duty of preparing a plan for a full scale assault against the Continent in 1944 as early as possible.

2. This part of my Directive was subsequently amplified (see C.O.S. (43) 113th Meeting (O), Item 4), in that I was ordered to submit an outline plan for an assault, with certain specified forces, on a target date the 1st May, 1944, to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. It was indicated to me, in the course of this amplification, that the lodgement area should include ports that, suitably developed, could be used by ocean-going ships for the build-up of the initial assault forces from the United Kingdom, and for their further build-up with additional divisions and supporting units that might be shipped from the United States or elsewhere.

3. I have the honour now to report that, in my opinion, it is possible to undertake the operation described, on or about the target date named, with the sea, land and air forces specified, given a certain set of circumstances in existence at that time.

4. These governing circumstances are partly within our direct control and partly without. Those within our control relate first to the problem of beach maintenance, and secondly to the supply of shipping, naval landing craft and transport aircraft. Wherever we may attempt to land, and however many ports we capture, we cannot escape the fact that we shall be forced to maintain a high proportion of our forces over the beaches for the first two or three months while port facilities are being restored; and that, in view of the variability of the weather in the Channel, this will not be feasible unless we are able rapidly to improvise sheltered anchorages off the beaches. New methods of overcoming this problem are now being examined. There is no reason to suppose that these methods will be ineffective, but I feel it my duty to point out that this operation is not to be contemplated unless this problem of prolonged cross-beach maintenance and the provision of artificial anchorages shall have been solved.

5. As regards the supply of shipping, naval landing craft and transport aircraft, increased resources in these would permit of the elaboration of alternative plans designed to meet more than one set of extraneous conditions, whereas the state of provision herein taken into account dictates the adoption of one course only, or none at all. In proportion as additional shipping, landing craft and transport aircraft can be made available, so the chances of success in the operation will be increased. It seems feasible to contemplate additions as a result either of stepped-up production, of strategical re-allotment or, in the last resort, of postponement of the date of assault.

6 I have come to the conclusion that, in view of the limitations in resources imposed by my directives, we may be assured of a reasonable chance of success on the 1st May, 1944, only if we concentrate our efforts on an assault across the Norman beaches about Bayeux.

7. As regards circumstances that we can control only indirectly, it is, in my opinion, necessary to stipulate that the state of affairs existing at the time, both on land in France and in the air above it, shall be such as to render the assault as little hazardous as may be so far as it is humanly possible to calculate. The essential discrepancy in value between the enemy's troops, highly organised, armed and battle-trained, who await us in their much vaunted impregnable defences, and our troops, who must of necessity launch their assault at the end of a cross-Channel voyage with all its attendant risks, must be reduced to the narrowest possible margin. Though much can be done to this end by the means available and likely to become available to us in the United Kingdom to influence these factors, we are largely dependent upon events that will take place on other war fronts, principally on the Russian front, between now and the date of the assault.

8. I therefore suggest to the Chiefs of Staff that it is necessary, if my plan be approved, to adopt the outlook that Operation "Overlord" is even now in progress, and to take all possible steps to see that all agencies that can be brought to bear are, from now on, co-ordinated in their action as herein below described, so as to bring about the state of affairs that we would have exist on the chosen day of assault.

9. Finally, I venture to draw attention to the danger of making direct comparisons between operation "Husky" and operation "Overlord." No doubt the experience now being gained in the Mediterranean will prove invaluable when the detailed planning stage for "Overlord" is reached, but viewed as a whole the two operations could hardly be more dissimilar. In "Husky," the bases of an extended continental coastline were used for a converging assault

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against an island, whereas in "Overlord" it is necessary to launch an assault from an island against an extended continental mainland coastline. Furthermore, while in the Mediterranean the tidal range is negligible and the weather reasonably reliable, in the English Channel the tidal range is considerable and the weather capricious.

10. Attached hereto are papers setting forth the plan that I recommend for adoption.

F. E. MORGAN, Lieutenant-General,
Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (Designate).

*H.Q., C.O.S.S.A.C.,
Norfolk House,
St. James's Square, S.W. 1.*

(C.O.S.S.A.C. (43) 32 (Final).
(Also C.O.S. (43) 415 (O).)
27th July, 1943.

DIGEST OF OPERATION "OVERLORD"

Object

1. The object of Operation "Overlord" is to mount and carry out an operation, with forces and equipment established in the United Kingdom, and with target date the 1st May, 1944, to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be developed. The lodgement area must contain sufficient port facilities to maintain a force of some twenty-six to thirty divisions, and enable that force to be augmented by follow-up shipments from the United States or elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units of the rate of three to five divisions per month.

Selection of a Lodgement Area

2. In order to provide sufficient port facilities to maintain these large forces, it will be necessary to select a lodgement area which includes a group of major ports. We must plan on the assumption that ports, on capture, will be seriously damaged and probably blocked. It will take some time to restore normal facilities. We shall thus be forced to rely on maintenance over beaches for an extended period.

3. A study of the beaches on the Belgian and Channel coasts shows that the beaches with the highest capacity for passing vehicles and stores inland are those in the Pas de Calais,* and the Caen†-Cotentin‡ area. Of these, the Caen beaches are the most favourable, as they are, unlike the others, sheltered from the prevailing winds. Naval and air considerations point to the area between the Pas de Calais and the Cotentin as the most suitable for the initial

* "Pas de Calais area" has been assumed as the area between Gravelines and the River Somme.

† "Caen area" is taken as that between the River Orne and the base of the Cotentin Peninsula.

‡ The "Cotentin" Peninsula is the peninsula in which Cherbourg is situated.

landing, air factors of optimum air support and rapid provision of airfields indicating the Pas de Calais as the best choice, with Caen as an acceptable alternative.

4. Thus, taking beach capacity and air and naval considerations together, it appears that either the Pas de Calais area or the Caen-Cotentin area is the most suitable for the initial main landing.

5. As the area for the initial landing, the Pas de Calais has many obvious advantages such that good air support and quick turn round for our shipping can be achieved. On the other hand, it is a focal point of the enemy fighters disposed for defence, and maximum enemy air activity can be brought to bear over this area with the minimum movement of his air forces. Moreover, the Pas de Calais is the most strongly defended area on the whole French coast. The defences would require very heavy and sustained bombardment from sea and air: penetration would be slow, and the result of the bombardment of beach exits would severely limit the rate of build-up. Further, this area does not offer good opportunities for expansion. It would be necessary to develop the bridgehead to include either the Belgian ports as far as Antwerp or the Channel ports Westwards to include Havre and Rouen. But both an advance to Antwerp across the numerous water obstacles, and a long flank march of some 120 miles to the Seine ports must be considered unsound operations of war unless the German forces are in a state not far short of final collapse.

6. In the Caen-Cotentin area it would be possible to make our initial landing either partly on the Cotentin Peninsula and partly on the Caen beaches, wholly in the Cotentin or wholly on the Caen beaches. An attack with part of our forces in the Cotentin and part on the Caen beaches is, however, considered to be unsound. It would entail dividing our limited forces by the low-lying marshy ground and intricate river system at the neck of the Cotentin Peninsula; thus exposing them to defeat in detail.

7. An attack against the Cotentin Peninsula, on the other hand, has a reasonable chance of success, and would ensure the early capture of the port of Cherbourg. Unfortunately, very few airfields exist in the Cotentin, and that area is not suitable for rapid airfield development. Furthermore, the narrow neck of the Peninsula would give the Germans an easy task in preventing us from breaking out and expanding our initial bridgehead. Moreover, during the period of our consolidation in the Cotentin the Germans would have time to reinforce their coastal troops in the Caen area, rendering a subsequent amphibious assault in that area much more difficult.

8. There remains the attack on the Caen beaches. The Caen sector is weakly held; the defences are relatively light and the beaches are of high capacity and sheltered from the prevailing winds. Inland the terrain is suitable for airfield development and for the consolidation of the initial bridgehead; and much of it is unfavourable for counter-attacks by panzer divisions. Maximum enemy air opposition can only be brought to bear at the expense of the enemy air defence screen covering the approaches to Germany; and the limited number of enemy airfields within range of the Caen area facilitates local neutralisation of the German fighter force. The sector suffers from the disadvantage that considerable effort will be required to provide adequate air support to our assault forces and some time must elapse before the capture of a major port.

After a landing in the Caen sector it would be necessary to seize either the Seine group of ports or the Brittany group of ports. To seize the Seine ports would entail forcing a crossing of the Seine, which is likely to require greater forces than we can build up through the Caen beaches and the port of Cherbourg. It should, however, be possible to seize the Brittany ports between Cherbourg and Nantes and on them build up sufficient forces for our final advance Eastwards.

Provided that the necessary air situation can first be achieved, the chances of a successful attack and of rapid subsequent development are so much greater in this sector than in any other that it is considered that the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages.

The Lodgement Area Selected

9. In the light of these factors, it is considered that our initial landing on the Continent should be effected in Caen area, with a view to the eventual seizure of a lodgement area comprising the Cherbourg-Brittany group of ports (from Cherbourg to Nantes).

Opening Phase up to the Capture of Cherbourg

10. The opening phase in the seizing of this lodgement area would be the effecting of a landing in the Caen sector with a view to the early capture and development of airfield sites in the Caen area, and of the port of Cherbourg.

11. The main limiting factors affecting such an operation are the possibility of attaining the necessary air situation; the number of offensive divisions which the enemy can make available for counter attack in the Caen area; the availability of landing ships and craft and of transport aircraft; and the capacity of the beaches and ports in the sector.

12. Although the strength of the G.A.F. available in 1944 on the Western front cannot be forecast at this stage, we can confidently expect that we shall have a vast numerical superiority in bomber forces. The first-line strength of the German fighter force is, however, showing a steady increase and although it is unlikely to equal the size of the force at our disposal, there is no doubt that our fighters will have a very large commitment entailing dispersal and operations at maximum intensity. Our fighters will also be operating under serious tactical disadvantages in the early stages, which will largely offset their numerical superiority. Before the assault takes place, therefore, it will be necessary to reduce the effectiveness of the G.A.F., particularly that part which can be brought to bear against the Caen area.

13. The necessary air situation to ensure a reasonable chance of success will therefore require that the maximum number of German fighter forces are contained in the Low Countries and North-West Germany, that the effectiveness of the fighter defence in the Caen area is reduced and that air reinforcements are prevented from arriving in the early stages from the Mediterranean. Above all, it will be necessary to reduce the over-all strength of the German fighter force between now and the date of the operation by destruction of the sources of supply, by the infliction of casualties by bringing on air battles, and, immediately prior to the assault, by the disorganisation of G.A.F. installations and control system in the Caen area.

14. As it is impossible to forecast with any accuracy the number and location of German formations in reserve in 1944, while, on the other hand, the forces available to us have been laid down, an attempt has been made in this paper to determine the wisest employment of our own forces and then to determine the maximum number of German formations which they can reasonably overcome. Apart from the air situation, which is an over-riding factor, the practicability of this plan will depend principally on the number, effectiveness and availability of German divisions present in France and the Low Countries in relation to our own capabilities. This consideration is discussed below (paragraph 35).

15. A maximum of thirty and a minimum of twenty-six equivalent divisions are likely to be available in the United Kingdom for cross-Channel operations on the 1st May, 1944. Further build-up can be at the rate of three to five divisions per month.

16. Landing ships and craft have been provided to lift the equivalent of three assault divisions and two follow-up divisions, without "overheads," and

it has been assumed that the equivalent of an additional two divisions can be afloat in ships.

17. Airborne forces amounting to two airborne divisions and some five or six parachute regiments will be available, but, largely owing to shortage of transport aircraft, it is only possible to lift the equivalent of two-thirds of one airborne division simultaneously, on the basis of present forecasts.

18. Even if additional landing ships and craft could be made available, the beaches in the Caen area would preclude the landing of forces greater than the equivalent of the three assault and two follow-up divisions, for which craft have already been provided. Nevertheless, an all-round increase of at least 10 per cent in landing ships and craft is highly desirable in order to provide a greater margin for contingencies within the framework of the existing plan. Furthermore, sufficient lift for a further assault division could most usefully be employed in an additional landing on other beaches.

19. There is no port of any capacity within the sector although there are a number of small ports of limited value. Maintenance will, therefore, of necessity be largely over the beaches until it is possible to capture and open up the port of Cherbourg. In view of the possibilities of interruption by bad weather it will be essential to provide early some form of improvised sheltered waters.

20. Assuming optimum weather conditions, it should be possible to build up the force over the beaches to a total by D plus 6 of the equivalent of some eleven divisions and five tank brigades and thereafter to land one division a day until about D plus 24.

Proposed Plan

Preliminary Phase.

21. During the preliminary phase, which must start forthwith, all possible means including air and sea action, propaganda, political and economic pressure, and sabotage, must be integrated into a combined offensive aimed at softening the German resistance. In particular, air action should be directed towards the reduction of the German air forces on the Western front, the progressive destruction of the German economic system and the undermining of German morale.

22. In order to contain the maximum German forces away from the Caen area diversionary operations should be staged against other areas such as the Pas de Calais and the Mediterranean Coast of France.

Preparatory Phase.

23. During this phase air action will be intensified against the G.A.F., particularly in North-West France, with a view to reducing the effectiveness of the G.A.F. in that area, and will be extended to include attacks against communications more directly associated with movement of German reserves which might affect the Caen area. Three naval assault forces will be assembled with the naval escorts and loaded at ports along the South Coast of England. Two naval assault forces carrying the follow-up forces will also be assembled and loaded, one in the Thames Estuary and one on the West Coast.

The Assault.

24. After a very short air bombardment of the beach defences three assault divisions will be landed simultaneously on the Caen beaches, followed up on D day by the equivalent of two tank brigades (United States regiments) and a brigade group (United States regimental combat team). At the same time, airborne forces will be used to seize the town of Caen; and subsidiary operations by commandos and possibly by airborne forces will be undertaken to neutralise certain coast defences and seize certain important river crossings. The object of the assault forces will be to seize the general line of Grand-camp-Bayeux-Caen.

Follow-up and Build-up Phase.

25. Subsequent action will take the form of a strong thrust Southwards and South-Westwards with a view to destroying enemy forces, acquiring sites for airfields, and gaining depth for a turning movement into the Cotentin Peninsula directed on Cherbourg. When sufficient depth has been gained a force will advance into the Cotentin and seize Cherbourg. At the same time a thrust will be made to deepen the bridgehead South-Eastwards in order to cover the construction and operation of additional airfields in the area South-East of Caen.

26. It is considered that, within fourteen days of the initial assault, Cherbourg should be captured and the bridgehead extended to include the general line Trouville-Alencon-Mont St. Michel. By this date, moreover it should have been possible to land some eighteen divisions and to have in

operation about fourteen airfields from which twenty-eight to thirty-three fighter-type squadrons should be operating.

Further Developments after Capture of Cherbourg

27. After the capture of Cherbourg the Supreme Allied Commander will have to decide whether to initiate operations to seize the Seine ports or whether he must content himself with first occupying the Brittany ports. In this decision he will have to be guided largely by the situation of the enemy forces. If the German resistance is sufficiently weak, an immediate advance could be made to seize Havre and Rouen. On the other hand, the more probable situation is that the Germans will have retired with the bulk of their forces to hold Paris and the line of the Seine, where they can best be covered by their air forces from North-East France and where they may possibly be reinforced by formations from Russia. Elsewhere they may move a few divisions from Southern France to hold the crossings of the Loire and will leave the existing defensive divisions in Brittany.

It will therefore most probably be necessary for us to seize the Brittany ports first, in order to build up sufficient forces with which we can eventually force the passage of the Seine.

28. Under these circumstances, the most suitable plan would appear to be to secure first the left flank and to gain sufficient airfields for subsequent operations. This would be done by extending the bridgehead to the line of the River Eure from Dreux to Rouen and thence along the line of the Seine to the sea, seizing at the same time Chartres, Orleans and Tours.

29. Under cover of these operations a force would be employed in capturing the Brittany ports; the first step being a thrust Southwards to seize Nantes and St. Nazaire, followed by subsidiary operations to capture Brest and the various small ports of the Brittany Peninsula.

30. This action would complete the occupation of our initial lodgement area and would secure sufficient major ports for the maintenance of at least thirty divisions. As soon as the organisation of the L. of C. in this lodgement area allowed, and sufficient air forces had been established, operations would then be begun to force the line of the Seine, and to capture Paris and the Seine ports. As opportunity offered, subsidiary action would also be taken to clear the Germans from the Biscay ports to facilitate the entry of additional American troops and the feeding of the French population.

Command and Control

31. In carrying out Operation "Overlord" administrative control would be greatly simplified if the principle were adopted that the United States forces were normally on the right of the line and the British and Canadian forces on the left.

Major Conditions Affecting Success of the Operation

32. It will be seen that the plan for the initial landing is based on two main principles — concentration of force and tactical surprise. Concentration of the assault forces is considered essential if we are to ensure adequate air support and if our limited assault forces are to avoid defeat in detail. An attempt has been made to obtain tactical surprise by landing in a lightly defended area — presumably lightly defended as, due to its distance from a major port, the Germans consider a landing there unlikely to be successful. This action, of course, presupposes that we can offset the absence of a port in the initial stages by the provision of improvised sheltered waters. It is believed that this can be accomplished.

33. The operation calls for a much higher standard of performance on the part of the naval assault forces than any previous operation. This will depend upon their being formed in sufficient time to permit of adequate training.

34. Above all, it is essential that there should be an over-all reduction in the German fighter force between now and the time of the surface assault. From now onwards every practical method of achieving this end must be employed. This condition, above all others, will dictate the date by which the the amphibious assault can be launched.

35. The next condition is that the number of German offensive divisions in reserve must not exceed a certain figure on the target date if the operation is to have a reasonable chance of success. The German reserves in France and the Low Countries as a whole, excluding divisions holding the coast, G.A.F. divisions and training divisions, should not exceed on the day of the assault twelve full-strength first-quality divisions. In addition, the Germans should not be able to transfer more than fifteen first-quality divisions from Russia during the first two months. Moreover, on the target date the divisions in reserve should be so located that the number of first-quality divisions which the Germans could deploy in the Caen area to support the divisions holding the coast should not exceed three divisions on D day, five divisions by D plus 2, or nine divisions by D plus 8.

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During the preliminary period, therefore, every effort must be made to dissipate and divert German formations, lower their fighting efficiency and disrupt communications.

36. Finally, there is the question of maintenance. Maintenance will have to be carried out over beaches for a period of some three months for a number of formations, varying from a maximum of eighteen divisions in the first month to twelve divisions in the second month, rapidly diminishing to nil in the third month. Unless adequate measures are taken to provide sheltered waters by artificial means, the operation will be at the mercy of the weather. Moreover, special facilities and equipment will be required to prevent undue damage to craft during this extended period. Immediate action for the provision of the necessary requirements is essential.

37. Given these conditions—a reduced G.A.F., a limitation in the number or effectiveness of German offensive formations in France, and adequate arrangements to provide improvised sheltered waters—it is considered that Operation “Overlord” has a reasonable prospect of success. To ensure these conditions being attained by the 1st May, 1944, action must start *now* and every possible effort made by all means in our power to soften German resistance and to speed up our own preparations.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,

30th July, 1943.

Note: C.O.S. (43) 416 (0), Report and Appreciation, with Appendices, is Filed in the Offices of the Secretariat, Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES

BEACHES AND THEORETICAL BEACH CAPACITIES AND MAJOR PORT CAPACITIES

BEACH CAPACITY FIGURES ARE GIVEN PURELY FOR PURPOSES OF COMPARISON AND ARE NOT ASSESSMENTS OF WHAT ACTUALLY CAN BE ACHIEVED.

CAEN SECTOR
Intelligence adequate
Intelligence not complete

BEACHES
Continuous
Small and isolated

SAND DUNES

HIGH GROUND AND CLIFFS OVERLOOKING BEACHES

WATERS SHELTERED FROM PREVAILING WINDS

PORT GROUPS - TOTAL GROUP CAPACITIES (Major Ports only)

90 days after all ports have been captured
(Expressed in terms of divisions which can be maintained, at 600 tons per division per day.)

INDIVIDUAL PORT CAPACITIES (Major Ports only)

(Expressed in terms of divisions which can be maintained, at 600 tons per division per day.)
On capture
90 days after capture

NOTE: TOTAL ESTIMATED PORT CAPACITIES ARE NOW UNDER RE-EXAMINATION, AND IT IS EXPECTED THAT THEY WILL BE INCREASED, ON THE AVERAGE, BY NOT LESS THAN 25 PERCENT.

BRETON NORTHWEST SECTOR
Daily Capacity
(a) Natural 14,000
(b) Assault
(c) Developed
(d) Weather 70-88%

BRETON NORTHEAST SECTOR
Daily Capacity
(a) Natural 25,000
(b) Assault 12,000
(c) Developed 37,000
(d) Weather 70-88%

BRETON SOUTHWEST SECTOR
Daily Capacity not known

BRETON SOUTHEAST SECTOR
Daily Capacity
(a) Natural 11,000
(b) Assault
(c) Developed
(d) Weather

BISCAY NORTH SECTOR
Daily Capacity
(a) Natural 10,000

COTENTIN SECTOR
Daily Capacity
(a) Natural 23,000
(b) Assault 12,000
(c) Developed 34,000
(d) Weather East 89-94% West 70-85%

CAEN SECTOR
Daily Capacity
(a) Natural 43,000
(b) Assault 32,000
(c) Developed 65,000
(d) Weather 88-90%

The Sector ISIGNY CABOURG is out of range of coast defences round LE HAVRE
Assault Capacity over 20,000

NORTH SEINE SECTOR
Daily Capacity
(a) Natural 18,000
(b) Assault 9,000
(c) Developed 27,000
(d) Weather 75-80%

PAS DE CALAIS SECTOR
Daily Capacity
(a) Natural 36,000
(b) Assault 20,000
(c) Developed 54,000
(d) Weather 75-84%

BELGIAN SECTOR
Daily Capacity
(a) Natural 20,000
(b) Assault 15,000
(c) Developed 30,000
(d) Weather 75-80%

DUTCH SECTOR
Capacity limited by small tide range

SEINE-PAS DE CALAIS GROUP (HAVRE & ROUEN-CALAIS)
A Force of 32 Divisions

CHERBOURG-SEINE GROUP (CHERBOURG-DIEPPE)
A Force of 34 Divisions

BRITTANY-CHERBOURG GROUP (NANTES-CAEN)
A Force of 31 Divisions

BISCAY-BRITANNY GROUP (BORDEAUX-BREST)
A Force of 32 Divisions

PAS DE CALAIS-BELGIAN GROUP (BOULOGNE-ANTWERP)
A Force of 36 Divisions


DUTCH-BELGIAN GROUP (DUNKERQUE-ROTTERDAM)
A Force of 37 Divisions

NOTE ON TOTAL PORT GROUP CAPACITIES

For capacities of each group including minor ports, see appendix "A". The BRITTANY-CHERBOURG group has a higher capacity in minor ports than any other group.

THEORETICAL DAILY CAPACITY

- (a) Natural The estimated number of vehicles or tons of stores that could be passed over the beaches in the whole sector, working eight hours a day (four hours per tide), assuming peace conditions and good weather, but no development of exits.
- (b) Assault The maximum capacity of the whole group on D Day if all worthwhile beaches are assaulted - "Natural" capacity less an arbitrary 25% to allow for enemy opposition and less a further percentage variable according to the area to allow for beaches that are not worth assaulting on account of their low capacity or other reasons.
- (c) Developed The estimated capacity after improvement of beach exits. This is taken as an arbitrary average of 150% of the natural capacity.
- (d) Weather The average extremes of the weather factor is shown as the percentage of days on which beaches could be worked between May and September. The value and steadiness of the weather factor indicate the value of the group for beach maintenance over a period. The value for April is generally lower and for October much lower than for May to September.



GEO-TOPOGRAPHICAL AND AIRFIELD MAP

(For use in selecting sites for rapid airfield construction)


U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

COLORS (horizontal) refer to density of possible sites in an area, judged on levelness and closeness of country.
LINE AND DOT PATTERNS (vertical) refer to soil types which govern permeability and drainage.


AIRFIELD LEGEND

- AIRFIELD (Runways and/or Full Facilities)
- ◐ LANDING GROUND (Limited Facilities)
- E.L.G. (Emergency use only)
- x SITE (Former Airfield, Landing Ground or E.L.G.)

Granular Soils Loam Soils Clay Soils Marsh, etc.



NOTE: Airfields, L.Gs. and E.L.Gs. in GERMANY are NOT shown



U.S. SECRET
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SITUATION D+2 (First Light)


1 Five Divs., One Airborne Div. & Three Tk Bdes plus overheads landed.

2 Estimated number of enemy Divs. shown in Blue.

★ U.S. FORMATIONS

⊗ BRITISH FORMATIONS

3 Air Situation. No airfields shown yet available.



(07162)

U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET


SITUATION D+8 (First Light)

- 1 Twelve Divs. plus overheads landed.
- 2 One Airborne Div. still in action but relieved of the major portion of its original task.
- 3 Corps numbered in order of landing (shown thus (2)).
- 4 Estimated number of enemy Divisions shown in BLUE.

★ U.S. FORMATIONS 🍁 CANADIAN FORMATIONS

📷 BRITISH FORMATIONS

- 5 Air Situation Six airfields & Two single landing strips available, operating about Seventeen Squadrons. (Fighter type).




(08162)

U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

SITUATION D+12

- 1 Sixteen Divs., plus overheads landed; all airborne troops withdrawn.
 - 2 Army H.Q.s. & Corps numbered in order of landing. (shown thus (2)).
 - 3 Estimated enemy Division shown in BLUE.
- ★ U.S. FORMATIONS 🍁 CANADIAN FORMATIONS
📷 BRITISH FORMATIONS
- 4 Air Situation Eleven airfields available operating about Twenty-six Squadrons. (Fighter type).
 - 5 Composite Groups or Commands numbered in order of landing. (shown thus (2)).



Remnants of One Division

(2) CORPS
(Three Divs.)

(1) C. Group (1) Army

(1) CORPS
(Two Divs.)

One Armd. Div. (2) Army
(2) C. Command

(4) CORPS
(One Armd. & Two Divs.)

(3) CORPS
(Three Divs. & One Armd. Div.)

(5) CORPS
(One Armd. & Two Divs.)

Remnants Falling Back on Rennes


Bulk of German Forces Falling Back to Line of R. Seine

(09162)

U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

SITUATION D+14

- 1 Eighteen Divs. plus overheads landed.
- 2 Army H.Q.s & Corps numbered in order of landing. (shown thus (2)).
- ★ U.S. FORMATIONS
- 🍁 CANADIAN FORMATIONS
- 🗺️ BRITISH FORMATIONS
- 3 Air Situation. Fourteen airfields available operating about Thirty-three Squadrons. (Fighter type).
- 4 Composite Groups or Commands numbered in order of landing. (shown thus (2)).





(00262)

U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

SITUATION D+24



- 1. Twenty-four Divs. landed
- 2. Army HQs. & Corps numbered in order of landing (shown thus (2))
- ★ U.S. FORMATIONS
- ✿ CANADIAN FORMATIONS
- ⊠ BRITISH FORMATIONS
- 3. Air situation. Twenty-seven airfields available, operating about sixty-two Squadrons (Fighter Type)
- 4. Composite Groups or Commands numbered in order of landing (shown thus (2))



U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

SITUATION D+30 to 40



- 1 Twenty-four Divs. & 1 of C tps landed.
- 2 Army & HQs. Corps numbered in order of landing.
(shown thus (2))
- ★ U.S. FORMATIONS
- ✳ CANADIAN FORMATIONS
- ⊠ BRITISH FORMATIONS
- 3 Air situation. Forty-six airfields available, of which thirty-four are occupied and operating seventy to eighty Squadrons (Fighter Type).
- 4 Composite Groups or Commands numbered in order of landing.
(shown thus (2))



U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

SITUATION D+40 to 50



1. Twenty-four Divs. Ashore
 2. All landings since D+24 devoted to air & adm. buildup
 3. Army H.Q.s. & Corps numbered in order of landing. (shown thus (2))
- ★ U.S. FORMATIONS
 - ☒ CANADIAN FORMATIONS
 - ☐ BRITISH FORMATIONS
4. Air situation Forward airfields being developed on the line ORLEANS-CHARTRES-EVREUX. Airfields in the CAEN area being improved to take Light Bomber Squadrons.
 5. Composite Groups or Commands numbered in order of landing. (shown thus (2))



U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

SITUATION D+70 to 90

- 1 British-Canadian Army Gp (16 Divs. of C tps) landed complete.
 - 2 American Army Gp (11 Divs. & 1 C tps) landed and preparing to receive further divs. at rate of 3-5 per month (of which 11 Corps landed).
 - 3 Army Gps, Army HQs. & Corps numbered in order of landing. (shown thus (2)).
 - 4 S.A.C. ready to advance to general line MEAUX--COMPIEGNE--AMIENS--ABBEVILLE with a view to securing PARIS and capturing HAVRE--ROUEN--DIEPPE
- ★ U.S. FORMATIONS
 - ✳ CANADIAN FORMATIONS
 - ⊠ BRITISH FORMATIONS
- 5 T.A.F. HQs. and Composite Groups or Commands numbered in order of landing. (shown thus (2)).



C.S.S. 305 and 305/1

EFFECT OF INDIAN FLOODS ON BURMA CAMPAIGN

References:

CCS 107th Meeting.

CCS 110th Meeting, Item (5)

CCS 111th Meeting, Item (3)

C.C.S. 305 was circulated, 14 August 1943, for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The interim report of an ad hoc committee, a study thereon, was circulated 18 August, (C.C.S. 305/1).

C.C.S. 305/1 was considered and noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 111th Meeting. A statement on the flood situation was included in C.C.S. 319/5.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

C.C.S. 305

14 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
EFFECT OF INDIAN FLOODS ON BURMA CAMPAIGN

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure is a message received from General Auchinlech on the above subject. It has been referred to an ad hoc committee for study and the submission of a report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

H. REDMAN

J. R. DEANE

Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE

PARAPHRASED VERSION OF A MOST SECRET
CYPHER TELEGRAM NOT IN A ONE TIME PAD

T.O.O. 140120Z Aug '43

T.O.R. 131943Z

MOST SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM

MOST IMMEDIATE

From: ARMINDIA

To: Air Ministry Special Cypher Section

Repeated: J.S.M. Washington - for F.M. Dill

65566/COS 13th August 2003.

Following from General Auchinlech for Chiefs of Staff:

Program of planning for operations from India:

1. On receipt of decisions of Washington Conference a first appreciation of the possibility of carrying out the tasks allotted to this Command was produced.

2. Salient point in this was that while requirements were in the neighborhood of 4,300 tons a day, theoretical maximum we could hope for was a lift into Assam of 3,400 tons a day. It seemed at the time that requirements for the operations could probably be reduced to this figure.

3 The two months which have followed have revealed in the first place increased requirements. This is mainly due to the continuance into October, November and December of engineer stores for Airfield Program which has first priority and must be met in full. Airfield Program and connected activities have resulted in an increase of personnel in Assam for which no allowance had been made. Further, we had reckoned on using some of the oil production for our own requirements, but the Americans now ask for the total output which means we must import more petrol and lubricants into Assam than we had anticipated.

4. While requirements have increased lift which we can count on getting has been reduced. In the first place the figure of 3,400 included no margin for contingencies which must be reckoned at absolute minimum of 15 per cent. Secondly, the stepping up of the previous lift which was only about 1700-1800 does not take effect until mid-September and in the meantime arrears are accumulating of essential stores which must be lifted. Shortage of locomotives will not be made good until October. Greatest factor, however, in reducing figure has been breaches near Burdwan owing to floods on the Damodar River subsequent breach at Ghatsila and floods at Parhatipur.

5. Result of factors in Paras. 3 and 4 above is that we are faced with a total deficiency of lift into Assam of about 128,000 tons by 1st March. If reductions are made to the limit which we consider possible in tonnages allotted for our own purposes and to the Americans this deficiency can be reduced but not by more than 20,000 tons in total which leaves a daily deficiency of about 600 tons for six months.

6. Problem is thus in first place whether L of C can be stepped up still further and secondly if no increase possible in L of C how reduction in requirements can be effected.

7. Whole question discussed today with Benthall, Member in Charge War Transport Department and with American Generals Ferris and Bissell.

8. Majority of improvements to L of C into Assam are long term projects which cannot help our immediate problem such as doubling railway lines, building increased River Fleet, and increasing capacity of River Ports. Much of this is already in hand but will not be effective before October 1944. Proposals for short term improvement are as follows:—

(i) Increasing number of train paths by improving the operation of the railway system through supervision by Military personnel, and by relaxing certain precautions thus taking risks which would not be acceptable in normal times. War Transport Department is immediately starting inquiry into possibility of this. Representative of Wheeler will be associated with inquiry and also Representative of Transportation Directorate.

(ii) Immediate increase in locomotive and rolling stock on Bengal and Assam Railway from other parts of India to be replaced by fresh stock from U.S.A. on arrival. War Transportation Department is inquiring into possibility.

(iii) Quickening of turn round on river by installation of navigational lights and of night running. We are inquiring into this.

(iv) Flying Stores for China from Calcutta into Assam Airfields. This can only be done with help of additional aircraft from U.S.A.

9. While we may be able to achieve some improvement by these methods or by a combination of them and are doing all we can to do so, I feel it is probable that an over-all deficiency will remain. The L of C into Assam has never fulfilled expectations and this must be borne in mind. Possibility must, therefore, be faced of having to call off either the advance from Ledo or the advance from Imphal or both.

10. If we call off the former, and the Road Construction project, troops required for defensive would probably be not more than one infantry brigade which was all we had there before the Americans took over this area. This would effect a saving of between four and five hundred tons a day. If we call off the latter we should still need two divisions forward for defensive purposes, with one division in reserve. This would mean a saving of only about two hundred tons a day. Thus if we remain on the defensive on both fronts saving effected would be six or seven hundred tons a day against anticipated deficiency of about six hundred tons a day. We should then be able to meet fully demands of air ferry route and later in the season when construction of airfields is reduced, while capacity of L of C is increased by fresh stock from U.S.A. and completion of pipelines, we should have a growing capacity to spare for increased lift to China.

11. Question now arises whether the land operation in Arakan, Cudgel and the assault on Akyab should be carried out without operations in North at the same time. We should carry out raids and simulate activity by all means in our

power in order to induce Japanese to believe that we were contemplating an offensive in the North. I consider therefore that it is unlikely that they would appreciate that we had abandoned the Imphal advance in time to enable them to alter the dispositions of their land forces substantially before the monsoon. As far as land forces are concerned, therefore, containing effect would be approximately the same as that of the Imphal advance. Unlikely however that a similar containing effect would be exerted in case of Air Forces. On balance I do not think abandonment of the land and air operations in Northern Burma should rule Arakan operations and Akyab.

12. I do however consider that Akyab should not be attempted without the land operations in Arakan. Examination of the L of C required for the latter reveals that this also is insufficient for full requirements. Bottleneck is Chittagong. Everything possible is being done to increase capacity here by extension of wharfage use of country craft at improvised jetties etc. but it appears unlikely that it will ever be possible to carry out both the raising to heavy bomber standard of the Eastern Bengal Group of airfields before next monsoon and the Arakan operation.

13. The A.O.C.-in-C. points out that if these airfields are not completed to heavy bomber standard in the winter of 1943-44 they will not be ready for operations either this year or in 1944-45. They are needed at once for deeper penetration in Burma. They would be essential for increased air offensive over Burma and particularly were it decided to carry out at a later date an airborne attack on Mandalay or Rangoon and they may also be required for supplying Allied Air Forces in China. I am not in a position to assess the relative probabilities of these operations.

14. I am in doubt as to whether priority given at *TRIDENT* to air operations means that preparations for air operations mentioned above should take absolute precedence over land operations which I have been instructed to carry out this winter. But if Akyab is to take place this winter I consider that Arakan operations must have precedence over raising the standard of these airfields.

15. It remains to consider whether, if Akyab is unavoidably delayed, the Arakan operations should be given priority over the raising of the standard of Eastern Bengal airfields. I think that the Arakan operations might be successful by themselves and that we should have a fair chance of capturing Akyab overland. Setting aside any non-military reasons for its capture main military reasons are:

- (i.) containing effect on Japanese forces in Burma and particularly Air Forces.

(ii.) possession of a more advanced airfield. These must be weighed against completion of airfields in Eastern Bengal.

16. We should maintain continuous air offensive against Burma and in particular Akyab whether amphibious operations were postponed or not. Japanese would remain in uncertainty until weather had deteriorated to such an extent as to make it difficult for them to move large forces. Consider therefore containing effect is likely to be the same in either case.

17. Regarding airfields A.O.C.-in-C. would prefer raising Eastern Bengal airfield to heavy bomber standard to acquiring new airfields at Akyab.

18. In these circumstances therefore there would be little military advantage in taking Akyab beyond raising morale and killing Japanese. Do not consider this would justify failure to raise standard of airfields. If therefore Akyab were abandoned I should recommend that the Arakan operations also should be abandoned and priority given to airfields.

19. Fully appreciate anxiety which exists to start large-scale offensive operations against Burma this coming winter. The course of planning for even the limited operations intended in Northern Burma has brought me to the conclusion that best military course would be to avoid such operations and to concentrate on supply to China by air, at the same time increasing and conserving strength of India and preparing resources for large scale amphibious operations against Malaya next winter. Preparation for these would enable us to bring training of troops to high standard. If they were definitely decided on for 1944-45 it would be desirable to divert resources earmarked for Akyab to taking Andamans in the late spring of 1944. We are urgently examining the possibility of this and will signal results to you.

20. Americans are examining effect of changed situation on their plans in more detail and I cannot send final recommendations until results of War Transport Departments inquiry regarding railways is known but it seems desirable to let you know probabilities at once.

21. This signal has been discussed with and agreed to by C.-in-C. Eastern Fleet who is in Delhi and A.O.C.-in-C.

T.O.O. 140120Z

C.C.S. 305/1

18 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

EFFECT OF INDIAN FLOODS ON BURMA CAMPAIGN

Note by the Secretaries

The Enclosure has been prepared by an ad hoc Committee appointed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to study the above subject.

H. REDMAN,

J. R. DEANE,

Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE

INTERIM REPORT

By the Committee Appointed to Examine C.C.S. 305

1. In accordance with the instructions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff we have examined the telegram from the Commander in Chief *INDIA* contained in paper C.C.S. 305, and submit this interim report.

2. From the information at our disposal, which is confined to the telegrams received from the Commander in Chief *INDIA*, there is a short-fall of 600 tons per day foreshadowed on the *ASSAM* line of communications out of the estimated capacity of 3,400 tons per day. This short-fall is expected to continue up to 1st March 1944.

3. In respect of priority for allotment of capacity on this line of communication we consider that the air transport service to *CHINA* should retain its present overriding priority.

4. We have examined the detailed allocation of tonnage as planned by the Commander in Chief *INDIA* on the basis of 3,400 tons per day, and agree that this allows no margin if the operations are to take place as planned.

5. We assess that a saving of approximately 500 tons per day might be made by calling a halt to one of the offensives as planned, either at *LEDO* or at *IMPHAL*.

6. It would therefore appear from the figures available that one of these projects should be cancelled if the other is to be carried out.

7. We have, however, addressed a cable to the Commander in Chief *INDIA* offering him certain assistance which should begin to have an effect in improving capacity by late November or December 1943. This assistance, coupled with the postponement of the date of active operations till 15th February, 1944, may permit of both projects being continued though with some loss of preparedness.

8. Having regard to the above factors, we do not consider that the abandonment of either project should be definitely decided upon. The importance of continuing work on the *LEDO* road is manifest, and with a lower target of road construction in the *IMPHAL* area, due to the later date of operations, the continuance of the *LEDO* road may well be possible with little delay.

9. We make this forecast with some reserve, and we cannot definitely state what will be practicable until we receive a reply from the Commander in Chief *INDIA*, to the cable which we have dispatched.

C.C.S. 306

ROME AN OPEN CITY

Reference:

C.C.S. 108th Meeting, Item (2)

C.C.S. 306 was circulated, 14 August 1943, for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. By informal action the message was approved and dispatched the same date. (*FAN* 191)

In their 108th Meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff further considered C.C.S. 306 and agreed to inform the President and Prime Minister that from a military point of view, the "stand still" order should be revoked.

Following this decision and with the approval of the President and Prime Minister, the Combined Chiefs of Staff dispatched *FAN* 194, 15 August, authorizing General Eisenhower to carry on operations to the extent he considers necessary or advisable, subject to previous limitations regarding safety of the Vatican.

C.C.S. 306

14 August 1943

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ROME AN OPEN CITY

Note by the Secretaries

Press reports have been received that Rome has been declared an open city by the Italian Government. General Eisenhower has indicated that he may make an attack against Rome tomorrow, 15 August.

Pending clarification of the situation, it is suggested that the following *FAN* message might be sent to General Eisenhower:

“Press reports this date indicate Italian Government has declared Rome an open city. Pending clarification and further instructions it is desired that you make no further attacks on Rome nor make any statements from your headquarters regarding the attitude of the United Nations with respect to the action taken by the Italian Government.”

H. REDMAN,

J. R. DEANE,

Combined Secretariat.

C.C.S. 307

ARTIFICIAL HARBORS FOR COMBINED OPERATIONS

References:

C.C.S. 108th Meeting, Item (4)

C.C.S. 113th Meeting, Item (10)

C.C.S. 307 was circulated, 14 August 1943, for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff took cognizance of this paper in their 108th meeting relative to the discussion of C.C.S. 304 (Operation *OVERLORD*).

In the C.C.S. 113th Meeting, it was noted that certain experts with regard to synthetic harbors were on their way to discuss the matter with appropriate United States Officers.

C.C.S. 307

14 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ARTIFICIAL HARBORS FOR COMBINED OPERATIONS

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

1. The enemy has realized that we can only maintain a large invasion force by using ports and he has, therefore, heavily defended the existing ports and their neighboring beaches from sea and land attack. He has also made arrangements to render them unserviceable if they should be captured.

2. It is, therefore, of vital importance that we should be able to improvise port facilities at an early date. Supplies could then be maintained during unfavorable weather conditions and before we have been able to capture and recondition ports. The British Chiefs of Staff have appointed a Committee to study the whole problem and to make recommendations as a matter of urgency.

3. The basic requirements for an improvised port are:

a. Breakwaters.

b. Unloading facilities.

4. *BREAKWATERS*

a. *Natural Topographical Features*

The best use must be made of natural features such as promontories and shallow banks. A study of the area, however, shows that there is only one position where such natural facilities exist.

b. *Ships Sunk to Form a Breakwater*

Ships were used to make breakwaters in the last war, but only in non-tidal waters. The objections to this method off the coast of France are:

(1) The large range of tide precludes their use except in very shallow water.

(2) The scour effect of the strong tidal stream may cause the ships to become unstable.

(3) The large number which would be required.

c. New Scientific Devices

(1) *Bubble Breakwater*. In principle this consists of a curtain of air bubbles rising from a submerged pipe. The constant upward flow of bubbles destroys the rotary movement of water particles which is associated with waves, thus damping out the waves. Air compressors are necessary to feed the pipe. This method has been used in Russia and full scale experiment is shortly to be carried out in England by the Admiralty.

(2) *Lilo Breakwater*. It has been found that a quilted canvas bag, inflated by air at a low pressure and ballasted to float so that the greater portion is below the surface, damps out waves. A model breakwater constructed on these principles has been designed and has given promising results. It is hoped to overcome the practical difficulties of mooring, and full scale trials are being progressed at high priority by the Admiralty.

5. *UNLOADING FACILITIES*

a. Methods in Previous Use

The process of beaching L.S.T. and L.C.T. and of drying out coasters and barges can be continued with additional safety within the breakwaters. To save wear and tear and to speed up discharge of cargoes, these methods must be supplemented by other facilities.

b. Piers

Piers and pierheads which are capable of being towed across the Channel have been designed and are being put into production. These piers are capable of being moored so that they will stand up to a strong wind, but unloading under all weather conditions will only be possible when they are placed inside breakwaters. These piers are being designed to enable L.S.T. and L.C.T. to "beach" against semi-submerged pontoons which enable them to discharge over their ramps. Simultaneously the upper deck of L.S.T. can discharge their vehicles direct on to an "upper deck" built on the pierhead.

c. Pierships

In the Annexure to Appendix "X" of the *OVERLORD* plan (C.O.S. (43) 416 (O)), C.O.S.S.A.C. has suggested the construction of specially

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
BRITISH MOST SECRET

modified 500 foot pierships, which could be sunk in position and which could be connected to the shore by some form of pontoon equipment or two-way pier. He has also suggested the construction of some form of quay on rocks. These and other suggestions are being examined.

d. Hards


If beaches of slope 1 in 40 or steeper can be found within the break-water, the construction of unloading hards similar to those used for loading in U.K. will simplify the unloading of L.S.T.

BUBBLE BREAKWATER



DIAGRAMMATIC SECTION

(07262)



C.C.S. 308/3

SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

References:

C.C.S 111th Meeting, Item (5)

C.C.S. 114th Meeting, Item (3)

C.C.S. 116th Meeting, Item (7)

1st Citadel Meeting

2nd Citadel Meeting, Item (7)

C.C.S. 308 circulated, 15 August, a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff which presented for consideration the proposed set-up for the South east Asia Command.

C.C.S. 308/1, a report by the Combined Staff Planners, proposed certain amendments with relation to a clarification of the status of General Stilwell and the command of the U.S. Army and Navy Air Transport Services.

C.C.S. 308/2, a memorandum from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, proposed a revision of Paragraph 8 c, C.C.S. 308.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 114th Meeting considered the subject of Southeast Asia Command and agreed upon the proposal set forth in C.C.S. 308 as amended by C.C.S. 308/1 and C.C.S. 308/2.

The conclusions of the agreement were circulated as C.C.S. 308/3 and also included in C.C.S. 319/5.

C.C.S. 308/3

21 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

Note by the Secretaries

The decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with relation to the Southeast Asia Command are set forth in the Enclosure.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE

SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

PART I

1. The vigorous and effective prosecution of large-scale operations against Japan in Southeast Asia, and the rapid development of the air route through Burma to China, necessitate the reorganization of the High Command in the Indian Theater. It has, therefore, been proposed that the Command in India should be divided from the operational Command in Southeast Asia as described below.

COMMAND IN INDIA

2. The administration of India as a base for the forces in Southeast Asia will remain under the control of the Commander in Chief, India. Coordination

of movement and maintenance both of the operational forces based on India and of the internal garrison can best be carried out efficiently by one staff responsible in the last resort to one authority with power to decide priorities. This machinery exists today in the Government of India and in G.H.Q. India. It is the only machinery which can carry out the dual tasks of meeting the internal requirements of India as well as the requirements of operations in the Southeast Asia Theater.

COMMAND IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

3. A Supreme Allied Command in Southeast Asia should be set up as follows:

a. The command and staff to be a combined British and American one on the lines of the North African Command.

b. The Supreme Allied Commander to be British, with an American deputy. He should have under him Naval, Army and Air Commanders in Chief, and also a Principal Administrative Officer to coordinate the administrative planning of all three services and of the Allied forces.

c. The Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and the Commanders of the three services mentioned above, acting under the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander, to control all operations and have under their command such Naval, Military and Air forces as may be assigned to the Southeast Asia Theater from time to time.

4. The proposed boundaries of the Southeast Command will be as follows:

a. *Eastern Boundary*

From the point where the frontiers of Burma, Indo China and Thailand meet, southwards along the eastern boundary of Thailand and Malaya to Singapore; from Singapore south to the North Coast of Sumatra; thence round the East Coast of Sumatra (leaving the Sunda Strait to the eastward of the line) to a point on the coast of Sumatra at longitude 104 degrees East; thence South to latitude 08 degrees South; thence Southeasterly towards Onslow, Australia, and, on reaching longitude 110 degrees East, due South along that meridian.

b. *Northern Frontier*

From the point where the frontiers of Burma, Indo China and Thailand meet generally north and west along the Eastern and Northern Fron-

tier of Burma to its junction with the Indo-Burma border; thence along that border to the sea; thence round the Coast of India and Persia (all exclusive to the South East Asia Command) to meridian 60 degrees East.

c. Western Boundary

Southward along meridian 60 degrees East to Albatross Island, thence Southeastward to exclude Rodriguez Island and thence due southward.

5. The Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, should be formed in the first instance at Delhi, since it will take over elements of the present General Headquarters, India. The Supreme Allied Commander will submit his recommendations as to the ultimate location of his Headquarters as soon as he has had time to study the problem.

DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN INDIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

6. Conflicts of opinion over priorities in connection with administration must be anticipated. It will, therefore, be necessary for someone on the spot to resolve these differences day by day as they occur. This authority should be the Viceroy, not in his statutory capacity as Governor-General, but acting on behalf of the British War Cabinet.

7. The Supreme Commander will in any event have direct access to the British Chiefs of Staff on all matters, and if he is not satisfied with the ruling of the Viceroy on administrative matters, he will be able to exercise this right. The Commander in Chief, India, will continue to have the right of direct access to the British Chiefs of Staff.

8. a. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander

General Stilwell will be Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of the Southeast Asia Theater and in that capacity will command the Chinese troops operating into Burma and all U.S. air and ground forces committed to the Southeast Asia Theater.

The operational control of the Chinese forces operating into Burma will be exercised, in conformity with the over-all plan of the British Army Commander, by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander or by his representative, who will be located with the troops.

The operational control of the 10th Air Force will be vested in the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and exercised by his air representative located at the headquarters of the Air Commander in Chief.

General Stilwell will continue to have the same direct responsibility to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as heretofore. His dual function under the Supreme Allied Commander and under the Generalissimo is recognized.

The organization and command of the U.S. Army and Navy Air Transport Services in the Southeast Asia area will remain under the direct control of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces and of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, respectively, subject to such supply and service functions as may be by them delegated to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander. Requests by the Supreme Allied Commander for the use of U.S. troop carrier aircraft for operational purposes will be transmitted to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander.

Requests for the use of surface transportation capacity in and through India, or for development involving construction for the air route to China, will be passed through the Supreme Allied Commander in order that they may be related, as regards priority, to his requirements before being placed on the Commander in Chief, India.

b. Command Relationship

The Combined Chiefs of Staff would exercise a general jurisdiction over strategy for the Southeast Asia Theater, and the allocation of American and British resources of all kinds between the China Theater and the Southeast Asia Command. The British Chiefs of Staff would exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operations, and would be the channel through which all instructions to the Supreme Commander are passed.

c. The Coordination of American Agencies such as O.S.S., O.W.I., F.C.B., etc., with comparable British Organizations

In order to facilitate the free exchange of information and coordination between the U.S. and British quasi-military agencies in India and the Southeast Asia Command, a Combined Liaison Committee will be set up at New Delhi.

There will be full and open discussion in the Combined Liaison Committee before any quasi-military activities involving operations in India or the Southeast Asia Theater are undertaken. However, before plans for such operations in these areas are put into effect by U.S. agencies, the concurrence of the government of India, the Commander in Chief, India, or the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Theater, must be obtained as applicable.

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C.C.S 309

“POINTBLANK”

Reference:

C.C.S. 109th Meeting, Item (3)
1st Citadel Meeting

C.C.S. 309 was circulated, 15 August 1943, for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In their 109th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed and took note of this paper. Further, in meeting with the President and Prime Minister, 19 August, it was agreed that the plan for the combined bomber offensive should include attacks from all convenient bases.

The final resolution agreed upon for this operation is included in C.C.S. 319/5.

15 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

"POINTBLANK"

Note by the Secretaries

In order to save delay, the enclosure, prepared by the Chief of the British Air Staff, is presented direct to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their consideration.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE

"POINTBLANK"

Note by the Chief of the Air Staff

1. I annex an appreciation by Air Intelligence of the trend of development and disposition of the German Fighter Force in relation to "POINTBLANK".

The salient points are: —

- a. The German Fighter Force has increased by 22% since 1 January 1943.
- b. Its strength on the Western Front has been doubled since the same date.
- c. The increase on the Western Front has absorbed the entire expansion under a.
- d. Fighter units and experienced fighter pilots have nevertheless had to be withdrawn from the Mediterranean and Russian Fronts as well, in spite of the critical situation on those fronts.

e. In spite of the present strain on the German night fighters they are being used by day to counter the deep daylight penetration of "POINT-BLANK" into Germany.

2. The build-up of the Eighth Bomber Command as required in the "POINTBLANK" plan approved by the C.C.O.S. at *TRIDENT* should have been 1068 aircraft on the 15th August. The comparable figure of the actual build-up achieved on that date was 921 (including 105 detached to North Africa).

3. The present strength of the G.A.F. Fighter Force is 2260 aircraft in first line units compared with a strength of 2000 which it was hoped would not be exceeded if "POINTBLANK" could have been executed as planned. Thus the G.A.F. Fighter Force is 13% stronger than had been hoped, and this in spite of increased successes in Russia and the Mediterranean which were not taken into account in the "POINTBLANK" plan.

4. I do not set out the above information in order to make a criticism of an inability to have achieved complete fulfillment of "POINTBLANK". My object is to bring out the fact that, in spite of some shortfall in the build-up, Germany is now faced with imminent disaster if only the pressure of "POINT-BLANK" can be maintained and increased *before* the increase in the G.A.F. Fighter Force has gone too far.

There is no need for us to speculate about the effect of "POINTBLANK" on Germany. The Germans themselves, when they weaken the Russian and Mediterranean fronts in the face of serious reverses there, tell us by their acts what importance to attach to it.

5. The daylight "Battle of Germany" is evidently regarded by the Germans as of critical importance and we have already made them throw into it most, if not all, of their available reserves.

If we do not now strain every nerve to bring enough force to bear to win this battle during the next two or three months but are content to see the 8th Bomber Command hampered by lack of reinforcements just as success is within its grasp, we may well miss the opportunity to win a decisive victory against the German Air Force which will have incalculable effects on all future operations and on the length of the war. And the opportunity, once lost, may not recur.

6. I, therefore, urge most strongly that we should invite the U.S.C.O.S. to take all practicable steps at the earliest possible date to increase the striking

power of the 8th Bomber Command as much as possible during the next two months.

ANNEX

G.A.F. SINGLE-ENGINE FIGHTER REINFORCEMENT OF
THE WESTERN FRONT, JANUARY-JULY, 1943

1. *Strength and Disposition.* The Initial Equipment (I.E.) of the G.A.F. single-engined fighter force as a whole increased by 245 aircraft from 1,095 to 1,340 between 1 January and 1 August 1943. The disposition of this force in the main operational areas on the respective dates was as follows:

	1-1-43	1-8-43	Difference
Western Front	305	600	+ 295
Mediterranean	320	295	- 25
Russian Front	430	395*	- 35
Refitting	40	50	+ 10
Total	1,095	1,340	245

*including 30 I.E. in Rumania newly formed since 1-1-43

2. It will be seen that the fighter force on the Western Front has been doubled during the period under review and that this increase has in effect more than absorbed the entire expansion which has occurred; it has in addition entailed a weakening of both the Mediterranean and Russian Fronts notwithstanding the important military campaigns in those areas where the Axis forces have suffered serious reverses since the beginning of the year.

3. *Sources of Increased Strength.* The raising of S.E. fighter strength on the Western Front has been accomplished in two ways:

a. As a result of the defensive strategy forced on the G.A.F. since the end of 1942 in face of growing Allied air power on the Western Front, in the Mediterranean and in Russia, Germany was forced to adopt the policy of achieving the maximum possible expansion of fighter production.

The outcome of this policy is clearly seen in the formation of new fighter units and of the expansion of others; in addition there has been a noticeable tendency to maintain the actual strength of many fighter units well in excess of I.E., particularly on the Western Front.

b. By the withdrawal of units from the Mediterranean and Russia.

4. The reinforcement of the Western Front as a result of the above measures can be analyzed as follows:

Newly formed units]	
]	165
Expansion of existing units]		
Transferred from Russia		90
Transferred from Mediterranean		60
	Gross Total	<u>315</u>
Loss:		
Fighter units transferred to fighter-bomber category.		20
	Net Total Increase	<u>295</u> aircraft

5. *Redisposition on the Western Front.* A most striking change in the disposition of the G.A.F. fighter force on the Western Front has taken place since 1 January in order to secure the greatest possible defensive strength to cover the approaches to Germany. Prior to that date, the German fighter dispositions were mainly to cover the North coast of France, Belgium and the Low Countries against R.A.F. fighter sweeps in these areas and against such daylight bombing of occupied territory as then took place.

The comparative dispositions are shown as follows:

Area	I.E. at 1-8-43	I.E. at 1-1-43	Differences
France (West of the Seine)	<u>95</u>	<u>95</u>	0
France (East of the Seine and Belgium)	105	70	+ 35
Holland	150	40	+ 110
N. W. Germany	180	35	+ 145
Denmark and S. Norway	50	35	+ 15
Trondheim and N. Norway	20	30	- 10
Total	<u>600</u>	<u>305</u>	<u>+ 295</u>

The salient points which emerge are:

a. The greatly increased defenses of Northwest Germany have absorbed 50% of the total increased fighter strength on the Western Front.

b. The balance of this increase has gone mainly to the Belgium-Holland area.

A point not clearly revealed by the above figures has been the movement eastwards of French based units and the bringing of others from Norway to Northwest Germany; there has therefore been a strong tendency to concentrate the maximum possible forces into the area between the Scheldt and the Elbe. Nevertheless it is certain that the present fighter strength defending Northwest Germany and its approaches is still inadequate for its purpose; this is supported by the increasing use of night-fighters for daylight interception especially against deep penetration into Germany where the resources of the G.A.F. are inadequate to maintain S.E. day fighter forces.

7. *Reason for increased defenses.* The doubling of the German S.E. fighter force on the Western Front and the allocation of virtually the whole of this increase to Belgium, Holland and Northwest Germany are attributable solely to the development of Allied day bombing of Germany. The defense of Germany against these attacks has in fact become the prime concern of the G.A.F. and is being undertaken even at the expense of air support for military operations on other fronts. There is no reason to suppose that this will not continue to constitute the main commitment of the defensive fighter forces of the G.A.F.: if anything this commitment is likely to increase and the transfer of further units to the Western Front from other operational areas cannot be excluded.

8. *Strain on Crews.* Despite their strength and flexibility the fighter defenses of Germany are liable to be subject to extreme strain over periods of sustained day and night attacks on Germany: this was particularly noticeable during the last week in July when day fighters were extensively employed as night fighters in addition to their day operations and conversely night fighters had to be employed for day interception. The effects of such continued activity on crews must inevitably have been severe and there is evidence that in the later raids during this period opposition was less determined and Allied losses noticeably reduced. There is no doubt that during this period the German fighter defenses were subjected to the most severe test they have yet experienced.

9. *Transfer of experienced pilots to Western Front.* The urgent necessity of the defense of Germany has not only deprived the Russian and Mediterranean Fronts of units, let alone reinforcements; it has also entailed a deterioration in quality of the fighter pilots employed in those fronts, notably Russia since there is strong evidence that the most experienced pilots are being transferred to the Western Front and replaced by others of inferior skill.

10. CONCLUSIONS

a. There can be no doubt that Germany regards the defense of the Reich against daylight air attack as of such supreme importance that adequate support for military operations in Russia and the Mediterranean has been rendered impossible. In Russia, the fighter force actually engaged on the entire front is now little more than half that on the Western Front; this fighter weakness has unquestionably been an important contributory factor to the German failure in Russia this year.

Similarly in the Mediterranean despite the wide areas exposed to Allied air attack from Sardinia to Crete and the need for support of Italy no reinforcement whatever has been forthcoming; consequently Allied air operations have been carried out with the maximum of success and minimum loss against negligible opposition thereby largely contributing to present conditions in Italy.

b. The Western Front with a fighter strength almost equal that of the Mediterranean and Russian Fronts combined constitutes the only source from which reinforcements needed elsewhere can be provided unless further new units are formed; this however appears unlikely in the immediate future. Consequently in the event of South Germany becoming exposed to air attack by day, it seems inevitable that such fighter defenses as may be set up must be derived almost exclusively from the West; the defense of South Germany against air attack on a scale equivalent to that now existing on the Western Front would necessitate the reduction of the fighter force in that area by up to 50% dependent on the then existing commitments of the G.A.F. in the Mediterranean and elsewhere.

C.C.S. 310

PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE

Reference:

C.C.S. 116th Meeting, Item (8)

C.C.S. 310 was circulated, 15 August 1943, for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at *QUADRANT*. In their 116th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed as to the necessity of adequate machinery for the coordination of propaganda and took note that, following the results of negotiations by the British authorities concerned, further action would be taken by the British Joint Staff Mission.

C.C.S. 310

15 August 1943

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE

Memorandum from the United States Chiefs of Staff

Recent events have indicated the necessity for establishing some machinery whereby propaganda policies to be followed by London, Washington, and Theater Headquarters may be coordinated, particularly in emergency cases.

The enclosure is presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a possible solution to this problem. They consider it desirable that something along these lines be accomplished during the *QUADRANT* Conferences.

ENCLOSURE

PROBLEM

To establish a central agency with power of decision regarding propaganda lines to be followed.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

The recent removal of Mussolini disclosed the fact that in emergencies there is no United Nations agency immediately available to coordinate and determine the propaganda policy that should be followed in order to derive the maximum benefit from the situation. As a result there has been a divergence in the propaganda aims as between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Theater Commander, which will be difficult to correct.

The time involved in obtaining agreed views from the Chief Executives of the two governments, the State Department, the Foreign Office, and the military and naval leaders of the two countries is too long to permit taking full advantage of a situation which requires immediate action.

ACTION RECOMMENDED

That the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommend to the President and the Prime Minister:

a. That a Propaganda Committee be set up in Washington to include one high-level representative each from the U.S. State Department, British Foreign Office, U.S. Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff.

b. That this Committee be authorized to make decisions and issue broad directives on propaganda policies to be followed by the propaganda agencies of the two countries. These should be such as to insure the maximum benefit in furthering the military and political aims of the two governments. It should be understood that this committee ordinarily is free to seek guidance on the highest levels, but in emergencies to have the responsibility of taking immediate action without reference to higher authority.

c. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff be charged with the implementation of the above.

C.C.S. 311

ITALIAN PEACE FEELERS

Reference:

CCS 110th Meeting, Item (2)

CCS 111th Meeting, Item (2)

C.C.S. 311 circulated, 17 August 1943, the approved paper on this subject for presentation to the President and Prime Minister.

With the approval of the President and Prime Minister, FAN 196 was dispatched to General Eisenhower instructing him in this regard.

C.C.S. 311

17 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ITALIAN PEACE FEELERS

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure with reference to the above subject has been prepared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for submission to the President and Prime Minister.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE

SUGGESTED ACTION ON ITALIAN
PEACE FEELERS

1. General Eisenhower should be instructed to send two Staff Officers, one U.S. and one British, to Lisbon at once to meet General "C".
2. The communication to General "C" should be on the following lines:—

a. The unconditional surrender of Italy is accepted on the terms stated in the document handed to him (Armistice Terms for Italy as already agreed. These do not include political, economic or financial terms which will be communicated later.)

b. These terms did not visualize the active assistance of Italy in fighting the Germans. The extent to which the terms will be modified in favor of Italy will depend on how far the Italian Government and people do, in fact, aid the United Nations against Germany during the remainder of the war. The United Nations, however, state without reservation that wherever Italian forces or Italians fight Germans, or destroy German property, or hamper German movement, they will be given all possible support by the

forces of the United Nations. Meanwhile bombing will be restricted to targets which immediately affect the movements and operations of German forces.

c. The cessation of hostilities between the United Nations and Italy will take effect from a date and hour to be notified by General Eisenhower.

(NOTE: General Eisenhower should make this notification a few hours before Allied forces land in Italy in strength.)

d. Italian Government must undertake to proclaim the Armistice immediately it is announced by General Eisenhower, and to order their forces and people from that hour to collaborate with the Allies and to resist the Germans.

(NOTE: As will be seen from 2 c above, the Italian Government will be given a few hours' notice.)

e. The Italian Government must, at the hour of the Armistice order that all United Nations' prisoners in danger of capture by the Germans shall be immediately released.

f. The Italian Government must, at the hour of the Armistice, order the Italian Fleet and as much of their merchant shipping as possible to put to sea for Allied ports. As many military aircraft as possible shall fly to Allied bases. Any ships or aircraft in danger of capture by the Germans must be destroyed.

3. Meanwhile there is a good deal that Badoglio can do without the Germans becoming aware of what is afoot. The precise character and extent of his action must be left to his judgment; but the following are the general lines which should be suggested to him:—

(i) General passive resistance throughout the country if this order can be conveyed to local authorities without the Germans knowing.

(ii) Minor sabotage throughout the country, particularly of communications and airfields used by the Germans.

(iii) Safeguard of Allied prisoners of war. If German pressure to hand them over becomes too great, they should be released.

(iv) No Italian warships to be allowed to fall into German hands. Arrangements to be made to insure that all these ships can sail to ports desig-

nated by General Eisenhower immediately he gives the order. Italian submarines should not be withdrawn from patrol as this would let the cat out of the bag.

(v) No merchant shipping to be allowed to fall into German hands. Merchant shipping in Northern ports should, if possible, be sailed to ports south of the line Venice-Leghorn. In the last resort they should be scuttled. All ships must be ready to sail for ports designated by General Eisenhower.

(vi) Germans must not be allowed to take over Italian coast defenses.

(vii) Make arrangements to be put in force at the proper time for Italian formations in the Balkans to march to the coast, with a view to their being taken off to Italy by United Nations.

4. General Eisenhower's representatives must arrange with General "C" a secure channel of communication between Italian Headquarters and General Eisenhower.

(NOTE: In view of the urgency of the matter, a warning order should be sent to General Eisenhower that instructions as to how he is to deal with peace-feelers are being concerted between the President and the Prime Minister, and that in the meanwhile he should hold two Staff Officers in readiness to proceed to Lisbon immediately on receipt of these instructions to meet General "C", who must leave Lisbon on the night of the 20th at very latest. He should also make the necessary transportation arrangements with London for entry into Portugal.)

C.C.S. 312 and 312/1

PIPELINE FROM INDIA TO CHINA

References:

C.C.S. 107th Meeting

C.C.S. 115th Meeting, Item (4)

C.C.S. 312 was circulated, 18 August, and the report of an ad hoc committee thereon (C.C.S. 312/1) was circulated, 21 August.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 115th Meeting approved the recommendations of the ad hoc committee, and this agreement was included in C.C.S. 319/5.

C.C.S. 312

18 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
PIPELINE FROM INDIA TO CHINA

References:

- a. C.C.S. 107th Meeting
- b. J.C.S. Memo Directive, 14 August 1943

Note by the United States Chiefs of Staff

The Enclosure, a report by the U.S. Joint administrative Committee, is presented for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff recommend that it be referred to the Combined Administrative Committee or to a special ad hoc Committee for study and report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff before being placed on the C.C.S. Agenda at *QUADRANT*. The Committee's report should assess the effect of the troop lift involved on other troop lift commitments.

ENCLOSURE

PIPELINE FROM INDIA TO CHINA

References:

- a. C.C.S. 107th Meeting
- b. J.C.S. Memo Directive, 14 August 1943

REPORT BY THE U.S. JOINT ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE

THE PROBLEM

1. Prepare a study on the construction of a pipeline from India to China via Calcutta, Ledo and Fort Hertz, to Kunming.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. *Description of Project:*

The project is divided into two parts which can be executed simultaneously:

a. The construction of a six-inch pipeline from Calcutta to Dibrugarh (Project C, attached map) to provide gasoline (1) for U.S. air transport operations in Assam, (2) for further transportation to Kunming, and (3) to supplement the supply of the Imphal Force. The Calcutta-Dibrugarh pipeline is 900 miles long and will have a capacity of 36,000 tons per month. The line is easily accessible from railroads for the entire length. Time required for construction is estimated at five months.

b. The construction of a four-inch pipeline from Dibrugarh via Fort Hertz to Kunming (Project A, attached map), to provide gasoline for air operations in China. This line is 1,000 miles long and will have a capacity of 18,000 tons per month. Approximately 400 miles of this line traverses territory accessible by road, the remainder is accessible only via foot trails or air. In order to speed construction by building several sections simultaneously, materials should be flown in to airfields along the route. Time required for construction is estimated at eight months.

3. *Military necessity:*

a. U.S. air transport operations require 15,000 tons of gasoline per month in Assam.

b. The amount of aviation fuel available in the Kunming area will be a limiting factor which will restrict the size of the air force which can be supported from Chinese bases, for attacks against Japanese shipping, shore installations, naval forces and ground forces during the year 1944.

c. There are additional military requirements, other than gasoline, for the support of ground establishments and ground forces, which are essential to the securing of the airbase area in China. The delivery of gasoline to the Kunming area by pipeline will permit the devotion to these requirements of much of the capacity of the U.S. air transport facilities previously used for gasoline.

4. *Requirements for Construction:*

The requirements for construction are as follows:

900 miles six-inch pipeline and accessories . . .	29,000 short tons
1,000 miles four-inch pipeline and accessories . .	18,000 short tons
Signal supplies	400 short tons
4,000 troops (15 Petr Dist Cos & misc dets)	2,600 short tons
	<hr/>
	50,000 short tons

5. *Capacity to Meet Requirements:*

a. Cargo shipping is available for movement of equipment and supplies.

b. Equipment and supplies are available as required to implement this project.

c. Additional shipping for the transportation of 4,000 troops must be made available or an equal number of troops destined for the same theater must be deferred.

d. Troop units are available as required.

6. *Difficulties to Be Overcome:*

a. In order to execute the project in a minimum of time, it will be necessary to transport, over a period of several months, 15,000 tons of pipeline material by air to points along the pipeline east of Ledo.

b. It will be necessary to transport over the line of communications from Calcutta, over a period of several months, an aggregate of:

(1) 20,000 tons of four-inch pipeline material to Assam.

(2) 30,000 tons of six-inch material along the route between Calcutta and Assam.

c. It will be necessary to provide adequate protection to prevent enemy action from interrupting the construction and operation of the pipeline.

CONCLUSIONS

7. a. The project is feasible from an engineering point of view.

b. The project can be initiated at once and promises considerable and early aid to China.


c. The air delivery of 15,000 tons of four-inch pipeline material invested in the Assam-Kunming pipeline project over a period of several months, will be returned in terms of tons of aviation gasoline delivered in Kunming *in the first month* of pipeline operation.

d. The distribution along the Calcutta-Assam line of communications of 30,000 tons of six-inch pipeline material over a period of several months will increase the capacity of that line of communication by 36,000 tons per month.

e. Without adequate ground protection, it is within the capabilities of the Japanese to interrupt the Assam-Kunming section of the pipeline project.

RECOMMENDATION

8. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the proposed pipeline project.



C.C.S. 312/1

21 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
PIPELINE FROM INDIA TO CHINA

Memorandum from Ad Hoc Committee

The ad hoc Committee appointed by the C.O.S. to examine administrative matters has reviewed C.C.S. 312, and recommended its approval.

Orders for the construction of these pipelines are included in the draft directive to the Supreme Commander Southeast Asia, submitted for approval of the C.C.S. under C.O.S.(Q) 36. The tentative allocation of shipping has included the movement of these troops.

GENERAL SIR T. S.
RIDDELL-WEBSTER
LT. GENERAL BREHON SOMERVELL
REAR ADMIRAL O. C. BADGER

C.C.S 313 and 313/1

APPRECIATION AND PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

Reference:

- C.C.S. 107th Meeting
- C.C.S. 113th Meeting, Item (5)
- 1st Citadel Meeting
- 2nd Citadel Meeting, Item (5)

C.C.S. 313 circulated, 18 August 1943, a covering memorandum and summary of CPS 83 (Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan).

C.C.S. 313/1 circulated a proposed amendment to paragraph 20 of C.C.S. 313.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 113th Meeting, after discussion of C.C.S. 313, agreed to defer action on this paper. Final decisions re C.C.S. 313 are included in the resolutions contained in C.C.S. 319/2 and 319/5.

C.C.S. 313

18 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

APPRECIATION AND PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

Note by the Secretaries

The Enclosure is a covering memorandum submitted by the Combined Staff Planners in forwarding C.P.S. 83 for consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. C.P.S. 83 has been previously circulated and file copies are available in the offices of the Secretariat.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

18 August 1943

ENCLOSURE

MEMORANDUM

From: The Combined Staff Planners.
To: Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Subject: Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of JAPAN (C.P.S. 83).

1. In their 90th Meeting on 20 May 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff "directed the Combined Staff Planners to initiate a study and prepare for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff an appreciation leading up to an outline plan for the defeat of *JAPAN*, including an estimate of the forces required for its implementation."

2. In their 102nd Meeting on 16 July 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed the Combined Staff Planners to place an appreciation and plan for the war against *JAPAN* before the Combined Chiefs of Staff during *QUADRANT*.

3. Combined planning teams, working in *LONDON* in June and in *WASHINGTON* in July, completed C.P.S. 83 on 8 August with the exception of certain

Tables of Forces which are under preparation and should be completed prior to the end of *QUADRANT*. A summary of C.P.S. 83 is attached.

4. On the basis of the premises adopted, the Combined Staff Planners consider that the measures set forth as being necessary for the defeat of *JAPAN*, namely, the retention of China as an effective ally, the destruction of Japanese sea and air forces, the blockade of *JAPAN*, and the large scale bombing of the Japanese homeland as a preliminary to the possible invasion of *JAPAN*, are sound.

5. The general lines of advance — through the *CENTRAL* and *SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC*, and possibly in the *NORTHWEST PACIFIC* by *UNITED STATES'* forces; and through the *STRAITS OF MALACCA* and *CHINA SEA* by British forces, with the development of a line of supplies to *CHINA* through *BURMA*, are concurred in.

6. The dates on which operations are to be undertaken, with the consequent prolonged duration, envisages, as set forth by the Planning Team, the least favorable conditions to be anticipated. The Planning Teams state that conditions less unfavorable will permit the expediting of the contemplated operations.

7. Even on this conditional basis the Combined Staff Planners consider that the plan contemplates a war in the *PACIFIC* so prolonged as to be unacceptable to the *UNITED NATIONS*. They feel that the situation existing at this time is that the Japanese have won the war and that operations which do not contemplate the complete nullification of Japanese gains before 1947 will produce the serious hazard that the war against *JAPAN* will not, in fact, be won by the *UNITED NATIONS*.

8. *THE UNITED NATIONS'* over-all objective, as approved in C.C.S. 242/6 during the *TRIDENT* Conference, states:—

“The over-all objective of the *UNITED NATIONS* is, in conjunction with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the *AXIS* Powers.”

9. The Combined Staff Planners feel that the conduct of the war to bring about the defeat of *JAPAN* must be in consonance with the over-all objective, as well as with the over-all strategic concept for the prosecution of the war against *JAPAN*, which reads (C.C.S. 242/6, Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3) :—

“1. In cooperation with Russia and other allies to bring about by the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the *AXIS* in Europe.

"2. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other *PACIFIC* Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against *JAPAN* with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the over-all objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

"3. Upon the defeat of the *AXIS* in *EUROPE*, in cooperation with other *PACIFIC* Powers and, if possible, with *RUSSIA*, to direct the full resources of the *UNITED STATES* and *GREAT BRITAIN* to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of *JAPAN*."

10. At the present time a great preponderance of the *UNITED NATIONS* Forces is deployed against the *AXIS* Powers in *EUROPE*. At the time of the defeat of *GERMANY* large forces will become available for redeployment against *JAPAN*. This redeployment will require a long period of time. During this period the will to prosecute the war to the defeat of *JAPAN* will suffer from the stultifying effect caused by long delays in the increase of offensive action in the *PACIFIC* and *FAR EAST*.

11. The Combined Staff Planners feel, therefore, that, if we are to comply with the approved over-all objective and strategic concept and are to ensure the complete defeat of *JAPAN*, we must contemplate the start of the reorientation of forces from four to six months in advance of the prospective date of the defeat of *GERMANY*, adjusting the tempo and scale of the reorientation to the progress of the war in Europe, as determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff from time to time.

12. The U.S. Planners feel that our plans and preparations should contemplate the defeat of *JAPAN* not later than 12 months after the defeat of *GERMANY*. This timing should itself now be established as a more or less controlling objective with which our efforts, measures, and courses of action should conform. If, in the future, the measures set forth in the proposed plan do not prospectively provide for this desired rate of progress of the war, other measures should be sought — as, for instance, inducing *RUSSIA* to enter the war.

The British Planners, however, while fully conscious of the need to shorten the war against Japan and to take all possible measures so to shorten it, cannot accept such a target date. In their opinion such acceptance would necessitate an entirely new concept of operations involving an assault on the Japanese homeland without the preparatory bombing from bases in China and/or Formosa which they believe will be required. This course, though worthy of consideration nearer the time, is insufficiently certain to provide a basis for long term planning.

13. The chief value of an over-all plan of this kind is the guidance of action now and in the immediate future. Operations now underway in the *NORTH*, *CENTRAL*, *SOUTH*, and *SOUTHWEST PACIFIC*, as well as those *PACIFIC* operations set forth in C.C.S. 301, — Specific Operations in the *PACIFIC* and *FAR EAST*, 1943-1944 — are in conformity with the plan. Operations for the seizure of *BURMA* are in conformity with the plan, but the date that they should be undertaken is in dispute.

14. The U.S. Planners consider that the *SOUTHWEST PACIFIC* operations, through *NEW GUINEA*, and to the *NORTHWEST* of *NEW GUINEA*, provide for a line of advance which at this time must be considered concurrent and coordinated with the advance in the *CENTRAL PACIFIC* and in this respect do not agree with the plan that these operations should be considered subsidiary in character.

The British Planners however consider that operations in *NEW GUINEA* will be slow and very expensive in resources. They therefore support the view set out in the summary that when we turn to our main *PACIFIC* effort, through the *MARSHALLS* and *CAROLINES*, operations in *NEW GUINEA* should become subsidiary and should only be pursued in so far as they are necessary for the success of our main effort.

15. The U.S. Planners assume that the operations in *NORTH BURMA*, as approved at the *TRIDENT* Conference — advance from *LEDO* and *IMPHAL*, and increase of supplies by air to *CHINA*, and the *AKYAB* and *RAMREE* operations — will be firmly carried out in 1943-1944. Beyond these operations the plan submitted by the British Members does not contemplate offensive operations from the *WEST* (other than further operations in *NORTH BURMA*) until March, 1945. In other words, during the period March, 1944, to March, 1945, the efforts from the *WEST* to “maintain and extend unremitting pressure against *JAPAN* with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate unconditional surrender can be forced” would be only those possible to the forces deployed in *NORTH BURMA*. The U.S. Planners feel that a more extensive contribution to the war effort is necessary along this line of advance during this period. They feel that the support rendered in 1944, even though smaller than could be afforded in 1945, will give better and more needed support to the *PACIFIC THEATER*.

16. The U.S. Planners consider that Course B, the capture of *SOUTH BURMA*, beginning in November, 1944, should be carried out. This operation is regarded as necessary not only for the improved line of supplies to *CHINA* through *RANGOON*, but as a preliminary to the further movement of the ad-

vance from the *WEST* through the *STRAIT OF MALACCA*. In this they are in disagreement with the British Planners who concur with Course C, the attack against *SINGAPORE* to by-pass *SOUTH BURMA*, and to be inaugurated in March, 1945.

17. The British Planners feel that the question of whether or not China remains in the war will not be decided by the choice between Course B (the prior capture of *BURMA*) and Course C (the prior capture of Singapore) since China's darkest hours will be in the early half of 1944, before Germany is defeated. Thereafter, the obvious weight of the United Nations offensive against Japan in general and the prospect of an early opening of the sea route in particular will do more to sustain morale than the arrival of limited additional material through Burma, always provided supply by the air route continues at the maximum.

18. The British Planners feel strongly that the recapture of *SOUTHERN BURMA* and *RANGOON* would be a small strategic gain for the expenditure of great effort. At best it would:—

a. Produce limited pressure on Japanese land and air forces for two dry seasons with little attrition during the intervening wet seasons.

b. Open the Burma Road. As this cannot in any case be in full operation before some time in 1946, whether we go for *RANGOON* or *SINGAPORE* first, the results are long term. In the unlikely event of the Japanese in the meantime occupying *KUNMING*, all our efforts in *BURMA* would be nullified.

19. On the other hand, the British Planners feel that the recapture of *SINGAPORE* before *RANGOON* is a full and correct application of sea and air power. It will electrify the Eastern world and have an immense psychological effect on the Japanese. It will threaten the Japanese communications to *THAILAND* and so to *BURMA*, enable direct attack to be brought to bear on the Dutch oilfields, and in fact flank and undermine the whole Japanese defense structure in *SOUTHEAST ASIA*. It provides a base for the great naval and air forces available for deployment against Japan from the West. Above all, it provides for an advance complementary to that being undertaken by the U.S.A. from the East, and converging upon the same objectives, i.e., the capture of *HONG KONG* or *FORMOSA* and the control of the *SOUTH CHINA SEA*. It thus accelerates the opening of a sea supply route to *CHINA*. Operations against *SINGAPORE* will, moreover, provoke intense Japanese reaction to preserve the material gains of the Japanese Empire in the West as opposed to its strategic position and gains in the East, thereby relieving Japanese pressure on

CHINA and stretching Japanese ability to resist the Eastern advance possibly to the limit.

RECOMMENDATIONS

20. To summarize, it is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should take the following action:—

*RECOMMENDATIONS BY
U.S. PLANNERS*

(a) Approve the general objectives and the general lines of advance set forth in the plan, as a basis for planning and preparation.

(b) Disapprove, as unacceptable those aspects of the plan which contemplate a prolonged war lasting into 1947 or 1948.

(c) Direct that plans and preparations for the defeat of Japan shall have as their objective the accomplishment of this defeat not later than 12 months after the defeat of Germany.

(d) Approve, in principle, the inauguration of reorientation of forces from the *EUROPEAN THEATER* to the *PACIFIC* and *FAR EAST THEATERS* from four to six months in advance of the prospective date of the defeat of *GERMANY*, the scope and timing of reorientation to be adjusted to the requirements of the *EUROPEAN THEATER*, as determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff from time to time.

(e) Recognize that the deployment of forces and the operations to

*RECOMMENDATIONS BY
BRITISH PLANNERS*

(a) Agreed.

(b) Agreed.

(c) Direct that intensified study of ways and means for shortening the war should be undertaken at every stage; and that theater commanders should be so instructed.

(d) Agreed.

(e) Agreed.

*RECOMMENDATIONS BY
U.S. PLANNERS*

be undertaken in the war against Japan must be in accord with the over-all objective and strategic concept defined in C.C.S. 242/6, Sections I and II.

(f) Re-affirm the *TRIDENT* decision that approved operations in North Burma and against Akyab and Ramree will be executed during the coming dry season.

(g) Re-affirm the *TRIDENT* decision to undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

(h) Direct the maximum possible expansion of the air supply route into China.

(i) Approve the Pacific operations as accepted in the final version of C.C.S. 301.

(j) Make a decision at this time as to operations to be undertaken in the west (South Burma or toward Singapore) in 1944.

(k) Agree that the forces to carry out the operations from the East, in-

*RECOMMENDATIONS BY
BRITISH PLANNERS*

(f) The British Planners consider that the form of this decision must await the outcome of discussion on C.C.S. 301.

(g) Agreed.

(h) Agreed.

(i) Agreed.

(j) Approve planning and preparations for the start of operations for the capture of Singapore with a target date of 1945, followed by the recapture or re-occupation of Southern Burma during the season 1945-46. This decision to be reviewed in the spring of 1944 in the light of the then existing German situation.

(k) Agree that the forces to carry out the operations from the East, in-

*RECOMMENDATIONS BY
U.S. PLANNERS*

cluding Southwest Pacific, will be provided by the U.S., Australia and New Zealand; operations to be carried out from the west to be with forces provided by Great Britain, except that special types not available to Great Britain will be added by the U.S.

*RECOMMENDATIONS BY
BRITISH PLANNERS*

cluding Southwest Pacific, will be provided by U.S. operations to be carried out from the west to be with forces provided by Great Britain, except that special types not available to Great Britain will be added by the U.S. The employment of Dominion forces will be a matter for discussion between all the Governments concerned.

APPENDIX

SUMMARY OF APPRECIATION AND OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

1. The following is a summary of C.P.S. 83 (Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan). We have based the outline plan that follows on our best evaluation of what may have to be undertaken.

2. We have assumed that Japanese resistance will be continuously stubborn, and have taken no credit for a decline in the morale of the Japanese people or fighting services. Nevertheless we do not believe that it will be necessary to carry out the whole program of operations in order to defeat them. Even if Japanese morale remains high, at some point the continuous process of weakening the enemy's forces and reducing his war potential will cause a rapid decline in his ability to fight and a consequent acceleration of our advance. Since it is impossible to forecast the stage of the operations at which this critical point will be reached, we have throughout endeavored to make the plan sufficiently flexible to permit of considerable acceleration at any stage.

BASIC CONCLUSIONS

3. We summarize below the basic conclusions of our appreciation:

4. To achieve the ultimate defeat of Japan we must destroy her capacity to resist and this may well involve the invasion of Japan.

5. The security of the Japanese position in the Pacific depends primarily on the Japanese Fleet and Air Forces. We must therefore destroy them as soon as we can.

6. Heavy and sustained air bombardment of Japan proper should cripple the Japanese war industry and destroy her ability to continue her main war effort. It might cause the surrender we demand but we cannot rely on this. In any case, air bombardment of this nature is probably an essential prelude to bring about the defeat of Japan.

7. To bring about the sustained air offensive against Japan we shall almost certainly require the use of China and/or Formosa as the bases for our long-range bombardment. These two areas will also go a long way towards meeting our requirements for mounting invasion forces. We shall require Chinese assistance in seizing and holding the area in China required for our air bases.

8. To secure and develop airfields on the mainland of China, it will be necessary to acquire ports in China. So far as we can see, Hong Kong will be the most suitable port to open initially.

9. We therefore require a sea route to China and/or Formosa and the interruption of the enemy's lines of communication thereto. This will entail control of the South Japan and South China Seas.

The best route of advance from the East lies through the Mandated Islands, and then either through the Celebes and Sulu Seas or north of Luzon.

The best route of advance from the West lies through the Straits of Malacca.

10. In reaching these conclusions we have been guided by certain principles, which in turn should be applied throughout the execution of the plan:

a. We should attack Japan along as many lines of advance as are profitable, in order to make use of our superior forces and to extend the enemy defense.

b. Every possible means of taking short cuts to our objectives should be adopted. The superior forces, particularly Air Forces, available to us and the opportunities for surprise should enable large and bold steps to be taken without unacceptable risk.

c. Shortage of bases will initially restrict our possible lines of advance. We should therefore take the first opportunity of securing additional bases from which to deploy our superior strength.

d. Our strength, particularly in the air, should be concentrated against Japan's weaknesses, which lie in her shortage of aircraft, warships, shipping and oil.

Conversely extensive campaigns against Japanese land forces in difficult country, where we cannot use our own forces to the best advantage, should be avoided until they have been weakened by lack of supplies and support from the Japanese navy and air forces.

Whenever possible, we should, in fact, aim at leaving Japanese land forces in possession of outlying territory, in order that they may continue to be a liability to Japanese shipping, air and naval forces.

e. Wherever practicable, direct attacks on our objectives should be aided, and if possible preceded, by attack against Japanese communications leading to them. The extremely extended nature of their communications, together with the notorious inability of the Japanese to deal with the unexpected, are likely to render such methods very profitable.

f. Since shipping is unlikely to be a limiting factor after the defeat of Germany, our lines of advance need not necessarily be selected so as to take the shortest route from the U.S. or U.K. to our ultimate objective, but rather the one most easily established and protected.

g. We should devise every possible means of exploiting to the full, the vast technical and numerical air superiority which we shall enjoy over the Japanese after the defeat of Germany.

h. Whilst recognizing that every effort must be made to retain China in the war and to develop her bases and land forces, our plans should retain the necessary flexibility to enable our program against the Japanese to be continued if China should drop out of the war or prove less effective than we now hope.

i. Whilst being prepared to achieve our aims without Russian assistance, our plans should nevertheless retain the necessary flexibility to exploit the situation fully if Russia should join in the war at any stage.

j. We cannot forecast the date at which Germany will be defeated. To minimize the delay in turning the full weight of our offensive against Japan after the defeat of Germany, the bases from which our initial advances are to be launched should be developed as soon as possible and plans for reorganization and redeployment made without delay.

GENERAL CONCEPT OF THE WAR

11. Applying these principles to the basic conclusions set out above, the general concept of the war which emerges is as follows:

FIRST PHASE — ACTION PRIOR TO CAPTURE OF A PORT IN CHINA AND/OR FORMOSA

12. *In the East*, our main effort should be through the Mandated Islands. Until we are ready to launch this main effort, we should maintain increasing pressure on the Japanese by means of offensive operations in the Solomons-

New Guinea area and in the Aleutians. When we turn to our main effort these latter operations should become subsidiary, and should only be undertaken insofar as they are necessary for the success of our main effort.

Having completed our advance through the Mandated Islands, we should then proceed either to the South Philippines or to the north of them. Our choice should be made in the light of whichever course will most quickly achieve our object of reaching the China Coast and/or capturing Formosa.

13. *In the West*, we should maintain China and build up our air forces there by stepping up the air supply route from Assam and by operations to clear Northern Burma, thus permitting the opening of a land route to China.

Meanwhile we should make preparations in India for the launching of the major campaigns to recapture the whole of Burma and to break into the Japanese perimeter from the west by the recapture of Singapore.

Once that has been accomplished we should make our way through the South China Sea towards the coast of China and Formosa.

COORDINATION

14. To integrate our advances from the West and the East, the timing of the various operations should, if possible, be so arranged that they afford one another the maximum amount of mutual assistance at each stage.

15. For our advance from the East, a very large fleet, but comparatively small land and shore-based air forces will be necessary, and therefore comparatively little shipping, until we have completed our advance through the Mandates, when our ground and land-based air forces may well be of a very large order.

Our advance from the West, on the other hand, will require large land and air forces and much shipping, but probably a considerably smaller fleet than in the case of our advance from the East.

16. Our advance from the east should provide opportunities for bringing the Japanese fleet to action in favorable circumstances. It will enable us to threaten and strike at Japan herself, and, in conjunction with air forces from China, to strike at the focal point of the Japanese sea communications in the Yellow Sea-Formosa areas. This will greatly assist our advances from the west by forcing the Japanese fleet and air forces on to the defensive in their Home

area and by enabling our forces in the east to strike at the Japanese communications leading to the objectives of our advance from the west.

17. In executing our advance from the west, and after completing the capture of North Burma, (*Course A*), two courses of action remain open to us in the west.

Course B — (Recapture of South Burma followed by recapture of Singapore) probably offers the best chance of maintaining China in the war by insuring that the overland supply route is developed as early as possible and with the greatest reliability. On the other hand, the delay in the recapture of Singapore is likely to mean that our advance to open the sea route to China would have to be undertaken from the east alone, and would receive little aid from the west.

Course C — (Recapture of Singapore, followed by recapture of South Burma) would enable a much greater degree of coordination and mutual assistance to be achieved in the later stages of our two advances since we should expect to reach Singapore and advance therefrom a year earlier. It would stretch Japanese resources over a wide area and would enable the British Fleet to operate off the China coast. Our land and air forces could also be moved up the South China Sea along routes far removed from the main enemy naval strength in Japan.

On the other hand, we should run the risk of delaying the development of the overland routes to China, although there would be no appreciable delay *if all operations go according to plan.*

18. Irrespective of whether the advance from the east or the west approaches China first, it is unlikely that we shall be able to capture Shanghai direct. In conjunction with shore-based air support from China, and Chinese land forces, we might, however, be able to undertake a direct assault on Hong Kong, subsequently taking Formosa.

If the capture of Hong Kong is impracticable, we should endeavor to seize Formosa first, or, if this too is impracticable, Luzon.

If neither of these can be seized direct, we should assault Hainan and if possible one of the Ryukyus.

If the above are impracticable we should continue operations against the South Philippines and complete our control of the Celebes and Sulu Seas,

subsequently carrying out our program to capture a port in China and/or Formosa.

SECOND PHASE — ACTION SUBSEQUENT TO THE CAPTURE OF A PORT IN CHINA AND/OR THE CAPTURE OF FORMOSA

19. This phase will involve overland and amphibious operations in China and direct air and naval action to weaken Japanese capacity to resist. It will probably culminate in the invasion of Japan.

20. If we are established in Hong Kong before Formosa has been captured, we shall be in a position to build up the necessary land forces in China, secure the air bases most accessible from Hong Kong, and start the bombing of Japan at long range.

If, on the other hand, we capture Formosa before Hong Kong, or find that the Chinese assistance on the mainland is disappointing, the bombing of Japan can start from Formosa.

21. It is possible that, with the assistance of sea-borne air forces, Japan may be sufficiently weakened to enable us to invade her when our bomber offensive has been developed from either Formosa, or the area most accessible from Hong Kong.

On the other hand, to bomb Japan effectively we may have to move further northwards from Hong Kong in order to use the area up to the line Wenchow-Nanchang-Changsha.

From the invasion point of view, we may possibly have to secure the Shanghai area, and if this is the case, we should be well placed from our positions in Hong Kong and Formosa to undertake such an advance both overland and coastwise.

22. If Chinese assistance proves to be effective, our main effort will probably be made overland. If, on the other hand, it is disappointing, our main effort would be concentrated in amphibious operations along the China coast as far northwards as necessary.

SUBSIDIARY AND ALTERNATIVE LINES OF ADVANCE

23. Meanwhile, subject to the requirements of our main advance, we should:

(i) undertake subsidiary operations along the Malay Barrier to bring increased pressure to bear on the Japanese;

(ii) prepare plans and bases for the capture of the Northern Kuriles and the reinforcement of Petropavlovsk, in order to secure a sea route to Russia in the event of her entering the war;

(iii) prepare plans and bases for the capture of Hokkaido should the opportunity arise for assisting our bombing or undertaking our invasion of Japan from this direction, possibly in conjunction with Russian action from the Maritime Provinces, Sakhalin or Petropavlovsk.

OUTLINE PLAN

24. Based on our appreciation, we indicate below an outline plan for operations against Japan:-

ACTION IN THE WEST

ACTION IN THE EAST

Serial 1 — Up to November 1943

Development of air routes to China.

Offensive operations against Solomons and New Guinea.

Holding operations in North Burma and China.

Offensive operations against the Aleutians.

Serial 2 — November 1943 to May 1944

Offensive operations in Northern Burma and on Arakan coast.

Offensive operations against Gilberts and Marshalls.

Developing Northern routes leading to China.

Subsidiary operations in Solomons and New Guinea and air operations from the Aleutians.

Serial 3 — June 1944 to November 1944

Holding operations in Burma.

Offensive operations against
Carolines.

Subsidiary operations in
New Guinea area.

Serial 4 — November 1944 to May 1945

Course B

(Favored by U.S.)

Offensive operations
in North Burma
and capture of
Rangoon.

Course C

(Favored by British)

Offensive operations
in North Burma.

Offensive operations
against Northern
Sumatra and Malaya.

Offensive operations against
the Pelews and possibly
Marianas.

Subsidiary operations in
the New Guinea area.

Commence offensive opera-
tions against South
Philippines.**

Serial 5 — June 1945 to November 1945

Holding
operations
in Burma.

Holding
operations
in North
Burma.
Continue
offensive
operations
in Malaya
and against
Japanese
communi-
cations to
Burma.

Con- — OR
tinue of-
fensive op-
erations
against the
South
Philippines.

Offensive
opera-
tions
against
Luzon,
Formosa
or
Ryukyus.

** If conditions are favorable, it may prove possible to by-pass this objective.

Serial 6 — November 1945 to May 1946

Complete offensive operations to clear Burma.	Offensive operations against North Burma and Rangoon, subsequently clearing the whole of Burma.	Con- tinue of- sive opera- tions South Philippines.	— OR	Launch of- fensive operations against Hong Kong or Formosa (if not already captured).
Offensive operations against N. Sumatra and Malaya.	Offensive operations against Camranh Bay.**			

Serial 7 — During the remainder of 1946

Complete capture of Malaya.	Launch offensive operations against Luzon, Formosa, Hong Kong, Hainan and/or Ryukyus from East and West.	OR	Establish the strategic bombing force in China and/or Formosa.
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Serial 8 — From 1947 onwards

Establish the strategic bombing force in China and/or Formosa.

Bomb Japan.
Invade Japan.

** If conditions are favorable, it may prove possible to by-pass these objectives.

C.C.S. 313/1

20 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

APPRECIATION AND PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

Memorandum from the United States Chiefs of Staff

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff recommend approval of paragraph 20 of C.C.S. 313 as amended below:

"20. To summarize, it is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should take the following action:—

a. Approve the general objectives as a basis for planning and preparation.

b. Direct examination of lines of advance, including a study of the feasibility and desirability of operations through the Moulmein area or Kra Peninsula in the direction of Bangkok with the object of isolating Rangoon and facilitating the capture of Singapore.

c. Disapprove, as unacceptable, those aspects of the plan which contemplate a prolonged war lasting into 1947 or 1948.

d. Direct that plans and preparations for the defeat of Japan shall have as their objective the accomplishment of this defeat not later than 12 months after the defeat of Germany.

e. Approve, in principle, the inauguration of reorientation of forces from the *EUROPEAN THEATER* to the *PACIFIC* and *FAR EAST THEATERS* from four to six months in advance of the prospective date of the defeat of *GERMANY*, the scope and timing of reorientation to be adjusted to the requirements of the *EUROPEAN THEATER*, as determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff from time to time.

f. Recognize that the deployment of forces and the operations to be undertaken in the war against Japan must be in accord with the over-all objective and strategic concept defined in C.C.S. 242/6, Sections I and II.

g. Reaffirm the *TRIDENT* decision that approved operations in North Burma and against Akyab and Ramree will be executed during the coming dry season.

h. Reaffirm the *TRIDENT* decision to undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

i. Direct the maximum possible expansion of the air supply route into China.

j. Approve the Pacific operations as accepted in the final version of C.C.S. 301.

k. Approve planning for the start of operations against Southern Burma and/or the Malaya Peninsula with a target date of 1944; these plans to be revised at the next meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

l. Agree that the forces to carry out the operations from the East, including Southwest Pacific, will be provided by U.S.; operations to be carried out from the west to be with forces provided by Great Britain, except that special types not available to Great Britain will be added by the U.S. The employment of Dominion forces will be a matter for discussion between all the Governments concerned."

C.C.S. 314 and 314/3

ALLOCATION OF LANDING CRAFT
(Operation *OVERLORD* — Vehicle Lift)

References:

C.C.S. 111th Meeting, Item (4)

C.C.S. 112th Meeting, Item (4)

C.C.S. 314 was circulated, 18 August 1943, for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In their 112th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed with the proposal of the British Chiefs of Staff that the possibility of arranging an increase in the number of LCT(6) available for *OVERLORD* from American sources should be explored.

Following the above action, a memorandum by the U.S. Chief of Staff (C.C.S. 314/3, 20 August) referred to C.C.S. 286, which was a memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff and which presented a proposed program for movement of U.S. landing ships and craft to the United Kingdom for operation *OVERLORD*, and replied to C.C.S. 314.

C.C.S. 314

18 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ALLOCATION OF LANDING CRAFT
(Operation *OVERLORD* — Vehicle Lift)

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

1. We have been examining the landing craft position for operation *OVERLORD*. It appears probable that there will be a shortage of vehicle lift of 870 vehicles, or 13 per cent of the total lift, compared with the calculations made at *TRIDENT*. This shortage is made up as follows:

LCT (3 or 4) — 57

LCT (5) — 15

2. The reasons for this shortage are as follows:

a. 164 LCG(M) which it was hoped to build in the United Kingdom, will not be ready in time. In order to compensate to some extent for this and in order to provide supporting fire for the U.S. assaults, it has been necessary to convert 43 LCT (3 and 4) to LCT(R) or LCG(L).

b. In the *TRIDENT* calculations it was assumed that the 44 LCT (4 and 5) employed in close mobile net protection duties with the Fleet at Scapa Flow, would all be available for *OVERLORD*. Recent developments in anti-ship weapons make it impossible to dispense with this type of protection. Every effort is being made to substitute other types of craft and 15 LCT's have been released. The Admiralty are going to try and release more, but at present they must retain 14 LCT(4) and 15 LCT(5).

3. Under the *TRIDENT* decisions, 18 LCT's were to be brought back from the Mediterranean for *OVERLORD*. It will be necessary for these to sail before bad weather starts in the Bay of Biscay. Admiral Cunningham has been asked whether these craft are taking part in *AVALANCHE* and when they can be released. The importance of ensuring their passage home has been emphasized. Owing to the casualties in *HUSKY* having been less than expected, we may

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get more back from this source, which would help us reduce the deficit. But we cannot count on this yet.

4. We have studied various methods by which the shortage in lift for *OVERLORD* could be wiped out. It seems that the only practicable method would be to arrange by some means an increase in the number of LCT(6) available for *OVERLORD* from American sources. The British Chiefs of Staff ask that the possibility of this should be explored.

C.C.S. 314/1 and 314/2

ALLOCATION OF
LANDING SHIPS AND CRAFT — AMERICAN PRODUCTION

References:

C.C.S. 111th Meeting, Item (4)

C.C.S. 112th Meeting, Item (4)

C.C.S. 314/1 was circulated, 18 August 1943, and a memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in reply was circulated 19 August (C.C.S. 314/2).

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 112th Meeting, considered C.C.S. 314/1 and 314/2 and amended and approved paragraph 3 b of C.C.S. 314/1.

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C.C.S. 314/1

18 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ALLOCATION OF
LANDING SHIPS AND CRAFT — AMERICAN PRODUCTION

Note by the Secretaries

In order to save delay, the enclosure prepared by the Chief of Combined Operations, in consultation with the British Joint Planning Staff, is presented direct to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their consideration.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

E N C L O S U R E

ALLOCATION OF
LANDING SHIPS AND CRAFT — AMERICAN PRODUCTION

(Memorandum by British Chiefs of Staff)

1. It will be remembered that in April 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed (C.C.S. 105/4) that future allocations of additional landing craft from U.S. production to the United Kingdom, as could be made available and as would be needed for specific employment and specifically projected operations, be accomplished by arrangement between the United States and British Naval Staffs, and formally processed through the Munitions Assignments Committee, Navy, subject to the approval of the Munitions Assignments Board in Washington.

2. No specific operations for the War against Germany, after *OVERLORD*, have yet been decided upon. For the War against Japan, it is hoped that decisions will shortly be taken on the scope and extent of British participation. In order to prepare the British Assault Fleet and to estimate British manning commitments for 1944/45, the British Chiefs of Staff wish to formulate their programme without waiting for specific operational decisions.

3. We, therefore, recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should agree:

- a. To modify the policy previously accepted.
- b. That the British should now work out and submit requests for a share of U.S. production in 1944-45.

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C.C.S. 314/2

19 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ALLOCATION OF
LANDING SHIPS AND CRAFT — AMERICAN PRODUCTION

Memorandum from the United States Chiefs of Staff

The United States Chiefs of Staff have considered the proposals presented by the British Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 314/1. They feel that the provision of landing craft still constitutes a bottleneck in the conduct of military operations and will continue to do so for some time. At present there is no likelihood of a reserve in landing craft being created.

The whole subject of the allocation of landing craft is being explored by the Combined Staff Planners. However, the United States Chiefs of Staff feel the landing craft must continue to be allocated as necessary to meet the needs of specific operations.

C.C.S. 314/3

20 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ALLOCATION OF LANDING CRAFT
(Operation *OVERLORD* — Vehicle Lift)

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. We have noted the memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 314) concerning the shortage of vehicle lift for *OVERLORD* and the necessity of additional landing craft therefor; viz., 57 LCT(3 or 4)'s and 15 LCT(5)'s. Consideration has also been given to the British proposals contained in C.C.S. 286.

2. We have examined the possibility of providing additional LCT(6)'s from U.S. sources and find that our own LCT deliveries to fulfill the *TRIDENT* U.S. commitment for *OVERLORD* cannot be accomplished as early as desired and that it is impossible to increase the number of the LCT's so committed; viz., 146, of which 41, at least, must come from the Mediterranean.

3. Studies are under way which it is hoped will effect an increase in the rate of U.S. landing craft production. However, the result of these studies at the present time indicates that such an acceleration cannot be felt before April 1944.

4. In view of this, the deficiencies in *OVERLORD* will have to be made good from the Mediterranean and these movements will, of course, in the case of LCT's, have to be adjusted to weather conditions.

5. It is suggested that every effort be made to put all the LCT(5)'s now in the U.K. in an operating condition and employ them in *OVERLORD* as a means to improve the situation.

C.C.S. 315 and 315/2

“HABBAKUKS”

Reference:

C.C.S. 112th Meeting, Item (3)

C.C.S. 315 was circulated, 18 August 1943, for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. C.C.S. 315/1, a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff, was circulated 19 August.

In their 112th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered these two papers, took note of paragraphs *a*, *b* and *c*, C.C.S. 315/1, and agreed to an addendum to be incorporated as paragraph *d*.

Resolutions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on this subject were circulated as C.C.S. 315/2.

C.C.S. 315

18 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

"HABBAKUKS"

Note by the Secretaries

In order to save delay, the enclosure, prepared by the Chief of Combined Operations, in consultation with the British Joint Planning Staff, is presented direct to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their consideration.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE

"HABBAKUKS"

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

1. We are impressed with the possibilities of constructing "floating air-fields" as a type of aircraft carrier, and we are of the opinion that research and design have now reached a stage when we should proceed with the production of certain types. A Technical Note is given in Annex I.

2. Three types of vessel have been designed on paper by naval architects:

HABBAKUK I

3. A vessel made of wood was designed in the hope that it could be ready in 1944 and would not use much strategic material. This, we have learned is not the case, as there is a shortage of timber. Consequently in view of the limited requirement for this type, it has been decided not to proceed with it.

HABBAKUK II

4. This vessel could be made of steel but would require about 150,000 tons per vessel as well as a great deal of shipyard space and skilled labor. Alterna-

tively, it could be made of pykrete (frozen pulp and water), but the feasibility of this depends on the completion of full-scale tests during the winter 1943-44. These experiments have been in progress in England and Canada since December 1942. The proposed design has a speed of about seven knots; is self-propelled; and has a length of 1,700-2,200 feet; the beam would be sufficient to operate and park medium bombers and transport aircraft and, if assisted take off could be employed, heavy bombers. If orders for the above full-scale tests are given immediately, and if these are successful, the first pykrete *HABBAKUK* might be operational by the middle of 1945, but there are a large number of constructional and operational problems to be overcome.

HABBAKUK III

5. This would be a smaller and faster type made of steel; about 70,000 tons per vessel; speed 12 knots; self-propelled; length 1,000-1,200 feet; beam sufficient to operate fighters, naval aircraft and light twin engine bombers. If a definite order is given in the near future, and if the material can be made available, the first could be operational by the spring of 1945. The construction of this type would, however, conflict with other ship construction, e.g. escort carriers.

6. Arrestor gear will be necessary on all types and the employment of assisted take-off methods would be of great value.

7. In the war against Japan, we see considerable possibilities in Types II and III, particularly the latter. They could not, of course, in any way fulfill the functions of an aircraft carrier operating with the fleet, but there are a number of other ways, details of which are described in Annex II in which we think they would be of great value. Indeed, we feel that after a certain number of escort carriers have been constructed, it would probably be better to build a few of these *HABBAKUKS* rather than devote all our efforts to further escort carriers. (See paragraphs 40 and 41 of Annex II.)

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. We suggest that we should now take steps as follows:

a. To construct at least two *HABBAKUKS III*, which is the more promising type for use both in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean;

b. To continue experiments and construct during the coming winter sections of pykrete for *HABBAKUK II*'s for experimental purposes. Subject to success in this, we should construct a number of *HABBAKUK II*'s in pykrete during the following winter for use in the Pacific.

9. We cannot undertake construction in the United Kingdom because neither labor nor the material can be made available. If, therefore, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agree in principle with our proposals, we suggest that they should invite the appropriate United States and Canadian authorities to set up a board forthwith to press on with this matter. We shall be glad to place British experts at the disposal of both.

ANNEX I

TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS*

Operational requirements fix types of design possible for large floating air bases.

1. The basic requirement is to maintain a flying platform of length 1,000-1,500 feet for fighters and naval aircraft, 2,000-6,000 feet for bombers with a width of 200-300 feet and at a height of 40-50 feet above water.

2. The most satisfactory methods of doing this are:

a. Flying deck supported over full width by hull as in existing carriers with a limited extension at sides to give a wider flying deck. The large quantities of steel required limit the size of the vessel to that of fighter carriers. A design has been prepared for such a vessel, *HABBAKUK IIID*: Length 1,200 feet, beam of hull 130 feet, width of flight deck 200 feet, freeboard 50 feet, draft 35 feet, speed 12-15 knots.

b. For larger vessels the use of a cheap light and abundant material is indicated. Such material has been evolved by research undertaken in Canada and England during the past year. It consists of a mixture of wood pulp (8-14%) and water, frozen and cooled to a temperature of five degrees Fahrenheit. It is known as Pykrete and its mechanical properties are similar to wood.

A vessel, *HABBAKUK II*, has been designed using this material. Its dimensions are 2,000 feet, length beam 300 feet, freeboard 50 feet, draft 150 feet, speed 7 knots. The massive construction, with 40-foot thickness of

* A fuller treatment of the technical problems with descriptions of the types of vessels proposed and the properties of Pykrete has been prepared and is available on application to the Joint Staff Secretariat.

pykrete for strength and protection at top, sides, and bottom, necessitates the deep draft. The labor and material required, except for propulsive machinery, would be taken from general construction and not from ship-building.

3. New problems of construction and operation arise from the very large size of the vessels.

The designs proposed seem to meet the requirements of hydrostatic stability and resistance to the largest ocean waves.

Propulsion power requirements range from 12,000-25,000 h.p. in *HABBAKUK III* to 50,000 h.p. in *HABBAKUK II*. The propulsion of *HABBAKUK II* is to be by a series of outboard nacelles driven from central power units.

Navigation is not required for narrow waters and little maneuvering is needed, but special steering devices: rudders on bows, outboard floats and nacelles, athwart turning nacelles, etc. are being devised and will be tested.

Anchoring will rarely be needed and will only be to moorings.

4. The vessels are liable to heavy attack and in addition to active defense — A.A. fire fighters and escorts — are designed to minimize effects of bombs and torpedoes.

HABBAKUK IIID has been designed to resist torpedo attack by a large degree of subdivision and possibly by special devices. It contains a hangar 600 x 100 feet, protected by a bomb-proof deck, and similar protection is afforded to the engines.

HABBAKUK II is fireproof, but a certain fire danger exists for *HABBAKUK III*, slightly less than for an ordinary ship.

5. *HABBAKUK II* can be made only in deep fjords, but suitable sites — corner Brook, Newfoundland, and Valdez, Alaska — on the east and west coasts of America have been surveyed. Many other sites would be available if artificial refrigeration was used.

HABBAKUK IIID can be made in a large dock 130 x 1,300 feet.

6. Repairs for *HABBAKUK III* can be carried out in a dock adapted for the purpose. *HABBAKUK II* can only be repaired afloat.

7. *HABBAKUK III* could operate in anything but shoal, narrow or dangerous waters on account of their moderate draught and poor maneuverability.

HABBAKUK II is only suitable for deep sea work, but can approach the shore in most of the Pacific and Mediterranean. Its refrigerating system has been designed for maintenance in tropical waters.

SUMMARY

8. The principal problems of construction of large floating bases are those directly connected with the large size of the vessel, determined by the size of the flying platform it supports. Large size implies either the use of very large quantities of steel or the use of unconventional but cheap and abundant materials, such as wood and ice for construction. It also implies changes from conventional design of the vessel and of its propulsive machinery. A whole set of other problems arise in regard to the navigation and range of these bases. All these problems are serious, but none seem out of range of solution in the near future, as means of solving them by calculation or the use of models are to hand in most cases, while in the remainder, experimental sections of the vessels will give the answer. It may turn out that when these tests are made, some of the designs put forward at this present stage will be found to be impracticable or relatively uneconomic, whilst in the course of the investigation new and better methods not hitherto discussed may emerge.

ANNEX II

REQUIREMENTS OF HABBAKUKS FOR WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Requirement for Aircraft Carriers of all sorts

1. Our projected plans for the defeat of Japan involve a series of amphibious assaults and it is obviously essential to speed this process up to the greatest possible extent. Two ways of doing this are:

a. To increase the size of the stops of our amphibious advances, the main limiting factor of which is the effective range of shore-based air support.

b. To accelerate the bombing of Japan by the use of ship-borne aircraft, which must necessarily be undertaken at very long range and will for some years be on a light scale only.

2. The extent to which these two measures can be achieved depends almost entirely on the number and efficiency of the aircraft carriers of all sorts that we can provide. Aircraft and air personnel we shall have in abundance after Ger-

many has been defeated, but air bases sufficiently close to enable our vast air resources to be impacted against the enemy will be severely limited.

3. Any increase in numbers or efficiency of our aircraft carriers will therefore have a direct effect on the time taken to defeat Japan.

FUNCTIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

4. The functions which are required to be undertaken by aircraft carriers of various sorts are as follows:

a. To destroy the Japanese Fleet, and provide cover for our operations and communications.

b. To carry out raids on Japanese back areas and in particular shipping, bases, sources of raw materials and industries in Japan.

c. As escorts for our convoys to protect them against attacks of all sorts, particularly by aircraft.

d. To provide fighter and tactical bomber support in amphibious operations.

e. To enable long-range amphibious operations to be supported by airborne troops flown from reasonably short distances, so that they are not unduly fatigued before being dropped.

f. To augment or extend our shore-based aircraft in support of defensive operations, such as the holding of small island bases after they have been captured.

g. The supply of Naval and fighter aircraft to the battle area, the aircraft carriers acting either as staging points or as ferries.

ATTRITION FOR PERFORMING REQUIRED FUNCTIONS

5. To perform the above functions each type of aircraft carrier required in a varying degree:

a. Ability to fly aircraft on and off.

b. Strategic mobility.

c. Protection from enemy attack.

These requirements are provided for by the three attributes, speed and size and invulnerability in varying combinations according to the function to be fulfilled.

6. It is the combination of speed and size which gives them the ability to fly aircraft on and off. In the case of the Fleet Carrier, its high speed enables it to be comparatively small. At the other end of the scale the stationary or very slow *HABBAKUK I*, because of its lack of speed, will require vast size to enable aircraft to fly on and off.

7. It is speed which, of course, determines the degree of strategic mobility provided. In the case of the Fleet Carrier, it is very great. In the case of the *HABBAKUK* it will be very small, and if the direction of the wind is unfavorable, strategic mobility may be almost lost altogether unless the operation of aircraft on passage is foregone altogether, since the vessel must turn up into the wind whenever aircraft are flying on and off.*

8. It is the combination of speed, size and invulnerability of construction which gives the aircraft carrier the required protection from enemy attack. In the case of the Fleet Carrier, this immunity is provided by high speed, a reasonably small target, fairly good under water and armor protection and the distribution of the "eggs" amongst a fair number of "baskets." In the escort carriers, the lack of speed and protection is to some extent made up for by distributing the "eggs" in very large numbers of "baskets." The large, slow, unmaneuverable *HABBAKUK* will, on the other hand, be extremely easy to hit with torpedoes and bombs and many "eggs" will be contained in each "basket." It must, therefore, be constructed with material of great strength to enable it to continue in operation, in spite of the hits which it is likely to receive.

POSSIBLE FUNCTIONS OF HABBAKUKS

9. Of the aircraft carrier functions enumerated in paragraph 4 above, clearly *HABBAKUKS* cannot operate with the Fleet (Function *a*) owing to their lack of mobility.

10. *TO CARRY OUT RAIDS ON JAPANESE INDUSTRIES, ETC.* (Function *b*) *HABBAKUK* could be used in one of three ways:

a. As a carrier operating aircraft in the normal way;

* During the advance to, and retirement from an operation the *HABBAKUK* will, therefore, normally require an aircraft carrier escort, in addition to A/S and possibly surface escort.

b. As a carrier, carrying the aircraft to the flying-off position, launching them, but the aircraft then returning to a convenient shore base; or

c. As an advanced landing ground for refuelling aircraft operating from bases further back, thus extending their radius of action.

11. For *a* aircraft must be capable of being stowed below, both for maintenance and for protection against enemy attack. To enable reasonably large numbers to be employed, comparatively small types of aircraft should therefore be used.

12. The use of short-range single-engine Naval types of aircraft combined with the comparatively low speed of any *HABBAKUK* would, however, make the achievement of surprise difficult. A long-range light twin-engine bomber (e.g., the Mosquito type) capable of operating without fighter escort would therefore be more satisfactory for this type of operation, and the *HABBAKUK* would require a speed of not less than about 12 knots.

13. At this speed a Mosquito requires a flight deck of not less than 1,200 ft. without assisted take off.

14. For *b* and *c* above, aircraft need not be maintained on board, and protection from enemy action could be dispensed with for the limited period that they are on board.

15. Stowage for aircraft between decks becomes, therefore, unnecessary, and the use of larger aircraft would not be uneconomical. These methods may, therefore, provide the opportunity for taking advantage of the long range and heavy loads of medium and heavy bombers.

16. For this type of operation a speed of about seven knots should be sufficient, and at this speed the length of deck required is as follows:

Medium Bombers: about 1,500/2,000 ft. without assisted take-off.

Heavy Bombers: about 2,200 ft. without assisted take-off.

17. Owing to the undesirability of attacking in small numbers, it will be necessary for the bombers to take-off and, in the case of *c*, land-on with a number of aircraft on deck. A vessel of considerable beam will therefore be necessary.

18. Even so, arrester gear will, almost certainly, be necessary to avoid collision with aircraft on deck. The provision of this gear for large aircraft, and

the strengthening of the latter will require investigation but should not be insoluble.

19. *For escorting convoys.* (Function *c*) a speed of at least 15 knots and fairly good maneuverability is required to enable the vessel to regain the convoy when the direction of the wind has necessitated steering away from it while operating aircraft.

20. Although not definitely ruled out for this function, the *HABBAKUK* is not very suitable for it, and should not, however, attempt it at present.

21. *For Fighter and tactical bomber support in amphibious operations* (Function *d*), there is clearly great scope for *HABBAKUKS* to reinforce the escort carriers on which we must otherwise mainly rely, until the destruction of the Japanese Fleet frees our Fleet carriers for this purpose.

22. For this function a speed approaching that of the slowest convoy to be used in the operation is important, otherwise the success of the whole operation may be seriously prejudiced due to loss of surprise. A speed of, or nearly, 12 knots is required.

23. Since large numbers of small aircraft, as opposed to a small number of large aircraft, are best for this function, a vessel of comparatively small size would be acceptable in order to achieve the speed required and fighters and naval types of bombers would be suitable.

24. For a 12-knot vessel these aircraft require a deck of at least 1,000 ft. in which to take off without assisted take-off.

25. Arrestor gear must almost certainly be used for landing on, regardless of the length of the vessel, in order to avoid collision with aircraft parked on deck.

26. The beam of the vessel need not necessarily be greater than that required to operate single engine types but a broad flying deck will of course enable more aircraft to be carried and operated.

27. Stowage for aircraft below must be provided both for maintenance and for protection against enemy attack.

28. *For launching air borne troops in support of amphibious operations* (Function *e*), fleet or escort carriers are of little value due to the small number of troops that can be carried in Naval types of aircraft. The *HABBAKUK* appears to offer the only practicable alternative.

29. Since it would be quite satisfactory to launch our air borne forces at a distance of 3/400 miles from the objective, at a time when our assault convoys are approaching it, a speed considerably less than the latter would be acceptable in this case without prejudicing surprise. About seven knots is considered acceptable.

30. To fly off a medium type of transport aircraft (e.g., C-47 carrying 12 men), from a vessel of seven knots, a flight deck would be required of at least 1,700 ft. without assisted take-off.

31. To carry and operate a reasonable number of such aircraft a vessel of considerable beam will be necessary. Again, arrester gear will almost certainly be necessary unless aircraft are able to return direct to a shore base.

32. *For the defense of Island based (Function f)* any of the types already described will be suitable. An engine-less *HABBAKUK*, moored in a sheltered and tideless harbor, free to swing to the wind, might also be of value in islands where airfields are lacking.

33. To operate fighter and naval types, a stationary *HABBAKUK* of this type would have to be at least 1,500 ft. long without assisted take-off.

34. *For the supply of naval and fighter aircraft*, whether acting as staging points or ferries, any of the mobile types referred to above would be suitable, and the engine-less type could also be used as a staging point, either permanently at anchor in harbor or temporarily at sea with tugs to keep it head to wind.

CONCLUSION ON TYPES OF "HABBAKUK" REQUIRED

35. It appears from the above that the following types of *HABBAKUK* would be of value. In all cases it is assumed that arrester gear must in any case be provided, but no reduction in length is allowed for assisted take-off.

a. About 1,000 ft. long. Speed about 12 knots. Beam sufficient for operating large numbers of fighter and naval aircraft. Protected stowage required for a considerable proportion.

b. About 1,200 ft. long. Speed about 12 knots. Beam sufficient for operating light twin-engine bombers. Protected stowage required for considerable proportion.

c. About 1,500/2,000 ft. long. Speed about 7 knots. Beam sufficient for operating fair numbers of medium bombers and transport aircraft. No stowage required.

d. About 2,200 ft. long. Speed about 7 knots. Beam sufficient for operating fair numbers of heavy bombers. No stowage required.

36. The types required could be reduced to two, one for requirements *a* and *b* and one for *c* and *d*, as follows:

1st (HABBAKUK III) a vessel of:

a. length about 1,000-1,200 ft.;

b. speed as near 12 knots as possible;

c. sufficient beam to operate fighters and naval aircraft and light twin-engine bombers;

d. protected stowage for aircraft;

2nd (HABBAKUK II) A vessel of:

a. seven knots;

b. length at least 1,700 ft. and if possible about 2,200 ft.;

c. sufficient beam to operate and park medium bombers and transport aircraft, and heavy bombers if length of 2,200 ft. proves possible;

d. protected storage for aircraft *not* required.

HABBAKUK III should be given first priority since the operation of fighter and naval types is already proven, and fighter and tactical support for amphibian operations is a matter of first importance.

ASSISTED TAKE-OFF

37. For efficient operation of all types of aircraft which can use *HABBAKUK II* and *III*, it is more than likely that assisted take-off methods and arrester gear will have to be used. By these means it should be unnecessary to rely entirely on the need for natural wind, and errors caused by pilots without fleet air arm training or resulting from battle damage to aircraft or the vessel itself should be reduced to a minimum.

38. The employment of these methods requires detailed investigation but may, if successful, allow a reduction in deck lengths. Although the greater the deck length the more likely the success of operations, the problem of reduction

should be investigated in closest collaboration while final designs are being produced by the *HABBAKUK* Main Technical Committee.

39. TYPES OF CONSTRUCTION

a. HABBAKUK III, the smaller and faster type, could best be made in steel and timber, and would take about 15 months to construct. Successful construction could be relied on without building any prototypes or experimental sections, and if a definite order is given in the near future they should be operational by the spring of 1944.

b. HABBAKUK II, the larger and slower type could be built in steel, but would require a very large quantity of it; it is more suited to construction in pykrete, but could not be built in this material with any reliability without first constructing sections for experiment. Experimental sections could be built next winter and if successful the first pykrete *HABBAKUK* might be operational by mid-1945 at the earliest, but there are a large number of constructional and operational problems to be overcome.

c. In comparison with a large number of escort carriers, *for a given number of operational aircraft*, a small number of the smaller steel and timber *HABBAKUK III's* referred to above, would require:

(1) Less steel, and steel of a type more easy to obtain.

(2) Less horsepower and certain of the engines would be of a type more easy to obtain.

(3) Less labor, and labor of a type which will shortly be freed from other war constructional projects and thus would not compete with existing shipbuilding commitments.

(4) Less personnel to man them — particularly officers and highly trained ratings.

d. The present shortage of steel is unlikely to remain a really serious bottleneck for long, anyhow after the defeat of Germany.

e. Good protection from the torpedo and bomb hits which we must expect will be inherent in the large pykrete vessel. The effect of hits on the steel and timber *HABBAKUK III* will be greatly minimized, in comparison with normal ships, by the following factors:

(1) By the provision of a number of independent propulsion units.

(2) The use of plastic armor of great thickness which, unlike normal ships' armor, is easy to provide and fit.

(3) Under water protection by such methods as subdivision, backed by plastic armor, used to a much greater extent than is possible in a normal ship, where accessibility to all compartments is required.

40. For operational reasons, we consider that the provision of a smaller number of *HABBAKUK* would be preferable to a very large number of small escort carriers, because:

a. Coordination and forming up of aircraft flying from a smaller number of vessels would be simplified, and a considerable economy would be made in skilled navigational personnel.

b. The sea room required for handling the vessels would be greatly reduced and thus concentration, control and mutual support gained.

c. The extreme vulnerability of our escort carriers is bound to be bad for morale when operating against shore-based aircraft, and this counterbalances to a large extent, the advantage they gain from the "eggs" being distributed among a very large number of "baskets."

CONCLUSIONS

41. We conclude, therefore, that:

a. Even if the building of steel and timber *HABBAKUK III's* should eventually prove to compete in steel, labor, etc., with an expansion in the present building program of escort carriers it would be desirable to construct at least a certain number of them at the expense of the latter.

b. To meet the requirement of a large mobile landing platform without using large quantities of steel and to exploit the inherent protective properties of pykrete, the development of the large pykrete type (*HABBAKUK II*) is very desirable.

C.C.S. 315/2

29 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

"HABBAKUKS"

Note by the Secretaries

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have taken note of paragraphs *a*, *b*, and *c* below, which were presented by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 315/1. They have agreed to the provisions of paragraph *d* below.

a. By the expenditure of extraordinary effort and consequent stoppage of other essential war projects, the construction of *HABBAKUK II* and an erecting plant therefor is feasible and might be completed as early as the end of 1945.

b. Construction of *HABBAKUK III* could possibly be accomplished by the end of 1945. Claims for invulnerability of *HABBAKUK III* to hull damage may be somewhat justified, but they are outweighed by the operating advantages inherent in conventional carrier types by virtue of speed, maneuverability, and operating refinements.

c. Due to the relatively small value of the *HABBAKUKS* in increasing the effectiveness of aircraft operation, and in view of the existing aircraft carrier program, the diversion of manpower and critical materials involved in their construction is not warranted.

d. The Combined Chiefs of Staff agree to the construction of a section of *HABBAKUK II*, the continuation of design, and the study of the construction and of the facilities necessary for a full-size ship. They have further agreed that the appropriate United States, British and Canadian authorities should be invited to set up a board forthwith to press on with the action agreed to above and to report progress monthly to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

H. REDMAN,

J. R. DEANE,

Combined Secretariat.

BRITISH MOST SECRET
U. S. SECRET

C. C. S. 316

THE "PLOUGH" FORCE

Reference:

CCS 112th Meeting, Item (5)

C.C.S. 316 was circulated 18 August 1943.

In their 112th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff concurred in the proposal set forth in paragraph 4 of the Enclosure to C.C.S. 316.

18 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE "PLOUGH" FORCE

Note by the Secretaries

In order to save delay, the enclosure, prepared by the Chief of Combined Operations, in consultation with the British Joint Planning Staff, is presented direct to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their consideration.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE

THE "PLOUGH" FORCE

(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff)

1. We have been considering the question of the possible employment of the *PLOUGH* Force, which we understand will shortly become available for operations elsewhere.

2. The essentials as we see it are that the Force should be retained intact and employed in snow conditions on the type of task for which it has been trained.

Hence, there are now two theaters in which the Force might be employed:

a. Norway, as originally planned. Here, if the maintenance commitment is not too great, it might be used for some specific operation at an appropriate moment, in conjunction perhaps with Operation *OVERLORD*.

b. Italy. Here it might be used in conjunction with possible operations in the Appenines, or better still in the Alps if we get as far north. Failing either of these, it might conceivably fulfill a useful role in collaboration with patriot forces in the mountains of the Dalmatian Coast.

3. The Force is at present gaining experience in the Kiska operations and we understand that it is unlikely to arrive back in the United States much before the end of November. There is time therefore for the possibilities of its further employment to be fully explored.

4. We suggest that the full details of the Force and its capabilities should be communicated to General Eisenhower and General Morgan at once, who should be asked to report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by 1 October 1943:

a. Whether they consider that the Force could be usefully employed in their theater, and if so, what tasks they propose it should undertake.

b. Whether any additional provision would be necessary in the form of transport aircraft or ancillary units to sustain the Force in the role proposed.

If General Eisenhower considers that the Force would best be employed on the Dalmatian Coast, we suggest that he should consult the Commanders in Chief in the Middle East and put forward his recommendations agreed with them.

5. The Combined Chiefs of Staff should then decide on the theater to which the Force should be allotted.

C.C.S. 317, 317/1, 317/2, and 317/3

EQUIPPING ALLIES, LIBERATED FORCES AND FRIENDLY NEUTRALS

References:

CCS 112th Meeting, Item (6)

CCS 113th Meeting, Item (3)

CCS 115th Meeting, Item (8)

C.C.S. 317 was circulated, 18 August 1943, for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In a memorandum, C.C.S. 317/1 circulated 21 August, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff proposed that the recommendations contained in paragraph 10 of C.C.S. 317 be approved as amended in C.C.S. 317/1.

C.C.S. 317/2, a note by the Secretaries, circulated the recommendation of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that an immediate decision be rendered on the recommendations contained in subparagraphs 10 *a* and *b* of C.C.S. 317.

By memorandum (C.C.S. 317/3 circulated 23 August) the British Chiefs of Staff concurred in C.C.S. 317/2 subject to a minor amendment.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 115th Meeting considered C.C.S. 317/1, 317/2 and 317/3 and agreed that the recommendations contained in subparagraphs 10 *a* and *b* of C.C.S. 317 be approved as amended.

C.C.S. 317

18 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
EQUIPPING ALLIES, LIBERATED FORCES AND FRIENDLY NEUTRALS

Note by the Secretaries

In order to avoid delay, the enclosure, prepared by the U.S. Staff Planners, is presented direct to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their consideration.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE

EQUIPPING ALLIES, LIBERATED FORCES AND FRIENDLY NEUTRALS

References: a. C.C.S. 288; C.C.S. 288/1; C.C.S. 288/2.
b. C.C.S. 104th Meeting, Item 3.

THE PROBLEM

1. To consider the requirements for materiel for equipping allies, liberated forces, and friendly neutrals, and the determination of basic policies which will govern the meeting of such requirements.

DISCUSSION

2. During the Casablanca Conference, the United States Government accepted the responsibility for equipping 11 French divisions (three armored and eight infantry). By 1 September 1943, the equipment for two armored and four infantry divisions, with supporting troops, will have been shipped.

3. General Eisenhower has recommended (radio *BOSCO-IN-21*, 13 Aug 1943) (Appendix "A") that equipment for remaining French troops be accelerated in a manner that would provide for a total of four armored and seven infantry divisions. The Commanding General of the North African Theater of Operations advises that such a program would satisfy the requirements of the

Casablanca Conference. The requisite equipment can be made available to meet such requirements without prejudice to currently directed operations, i.e., *BOLERO/SICKLE*, and operations in the Pacific. It should be noted, however, that approximately 60% of the equipment required must be withheld from advance shipments to the United Kingdom, to be made up prior to departure of United Kingdom units concerned. This can be done.

4. During the first four to five months following an initial assault on the continent, all available port and beach capacity will be required for the build-up and maintenance of the United Nations forces. It is considered that a minimum of six to eight months will be required between the start of reorganization and reequipment of French Army units on the continent and their initial employment. Thus it would appear that no continental French Army units could be employed for from ten to thirteen months after the initial assault.

5. Balkan forces are capable of mounting approximately six modified divisions and supporting troops (175,000) (Appendix "B"). They should be supplied with captured German and Italian equipment, if available, inasmuch as they are familiar therewith, and their strategic position does not further substantiate commitments from other sources.

6. It is assumed that Polish forces will continue to fight with the British and they need not be considered as sacrificed by non-support of the Polish "Secret Army" as an organized unit. Moreover, the formation of Polish divisions and brigades can only be accomplished after the fall of Germany, at which time existence of a formal Polish Army for the defeat of Germany would not be necessary (Appendix "C").

7. In respect to equipping the Turkish forces, it is presumed that this program will not extend beyond that envisaged at *TRIDENT*. In view of the apparent inability of the Turkish forces to properly assimilate, maintain, and train with such equipment as has been provided to them, it is questionable as to whether the political benefits that would accrue from furnishing any further equipment would outweigh the advisability of retaining such equipment for other purposes.

8. The aggregate strengths of forces which might be available to the United Nations and which are now located in Norway, Denmark, Belgium and Holland totals about 150,000 men (Appendix "D"). Since potential forces in none of these countries constitutes a force which of itself could carry out extensive offensive operations, it is assumed that such forces would be available only for garrison and interior guard duty.

9. It is the opinion of the War Shipping Administration that cargo shipping captured should be operated for rehabilitation and support of the occupied country. This policy will reduce shipping load on United Nations and will save the time and expense of repair and rehabilitation of vessels in U.S. ports. Personnel vessels should be operated to assist U.S. troop lift regardless of decisions as to U.S. or British control.

RECOMMENDATIONS

10. It is recommended that:

a. The supplies and equipment necessary to carry out the program recommended by the Commanding General of the North African Theater of Operations (cable W7177 — *CM-IN-BOSCO* 21, 13 Aug. 1943) be authorized for shipment during the period 1 September — 31 December 1943.

b. Rearmament of French Army units be limited to the obligations of the Casablanca Conference, i.e., 11 divisions as modified by General Eisenhower's radio of 13 August 1943.

c. Equipment for any French local forces to be organized on the Continent subsequent to invasion be limited to that required for garrison or guard duties and no attempt be made to organize assault forces. Equipment to be furnished through *CG, ETO*, for Northern France and through *CG, NATO*, for Southern France. All equipment to be furnished as far as practicable from captured German and Italian items.

d. In accordance with C.C.S. 303/3, Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe (par. 6 *d* and par. 8) equipment to be supplied to the Balkans will be limited to supply of Balkan guerrillas by air and sea transport and for planning purposes the forces to be so equipped will be limited to 175,000 men (six divisions and supporting troops).

e. No equipment be supplied the Polish forces in Poland, other than that which can be flown in to guerrilla and underground forces extant within the limits of Poland. (The limitations imposed by the requirement that all material must be flown in will limit the forces that can be equipped to an optimum figure of 50 modified infantry battalions). This is to be a British commitment.

f. The program of aid to Turkey be reviewed in the light of experience to date and with a view to possibly curtailing the furnishing of additional equipment.

g. Equipment for potential forces in Norway and the Low Countries be limited to basic individual equipment for a total force aggregating 150,000 men, together with certain categories of light infantry weapons and light motor vehicles. That measures be initiated to determine the exact forces to be equipped as soon as operations by the United Nations in Western Europe make such action practicable. Theater commanders concerned to equip liberated forces of Norway, Holland, and Belgium through *CG, ETO*. The Balkans to be equipped through *CG, NATO*.

h. That in implementing the recommendations appearing in subparagraphs *c* to *g*, inclusive, maximum use be made of captured war materiel.

i. That implementation (after maximum utilization of captured war materiel) of equipping the forces carried in subparagraphs *a*, *b* and *d* above, be considered to be a responsibility of the United States, and for subparagraphs *c*, *e*, *f*, and *g* to be considered as a responsibility of the United Kingdom.

j. Captured cargo shipping be used, insofar as practicable, to carry relief and rehabilitation supplies to the country from which captured. Captured personnel vessels be operated to assist U.S. troop lift regardless of decisions as to U.S. or British control.

APPENDIX "A"

REARMAMENT OF THE FRENCH

1. During the Casablanca Conference, the United States Government accepted the responsibility for the equipping of 11 French divisions (three armored and eight infantry).

2. By 1 September 1943 the equipment for two armored and four infantry divisions, with supporting troops, will have been shipped.

3. *a.* By radiogram W7177 (*BOSCO-IN-21*, 13 August 1943), the Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, recommends that equipment for the remaining French troops be provided as follows:

September, 1943 — One infantry and one armored division
(less certain units)

October, 1943 — One infantry division

November, 1943 — One infantry division

December, 1943 — One armored division

Equipment for supporting and service units to be provided on a proportionate basis for each month.

b. The proposal outlined in *a* above will provide for a total of four armored (on a slightly reduced scale) and seven infantry divisions. The Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, advises that this, considering also the Koenig Division, which was equipped by the British, will satisfy the requirements of the Casablanca Conference.

4. Equipment, allowing minor substitutions, can be made available to meet the requirements outlined in paragraph 3 above, provided that priority above that for pre-shipments to the United Kingdom is granted. About 60% of the equipment for French units would necessarily be withheld from pre-shipment to the United Kingdom. These shortages can be made up in time to equip U.K. units prior to departure. Provision of this equipment will not prejudice currently directed operations in the Pacific, *BOLERO*, or *SICKLE*. Any equipment left behind by U.S. divisions transferred from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom will be credited against this requirement. Shipping can be made available as requested by General Eisenhower (180,000 ship tons in September and 150,000 ship tons per month, October, November, and December).

5. The provision of equipment and supplies referred to in paragraph 5 above, will satisfy the United States obligation of the Casablanca Conference. There is no further known requirement for equipment for French units from United States sources. During the first four to five months following the initial assault on the Continent, all available port and beach capacity will be required for build-up of the combat forces. It is considered that a minimum of six to eight months would be required between the start of reorganization and re-equipment of French Army units on the Continent, and their initial employment. Thus it would appear that no Continental French Army units could be employed for from ten to thirteen months after the assault.

6. Certain resistance groups in France are being equipped by air delivery with small arms. This is a British commitment. Any demands on the United States for weapons or equipment for this purpose will be negligible.

7. It may be necessary to clothe and equip local defense units organized in France after the invasion is well under way. Arms for such units would undoubtedly be limited to small arms and light weapons. It is believed that any such equipment should be provided from and limited to that available from captured enemy (Italian) supplies, and should not be set up as an obligation of the United States Government.

APPENDIX "B"

BALKANS

1. The Balkan guerrilla forces are estimated to number around 175,000; however, some estimates have placed this figure as high as 300,000. The former figure is based on recent intelligence reports and is considered to be reliable. These forces are divided into several political groups, operating independently, the strongest of which is General Mihailovitch's Chetniks. However, it is doubtful that even he can command the loyalty of more than 175,000 to 200,000 men.

2. In addition to these forces, recent radio report from the Mediterranean Theater quotes a Yugoslavian representative as being desirous of establishing a training corps, on the fall of Italy, in some Italian territory, preferably Sicily, to consist of 30,000 to 40,000 Yugoslavian prisoners of war now in Italy. The State Department is very emphatic in the opinion that a maximum of 6,500 Yugoslavian and 1,800 Greek prisoners of war will be liberated on the fall of Italy, and that any claims of the Yugoslav Government in Exile in excess of this figure would constitute an attempt to create a Free Yugoslav Army to lend national prestige in peace conference negotiations. The liberated prisoners of war available therefore appear to be relatively insignificant in comparison to the tangible guerrilla forces, and, moreover, the time that would be consumed in training such a force would render them valueless in the conquest of Germany.

3. In the past, supply of these forces has been effected by the British Middle East Command, in some 100 scattered sorties, dropping only the bare essentials of medical supplies, etc. Their principal needs are machine guns, light (horse) artillery and medical supplies.

4. The supply of equipment to the Balkans therefore devolves to a consideration of furnishing an equivalent of the requirements for a force commensurate with the 175,000 guerrillas.

5. Equipment to be supplied to the Balkans should be limited to supply of Balkan guerrillas by air and sea transport. The latter method must supplement the former before any substantial amount of equipment can be made available to a force aggregating 175,000 men.

APPENDIX "C"

POLISH FORCES

1. Polish forces in the U.K. consist of approximately 40,000 men, including one armored division, one parachute brigade, 13 air squadrons and some light naval vessels. In the Middle East, Polish forces contain about 73,000 men, including two infantry divisions, one tank brigade, and corps troops. In both of the above elements, the supply of materiel and equipment has been from British sources, including some lend-lease transactions, and the supply status of each is approximately 75% complete.

2. There is an additional Polish force of approximately 65,000 men, in the occupied territory, known as the "Secret Army." Various estimates of this force have run as high as 300,000 men, however the former figure is based on U.S. Army Intelligence information and is considered to be reliable. In addition to supplying the Polish forces in the U.K. and Middle East, the British have occasionally dropped small quantities of explosives, and communications equipment, to this "Secret Army," from the air.

3. Supply of the forces in the U.K. and Middle East having been undertaken by the British (these elements are now a part of British forces in the respective area), the equipping of Polish forces evolves to the requirements of the "Secret Army." This requirement amounts to equipment for an equivalent of fifty infantry battalions which must be flown in, and would require an estimated 500 sorties initially. The Polish General Staff estimates this force could fight in isolation for about 20 days and its continued existence would depend on a break through contact by other Allied Forces within that time.

4. The Polish plan further envisages the transporting of the U.K. and Middle East Forces into Poland by air after the break through contact with the "Secret Army" has been established. These, with other liberated Polish forces, would be organized into 16 infantry divisions and six dismounted cavalry brigades. This latter phase is not considered as advantageous inasmuch as the effect of it can not be realized until such time as it is no longer needed.

5. It is clear that sabotage and intelligence operations are desirable and the operation of 50 rifle battalions will aid considerably in this activity, as well as occupy the attention of considerable German forces. However, current intelligence digests indicate Russia will violently oppose any arming of the Poles in Poland due to the well-known Polish-Russian enmity.

6. To support this operation, including supply of initial equipment, would require some 2,000 sorties by heavy transport planes and this air lift can not be spared without seriously affecting other operations.

APPENDIX "D"

NORWAY, LOW COUNTRIES

1. In giving consideration to the possible need for supplying equipment and materiel to the forces of free neutrals of nations at present occupied by Axis forces and which might come within the scope of possibly having to be rearmed by the United Nations, estimates have been confined to Norway, Denmark, Belgium and Holland. The table which follows indicates (on the basis of informal estimates furnished by a representative of the Joint Intelligence Committee) the strengths of the armed forces of each nation at or about the time each became involved in the war, as well as the indicated potential strengths of that portion of the manpower of each nation which might be available for reequipment, rearming, training and service in the event of a United Nations reoccupation:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Estimated Strength at Outbreak of War</i>	<i>Possible Strength to Be Equipped</i>
Norway	17,000	40,000 (a)
Denmark	11,000	10,000 (b)
Belgium	650,000	50,000 (a)
Holland	400,000	50,000 (a)
		<hr/> 150,000

- (a) Estimated on basis of ability to form and train units upon liberation.
- (b) For police purposes only.

2. From the above table it is apparent that the aggregate strength of the forces which might be available for rearming in all of these countries totals 150,000 troops. Since potential forces in none of these countries constitute a force which of itself could carry out extended offensive operations, it is presumed that such forces would be supplied only to the extent of basic individual equipment, together with certain categories of small arms and light motor vehicles. Considering the reequipment of all of these nations as a complete total requirement, and assuming that such reequipment would not take place until, at the earliest, some time after 1 January 1944 (the estimated date on which the rearming of the French forces as presently contemplated would be completed), it is not considered that any great problem of supply would be

involved and that quantities of the requisite materiel could be made available without unduly affecting the equipment status of American forces.

3. Assuming (for conservative purposes) that the reequipping of all of these countries would be coincidental, which of course would not be the case, a total maximum shipping requirement of some six to eight ships might be required but this could be made available without any effect on the *BOLERO/SICKLE* operation or operations as presently contemplated and planned for the South and Southwest Pacific areas.

4. It is, of course, obvious that a determination must be made at the earliest practicable moment in the event any or all of these countries, or any contiguous countries, are to be reequipped and rearmed. Such plans must indicate the approximate date on which rearming and reequipping would be required and, in general, the type force that it would be considered advisable to rearm and reequip for each country with the forces available to it and the nature of operations in which it is contemplated such forces might become engaged, i.e., garrison and police duty, or actual components of an offensive fighting force. It is also essential that a determination be made at the earliest practicable date as to how much equipment would be supplied and the source of the equipment.

C.C.S. 317/1

21 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

EQUIPPING ALLIES, LIBERATED FORCES AND FRIENDLY NEUTRALS

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

We recommend approval of paragraph 10 of C.C.S. 317, amended to read as follows (Note: additions are underlined and deletions are in Italics):—

“10. It is recommended that:

a. The supplies and equipment necessary to carry out the program recommended by the Commanding General of the North African Theater of Operations (cable W7177 - CM-IN-BOSCO 21, 13 Aug. 1943) be authorized for shipment during the period 1 September — 31 December 1943.

b. Rearmament of French Army units be limited to the obligations of the Casablanca Conference, i.e., 11 divisions as modified by General Eisenhower's radio of 13 August 1943.

c. Equipment for any French local forces to be organized on the Continent subsequent to invasion be limited to that required for garrison or guard duties and no attempt be made to organize assault forces. *Equipment to be furnished through CG, ETO, for Northern France and through CG, NATO, for Southern France. All equipment to be furnished as far as practicable from captured German and Italian items.*

d. In accordance with C.C.S. 303/3, Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe (par. 6 d and par. 8) equipment to be supplied to the Balkans will be limited to supply of Balkan guerrillas by air and sea transport and for supply planning purposes the forces to be so equipped will be limited to 175,000 men (six divisions and supporting troops).

e. No equipment be supplied the Polish forces in Poland, other than that which can be flown in to guerrilla and underground forces extant within the limits of Poland. (The limitations imposed by the requirement that all material must be flown in will limit the forces that can be equipped to an optimum figure of 50 modified infantry battalions). This is to be a British commitment.

f. The program of aid to Turkey be reviewed in the light of experience to date and with a view to possibly curtailing the furnishing of additional equipment.

g. For supply planning purposes, equipment for potential forces in Norway and the Low Countries be limited to basic individual equipment for a total force aggregating 150,000 men, together with certain categories of light infantry weapons and light motor vehicles. That measures be initiated to determine the exact forces to be equipped as soon as operations by the United Nations in Western Europe make such action practicable. *Theater commanders concerned to equip liberated forces of Norway, Holland, and Belgium through CG, ETO. The Balkans to be equipped through CG, NATO.*

h. That in implementing the recommendations appearing in subparagraphs c to g, inclusive, maximum use be made of captured war materiel.

i. That implementation (after maximum utilization of captured war materiel) of equipping the forces carried in subparagraphs a, b, and d above, be considered to be a responsibility of the United States, and for subparagraphs c, e, f, and g to be considered as a responsibility of the United Kingdom.

j. Captured cargo shipping be used, insofar as practicable, to carry relief and rehabilitation supplies to the country from which captured. Captured personnel vessels be operated to assist U.S. troop lift regardless of decisions as to U.S. or British control."

C.C.S. 317/2

22 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
EQUIPPING ALLIES, LIBERATED FORCES AND FRIENDLY NEUTRALS

Note by the Secretaries

Action on C.C.S. 317 has been deferred pending further study of the subject by the British Chiefs of Staff.

The United States Chiefs of Staff, however, recommend that immediate decision be rendered on the recommendations contained in paragraph 10 *a* and *b* of that paper. These paragraphs pertain to the equipment of French forces in North Africa. A decision at this time is necessary because of certain administrative arrangements which should be carried out at once in the event that the recommendations are to be approved.

H. REDMAN,

J. R. DEANE,

Combined Secretariat.

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C.C.S. 317/3

23 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

EQUIPPING ALLIES, LIBERATED FORCES AND FRIENDLY NEUTRALS

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

We agree with the recommendation of the United States Chiefs of Staff that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should approve at once sub-paragraphs 10 *a* and *b* of C.C.S. 317, provided that the following is inserted at the end of sub-paragraph *a*, "insofar as this does not interfere with operations scheduled previous to *QUADRANT*".

If you agree, we suggest that the necessary action should now be taken without this matter again coming before the Combined Chiefs of Staff at *QUADRANT*.

C. C. S. 318/1

SARDINIA, FIFTH COLUMN ACTIVITIES

References:

CCS 112th Meeting, Item (7)

CCS 113th Meeting, Item (4)

C.C.C. 318, 19 August 1943, circulated a memorandum from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff proposing that present conditions of unrest in Italy might offer an opportunity for favorable results from 5th column activities in Sardinia. They therefore submitted a suggested message to General Eisenhower.

C.C.S. 318/1, 20 August 1943, circulated an amended message proposed for dispatch to General Eisenhower.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 113th Meeting, agreed that the message contained in C.C.S. 318/1, as amended during discussion to include a reference to operations in Corsica, be dispatched. (FAN 198)

The conclusions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff were included in C.C.S. 319/5.

C.C.S. 318/1

20 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
SARDINIA, FIFTH COLUMN ACTIVITIES

Memorandum from the United States Chiefs of Staff

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff desire to amend the message to General Eisenhower which they proposed in C.C.S. 318 to read as follows:

“The promising situation existing throughout the Italian area would appear to offer an excellent opportunity by means of fifth column activities to establish conditions in Sardinia for an unopposed occupation of that island. The O.S.S. and S.O.E. organizations might collaborate in accomplishing this. Furthermore, this presents an excellent opportunity to test the effectiveness of these organizations and to provide them with experience and training for future operations of a similar character. Your comments and recommendations are requested.

C.C.S. 319

FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

References:

- C.C.S. 112th Meeting, Item (2)
- C.C.S. 114th Meeting, Item (2)
- C.C.S. 115th Meeting, Item (2)
- C.C.S. 116th Meeting, Item (2)
- 1st Citadel Meeting

The first Progress Report to the President and Prime Minister, pertaining principally to the European Theater, was considered, amended by them and subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 319, 19 August 1943.

C.C.S. 319/1 circulated for consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff a draft report with reference to the war against Japan. The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 114th Meeting amended C.C.S. 319/1 (subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 319/2).

C.C.S. 319/3, 22 August 1943, circulated for consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff the Draft Final Report. This report as amended during the course of discussion in their 115th Meeting was circulated as C.C.S. 319/4.

C.C.S. 319/4, the Final Report to the President and Prime Minister was amended during the course of discussion in the C.C.S. 116th Meeting and was subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 319/5 on 24 August. This report was presented to and approved by the President and Prime Minister.

19 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

PROGRESS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

Note by the Secretaries

The Enclosure is the report to the President and the Prime Minister which was made to them at the meeting at the Citadel on 19 August. It includes all of the amendments which they directed be made.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

PROGRESS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff submit the following report on the progress made so far in the *QUADRANT* Conference.

2. We have agreed to accept tentatively Sections I, II and III of the final report made to you at the *TRIDENT* Conference as a basis for use in this Conference. These sections, covering the Over-all Objective, the Over-all Strategic Concept for the Prosecution of the War, and the Basic Undertakings in Support of the Over-all Strategic Concept, to be reaffirmed at the conclusion of the present Conference.

STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE

3. We have approved the following strategic concept of operations for the defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe, 1943-44.

4. OPERATION "POINTBLANK"

The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive from all convenient bases is a prerequisite to *OVERLORD* (barring an independent and complete Russian victory before *OVERLORD* can be mounted). This operation must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority.

5. OPERATION "OVERLORD"

a. This operation will be the primary U.S.-British ground and air effort against the *AXIS* in *EUROPE*. (Target date 1 May 1944). After securing adequate *CHANNEL* ports, exploitation will be directed toward securing areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy. Following the establishment of strong Allied forces in *FRANCE*, operations designed to strike at the heart of *GERMANY* and to destroy her military forces will be undertaken.

b. Balanced ground and air force build-up for *OVERLORD*, and continuous planning for and maintenance of those forces available in the *UNITED KINGDOM* in readiness to take advantage of any situation permitting an opportunistic *cross-CHANNEL* move into *FRANCE*.

c. As between Operation *OVERLORD* and operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN*, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be distributed and employed with the main object of insuring the success of *OVERLORD*. Operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN* Theater will be carried out with the forces allotted at *TRIDENT* except insofar as these may be varied by decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

We have approved the outline plan of General Morgan for Operation *OVERLORD* and have authorized him to proceed with the detailed planning and with full preparations.

6. OPERATIONS IN ITALY

a. *First Phase*. The elimination of *ITALY* as a belligerent and establishment of air bases in the *ROME* area, and, if feasible, farther north.

b. *Second Phase*. Seizure of *SARDINIA* and *CORSICA*.

c. Third Phase. The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German forces in Northern *ITALY*, and the creation of the conditions required for *OVERLORD* and of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the reequipped French Army and Air Force into Southern *FRANCE*.

7. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN FRANCE

Offensive operations against Southern *FRANCE* (to include the use of trained and equipped French forces), should be undertaken to establish a lodgement in the *TOULON-MARSEILLES* area and exploit northward in order to create a diversion in connection with *OVERLORD*. Air nourished guerilla operations in the Southern Alps will, if possible, be initiated.

8. AIR OPERATIONS

a. Strategic bombing operations from Italian and Central *MEDITERRANEAN* bases, complementing *POINTBLANK*.

b. Support for ground operations with land and carrier-based air forces.

c. Development of an air ferry route through the *AZORES*.

d. Air supply of *BALKAN* and French guerillas (see paragraph 10 below).

9. OPERATIONS AT SEA

a. Intensified anti-submarine warfare, including operations from the *AZORES*.

b. Security of our sea communications.

c. Continued disruption of *AXIS* sea communications.

d. Support of amphibious operations.

10. OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS

Operations in the *BALKAN* area will be limited to supply of *BALKAN* guerillas by air and sea transport, to minor Commando forces, and to the bombing of *PLOESTI* and other strategic objectives from Italian bases.

11. *GARRISON REQUIREMENTS AND SECURITY OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN*

Defensive garrison commitments in the *MEDITERRANEAN* area will be reviewed from time to time, with a view to effecting economy of force. The security of our lines of communication through the Strait of *GIBRALTAR* will be assured by appropriate dispositions of our forces in Northwest *AFRICA*, so long as there remains even a remote possibility of the Germans invading the *IBERIAN PENINSULA*.

THE U-BOAT WAR

12. *PROGRESS REPORT*

We have had encouraging reports from the Chiefs of the two Naval Staffs regarding the U-boat war. We have approved recommendations made by the Allied Submarine Board which should result in further strengthening our anti-U-boat operations. The Board has been directed to continue and expand its studies in search of further improvements.

PORTUGUESE ISLANDS

13. *FACILITIES IN THE AZORES ISLANDS*

On the successful conclusion of the negotiations for the use of the *AZORES* we have taken note of the assurance given by the British Chiefs of Staff that everything will be done by the British as soon as possible after actual entry into the *AZORES* has been gained to make arrangements for their operational and transit use by U.S. aircraft.

THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

14. *SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND*

We have considered the proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff for the set-up of the Southeast Asia Command.

On the question of Command relationship, we have agreed:

- a. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise a general jurisdiction over the strategy for the Southeast Asia Theater and the allocation of American and British resources of all kinds between the China Theater and the Southeast Asia Command.

b. That the British Chiefs of Staff will exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operations, and will be the channel through which all instructions to the Supreme Commander are passed.

We are giving further consideration to:

c. The precise duties of General Stilwell as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander; and

d. Arrangements for the coordination of American agencies such as O.S.S., O.W.I., F.C.B., etc., with comparable British organizations.

15. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST

a. We have given preliminary consideration to a memorandum by the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff on specific operations in the *PACIFIC* and *FAR EAST* 1943-44.

b. We have had an account from Brigadier Wingate of the experiences of the long-range penetration groups which were employed in Northern *BURMA* in the early part of this year. We think that there is much to be said for further developing this method of conducting operations on a larger scale against the Japanese, and are working out plans to give effect to this policy.

c. We have not yet considered specific operations in Northern *BURMA* or the Arakan Coast for 1943-44, pending the receipt of further information about the logistic situation which has been created by the disastrous floods in India.

d. Meanwhile the Combined Staff Planners have completed in outline a long-term plan for the defeat of *JAPAN*. This has not yet been considered. We propose to review specific operations in the *PACIFIC* and *FAR EAST* for 1943-44 (See *a*, *b* and *c* above) in the light of the conclusions reached on this larger question.

REMAINDER OF CONFERENCE

16. Before we separate, we propose to discuss the following matters:

a. Immediate operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN*;

b. Emergency return to the *CONTINENT*;

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- c. Military considerations in relation to *SPAIN*;
- d. Military considerations in relation to *TURKEY*;
- e. Military considerations in relation to *RUSSIA*;
- f. Equipment of Allies, liberated forces and friendly neutrals;
- g. A number of miscellaneous matters.

C.C.S. 319/2 (Revised)

27 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

PROGRESS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

From the Combined Chiefs of Staff

We have had under consideration an appreciation leading up to an outline plan for the complete and ultimate defeat of Japan. We have also considered the specific operations to be carried out against Japan in 1943-44. Our conclusions are set forth in the enclosed report.

ENCLOSURE

PROGRESS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

1. At *TRIDENT* we directed the Combined Staff Planners to initiate a study and prepare for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff an appreciation leading up to an outline plan for the defeat of Japan, including an estimate of the forces required for this implementation.
2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, having made a preliminary examination of this study (summary attached as Annex I) are of the opinion that the following factors require particular emphasis:
 - a. The dependence of Japan upon air power, naval power, and shipping for maintaining her position in the Pacific and Southeast Asia;
 - b. The consequent need for applying the maximum attrition to Japan's air force, naval forces, and shipping by all possible means in all possible areas.
 - c. The advantage to be gained and the time to be saved by a more extensive use of the superior air resources at the disposal of the United Nations, both in the strategic field and in conjunction with operations on land.
3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff consider that great advantage may be obtained by modern and untried methods from the vast resources which, with

the defeat of Germany, will become available to the United Nations. They have in mind:

a. A project rapidly to expand and extend the striking power of the United Nations air forces in China as well as of the ground troops for their defense by employing the large numbers of load carrying aircraft available to open an "air road" to China.

b. The employment of lightly equipped jungle forces, dependent largely upon air supply lines.

c. The use of special equipment, such as artificial harbors, *HABBA-KUKS*, etc., to enable the superior power of the United Nations to be deployed in unexpected and undeveloped areas.

From every point of view operations should be framed to force the defeat of Japan as soon as possible after the defeat of Germany. Planning should be on the basis of accomplishing this within twelve months of that event. Decisions as to specific operations which will insure a much more rapid course of events than that envisaged in the plan laid before us (Annex I) must await further examination on the lines indicated above.

4. The deployment of forces and the operations to be undertaken in the war against Japan must be in accord with the over-all objective and strategic concept defined at *TRIDENT*. (C.C.S. 242/6, Sections one and two.)

5. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are agreed that the reorientation of forces from the European theater to the Pacific and Far East should be started as soon as the German situation, in the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, so allows.

The principle has been accepted that the forces to carry out operations from the East, including the Southwest Pacific, shall be provided by the United States, and for operations from the West by Great Britain, except for special types not available to Great Britain which will be provided by the United States. The employment of Dominion forces will be a matter of discussion between all Governments concerned.

6. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are convinced that the issues raised in the plan (Annex I) that has been submitted are so large and complicated that it would be impracticable to arrive at all the necessary decisions for operations in the war against Japan in 1943-44 during the few days of *QUADRANT* which remain. They therefore propose that, as soon as the necessary further exam-

inations have been made, a Combined Chiefs of Staff Conference should be held wherever may be most convenient unless agreement is reached through the ordinary channels.

7. There are, nevertheless, certain decisions which the Combined Chiefs of Staff feel able to make at once. These are:

a. To approve the proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff for operations in the Pacific in 1943-44 (see Annex II).

b. To carry out operations for the capture of Upper Burma in order to improve the air route and establish overland communications with China. Target date mid-February 1944.

It is recognized that the extent of these operations is dependent upon logistic considerations as affected by recent floods.

c. To continue preparations for an amphibious operation in the spring of 1944 on the scale already contemplated, namely, for the capture of Akyab and Ramree.

d. To continue the preparation of India as a base for the operations eventually contemplated in the Southeast Asia Command.

8. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have also directed that the following studies shall be made forthwith:

a. A study and report on the following operations and their relation one to another:

(1) An operation against Northern Sumatra; target date spring, 1944.

(2) Operations southwards from Northern Burma; target date November 1944.

(3) Operations through the Moulmein area or Kra Isthmus in the direction of Bangkok; target date to be as early as practicable.

(4) Operations through the Malacca Straits and Malaya for the direct capture of Singapore; target date to be as early as practicable.

(5) The capture of Akyab and Ramree to determine whether it is necessary to the success of operations in (1) to (4) above or the operations in Northern Burma (Paragraph 7 *b*).

b. A study of the potentialities and limitations of developing the air route to China on a scale sufficient to employ all the heavy bomber and transport aircraft likely to be available for the Southeast Asia Theater and China in 1944-45, on the assumption that Germany is defeated in the Autumn of 1944.

This study to specify the action required to implement the best possible plan resulting from the above without prejudice to the operations in paragraphs 7 b and c.

ANNEX "I"

SUMMARY OF APPRECIATION AND OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

1. The following is a summary of C.P.S. 83 (Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan). We have based the outline plan that follows on our best evaluation of what may have to be undertaken.

2. We have assumed that Japanese resistance will be continuously stubborn, and have taken no credit for a decline in the morale of the Japanese people or fighting services. Nevertheless we do not believe that it will be necessary to carry out the whole program of operations in order to defeat them. Even if Japanese morale remains high, at some point the continuous process of weakening the enemy's forces and reducing his war potential will cause a rapid decline in his ability to fight and a consequent acceleration of our advance. Since it is impossible to forecast the stage of the operations at which this critical point will be reached, we have throughout endeavored to make the plan sufficiently flexible to permit of considerable acceleration at any stage.

BASIC CONCLUSIONS

3. We summarize below the basic conclusions of our appreciation:

4. To achieve the ultimate defeat of Japan we must destroy her capacity to resist and this may well involve the invasion of Japan.

5. The security of the Japanese position in the Pacific depends primarily on the Japanese Fleet and Air Forces. We must therefore destroy them as soon as we can.

6. Heavy and sustained air bombardment of Japan proper should cripple the Japanese war industry and destroy her ability to continue her main war effort. It might cause the surrender we demand but we cannot rely on this. In any case, air bombardment of this nature is probably an essential prelude to bring about the defeat of Japan.

7. To bring about the sustained air offensive against Japan we shall almost certainly require the use of China and/or Formosa as the bases for our long range bombardment. These two areas will also go a long way towards meeting our requirements for mounting invasion forces. We shall require Chinese assistance in seizing and holding the area in China required for our air bases.

8. To secure and develop airfields on the mainland of China, it will be necessary to acquire ports in China. So far as we can see, Hong Kong will be the most suitable port to open initially.

9. We therefore require a sea route to China and/or Formosa and the interruption of the enemy's lines of communication thereto. This will entail control of the South Japan and South China Seas.

The best route of advance from the East lies through the Mandated Islands, and then either through the Celebes and Sulu Seas or north of Luzon.

The best route of advance from the West lies through the Straits of Malacca.

10. In reaching these conclusions we have been guided by certain principles, which in turn should be applied throughout the execution of the plan:

a. We should attack Japan along as many lines of advance as are profitable, in order to make use of our superior forces and to extend the enemy defense.

b. Every possible means of taking short cuts to our objectives should be adopted. The superior forces, particularly Air Forces, available to us and the opportunities for surprise should enable large and bold steps to be taken without unacceptable risk.

c. Shortage of bases will initially restrict our possible lines of advance. We should therefore take the first opportunity of securing additional bases from which to deploy our superior strength.

d. Our strength, particularly in the air, should be concentrated against Japan's weaknesses, which lie in her shortage of aircraft, warships, shipping and oil.

Conversely extensive campaigns against Japanese land forces in difficult country, where we cannot use our own forces to the best advantage, should be avoided until they have been weakened by lack of supplies and support from the Japanese navy and air forces.

Wherever possible, we should, in fact, aim at leaving Japanese land forces in possession of outlying territory, in order that they may continue to be a liability to Japanese shipping, air and naval forces.

e. Wherever practicable, direct attacks on our objectives should be aided, and if possible preceded, by attack against Japanese communications leading to them. The extremely extended nature of their communications, together with the notorious inability of the Japanese to deal with the unexpected, are likely to render such methods very profitable.

f. Since shipping is unlikely to be a limiting factor after the defeat of Germany, our lines of advance need not necessarily be selected so as to take the shortest route from the U.S. or U.K. to our ultimate objective, but rather the one most easily established and protected.

g. We should devise every possible means of exploiting to the full, the vast technical and numerical air superiority which we shall enjoy over the Japanese after the defeat of Germany.

h. Whilst recognizing that every effort must be made to retain China in the war and to develop her bases and land forces, our plans should retain the necessary flexibility to enable our program against the Japanese to be continued if China should drop out of the war or prove less effective than we now hope.

i. Whilst being prepared to achieve our aims without Russian assistance, our plans should nevertheless retain the necessary flexibility to exploit the situation fully if Russia should join in the war at any stage.

j. We cannot forecast the date at which Germany will be defeated. To minimize the delay in turning the full weight of our offensive against Japan after the defeat of Germany, the bases from which our initial advances are

to be launched should be developed as soon as possible and plans for reorganization and redeployment made without delay.

GENERAL CONCEPT OF THE WAR

11. Applying these principles to the basic conclusions set out above, the general concept of the war which emerges is as follows:

FIRST PHASE — ACTION PRIOR TO CAPTURE OF A PORT IN CHINA AND/OR FORMOSA

12. *In the East*, our main effort should be through the Mandated Islands. Until we are ready to launch this main effort, we should maintain increasing pressure on the Japanese by means of offensive operations in the Solomons-New Guinea area and in the Aleutians. When we turn to our main effort these latter operations should become subsidiary, and should only be undertaken insofar as they are necessary for the success of our main effort.

Having completed our advance through the Mandated Islands, we should then proceed either to the South Philippines or to the north of them. Our choice should be made in the light of whichever course will most quickly achieve our object of reaching the China Coast and/or capturing Formosa.

13. *In the West*, we should maintain China and build up our air forces there by stepping up the air supply route from Assam and by operations to clear Northern Burma, thus permitting the opening of a land route to China.

Meanwhile we should make preparations in India for the launching of the major campaigns to recapture the whole of Burma and to break into the Japanese perimeter from the west by the recapture of Singapore.

Once that has been accomplished we should make our way through the South China Sea towards the coast of China and Formosa.

COORDINATION

14. To integrate our advances from the West and the East, the timing of the various operations should, if possible, be so arranged that they afford one another the maximum amount of mutual assistance at each stage.

15. For our advance from the East, a very large fleet, but comparatively small land and shore-based air forces will be necessary, and therefore comparatively

little shipping, until we have completed our advance through the Mandates, when our ground and land-based air forces may well be of a very large order.

Our advance from the West, on the other hand, will require large land and air forces and much shipping, but probably a considerably smaller fleet than in the case of our advance from the East.

16. Our advance from the east should provide opportunities for bringing the Japanese fleet to action in favorable circumstances. It will enable us to threaten and strike at Japan herself, and, in conjunction with air forces from China, to strike at the focal point of the Japanese sea communications in the Yellow Sea-Formosa areas. This will greatly assist our advance from the west by forcing the Japanese fleet and air forces on to the defensive in their Home area and by enabling our forces in the east to strike at the Japanese communications leading to the objectives of our advance from the west.

17. In executing our advance from the west, and after completing the capture of North Burma, (Course A), two courses of action remain open to us in the west:

Course B — (Recapture of South Burma followed by recapture of Singapore) probably offers the best chance of maintaining China in the war by insuring that the overland supply route is developed as early as possible and with the greatest reliability. On the other hand, the delay in the recapture of Singapore is likely to mean that our advance to open the sea route to China would have to be undertaken from the east alone, and would receive little aid from the west.

Course C — (Recapture of Singapore, followed by recapture of South Burma) would enable a much greater degree of coordination and mutual assistance to be achieved in the later stages of our two advances since we should expect to reach Singapore and advance therefrom a year earlier. It would stretch Japanese resources over a wide area and would enable the British Fleet to operate off the China coast. Our land and air forces could also be moved up the South China Sea along routes far removed from the main enemy naval strength in Japan.

On the other hand, we should run the risk of delaying the development of the overland routes to China, although there would be no appreciable delay *if all operations go according to plan.*

18. Irrespective of whether the advance from the east or the west approaches China first, it is unlikely that we shall be able to capture Shanghai direct. In conjunction with shore-based air support from China, and Chinese

land forces, we might, however, be able to undertake a direct assault on Hong Kong, subsequently taking Formosa.

If the capture of Hong Kong is impracticable, we should endeavor to seize Formosa first, or, if this too is impracticable, Luzon.

If neither of these can be seized direct, we should assault Hainan and if possible one of the Ryukyus.

If the above are impracticable we should continue operations against the South Philippines and complete our control of the Celebes and Sulu Seas, subsequently carrying out our program to capture a port in China and/or Formosa.

SECOND PHASE — ACTION SUBSEQUENT TO THE CAPTURE OF A PORT IN CHINA AND/OR THE CAPTURE OF FORMOSA

19. This phase will involve overland and amphibious operations in China and direct air and naval action to weaken Japanese capacity to resist. It will probably culminate in the invasion of Japan.

20. If we are established in Hong Kong before Formosa has been captured, we shall be in a position to build up the necessary land forces in China, secure the air bases most accessible from Hong Kong, and start the bombing of Japan at long range.

If, on the other hand, we capture Formosa before Hong Kong, or find that the Chinese assistance on the mainland is disappointing, the bombing of Japan can start from Formosa.

21. It is possible that, with the assistance of sea-borne air forces, Japan may be sufficiently weakened to enable us to invade her when our bomber offensive has been developed from either Formosa, or the area most accessible from Hong Kong.

On the other hand, to bomb Japan effectively we may have to move further northwards from Hong Kong in order to use the area up to the line Wenchow-Nanchang-Changsha.

From the invasion point of view, we may possibly have to secure the Shanghai area, and if this is the case, we should be well placed from our positions in Hong Kong and Formosa to undertake such an advance both overland and coastwise.

22. If Chinese assistance proves to be effective, our main effort will probably be made overland. If, on the other hand, it is disappointing, our main effort would be concentrated in amphibious operations along the China coast as far northwards as necessary.

SUBSIDIARY AND ALTERNATIVE LINES OF ADVANCE

23. Meanwhile, subject to the requirements of our main advance, we should:

(i) undertake subsidiary operations along the Malay Barrier to bring increased pressure to bear on the Japanese;

(ii) prepare plans and bases for the capture of the Northern Kuriles and the reinforcement of Petropavlovsk, in order to secure a sea route to Russia in the event of her entering the war;

(iii) prepare plans and bases for the capture of Hokkaido should the opportunity arise for assisting our bombing or undertaking our invasion of Japan from this direction, possibly in conjunction with Russian action from the Maritime Provinces, Sakhalin or Petropavlovsk.

OUTLINE PLAN

24. Based on our appreciation, we indicate below an outline plan for operations against Japan:—

ACTION IN THE WEST

ACTION IN THE EAST

Serial 1 — Up to November 1943

Development of air routes to China.

Offensive operations against Solomons and New Guinea.

Holding operations in North Burma and China.

Offensive operations against the Aleutians.

Serial 2 — November 1943 to May 1944

Offensive operations in Northern Burma and on Arakan coast.

Offensive operations against Gilberts and Marshalls.

Developing Northern routes leading to China.

Subsidiary operations in Solomons and New Guinea and air operations from the Aleutians.

Serial 3 — June 1944 to November 1944

Holding operations in Burma.

Offensive operations against
Carolines.

Subsidiary operations in the
New Guinea area.

Serial 4 — November 1944 to May 1945

Course B

(Favored by U.S.)

Offensive opera-
tions in North
Burma and capture
of Rangoon

Course C

(Favored by British)

Offensive opera-
tions in North
Burma.

Offensive opera-
tions against
Northern Suma-
tra and Malaya.

Offensive operations
against the Pelews and
possibly Marianas.

Subsidiary operations in
the New Guinea area.

Commence offensive op-
erations against South
Philippines.*

Serial 5 — June 1945 to November 1945

Holding opera-
tions in Burma.

Holding opera-
tions in North
Burma.

Continue offen-
sive opera-
tions in Mala-
ya and against
Japanese com-
munications to
Burma.

Continue of — OR —
fensive opera-
tions against
the South
Philippines.

Offensive
opera-
tions
against
Luzon,
Formosa
or
Ryukyus.

* If conditions are favorable, it may prove possible to by-pass this objective.

Serial 6 — November 1945 to May 1946

Complete offensive operations to clear Burma.	Offensive operations against North Burma and Rangoon, subsequently clearing the whole of Burma.	Continue offensive operations against South Philippines.	OR Launch offensive operations against Hong Kong or Formosa (if not already captured).
Offensive operations against N. Sumatra and Malaya.	Offensive operations against Camranh Bay.*		

Serial 7 — During the remainder of 1946

Complete capture of Malaya.	Launch offensive operations against Luzon, Formosa, Hong Kong, Hainan and/or Ryukyus from East and West.	OR Establish the strategic bombing force in China and/or Formosa.
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Serial 8 — From 1947 onwards

Establish the strategic bombing force in China and/or Formosa.

Bomb Japan.

Invade Japan.

* If conditions are favorable, it may prove possible to by-pass these objectives.

ANNEX "II"

**SPECIFIC OPERATIONS APPROVED IN THE PACIFIC THEATER 1943-44,
INCLUDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AIR ROUTE INTO CHINA**

The various operations approved in the Pacific Theater during 1943-44 and for the development of the air route into China are shown below.

1. *GILBERTS*

The seizure and consolidation of the *GILBERTS* preparatory to a further advance into the *MARSHALLS*. *NAURU*, *TARAWA*, and *MAKIN* are to be captured by simultaneous assault followed by the rapid development of airfields in the forward (*TARAWA-MAKIN*) area and staging fields along the *GILBERT* line.

2. *MARSHALLS*

The seizure of the *MARSHALL ISLANDS* (including *WAKE* and *KUSAIE*) preparatory to a westward advance through the Central *PACIFIC*. Initial operations envisage either the seizure of the center nucleus by simultaneous assault or a step-by-step advance up from the *GILBERTS* through *JALUIT* and *MILI*.

3. *PONAPE*

The capture of *PONAPE* preparatory to operations against the *TRUK* area. The main effort is to be against the northern (*PONAPE* Town) area. Subsequent operations provide for the elimination of enemy forces by successive seizure of their positions.

4. *CAROLINES (TRUK area)*

The seizure of the eastern *CAROLINES* as far west as *WOLEAI* and the establishment of a fleet base at *TRUK*. Atolls to the southeastward of *TRUK* are to be captured first, followed by the rapid development of airfields in the area. These will provide bases for a sustained fighter-supported bombing offensive against *TRUK*. Subsequent operations provide for capture of *TRUK* and the reduction as necessary of the remaining enemy positions as far west as *WOLEAI*.

5. *PALAU ISLANDS*

The capture of the *PALAU*S including *YAP*. The plan calls for the initial capture of *YAP* and other suitable islands in the neighboring atolls from which to conduct a more intensified air attack against the *PALAU*S. The initial phases of the final assault against the *PALAU*S center largely on the *MALAKAL-KOROR* Harbor area, with the objective of seizing airfields. Subsequent operations provide for the capture or neutralization of all the islands.

6. *OPERATIONS AGAINST GUAM AND THE JAPANESE MARIANAS*

The seizure of *GUAM* and the Japanese *MARIANAS*.

7. *OPERATIONS IN THE NEW GUINEA-BISMARCKS-ADMIRALTY ISLANDS SUBSEQUENT TO CARTWHEEL*

The seizure or neutralization of eastern *NEW GUINEA* as far west as *WEWAK* and including the *ADMIRALTY ISLANDS* and *BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO*. *RABAU*L is to be neutralized rather than captured. Airfields are to be developed throughout the area and advanced naval anchorages are to be established at *KAVIENG* and *MANUS ISLAND*. The plan envisages: (1) an advance to *WEWAK*, (2) the seizure of *NEW IRELAND* and the outlying islands of *NEW HANOVER* and *ST. MATTHIAS*, and (3) the seizure of the *ADMIRALTY ISLANDS* in the order listed. Concurrently with these operations, *RABAU*L is to be neutralized by an air offensive of increasing intensity.

8. *OPERATIONS IN NEW GUINEA SUBSEQUENT TO THE WEWAK-KAVIENG OPERATION*

An advance along the north coast of *NEW GUINEA* as far west as *VOGELKOP*, by *step-by-step airborne-waterborne advances*. Each successive offensive is predicated on the consolidation of earlier seizures, including the activation of airfields from which to provide close land-based aircraft support for subsequent operations.

9. *AIR ROUTE INTO CHINA*

Present plans provide for first priority of resources available in the China-Burma-India Theater, on the building up and increasing of the air routes and air supplies to China, and the development of air facilities, with a view to:

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- a.* Keeping China in the war.
- b.* Intensifying operations against the Japanese.
- c.* Maintaining increased U.S. and Chinese Air Forces in China.
- d.* Equipping Chinese ground forces.

C.C.S. 319/5

24 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

Note by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

The Enclosure is the final report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the *QUADRANT* Conference. It has been approved by the President and the Prime Minister, except for paragraph 61, upon which action has been deferred pending further consideration by the U.S. and British Governments.

ENCLOSURE

QUADRANT

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER
OF THE FINAL AGREED SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS REACHED
BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

1. In previous memoranda (C.C.S. 319 and C.C.S. 319/2) the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented certain agreed conclusions reached during the present conference regarding operations in the main theaters of war. These amended conclusions have been related to resources available, and an agreed summary is submitted herewith.

I. OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE

2. In conjunction with *RUSSIA* and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the *AXIS* powers.

*II. OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION
OF THE WAR*

3. In cooperation with *RUSSIA* and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the *AXIS* in *EUROPE*.

4. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other *PACIFIC* Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against *JAPAN* with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the over-all objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

5. Upon the defeat of the *AXIS* in *EUROPE*, in cooperation with other *PACIFIC* Powers and, if possible, with *RUSSIA*, to direct the full resources of the *UNITED STATES* and *GREAT BRITAIN* to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of *JAPAN*.

III. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

6. Whatever operations are decided on in support of the over-all strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the *WESTERN HEMISPHERE* and the *BRITISH ISLES*.

b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

d. Continue the disruption of *AXIS* sea communications.

e. Intensify the air offensive against the *AXIS* Powers in *EUROPE*.

f. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the *AXIS* citadel.

g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of *RUSSIA*.

h. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of *CHINA* as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against *JAPAN*.

i. To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of *TURKEY* in the war on the side of the Allies (See also paragraph 62).

j. To prepare the French Forces in *AFRICA* to fulfill an active role in the war against the *AXIS* Powers (See also paragraph 63).

IV. EXECUTION OF THE OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

7. The following operations in execution of the over-all strategic concept are agreed upon.

8. THE U-BOAT WAR

a. Progress Report

We have had encouraging reports from the Chiefs of the two Naval Staffs regarding the U-boat war. We have approved recommendations made by the Allied Submarine Board which should result in further strengthening our anti-U-boat operations. The Board has been directed to continue and expand its studies in search of further improvements.

b. Facilities in the AZORES Islands

The facilities of the *AZORES* Islands will be used for intensified sea and air operations against the U-boat.

NOTE: On the successful conclusion of the negotiations for the use of the *AZORES* we have taken note of the assurance given by the British Chiefs of Staff that everything will be done by the British as soon as possible after actual entry into the *AZORES* has been gained to make arrangements for their operational and transit use by U.S. aircraft.

9. THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE

We have approved the following operations in 1943-44 for the defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe.

10. THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE

The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive from all convenient bases is a prerequisite to *OVERLORD* (barring an independent and complete

Russian victory before *OVERLORD* can be mounted). This operation must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority.

11. OPERATION "OVERLORD"

a. This operation will be the primary U.S.-British ground and air effort against the *AXIS* in *EUROPE*. (Target date 1 May 1944). After securing adequate *CHANNEL* ports, exploitation will be directed toward securing areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy. Following the establishment of strong Allied forces in *FRANCE*, operations designed to strike at the heart of *GERMANY* and to destroy her military forces will be undertaken.

b. There will be a balanced ground and air force build-up for *OVERLORD*, and continuous planning for and maintenance of those forces available in the *UNITED KINGDOM* in readiness to take advantage of any situation permitting an opportunistic cross-*CHANNEL* move into *FRANCE*.

c. As between Operation *OVERLORD* and operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN*, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be distributed and employed with the main object of insuring the success of *OVERLORD*. Operations in the *MEDITERRANEAN* Theater will be carried out with the forces allotted at *TRIDENT* except insofar as these may be varied by decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

12. We have approved the outline plan of General Morgan for Operation *OVERLORD* and have authorized him to proceed with the detailed planning and with full preparations.

13. OPERATION "JUPITER"

In case circumstances render the execution of *OVERLORD* impossible, it may be necessary to consider *JUPITER* as an alternative. Plans for this operation, with particular reference to an entry into Southern Norway, should therefore be made and kept up to date.

14. OPERATIONS IN ITALY

a. First phase. The elimination of *ITALY* as a belligerent and establishment of air bases in the *ROME* area, and, if feasible, farther north.

b. Second phase. Seizure of *SARDINIA* and *CORSICA*.

c. Third phase. The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German forces in Northern *ITALY*, and the creation of the conditions required for

OVERLORD and of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the reequipped French Army and Air Force into Southern *FRANCE*.

15. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN FRANCE

Offensive operations against Southern *FRANCE* (to include the use of trained and equipped French forces), should be undertaken to establish a lodgement in the *TOULON-MARSEILLES* area and to exploit northward in order to create a diversion in connection with *OVERLORD*. Air nourished guerrilla operations in the Southern Alps will, if possible, be initiated.

16. AIR OPERATIONS

a. Strategic bombing operations from Italian and Central *MEDITERRANEAN* bases, complementing *POINTBLANK*.

b. Development of an air ferry route through the *AZORES*.

c. Air supply of *BALKAN* and French guerrillas (see paragraph 17 below).

17. OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS

Operations in the *BALKAN* area will be limited to supply of *BALKAN* guerrillas by air and sea transport, to minor Commando forces, and to the bombing of strategic objectives.

18. GARRISON REQUIREMENTS AND SECURITY OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Defensive garrison commitments in the *MEDITERRANEAN* area will be reviewed from time to time, with a view to effecting economy of force. The security of our lines of communication through the Strait of *GIBRALTAR* will be assured by appropriate dispositions of our forces in Northwest *AFRICA*, so long as there remains even a remote possibility of the Germans invading the *IBERIAN PENINSULA*.

19. EMERGENCY RETURN TO THE CONTINENT

We have examined the plans that have been prepared by General Morgan's staff for an emergency operation to enter the Continent. We have taken note of these plans and have directed that they be kept under continuous review

with particular reference to the premises regarding the attainment of air superiority and the number of troops necessary for the success of these operations.

THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

20. LONG-TERM STRATEGY

We have made a preliminary study of long-term strategy for the defeat of *JAPAN* and are of the opinion that the following factors require particular emphasis:

a. The dependence of *JAPAN* upon air power, naval power, and shipping for maintaining her position in the Pacific and Southeast Asia.

b. The consequent need for applying the maximum attrition to *JAPAN*'s air force, naval forces and shipping by all possible means in all possible areas.

c. The advantage to be gained and the time to be saved by a more extensive use of the superior air resources at the disposal of the United Nations, both in the strategic field and in conjunction with operations on land.

21. We consider that great advantage may be obtained, by modern and untried methods, from the vast resources which, with the defeat of Germany, will become available to the United Nations. We have in mind:

a. A project rapidly to expand and extend the striking power of the United Nations air forces in *CHINA* as well as of the ground troops for their defense by employing the large numbers of load carrying aircraft available to open an "air road" to *CHINA*.

b. The employment of lightly equipped jungle forces, dependent largely upon air supply lines.

c. The use of special equipment, such as artificial harbors, *HABBA-KUKS*, etc., to enable the superior power of the United Nations to be deployed in unexpected and undeveloped areas.

22. From every point of view operations should be framed to force the defeat of *JAPAN* as soon as possible after the defeat of *GERMANY*. Planning should be on the basis of accomplishing this within 12 months of that event. Decisions as to specific operations which will insure a rapid course of events must await further examination on the lines indicated above.

23. The deployment of forces and the operations to be undertaken in the war against *JAPAN* must be in accord with the over-all objective and strategic concept reaffirmed in Sections I and II above (paragraphs 2-5).

24. We are agreed that the reorientation of forces from the European Theater to the *PACIFIC* and *FAR EAST* should be started as soon as the German situation, in our opinion, so allows.

25. The principle has been accepted that the forces to carry out operations from the East, including the *SOUTHWEST PACIFIC*, shall be provided by the *UNITED STATES*, and for operations from the West by *GREAT BRITAIN*, except for special types not available to *GREAT BRITAIN* which will be provided by the *UNITED STATES*. The employment of Dominion forces will be a matter of discussion between all Governments concerned.

26. *SPECIFIC OPERATIONS 1943-44*

We have found it impracticable during *QUADRANT* to arrive at all the necessary decisions for operations in the war against *JAPAN* in 1943-44. We therefore propose that, as soon as the necessary further examinations have been made, a Combined Chiefs of Staff Conference should be held wherever may be most convenient, unless agreement is reached through the ordinary channels. There are, nevertheless, certain decisions which we feel able to make at once.

27. *OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC 1943-44*

We approve the proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff for operations in the *PACIFIC* in 1943-44 as follows:

28. *GILBERTS*

The seizure and consolidation of the *GILBERTS* preparatory to a further advance into the *MARSHALLS*.

29. *MARSHALLS*

The seizure of the *MARSHALL ISLANDS* (including *WAKE* and *KU-SAIE*) preparatory to a westward advance through the Central *PACIFIC*.

30. *PONAPE*

The capture of *PONAPE* preparatory to operations against the *TRUK* area.

31. *CAROLINES (TRUK AREA)*

The seizure of the eastern *CAROLINES* as far west as *WOLEAI* and the establishment of a fleet base at *TRUK*.

32. *PALAU ISLANDS*

The capture of the *PALAU*S including *YAP*.

33. *OPERATIONS AGAINST GUAM AND THE JAPANESE MARIANAS*

The seizure of *GUAM* and the Japanese *MARIANAS*.

34. *PARAMUSHIRU*

Consideration of operations against *PARAMUSHIRU* and the *KURILES*.

35. *OPERATIONS IN THE NEW GUINEA-BISMARCKS-ADMIRALTY ISLANDS SUBSEQUENT TO CURRENT OPERATIONS*

The seizure or neutralization of eastern *NEW GUINEA* as far west as *WEWAK* and including the *ADMIRALTY ISLANDS* and *BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO*. *RABAUL* is to be neutralized rather than captured.

36. *OPERATIONS IN NEW GUINEA SUBSEQUENT TO THE WEWAK-KAVIENG OPERATION*

An advance along the north coast of *NEW GUINEA* as far west as *VOGELKOP*, by step-by-step airborne-water-borne advances.

37. *OPERATIONS IN INDIA-BURMA-CHINA THEATER, 1943-44*

To carry out operations for the capture of *UPPER BURMA* in order to improve the air route and establish overland communications with *CHINA*. Target date mid-February 1944.

It is recognized that the extent of these operations is dependent upon logistic considerations as affected by recent floods.

83. To continue preparations for an amphibious operation in the spring of 1944. Pending a decision on the particular operation, the scale of these preparations should be of the order of those contemplated at *TRIDENT* for the capture of *AKYAB* and *RAMREE*.

39. To continue the preparation of *INDIA* as a base for the operations eventually contemplated in the Southeast Asia Command.

40. To continue to build up and increase the air routes and air supplies of *CHINA*, and the development of air facilities, with a view to:

- a. Keeping *CHINA* in the war.
- b. Intensifying operations against the Japanese.
- c. Maintaining increased U.S. and Chinese Air Forces in *CHINA*.
- d. Equipping Chinese ground forces.

41. We have decided that our main effort should be put into offensive operations with the object of establishing land communications with *CHINA* and improving and securing the air route. Priorities cannot be rigid and we therefore propose to instruct the Supreme Commander in formulating his proposals to regard this decision as a guide and to bear in mind the importance of the longer term development of the lines of communication.

42. *EXAMINATION OF FUTURE OPERATIONS*

We have directed that the following studies shall be made forthwith:

43. A study and report on the following operations and their relation one to another:

- a. An operation against *NORTHERN SUMATRA*; target date spring 1944.
- b. Operations southwards from *NORTHERN BURMA*; target date November 1944.
- c. Operations through the *MOULMEIN* area or *KRA ISTHMUS* in the direction of *BANGKOK*; target date to be as early as practicable.
- d. Operations through the *MALACCA STRAITS* and *MALAYA* for the direct capture of Singapore; target date to be as early as practicable.
- e. The capture of *AKYAB* and *RAMREE* to determine whether it is necessary to the success of operations in *a* to *d* above or the operations in *UPPER BURMA* (Paragraph 37).

44. A study of the potentialities and limitations of developing the air route to *CHINA* on a scale sufficient to employ all the heavy bomber and transport aircraft likely to be available for the Southeast Asia Theater and *CHINA* in 1944-45, on the assumption that *GERMANY* is defeated in the autumn of 1944.

45. This study to specify the action required to implement the best possible plan resulting from the above without prejudice to the operations in paragraphs 37 and 38.

46. *SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND*

General

The vigorous and effective prosecution of large-scale operations against *JAPAN* in Southeast Asia, and the rapid development of the air route through *BURMA* to *CHINA*, necessitate the reorganization of the High Command in the Indian Theater. It has, therefore, been decided that the Command in *INDIA* should be divided from the operational Command in Southeast Asia as described below:

47. *COMMAND IN INDIA*

The administration of *INDIA* as a base for the forces in Southeast Asia will remain under the control of the Commander in Chief, India. Coordination of movement and maintenance both of the operational forces based on *INDIA* and of the internal garrison can best be carried out efficiently by one staff responsible in the last resort to one authority with power to decide priorities. This machinery exists today in the Government of *INDIA* and in *G.H.Q.* India. It is the only machinery which can carry out the dual tasks of meeting the internal requirements of *INDIA* as well as the requirements of operations in the Southeast Asia Theater.

48. *COMMAND IN SOUTHEAST ASIA*

A Supreme Allied Command in Southeast Asia should be set up as follows:

- a. The command and staff to be a combined British and American one on the lines of the North African Command.

b. The Supreme Allied Commander to be British, with an American deputy. He should have under him Naval, Army and Air Commanders in Chief, and also a Principal Administrative Officer to coordinate the administrative planning of all three Services and of the Allied forces.

c. The Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and the Commanders of the three Services mentioned above, acting under the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander, to control all operations and have under their command such Naval, Military and Air forces as may be assigned to the Southeast Asia Theater from time to time.

49. *AREA INCLUDED*

The boundaries are set out in detail in C.C.S. 308/3, but, generally, they include *BURMA, CEYLON, THAILAND (SIAM), the MALAY PENINSULA* and *SUMATRA*.

50. *DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN INDIA AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA*

Conflicts of opinion over priorities in connection with administration must be anticipated. It will, therefore, be necessary for someone on the spot to resolve these differences day by day as they occur. This authority should be the Viceroy, not in his statutory capacity as Governor-General, but acting on behalf of the British War Cabinet.

51. The Supreme Commander will in any event have direct access to the British Chiefs of Staff on all matters, and if he is not satisfied with the ruling of the Viceroy on administrative matters, he will be able to exercise this right. The Commander in Chief, India, will continue to have the right of direct access to the British Chiefs of Staff.

52. *DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER*

General Stilwell will be Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of the Southeast Asia Theater and in that capacity will command the Chinese troops operating into Burma and all U.S. air and ground forces committed to the Southeast Asia Theater.

53. The operational control of the Chinese forces operating into Burma will be exercised, in conformity with the over-all plan of the British Army Commander, by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, or by his representative, who will be located with the troops.

54. The operational control of the 10th Air Force will be vested in the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and exercised by his air representative located at the headquarters of the Air Commander in Chief.

55. General Stilwell will continue to have the same direct responsibility to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as heretofore. His dual function under the Supreme Allied Commander and under the Generalissimo is recognized.

56. The organization and command of the U.S. Army and Navy Air Transport Services in the Southeast Asia area will remain under the direct control of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, and of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, respectively, subject to such supply and service functions as may be by them delegated to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander. Requests by the Supreme Allied Commander for the use of U.S. troop carrier aircraft for operational purposes will be transmitted to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander.

57. Requests for the use of surface transportation capacity in and through *INDIA*, or for development involving construction for the air route to *CHINA*, will be passed through the Supreme Allied Commander in order that they may be related, as regards priority, to his requirements before being placed on the Commander in Chief, *INDIA*.

58. *COMMAND RELATIONSHIP*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff would exercise a general jurisdiction over strategy for the Southeast Asia Theater, and the allocation of American and British resources of all kinds between the China Theater and the Southeast Asia Command. The British Chiefs of Staff would exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operations, and would be the channel through which all instructions to the Supreme Commander are passed.

59. *THE COORDINATION OF AMERICAN AGENCIES SUCH AS O.S.S., O.W.I., F.C.B., ETC., WITH COMPARABLE BRITISH ORGANIZATIONS*

In order to facilitate the free exchange of information and coordination between the U.S. and British quasi-military agencies in *INDIA* and the Southeast Asia Command, a Combined Liaison Committee will be set up at New Delhi.

60. There will be full and open discussion in the Combined Liaison Committee before any quasi-military activities involving operations in *INDIA* or the Southeast Asia Theater are undertaken. However, before plans for such

operations in these areas are put into effect by U.S. agencies, the concurrence of the government of *INDIA*, the Commander in Chief, *INDIA*, or the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Theater, must be obtained as applicable.

V. CONCLUSIONS ON MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS

61. MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS IN RELATION TO SPAIN

We suggest that our general policy should be to deny the enemy his present privileged position in *SPAIN*, and to supplant him there to as great an extent as possible, thus transferring to the Germans the anxiety that has hitherto been ours. In pursuance of this policy, we suggest that we should now intensify pressure by economic and political means in order to obtain the following objectives:

- a. Discontinuance of supplies of raw materials to *GERMANY*. The most important material which *GERMANY* obtains from *SPAIN* is wolfram, of which commodity *SPAIN* and *PORTUGAL* supply the largest proportion of German requirements.
- b. Withdrawal of the Blue Division from the ranks of the enemy.
- c. A modification of the present distribution of Spanish forces in *MOROCCO* so as to remove any suggestion of distrust of the United Nations.
- d. Cessation of the use of Spanish shipping for the benefit of our enemies.
- e. Denial to the enemy of secret intelligence facilities.
- f. Facilities for civil aircraft of United Nations.
- g. A more benevolent attitude towards escaped Allied prisoners of war.
- h. Elimination of objectionable anti-Allied propaganda and increase in pro-Allied propaganda.

62. MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS IN RELATION TO TURKEY

We are of the opinion that from the military point of view the time is not ripe for *TURKEY* to enter the war on our side. Our policy should be as follows:

a. We should ask *TURKEY* to interpret the Montreux Convention strictly, so as to exclude the passage of all German shipping of military value through the Straits.

b. We should ask that supplies of chrome to Germany should be stopped.

c. We should ask *TURKEY* to continue:

(1) To improve her internal communications.

(2) To complete the airfields required for *HARDIHOOD*.

(3) To allow us to install the full R.D.F. and Sector Control facilities which we require.

(4) To complete the construction of storage facilities required for the full *HARDIHOOD* Plan.

(5) To raise the effectiveness of their fighting forces.

d. Our policy on equipment to *TURKEY* should be that we should continue to supply such equipment as we can spare and as the Turks can absorb.

63. *REEQUIPPING THE FRENCH FORCES*

We have approved the rearmament of French units up to and including eleven divisions by 31 December 1943 as recommended by the Commander, North African Theater.

64. *"PLOUGH" FORCE*

General Morgan and General Eisenhower have been given the details of *PLOUGH* force and have been asked to report as to possible uses for it in their respective theaters.

65. *SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN SARDINIA AND CORSICA*

We have asked General Eisenhower to examine the possibilities of intensifying subversive activities in *SARDINIA* and *CORSICA* with a view to facilitating entry into those islands.

66. *"HABBAKUK"*

We have examined the possibilities of constructing "floating airfields" and have given our approval to the active pursuit of further experiments.

67. PIPELINE, INDIA-CHINA

We have approved, subject to prior requirements for Military operations in *BURMA*, the construction of a four-inch pipeline from *ASSAM* to *KUNMING* and of a six-inch pipeline from *CALCUTTA* to *ASSAM*. These will facilitate air operations in *CHINA* and ease congestion on the existing lines of supply.

68. SUPPLY ROUTES IN N. E. INDIA

We have approved, subject to prior requirements of operations in *BURMA*, intensified development of the supply routes into and in *ASSAM* and have issued directives to theater commanders concerned with a view to a target of 220,000 tons per month being reached by 31 December 1945.

**RELATION OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO
THE OPERATIONS DECIDED UPON**

69. We have carried out an examination of the available resources of the United Nations with a view to assessing our ability to carry out the operations decided upon. We find in general that these resources will be sufficient to meet our needs. In some cases, however, the availability of resources is dependent upon conditions which cannot be foreseen at this time. The subject therefore should be kept under constant review, and if shortages develop or conflicts of interest arise, they will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for decision.

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C.C.S. 320

"RANKIN"

Reference:

CCS 115th Meeting, Item (9)

2nd Citadel Meeting, Item (2)

C.C.S. 320 was circulated 20 August 1943. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 115th Meeting, approved the subject plan in principle, and their decision on this subject paper is included in C.C.S. 319/5.

20 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

"RANKIN"

Note by the Secretaries

The Enclosure is a digest of the plan for Operation *RANKIN* which has been prepared by the *COSSAC* Staff.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE

DIGEST OF OPERATION "RANKIN"

Recommendations for the Courses of Action to be followed in North-West Europe in the event of substantial weakening of German resistance, or withdrawal from Occupied Countries or unconditional surrender occurring between the 1st November, 1943, and the 1st May 1944.

INTRODUCTION

1. The latest review (J.I.C. (43) 324 of 3 August 1943) by the J.I.C. of the enemy's present situation and his possible plans and intentions during the remainder of 1943 shows that the recent reverses on the Russian front, the breach developing in Italy and the Balkans, the set-back suffered by the U-boat campaign and the ever-increasing Allied air offensive, all combine to create a position which (in the opinion of the J.I.C.) must appear to the German leaders as verging on the desperate. The limiting factor for the enemy being availability of forces, the gathering threat in Italy and the Balkans may well lead him to find reserves at the expense of the ground and air forces now located in Norway, Denmark, the Low Countries and France. Nor is it beyond the bounds of possibility that an imminent threat of complete disaster on the Russian front might induce him to abandon altogether his occupation of Western and probably Southern Europe, in order to concentrate all available

forces against the Russian menace, postpone the hour of final defeat and insure the ultimate occupation of Germany by Anglo-American rather than by Russian forces.

CONDITIONS OF A RETURN TO NORTH-WEST EUROPE DURING THE WINTER 1943-44

2. It follows from the above that it has become a matter of urgent necessity to prepare for a return to the Continent during the winter 1943-44. The possible alternative conditions of return are:—

Case A.— Such substantial weakening of the strength and morale of the German armed forces as will permit successful assault with the Anglo-American forces prior to the target date of *OVERLORD*.

Case B.— German withdrawal from the occupied countries.

Case C.— German unconditional surrender and cessation of organized resistance in North-West Europe.

In *Cases A* and *B* our object is to effect a lodgment on the Continent from which we can complete the defeat of Germany; our object in *Case C* is to occupy as rapidly as possible appropriate areas from which we can take steps to enforce the terms of unconditional surrender laid down by the Allied Governments. Inherent in all cases will be the rehabilitation of liberated countries. The three cases are considered in succession below.

CASE A. — COURSES OF ACTION FOR A RETURN TO THE CONTINENT IN THE EVENT OF SUBSTANTIAL WEAKENING OF GERMAN RESISTANCE IN FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES.

3. Excluding airborne troops and tank brigades, it is calculated that the number of Allied Divisions operationally and administratively ready on the 1st November, 1943, will be eight, on the 1st January, 1944, seventeen, and on the 1st March, 1944, twenty-three. The approximate Naval Assault Forces available on these dates will be respectively one, two-three, and five. The Metropolitan Air Force will be available for cover and support and one composite group of the Tactical Air Force should be available by the end of 1943. It is considered that with these resources the following operations would be practicable. During November and December 1943 an assault could only be undertaken on a narrow front against a weakly-held sector of the coastline, provided that there are clear indications that France and the Low Countries have been almost entirely denuded of reserves, and that German resistance is on the

point of collapse. During January and February 1944 an assault could be undertaken against weak opposition to secure a strictly limited objective. From March 1944 onwards an assault with a more ambitious role might be undertaken, provided the strength and morale of the German troops and, in particular, of German reserves, are markedly below the maximum acceptable strength for Operation *OVERLORD*. Clearly in all three cases the overriding condition of adequate reduction in the present fighting value of the G.A.F. on the Western front, and an inability of the German Command to bring up important reserves, must pertain.

4. As for the area of assault, the choice in Operation *OVERLORD* was narrowed down to the alternatives of the Pas de Calais and the Cotentin-Caen sectors. The Pas de Calais is the pivot of the whole German defensive system, and it may be expected that the defenses there will remain strong to the end; it is therefore concluded that the assault area in the present case should be the same as for *OVERLORD*, i.e., Cotentin-Caen. As maintenance over beaches and the construction of artificial ports would prove too hazardous in winter, it will be essential to capture the port of Cherbourg and as many minor ports as possible within 48 hours. The plan for *OVERLORD* would therefore have to be modified to meet this special requirement. There are obvious advantages in having the same area for either operation; for in the early months of 1944 our preparations for *OVERLORD* will be well advanced, and it would be difficult at that stage to change the area of assault to some different part of the coast.

5. The strategic recommendations for *Case A* may accordingly be summarized as follows:—

a. No assault against organized resistance will be feasible before the 1st January, 1944, unless there are clear indications that German resistance in the West is on the point of collapse, and measures are taken in time to make the Naval Assault Forces available for operations by recourse to special manning expedients.

b. Subsequent to that date, an assault elsewhere than in the area selected for *OVERLORD* is unlikely to be feasible or advisable.

c. If a sufficiently drastic reduction in the morale and strength of the German armed forces takes place, operations against organized opposition could be undertaken in January or February 1944 to capture the Cotentin Peninsula, or in March or April 1944 to put up a modified *OVERLORD* plan into effect. In either case the plan must provide for the capture of the port of Cherbourg within the first 48 hours.

d. As in the case of *OVERLORD*, diversionary operations in the Pas de Calais area, and from the Mediterranean against the South of France will probably be essential.

CASE B. — COURSES OF ACTION FOR A RETURN TO THE CONTINENT IN THE EVENT OF A GERMAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OCCUPIED COUNTRIES.

6. It is probable that if the enemy is obliged to make withdrawals from Western Europe he will first withdraw his forces from his extremities, i.e., from Norway in the North and from South-Western and Western France in the South. If this occurs, we should require, for political as well as strategic reasons, to send some forces to occupy the areas so liberated; but it would be important that we should not tie up our main forces far from the eventual center of action.

7. In Norway, establishment of certain bases for Coastal Command Aircraft and Naval Forces is likely to be most desirable. It is probable that requirements can be limited to the establishment of bases in Northern Norway for aircraft of Coastal Command for the anti-submarine protection of shipping on passage round the North Cape; the development of Stavanger and Bergen as bases for aircraft of Coastal Command and light Naval Forces to blockade the entrance to the Baltic, and for the conduct of small offensive operations; and the establishment of surface warning sets (Radar) on the South coast of Norway. It is considered that forces of the order of one brigade group would be required for Northern Norway, and one division for Southern Norway, to secure the naval and air bases and support the Norwegian contingent in its task of rehabilitation.

8. In France, it is probable that the first point of withdrawal would be Bordeaux, followed in succession by the other ports on the Western coast; the Channel coast and in particular the Pas de Calais would remain the last areas to be uncovered. Once withdrawal begins it is likely that it will eventually continue as far as the Siegfried Line, owing to the difficulty of holding any intermediate position with an economical force.

9. The governing condition of our return is that we must have ports, since maintenance over beaches in winter is not practicable. If the enemy withdraw from South-Western and Western France, it is proposed that we should send a brigade group each, together with minimum necessary covering air forces, to occupy Bordeaux, Nantes and Brest. The purpose of occupation of Bordeaux would be the rehabilitation of South-West France; the purpose of occupation

of Brest and Nantes would also be partly the rehabilitation of France, but mainly the preparation, as a long-term policy, for the entry and maintenance of United States Forces direct from the United States. Demands to commit larger forces to these areas should be firmly resisted, and the first point of entry for our main forces should not be West of Cherbourg. The Northern extension of the German defensive position on the Siegfried Line would probably prevent our use of Antwerp, in which case the major ports available for our return would be Cherbourg, Havre and Rouen. It is impossible to forecast the turn that operations would take, since our advance would be dependent on the enemy's withdrawal policy. It must be assumed that the enemy's demolitions will be thorough, and, therefore, it cannot be expected that our rate of advance will be swift. Moreover, rapid airfield construction, as proposed in *OVERLORD*, is impracticable in winter, and a more permanent and lengthy type of construction will be required. The capture of existing airfields is, therefore, of increased importance. A likely course of events is that an initial landing might be made at Cherbourg, followed by later landings at Havre and Rouen, and not long afterwards by the introduction of reinforcements and stores through the Pas de Calais ports. Our general intention should be to press Eastwards as fast as possible, opening up additional ports as we go, with the further object of establishing airfields in the Pas de Calais and in Belgium, from which the Tactical Air Force can complete the destruction of the German Air Force and the strategic bomber force can intensify their attack on Germany at closer range when the advance Eastwards has gone sufficiently far to make this profitable. Under the condition of German withdrawal, deficiencies in the strength of the Tactical Air Force can be made good at the expense of the static fighter defense system of the United Kingdom. In this way enough squadrons could be made available to take full advantage of airfields prepared by the Army on the Continent, while additional air support could still be provided from bases in the United Kingdom.

10. The strategic recommendations for *Case B* may accordingly be summarized as follows:—

a. That the port of Cherbourg be the first place of entry for our main forces.

b. That as the German withdrawal proceeds, our main forces be based on Cherbourg, Havre and Rouen, supplemented as necessary by the smaller ports further East.

c. That the port of Bordeaux be occupied in the first instance by a small force only for the sole purpose of rehabilitation of South-West France.

d. That the ports of Brest and Nantes be similarly occupied by small forces only, partly to assist in the rehabilitation of France, but mainly to prepare, as a long-term policy, for the entry and maintenance of United States Forces direct from the United States.

e. That as large forces as possible from the Mediterranean be dispatched to occupy the ports of Marseilles and Toulon, and subsequently to move Northwards on Lyons and Vichy, and thereafter as required.

CASE C — COURSES OF ACTION FOR A RETURN TO THE CONTINENT IN THE EVENT OF GERMAN UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER AND THE CESSATION OF ORGANIZED ARMED RESISTANCE IN NORTH-WEST EUROPE

11. The object is to occupy, as rapidly as possible, appropriate areas from which we can take steps to enforce the terms of unconditional surrender imposed by the Allied Governments on Germany; and in addition to carry out the rehabilitation of the Occupied Countries.

12. A consideration of the areas of strategic importance leads to the conclusion that the best use of our limited land forces lies in the speedy occupation in adequate force of the Jutland Peninsula, the adjacent great ports of Bremen, Hamburg and Kiel, and the large towns in the valleys of the Ruhr and the Rhine. It is considered that the forces required for occupation of these areas would amount to seven divisions for Denmark and North-West Germany, six Divisions for the Ruhr, eleven Divisions for the valley of the Rhine; making a total in all of twenty-four Divisions.

13. In addition to the forces required for occupation of Germany, further forces will be required for rehabilitation of the Liberated Territories and to assist in the disarmament of Germany. It is considered that the following forces will be required in support of the contingents of the Nations concerned, or in the case of Denmark supplementary to the field force formations given in paragraph 12 above; one division and one brigade for Norway, one brigade for Denmark, two brigades for Holland, four brigades for Belgium; and in the case of France, two field force divisions for Paris and Northern France, two field force divisions for the Mediterranean ports and South France, and six brigades for the Atlantic and Channel ports. Except where it is explicitly stated that field force divisions will be required, full use should be made of non-field force formations in the above role.

14. Both in the case of Germany and in the case of liberated territories, it will be necessary for adequate air forces to form part of the occupying force. In Germany, their role will be to take immediate action to overcome any re-

sistance to our terms, to take punitive action against local disorder and to be a reminder to the German people of the main strategic bomber force which will remain based in the United Kingdom. Adequate air forces for occupation of areas near key points in Germany and liberated territories are available in the United Kingdom and the whole resources of the Metropolitan Air Force will be available for reinforcement.

15. The use of large forces in the dual task of rehabilitating the liberated territories and occupying strategic areas in Germany is a problem of such complexity that the greatest simplicity in plan is required if mistakes of far-reaching consequence are to be avoided. It is considered that the best plan will be to keep to the alignment proposed for *OVERLORD*, i.e., to dispose the American forces on the right of the front and the British forces on the left. It is thus contemplated that the American sphere of responsibility will extend from the Rhine at the Swiss Border to Dusseldorf, and will also include France and Belgium; while the British sphere of responsibility will include the Ruhr and North-West Germany, Holland, Denmark and Norway. In the liberated countries there should be representative forces of both nations.

16. It is clear that for both political and military reasons speed of entry will be of the first importance. It may be possible to use air transport to a limited extent, but the bulk of our forces will have to be carried by sea. In the case of reentry through Copenhagen, Bremen and Hamburg, minesweeping is likely to impose short delays. The most suitable port of entry for the formations to occupy the Ruhr appears to be Rotterdam, while that for the forces for the Rhine Valley will be Antwerp.

17. The comparison of requirements against availability of forces at different dates is as follows, providing the *BOLERO* program is maintained and the forces earmarked to return from the Mediterranean are received. The requirement is constant at 26 divisions and the availability of divisions shown excludes airborne troops and tank brigades:—

a. March 1944.

23 divisions administratively ready for mobile operations.

4 divisions administratively incomplete.

Total 27 divisions.

b. January 1944.

17 divisions administratively ready for mobile operations.

7 divisions administratively incomplete.

Total 24 divisions.

c. November 1943.

8 divisions administratively ready for mobile operations.
8 divisions administratively incomplete.

Total 16 divisions.

In view of the non-operational and semi-mobile nature of the tasks, the total figure shown in each case may be taken as the availability. The deficits therefore are two divisions in January 1944, and ten divisions in November 1943. It is proposed that these deficits should be made good when emergency arises by the dispatch of Allied forces in the Mediterranean and of the United States divisions earmarked for Operation *OVERLORD*. Apart from these forces it is proposed that Allied forces in the Mediterranean should supply one United States and one British division to accompany the forces of the French Committee of National Liberation, for employment in Southern France.

18. It is emphasized that the forces given in paragraph 12 above are the minimum land forces which will be required initially to obtain control in the Rhine Valley, the Ruhr, the entrance to the Baltic and in North-Western Germany. The ultimate size of forces of occupation will depend on the requirements and terms of occupation laid down by the Allied Governments.

19. The strategic recommendations for *Case C* may accordingly be summarized as follows:-

a. That the sphere of the Supreme Allied Commander include the whole of France, Luxemburg, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway and such portion of enemy territory as the Allied Governments may decide. It is assumed that this will include at least the Rhine Valley, the Ruhr and North-West Germany.

b. That, as soon as the situation permits at the time of German unconditional surrender, Allied Forces based in the United Kingdom be dispatched:

(1) To occupy and control the Valley of the Rhine from the Swiss to the Dutch frontiers, together with the area of the Ruhr, and insure disarmament of German armed forces returning from occupied territory.

(2) To occupy and control Denmark, Schleswig, Holstein, the Kiel Canal, and the cities of Hamburg and Bremen, and insure disarmament of German armed forces in those areas.

(3) To open selected ports in the West coast of France and the Low Countries, to establish control in the capitals of those countries, to institute measures of rehabilitation, and to assist as may be required in the disarmament of German armed forces.

(4) To establish control in Norway, to rehabilitate the country, and insure disarmament of German armed forces.

c. That, simultaneously, Allied contingents from the forces based in the Mediterranean be dispatched to open selected ports on the Mediterranean coast of France, to establish control at Vichy, to institute measures for the rehabilitation of Southern France, and to assist as may be required in the disarmament of German armed forces. These Allied forces to come under operational control of the Supreme Allied Commander on arrival in France.

d. That, under the general direction of the Supreme Allied Commander, France, Belgium and the Rhine Valley from the Swiss frontier to inclusive Dusseldorf be regarded as a sphere under the control of the United States forces, with British representation in the liberated countries.

e. That, under the general direction of the Supreme Allied Commander, Holland, Denmark, Norway and North-West Germany from inclusive the Ruhr Valley to Lubeck be regarded as a sphere under the control of British forces, with United States representation in the liberated countries.

CONCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS

20. Certain general recommendations emerge from the above study of **RANKIN**:-

a. The forces allotted for **OVERLORD** should be considered as equally available for **RANKIN**, if the occasion should arise.

b. The appointment of the Allied Air Commander-In-Chief and Staff, and the provision in the United Kingdom of the Commanding General, Staff and headquarters of the United States Army Group are of urgent importance and should be undertaken forthwith.

c. If the strategic recommendations in this paper are accepted in principle, the British and United States Governments should be invited, as a matter of urgency, to lay down a policy to govern the conduct of the Civil Affairs Staff in the establishment of military governments in enemy territory to be occupied by our troops, and a policy to govern the establishment of indigenous administrations in the liberated Allied territories.

d. That no time be lost in setting up nucleus combined American/British Civil Affairs Staffs in London for Germany and for each Allied country and friendly country, and such other countries as may be decided to lie within the sphere of the Supreme Allied Commander, to study in detail the problems involved and to make, without delay, detailed plans for the organization of civil administration therein.

e. That plans be made forthwith, complete in every detail, for the rapid recruitment in reserve units on a para-military basis of British civil resources in technical personnel, labor and equipment for employment on the Continent, especially for airfield construction. In order to avoid any interference with the progress of current vital work, such as the *BOLERO* and airfield construction programs, these plans only to be put into effect when the emergency arises.

f. It will be desirable to undertake a campaign of propaganda among our own people to bring to their notice the necessity for widespread participation in the campaign in prospect. Our Service resources will be stretched to the uttermost, and will need every sort of civilian administrative support if they are to develop their full force at the decisive point or points. Provision of this support may well entail sacrifices on the part of all classes of the community.

g. Close attention should be devoted to the question of collaboration with the U.S.S.R.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1,
14 August, 1943.

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C.C.S. 321

POLICY TOWARDS SPAIN

Reference:

CCS 113th Meeting, Item (7)

2nd Citadel Meeting, Item (8)

C.C.S. 321 was circulated, 20 August 1943, and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 113th Meeting. The conclusions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on this subject paper are included in C.C.S. 319/5.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

POLICY TOWARDS SPAIN

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

1. We have examined the suggestion put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 303 paragraph 10) that the time is now ripe to take full advantage of our present position and adopt a stern and frankly demanding policy towards Spain.

2. We can say at once that we agree entirely with the sense of this suggestion. The only point at issue is exactly how far we should go.

3. We feel that it will be agreed that:

a. The Spaniards, with Germany on their doorstep, will not be persuaded to take any military action which appears to threaten Germany and which might bring on them German retaliation. Any action or threat on our part to coerce them in this direction would merely tend to unite them against us.

b. From our point of view, it is most undesirable that we should press the Spaniards to a point which might impose upon us any military commitment in support of diplomatic or military threats.

4. We suggest therefore that it would be unwise to go so far as to press the Spaniards to transfer the bulk of their defensive forces to the North, which they would be most unlikely to do.

5. We suggest that our general policy should be to deny the enemy his present privileged position in Spain, and to supplant him there to as great an extent as possible, thus transferring to the Germans the anxiety that has hitherto been ours. In pursuance of this policy, we suggest that we should now intensify pressure by economic and political means in order to obtain the following objectives:

a. Discontinuance of supplies of raw materials to Germany. The most important material which Germany obtains from Spain is wolfram, of which commodity Spain and Portugal supply the largest proportion of German

requirements. A note on the wolfram position by the Ministry of Economic Warfare is attached.

- b. Withdrawal of the Blue Division from the ranks of the enemy.
 - c. A modification of the present distribution of Spanish forces in Morocco so as to remove any suggestion of distrust of the United Nations.
 - d. Cessation of the use of Spanish shipping for the benefit of our enemies.
 - e. Denial to the enemy of secret intelligence facilities.
 - f. Facilities for civil aircraft of United Nations.
 - g. A more benevolent attitude towards escaped Allied prisoners of war.
 - h. The strictest interpretation of international law towards enemy personnel and naval and air units.
 - i. Elimination of objectionable anti-Allied propaganda and increase in pro-Allied propaganda.
6. Owing to the resentment which we are likely to cause if we interfere directly in Spanish internal affairs, it would not be in our military interests openly to promote the restoration of the monarchy since such interference would be likely to cause serious disorder in Spain, of which the Germans might take advantage by infiltration.

We should, however, welcome and encourage the formation of a less anti-Allied Government.

ENCLOSURE

WOLFRAM FROM THE IBERIAN PENINSULA

1. *GERMANY'S PRESENT POSITION*

The virtual absence of stock, Allied preemptive purchasing in the Peninsula and the success achieved against blockade runners has made Germany's wolfram position critical.

2. *STOCKS AND SUPPLIES*

Germany started the war with a stock of 12,000 tons of concentrates. After the outbreak of war, Germany was dependent upon what was then a small output in the Peninsula, of which Portugal provided some 2,000 to 3,000 tons and Spain only 300 tons. Until 1942 Germany used her stocks to maintain an annual consumption of about 9,000 tons. From 1942 onwards, her consumption has been at the rate of about 5,800 per year, of which about 4,300 are basic industrial consumption and the balance for A.P. projectiles. Mines in Germany and France produce about 250 tons a year. Should our preemptive purchases in Spain and Portugal continue to be successful Germany will receive only about 2,000 tons from each country in 1943 and may receive substantially less from Spain. As Germany started the year with only 500 tons of stock, a further cut in consumption will be necessary unless she succeeds in obtaining further supplies by blockade running.

3. *EFFECTS OF SHORTAGE*

Germany's main uses for tungsten (the metal derived from wolfram) are to make tungsten carbide, which is used for providing a hard tip for machine tools, and for cores for armor piercing projectiles. Small quantities of tungsten are also used for providing filaments for electric lamps, radio valves, etc., and as a hydrogenation catalyst. A substantial reduction of supplies would therefore face Germany with the following alternatives:

- a. A cut in the production of weapons of all types, resulting from the absence of tungsten carbide tips from cutting tools and consequent less efficient production, or
- b. The sacrifice of armor piercing ammunition with tungsten carbide cores.

Should supplies from the Peninsula be entirely cut off, Germany would probably suffer both as it is improbable that she would obtain sufficient supplies by blockade running. Blockade running by surface ships should prove impracticable in the future and submarines could only bring the desired quantity at the expense of all other much needed commodities.

4. *SPEED OF EFFECT*

The loss of supplies from the Iberian Peninsula would probably not affect military operations for six months but after that the effect would be increasingly felt.

5. *CONCLUSIONS*

Failure to obtain wolfram from the Iberian Peninsula would seriously affect the rate of production throughout German industry and would render impossible the manufacture of armor piercing projectiles with tungsten carbide cores on any substantial scale. These effects would become apparent in actual operations after about six months, depending on the rate of military wastage.

C.C.S. 322/1

POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY

References:

CCS 113th Meeting, Item (8)

2nd Citadel Meeting, Item (9)

C.C.S. 322 was circulated, 20 August 1943, and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 113th Meeting. Subsequently, during the course of discussion in their second meeting with the President and Prime Minister, the policy was approved subject to a minor amendment, proposed by the Prime Minister. The final approved paper was circulated as C.C.S. 322/1.

The conclusions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on this subject paper are included in C.C.S. 319/5.

C.C.S. 322/1

30 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, Policy Towards Turkey, in the form as finally approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the President and Prime Minister, is circulated for information.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE

POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY

The British Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that from the military point of view the time is not ripe for Turkey to enter the war on our side. Our policy should be as follows:

a. We should ask Turkey to interpret the Montreux Convention strictly, so as to exclude the passage of all German shipping of military value through the Straits.

b. We should ask that supplies of chrome to Germany should be stopped.

c. We should ask Turkey to continue:

(1) To improve her internal communications.

(2) To complete the airfields required for *HARDIHOOD*.

(3) To allow us to install the full R.D.F. and Sector Control facilities which we require.

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(4) To complete the construction of storage facilities required for the full *HARDIHOOD* Plan.

(5) To raise the effectiveness of their fighting forces.

d. Our policy on equipment to Turkey should be that we should continue to supply such equipment as we can spare and as the Turks can absorb.

C.C.S. 323

AIR PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

Reference:

C.C.S. 114th Meeting, Item (6)

C.C.S. 323 was circulated, 20 August 1943. The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 114th Meeting, after discussion, referred this paper to the Combined Staff Planners for study and submission of an appropriate report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff not later than 15 September 1943.

No further action was taken on this subject paper at *QUADRANT*.

20 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS STAFF

AIR PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

Memorandum from the U. S. Chiefs of Staff

The Enclosure, prepared by the U.S. Army Air Force Planners, is referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the recommendation that it be referred to the Combined Staff Planners for study and the submission of a report by 15 September 1943.

ENCLOSURE

AIR PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

Memorandum from the United States Army Air Force Planners

THE PROBLEM

1. The provision of an appreciation producing an outline plan to direct the full aerial resources of the United Nations to bring about, in conjunction with other military and naval effort, the overwhelming defeat of Japan not later than 12 months after the defeat of the Axis powers in Europe.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. It is assumed that:

a. The defeat of the Axis powers in Europe has been accomplished in the fall of 1944.

b. Russia and Japan maintain a state of neutrality.

c. China continues as an active and cooperative Ally, furnishing ground forces which, in conjunction with U.S. Tactical Air Forces, serve to secure the unoccupied portions of China.

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d. The capacity of the air, road and pipeline facilities for "over the hump" transportation is to be first devoted to requirements of the 14th Air Force and the Chinese Army.

e. During the period in question, October 1944 to August 1945, inclusive, United Nations naval, air, amphibious and ground operations in the North, Central, South and Southwest Pacific, in Burma and the Bay of Bengal areas, are maintaining constant and increasing pressure against enemy forces. United Nations submarines, in increasing numbers, continue to harass and destroy enemy shipping.


f. North and North Central Burma are cleared of the enemy and occupied in 1944; and all of Burma in 1945.

THE MISSION

3. To accomplish, by a combined aerial offensive, the destruction of the Japanese military, industrial and economic systems to such a degree that the nation's capacity for armed resistance is effectively eliminated, within 12 months after the defeat of Germany.

OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE

4. a. To accelerate the destruction of selected systems of critical Japanese industry, the accomplishment of which will reduce the Japanese war effort



6. In view of the political, economic, military and transportation situation in the U.S.S.R., and more particularly the degree of industrial and economic development in Far Eastern Russia, the vulnerability of supply lines connecting it with Western Russia, and the consequent logistic difficulties which would probably be encountered in supporting air forces in substantial strength in the Maritime Provinces, it is unwise at this time to plan United Nations bomber offensive operations against Japan from bases in that area.

7. The islands of the Pacific within effective bombing range of the vital industrial areas of Japan, do not afford adequate bases for our air forces which will be available in 1944-45. Upon information now available, it appears that the only land area affording such bases with adequate capacity and dispersion, within 1,500 miles of the Japanese target area, immediately available for development, is on the Chinese mainland.

8. The beginning of the air offensive against Japan cannot await the opening of the ports of Hong Kong and Wenchow by the difficult and necessarily slow penetration of the enemy's far flung and well defended defensive positions to the south and east thereof. Naval advances from the south and east will, however, be greatly facilitated and expedited by preliminary air offensive operations against the industrial and transportation targets on the island of Honshu.

9. It is evident that if a bomber offensive is to begin in 1944 from bases in China, the movement of all troops, organizational equipment and supplies in the base areas must initially be accomplished by air from India.

10. The transportation of such personnel, equipment and supplies may be accomplished by the employment of approximately 4,000 B-24 airplanes converted to cargo airplanes and tankers. The project will require a flow of approximately 596,000 tons per month through the port of Calcutta. (See Section 1, Enclosure "A"). Calcutta port facilities are at present adequate to handle 960,000 tons per month. Construction of additional facilities in that port will however not be required immediately.

11. A most important factor in planning for the air attack on Japan from the west, is the necessity for providing adequate protection of the air bases against the violent Japanese reaction which is certain to follow the large-scale development of those bases, and initiation of the use thereof. The pressure being exerted by our operations against Japanese forces in outlying Pacific areas in Burma and perhaps Sumatra, will substantially contain those forces, and prevent Japan from greatly reinforcing her air forces now deployed in China. Nevertheless, Japan will not readily accept the risk of loss of her already

important, and potentially rich, newly acquired empire to the south. It is believed, however, that Chinese forces, reasonably equipped and supplied, aided in leadership, supported by the U.S. 10th and 14th Air Forces, will be able to defend the air base areas. Chinese forces and U.S. Tactical Air Forces, essential to provide such defense, will be available. Logistic support for them is dealt with in a subsequent paragraph. The initiation of the bomber offensive, and even measures in preparation therefor, will tremendously stimulate Chinese morale and unify the Chinese people under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek.

12. A brief outline of the logistical implications of the proposed plan is contained in Enclosure "A."

13. B-29 heavy bomber aircraft possess a tactical radius of 1,500 miles with a bomb load of ten tons, and are the best suited aircraft for the bombing of Japan from available bases. B-29 tactical units shown in Section 2 of Enclosure "A" will be available for deployment in China for operations against Japan on the dates indicated.

14. Studies conducted within the U.S. Army Air Forces indicate that 28 B-29 groups, of 28 airplanes each, conducting five missions per month on a 50 percent operational basis, for a period of six months, or a total of 168 operating group months, can accomplish the degree of destruction required to accomplish the Over-all Objective, described in paragraph 4, above.

15. Seventy-five percent of the selected strategic targets in Japan lie between Tokio and Nagasaki. Substantially, all of this objective area is within 1,500 miles of a region in unoccupied China, the center of which is Changsha, within an approximate 800 miles radius of Kunming (See Map, Appendix "A").

16. The area 400 miles north and south of Changsha, within this zone, is suitable for the development of VLR bomber airfields, and many old unimproved fields exist in the region. Operations of B-29 aircraft from this area would bring the majority of the selected strategic objectives within effective tactical radius.

17. From a source of supply in the Calcutta area, 200 heavy bomber aircraft of the B-24 type, stripped of armor, armament, and other equipment not essential to transport service, can support one B-29 group operating against Japan from bases in this area, at the rate set forth in paragraph 14.

18. Such B-24 type airplanes would transport gasoline, bombs and other required supplies directly from the port of Calcutta to Kunming, using the latter area as a staging center, before proceeding with a capacity load to the B-29 operating base zone.

19. *FORCES REQUIRED*

A minimum striking force of 100 B-29 airplanes is desirable to conduct effective strategic bombing operations against Japanese mainland objectives. The availability of ten B-29 groups in the base area will permit sustained operation by such striking forces. Ten B-29 groups will be available for deployment in China by October, 1944.

20. 2,000 B-24 type aircraft, converted to transports, would be required to support such operations from Calcutta supply bases. This number of aircraft, so converted, could be made available in the Calcutta area by October, 1944.

21. Aircraft availability schedules shown in Section 2, Enclosure "A," indicate that a total of 20 B-29 groups will be available for deployment in China by May, 1945, and could be maintained at normal strength thereafter.

22. The same schedules indicate that the 4,000 B-24 type aircraft required for conversion to transport functions to maintain these 20 B-29 groups, can also be made available in the Calcutta area by May, 1945.

23. Operations by the 10-20 groups of B-29 aircraft which will be available, at the rate set forth in paragraph 14, would total 182 operating group months by 31 August 1945 at which time it is estimated that the degree of destruction of Japanese resources essential to crush the enemy's capacity for effective armed resistance will have been fully accomplished.

24. Such operations, while weakening and demoralizing the enemy, will vastly encourage our long suffering Chinese allies, and inspire them to increased and united effort to eject the enemy from their homeland, and hasten complete victory.

25. During the summer months of 1945, B-29 groups based in the Aleutian Islands could effectively attack parallel strategic Japanese objectives located in the northern part of the Empire.

26. *AIR BASES.* A report on air base requirements and availability is contained in Section 3, Enclosure "A." Sites, materials and labor required for construction of Chinese and Indian air bases are locally available.

27. Preparation of the necessary bases and other facilities for these operations must be initiated at least one year prior to October, 1944.

28. *OTHER SUPPLY ROUTES INTO CHINA.* The supplies brought into China from the west by the Air Transport Command, by pipeline, or by over-

land transportation, would be available for equipment and support of Chinese Ground units and supporting Tactical Air Forces (the latter provided by the U.S.A.A.F., with limited augmentation by Chinese Air Units). The Tactical Air Force required to be furnished by the U.S.A.A.F., will be available. The indicated volume of such supplies during the period in question is set forth in Section 4, Enclosure "A." Such balance of supply as is available beyond the requirements of the above forces will serve to reduce the demands of the B-29 strategic Air Force upon the special type of air transport support set forth herein.

29. *CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION*

a. Phase I. October 1944-April 1945. Sustained B-29 precision bombing attacks throughout the period to accomplish the destruction of selected strategic Japanese industrial systems, including aircraft factories and ship yards.

b. Phase II. May 1945-August 1945. An all-out attack against the other selected strategic objectives within tactical radius, integrated with attacks upon complementary objectives in Northern Japan by two B-29 groups based in the Aleutian Islands, to accomplish the destruction of Japanese resources which are an essential preliminary to an occupation of the Japanese homeland by United Nations forces.

CONCLUSIONS

30. The destruction of Japanese resources to such a point that the enemy's capacity for effective armed resistance is substantially exhausted can be accomplished by sustained bombing operations of 10-20 B-29 groups based in an area of Unoccupied China within 1,500 miles of the center of the Japanese industrial zone.

31. Such operations can be supplied by 2,000-4,000 B-24 type aircraft, converted to transports, based at Calcutta, supplying the operational bases after staging at Kunming.

32. The required air striking and supply forces will be available.

33. Adequate air and ground defense forces and the maintenance of such units will likewise be available.

34. The planning and preparation of air bases and other facilities essential for the execution of this plan should be instituted without delay.

35. The execution of this plan promises to vastly strengthen our Chinese Allies, and to bring about a decisive defeat of Japan within 12 months after the defeat of the Axis powers in Europe.

RECOMMENDATIONS

36. That the line of advance proposed in the "Air Plan for the Defeat of Japan" be approved; and that this appreciation and outline plan be submitted to the Combined Staff Planners for further study and detailed development.

37. That in consonance with the United Nations Overall Objective, and Overall Strategic Concept for the Prosecution of the War, action be initiated without delay and prosecuted with all practicable expedition, to complete the preparatory measures required to be taken, and to provide the facilities and air bases in expanded numbers and increased proportions, essential for the timely execution of this plan.

ENCLOSURE "A"

AIR PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

LOGISTICAL SUMMARY

INDEX

- Section 1.* Initial and maintenance tonnages required to support the 20 B-29 groups in the general vicinity of Changsha and personnel and troop lift required.
Port capacity Calcutta.
- Section 2.* Estimate of converted B-24's (C-87) required and availability of same.
Availability of B-29 groups.
- Section 3.* Airdromes available and required in the Calcutta, Assam, Kunming areas.
- Section 4.* Capacity of the India-China air supply route, the Ledo Road and pipeline and estimated dates available.

ENCLOSURE "A"

AIR PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

SECTION 1

INITIAL AND MAINTENANCE TONNAGES REQUIRED TO SUPPORT
THE 20 B-29 GROUPS IN THE GENERAL VICINITY OF CHANGSHA —
PERSONNEL AND TROOP LIFT REQUIRED —
PORT CAPACITY OF CALCUTTA

1. Monthly maintenance (short tons) required to support 20 B-29 groups based on 140 sorties per month per group:

A/C Gasoline and Oil	27,700 tons
All other supplies	42,300 tons

Total	70,000 tons
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Additional A/C Gas and Oil to be delivered at Kun- ming to relay supplies forward	70,000 tons
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Total to be moved out of Calcutta area to Kunming and Changsha area	140,000 tons
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2. Initial tonnages plus 60 days maintenance all supplies per B-29 group exclusive of construction materials 15,000 tons

Note: Calculations based on normal combat-service team 3,800 men per group and four tons per man.

3. Tonnages required for B-24 transport organization:

Monthly maintenance base supply	21,000 tons
A/C Gasoline and Oil	435,000 tons

Total	456,000 tons
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Initial tonnage plus 60 days maintenance 146,000 men @ four tons	584,000 tons
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4. Total monthly maintenance tonnage into Calcutta:	
For B-29 group	140,000 tons
For B-24 requirements	456,000 tons
Total	596,000 tons
Capacity of Port of Calcutta	32,000 tons per day
	960,000 tons per month
5. Personnel and Troop Lift:	
Personnel for B-24 transport operations. The bulk of this personnel will be based in the Calcutta area	
	146,000
20 B-29 groups @ 3,800 per group. Some of this personnel will be based at Calcutta and Kunming	
	76,000
Total personnel	222,000

ENCLOSURE "A"

AIR PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

SECTION 2

*ESTIMATE OF CONVERTED B-24's (C-87) REQUIRED AND AVAILABLE.
 AVAILABILITY OF B-29 GROUPS*

1. Estimate of Converted Required B-24's:
 - a. For monthly maintenance Calcutta to Kunming, 2,250 mile round trip, 140,000 tons 3,000 B-24

Basis: 75% aircraft in operation 20 missions per month delivering three tons per airplane.

- b. For monthly maintenance Kunming forward, 1,600 mile round trip, 70,000 tons 950 B-24
- 75% aircraft in operation 20 missions per month delivering five tons.
- Total B-24 required 3,950 B-24

Note: If 70 sorties per group are flown instead of 140, requirements will be reduced 20% since gas is 40% of pay load. In this case, 3,150 B-24's are required.

- c. Requirements to move initial tonnage plus 60 days maintenance for one group:
 Initial plus 60 days maintenance tons per group . . . 15,000 tons
 To move one group into position per month requires 850 B-24 with 75% operational.

2. a. The following tables assume that B-29 groups will be ready as shown in C.P.S. 83, Appendix III, and that sufficient knowledge of the collapse of Germany will be available to permit the immediate conversion of production and the stripping of part of the B-24 inventory then on hand.

1944	B-29 Groups	B-24 Aircraft	
		Required	Inventory
June	4	1,600	5,800
July	6	1,900	5,800
August	7	2,200	5,800
September	8	2,500	5,800
October	10	2,800	5,800
November	11	3,100	5,800
December	13	3,400	5,800
1945			
January	15	3,700	5,800
February	16	4,000	5,800
March	18	4,000	5,800
April	19	4,000	5,800
May	20	4,000	5,800

b. The size of the inventory after June 1st, 1944, and its availability for conversion will depend on the course of the war in Europe. The inventory should, in no case, be less than the figure shown above.

ENCLOSURE "A"

AIR PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

SECTION 3

**AIRDROMES AVAILABLE AND REQUIRED
IN THE
CALCUTTA, ASSAM, KUNMING AND CHANGSHA AREAS**

Specification: Heavy Bombardment.

Calcutta: 45 required; 1 available

Assam: 9 required; 9 available

Kunming: 50 required; 5 available

Changsha: 20 airdromes for B-29 groups

Three airdromes for advance depot and air transport activity. Bulk of supplies will be flown direct to B-29 airdromes.

Note: Fighter Defense Bases will be considered separately.

ENCLOSURE "A"

AIR PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

SECTION 4

**CAPACITY OF THE INDIA-CHINA AIR SUPPLY ROUTE,
THE LEDO ROAD AND PIPELINE, AND ESTIMATED DATES AVAILABLE**

Assam-India Air Supply Route:

Capacity: 10,000 tons monthly
Date: September, 1943
Capacity: 20,000 tons monthly
Date: April, 1944

Assam-Ledo-Kunming Road:

Capacity: 65,000 tons
Date: June, 1945 (U.S.)
or
March, 1946 (British)

Calcutta-Assam-Kunming Pipeline:


Capacities: Calcutta-Assam, 36,000 tons
Assam-Kunming, 18,000 tons
Date: June, 1944

U.S. SECRET BRITISH MOST SECRET

REQUIRED TO REDUCE JAPAN TO MILITARY IMPOTENCY -

- B-29 GROUPS** 28 Airplanes per Group = 168 Group Months.
- MINIMUM AIRCRAFT** per Mission 100 B-29's
- BOMB LOAD** 10 Tons per B-29 - Radius 1500 miles.
- SCHEDULE** October 1944 - 10 Groups Buildup to 20 by May of 1945.
- REQUIRED** 4000' B-24's for 100% Maintenance of B-29 Groups.
- DESTRUCTION** of Key Targets - 168 Group Months Completed by August 1945.

NOTE: Total of Supplies Delivered by Pipelines Air Transport Command and Burma Road Used to Support China.



2 GROUPS B-29's FROM ALIUTIANS

TARGET AREA INCLUDES 75% OF KEY TARGETS

AIR PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

(05262)

C.C.S. 324/1

REHABILITATION OF OCCUPIED AND LIBERATED TERRITORIES

Reference:

C.C.S. 115th Meeting, Item (10)

C.C.S. 324, 20 August 1943, circulated a study on this subject, prepared by the U.S. Joint Administrative Committee.

The report of an ad hoc committee thereon was circulated as C.C.S. 324/1 22 August and presented for consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 115th Meeting approved the recommendations contained in paragraph 5, C.C.S. 324/1.

C.C.S. 324/1

22 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

REHABILITATION OF OCCUPIED AND LIBERATED TERRITORIES

References:

- a. C.C.S. 288; C.C.S. 288/1;
C.C.S. 288/2.
- b. C.C.S. 104th Meeting, Item 3.

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, on the above subject, was submitted by an ad hoc committee for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

H. REDMAN,

J. R. DEANE,

Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE

REHABILITATION OF OCCUPIED AND LIBERATED TERRITORIES

References:

- a. C.C.S. 288; C.C.S. 288/1;
C.C.S. 288/2.
- b. C.C.S. 104th Meeting, Item 3.

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the broad basic policy and division of responsibility as between the United Kingdom and the United States regarding the stating of requirements, procurement of supplies and shipping thereof, for supplies

required in connection with the initial phases of relief and rehabilitation of reoccupied countries.

DISCUSSION

2. It is recognized that minimum economic relief for the population of occupied areas must be furnished by the military during the period of military operations and for some time thereafter. Procurement for such relief by the military should be limited to that essential to military occupation but as this period may vary it is desirable for the military procurement to be coordinated with that of the civil authorities for the purpose of long term production planning. As such, it should be confined to making available the minimum quantities of food, fuel, medical, sanitary, and agreed essential supplies necessary to maintain the health and working capacity of the civilian population, as well as that required to preserve public order, maintain lines of communication and, where appropriate, develop effective fighting partners or local resources to lighten the burden on the allied armies.

3. In accordance with the basic objectives outlined in paragraph 2 above, it is essential that a program of requirements be developed which will clearly indicate the quantities of supplies estimated to be required for the civilian populations of reoccupied countries in Europe according to operational estimates. Such a statement of requirements should indicate the quantities of each category which will be supplied by the United Kingdom and what part will be supplied by the United States. Likewise, the responsibility for arranging for the shipment of these supplies should be established.

4. Stockpiles should be held to the smallest possible amount with food items limited to the basic ration in order that large frozen stocks will not accumulate and thereby impinge on other needs of equal or greater urgency. In the case of the United States, inasmuch as the War Department utilizes military priorities for the procurement of those stores it furnishes during the period of military operations for the economic relief of the populations of occupied areas, such procurement must necessarily be limited to the basic ration, soap, medical and sanitary supplies and fuel (coal and petroleum) essential to military operations as distinguished from a more generous relief standard or from rehabilitation measures. It is essential that the basic ration issued by the United States or the United Kingdom be as nearly as possible the same.

RECOMMENDATIONS

5. It is recommended that an over-all combined program of requirements covering the minimum economic relief for the population of occupied areas

that must be furnished by the military during the period of military operations and for some time thereafter, be developed in accordance with the following principles:

a. The quantities incorporated in the program to be confined to the provision of the basic ration, soap, medical, sanitary supplies, fuel (coal and petroleum products), and other agreed articles considered essential to military operations. The basic ration should be as nearly as possible the same whether supplied by the United States or United Kingdom.

b. Stockpiling should be limited to the smallest possible amount.

c. A statement of requirements will be prepared indicating the quantities of each category which will be supplied by the United Kingdom and the United States.

d. Responsibility for arranging for shipment will rest with the country procuring the supplies.

e. In the provision of coal and other supplies required for relief of civil populations in reoccupied countries, maximum use will be made of supplies, stockpiles and resources locally available within such reoccupied countries. Where possible and where a surplus of coal or other supplies exists within any particular reoccupied country over and above the requirements for such commodities by that country, such surpluses will be used to fill the requirements of other reoccupied countries.

f. The monthly requirements for the various countries which it is anticipated may be reoccupied, will be a matter for recommendation by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee.

g. It is agreed that for a period of three months subsequent to the occupation of Italy, the United Kingdom will deliver up to 100,000 tons of coal to Italy each month if the Italian stock position and the need require it. Deliveries after the first three months will be the subject of further negotiation. Subsequent to the occupation of Italy within the strategic plan, the United States will make available the equivalent of two ships each month for the purpose of supplying the Italian civilian population with the essential dry cargo imports other than coal if the need requires it. Should it be agreed that essential civilian requirements exceed the capacity set forth above additional shipping will be provided as may be agreed upon. This paragraph is subject to the provision that Italian ships are not available for the purposes herein stated.

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C.C.S. 325

SUPPLY ROUTES IN NORTHEAST INDIA

Reference:

C.C.S. 114th Meeting, Item (5)

C.C.S. 325 was circulated 21 August 1943 for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the recommendations contained in this paper and their conclusions are included in C.C.S. 319/5.

C.C.S. 325

21 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUPPLY ROUTES IN NORTHEAST INDIA

Note by the Secretaries

The Enclosure, prepared by General Riddell-Webster and General Somervell, is presented for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

H. REDMAN,

J. R. DEANE,

Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE

1. The opening of an overland route to *CHINA* will greatly facilitate operations and may well assist in bringing hostilities to an earlier conclusion than would otherwise be possible. In addition to meeting requirements for 1943-1944 operations in *BURMA*, and the short term projects which are necessary to make them possible, it is necessary because of the Herculean task ahead to make urgent preparations for completing the overland route and insuring an adequate supply of stores for delivery over the route when opened.

2. Preliminary studies of the possible opening date and capacity of the road from *LEDO* via *MYITKYINA-PAOSHAN* to *KUNMING*, together with projected pipelines, disclose certain divergence of views as between the U.S. and British Staffs. It is not possible or necessary in this paper to assess which of the views is more nearly correct, but it is agreed by all parties that the project is urgent and should be carried out at the *earliest possible date*, subject to such operations as may be agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

3. Regardless of the date of opening of the route, which depends on the course of operations and on the major constructional problems that may arise, it is necessary now to examine the target requirement of tonnage to be carried over the route and to initiate urgent action for the expansion of the

ASSAM L of C in preparation for this tonnage and that required for the maintenance of the route if development is not to be held up for lack of prompt action.

4. The present planned capacity of the *ASSAM L of C* to be reached by 1 November 1943 is 102,000 tons per month, including petroleum products, which will suffice only for minimum operational maintenance of essential ground and air forces, for an estimated air ferry delivery to *CHINA* of about 10,000 tons per month and for road construction to keep pace with operational advances.

5. When the overland route is opened it is estimated that the additional requirement will be:

- a. Increase of air route 10,000 tons per month
- b. Increase for operational forces 13,000 tons per month
- c. Stores for delivery to *CHINA* by road 65,000 tons per month
- d. Maintenance stores for route 30,000 tons per month

This represents an increase of 118,000 tons per month to be carried by the *ASSAM L of C*, exclusive of petroleum products for which two six-inch pipelines from *CALCUTTA* to *LEDO* are essential features and whose construction must keep pace with the development of the project.

6. We, therefore, recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve in principle the project for a supply route to *CHINA* through *BURMA* and *ASSAM* and that a directive (draft attached) be issued to the Supreme Commander to initiate immediate action to increase the capacity of the *ASSAM L of C* to the following target figures:

1st November	1943	102,000 tons per month
1st May	1944	140,000 tons per month
1st July	1944	1st six-inch pipeline <i>CALCUTTA</i> to <i>LEDO</i>
1st January	1945	170,000 tons per month
1st May	1945	200,000 tons per month
1st July	1945	a. a second six-inch pipeline <i>CALCUTTA</i> to <i>LEDO</i> b. balanced increase of tankage at <i>CALCUTTA</i>
1st January	1946	220,000 tons per month

7. The United States Chiefs of Staff have agreed to the provision of the special personnel, equipment and stores necessary to construct and operate the route *LEDO-KUNMING* and, having due regard to agreed operational priorities, will make available such personnel, equipment and stores as may be necessary to achieve the increased tonnage on the *ASSAM L of C* in conformity with the plan recommended by the Supreme Commander. Pending the assumption of command by the Supreme Commander, the Commander in Chief *INDIA* should be charged with the primary action in regard to the above.

APPENDIX "A"

D R A F T

DIRECTIVE TO

COMMANDER IN CHIEF, INDIA

FROM CHIEFS OF STAFF

The attached draft Directive to the Supreme Commander *SOUTHEAST ASIA* has been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Pending the appointment of the Supreme Commander, you should, in consultation with the appropriate American authorities, initiate the steps necessary for the development of the *NORTHEAST INDIA* and *ASSAM* transportation systems.

APPENDIX "B"

DRAFT DIRECTIVE

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

TO SUPREME COMMANDER SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved in principle the development at the earliest possible moment, of a supply route into *CHINA* from *BURMA*, with the ultimate object of effecting delivery into *CHINA* of 85,000 tons per month of general stores and up to 54,000 tons per month of petrol, of which 18,000 tons of aviation spirit by four-inch pipeline via Fort Hertz and 36,000 tons by six-inch pipeline follow the road.

It is envisaged that delivery of stores will be effected as to 20,000 tons monthly by air ferry, the balance passing over a rehabilitated "*BURMA ROAD*," and that all petrol will be delivered by pipelines. The prerequisite to the effective opening of the supply route to *CHINA* is the development of the transportation system of *NORTHEAST INDIA* and *ASSAM*. This is a matter of urgency and you should, in consultation with Commander in Chief *INDIA* and the appropriate United States authorities in *INDIA*, plan your requirements and initiate the necessary action for the development of the transportation system to the following target figures:

1st November 1943:	102,000 tons per month (a)
1st May 1944:	140,000 tons per month
1st January 1945:	170,000 tons per month
1st May 1945:	200,000 tons per month
1st January 1946:	220,000 tons per month

Note: (a) Plans for this have already been made by Commander in Chief *INDIA*.

United States Chiefs of Staff have agreed to the provision of the special personnel, equipment and stores necessary to construct and operate the route *LEDO-KUNMING*, and, having due regard to agreed priorities, will make avail-

able such personnel, equipment and stores as may be found necessary to achieve the increase in transportation capacity, in conformity with your plan.

Requirements in equipment, materials and special personnel should be notified through () (b) as soon as possible.

Attached as Annexure I are certain informatory details necessary for purposes of planning.

NOTE: (b) Procedure for submission of demands to be determined.

ANNEX TO APPENDIX "B"

*Annexure I to Directive to Supreme Commander S.E. ASIA
No. dated August 43*

BREAKDOWN OF TARGET TONNAGE

1. The ultimate target figure of 220,000 tons per month in the Directive is made up as follows:

Estimated operational and administrative needs as at:

1st November 1943	92,000 tons per month
Air lift as at 1st November 1943	10,000 tons per month
Estimated increase for operational forces	13,000 tons per month
Maintenance stores for the overland route	30,000 tons per month
Ultimate road delivery required into CHINA	65,000 tons per month
Additional air lift	10,000 tons per month

PETROL

2. The intention is to deliver by two six-inch pipelines from CALCUTTA

Annex to Appendix "B"

carrying 72,000 tons per month. The United States authorities have undertaken to provide the pipelines and necessary tankage by the following dates:

1st July 1944..... 1st pipeline to *LEDO*
1st July 1945..... 2nd pipeline to *LEDO*

The capacity of these pipelines is estimated to be 72,000 tons per month. The total ultimate requirement of petrol for all purposes is 96,000 tons per month, of which 9,000 tons will be produced and consumed locally. There will, therefore, remain 15,000 tons per month for transport with other stores. The figure of 220,000 tons per month makes allowance for this lift.

RIVER CRAFT

3. The United States authorities have under provision a number of barges and towboats, and are prepared to supply the necessary supervisory personnel with a view to commencing operations by 1st April 1944 with a fleet estimated to be capable of delivering at *DIBRUGARH*:

15,000 tons P.O.L. per month
15,000 tons General stores per month.

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C.C.S. 326

AMPHIBIANS FOR "OVERLORD"

Reference:

C.C.S. 115th Meeting, Item (7)

C.C.S. 326 was circulated 21 August 1943.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 115th Meeting agreed to defer action on this paper until after the *QUADRANT* Conference.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

AMPHIBIANS FOR "OVERLORD"

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

1. In view of the proved value and necessity of the *DUKW*, two and one-half ton amphibious truck, it is considered essential that adequate provision of these vehicles be available for *OVERLORD* in order to mitigate the great problems involved in prolonged maintenance over the beaches under difficult conditions.

2. Preliminary examination of requirements resulted in demands being placed for 1,200 *DUKW*s, of which 700 were destined for use by U.S. Forces and 500 for use by British Forces. It is understood that this requirement was accepted on the basis of production of 400 *DUKW*s per month to meet present global requirements.

3. Subsequent to the above demand, additional requirements for *OVERLORD*, it is understood, have been stated bringing the total requirement to 2,400; covering 1,400 for U.S. Forces, and 1,000 for the British, of which the latter will probably be increased to 1,500. Preliminary inquiries in Washington lead us to suppose that these enhanced demands have not yet been presented to the Amphibian Subcommittee of the Munitions Assignment Committee, and there appears to be some doubt in Washington as to what is the full *OVERLORD* requirement. With a view to clarifying the position, a telegram has been sent to London.

4. It is probable that the present production of *DUKW*s will prove too small to compete with requirements, and it is considered that every effort should be made as a matter of urgency to increase productive capacity. It is believed that a substantial increase can be achieved with existing plant but at the expense of production of two and one-half ton trucks and by a reallocation of the requisite steel for hulls.

5. It is further understood that the U.S. Navy has, or will shortly have, a considerable requirement for *DUKW*s additional to any already demanded.

6. In view of the above, agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff is requested for:

a. Acceptance of the principle that priority of allocation of production be given to *OVERLORD*.

b. The issue of instructions for the urgent examination of possible increases in production.

c. Allocations to *OVERLORD* be concurrent for American and British needs in a ratio to be stated by Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate).

C.C.S. 327

OPERATIONS FROM INDIA

References:

C.C.S. 110th Meeting, Item (5)

C.C.S. 111th Meeting, Item (3)

C.C.S. 115th Meeting, Item (5)

1st Citadel Meeting

2nd Citadel Meeting, Item (6)

C.C.S. 327 was circulated 23 August 1943 for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 115th Meeting agreed to certain conclusions which are included in C.C.S. 319/5.

C.C.S. 327

23 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONS FROM INDIA

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

1. We have now received a number of telegrams from Commander in Chief in India giving his views on the possibility of operations in Northern Burma, in the light of the generous offer of assistance put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff.

2. These telegrams discuss the subject in great detail, and it is quite clear that they cannot be examined fully during the present Conference. We propose, therefore, to take them back to London, have them examined at once, and let the United States Chiefs of Staff know as soon as we can the extent to which we would like to take advantage of their assistance.

3. Meanwhile, it has been possible to extract from these telegrams a brief summary of the Commander in Chief's views, and we think they should be brought to the notice of the Combined Chiefs of Staff before the Conference breaks up. Briefly, on the assumption that first priority must be accorded to raising the capacity of the air route to China, the Commander in Chief estimates that:—

a. Even with the assistance now offered, he will be short on 1st March 1944, by a total of 102,000 tons, of the supplies and material required to enable him to fulfill the undertakings agreed at *TRIDENT* for Northern Burma.

b. The deficiency must either fall on the Ledo operation or must be shared between the Ledo and Imphal operations. It cannot be borne exclusively by the Imphal advance as the capacity then available would not enable us to maintain the forces necessary to repel a Japanese incursion.

c. If a certain reduction in the capacity allotted to the Ledo operations could be accepted, the Commander in Chief estimates that it should be possible to undertake a limited advance to the areas forward of Tamu and Tiddim which we occupied prior to the monsoon this year. It is not clear whether General Stilwell can accept this reduction however without causing the Ledo operations to be abandoned. In General Auchinlech's opinion the extensive use of L.R.P.Gs in the manner proposed by Brigadier Wingate will not alleviate the position since the L.R.P.Gs must be followed up by our

main forces to hold the ground gained, and the capacity of the L. of C. will not be sufficient for the purpose.

d. Even these limited operations will apparently absorb the whole capacity of the L. of C. for the coming winter, and will make impossible the long-term improvements of the L. of C. which are essential if we are to contemplate the longer term increase of supplies to China by land or by air.

4. We have not the figures available in Quebec to explain in detail how the Commander in Chief arrives at the above conclusions, and further investigation will be necessary in India before definite decisions can be taken as to what is to be done. Before this investigation can be carried any further, however, it is clear that a policy decision is required from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

5. Broadly speaking there are three possible courses open to us in Northern Burma in the dry season 1943-44; and it seems clear that the existing capacity of the L. of C. will not allow us to do more than one of these fully:—

First Course. To put our main effort into the land and air operations which are necessary to establish land communications with China and to improve and secure the air route. It is believed that this can only be done at the expense of the air lift to China.

Second Course. To give first priority of resources to increasing air supplies to China. It is believed that if this is to be done there will not be sufficient transportation capacity to sustain offensive operations in Northern Burma. The air route will therefore remain liable to interruption.

Third Course. To adopt a longer term policy and put our main effort into the development of the L. of C. so that we shall be able in the 1944-45 season both to make the air route secure and to deliver a far greater tonnage to China. This could be done if we are prepared to curtail land operations and accept a smaller rate of delivery to China in the meantime.

6. We should like to discuss these three courses with the United States Chiefs of Staff so that we shall be in a position to give guidance to the Supreme Commander immediately we return to London. Our own feeling is that we should adopt the first course and put our main effort into offensive operations with the object of establishing land communications with China and improving and securing the air route. We suggest that the successful conquest of Northern Burma in the coming dry season which should result in our joining

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hands with the Chinese, should go far to compensate the Generalissimo for a temporary reduction in the supplies he will receive by air. Priorities between the three courses will not be rigid and we therefore propose to instruct the Supreme Commander, in formulating his proposals, to regard this decision as a guide and bear in mind the importance of the longer term development of the L. of C.

C.C.S. 328/1

DIRECTIVE TO GENERAL EISENHOWER

Reference:

C.C.S. 116th Meeting, Item (3)

C.C.S. 328, 24 August 1943, circulated a proposed directive prepared by the Combined Staff Planners and their suggestion that General Eisenhower be given the full report which has been submitted to and approved by the President and Prime Minister.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 116th Meeting agreed that General Eisenhower should be furnished only those sections of C.C.S. 319/5 and 329/2 pertaining to operations in the European Theater. The directive to General Eisenhower, which transmitted extracts from C.C.S. 319/5 and C.C.S. 329/2, was circulated as C.C.S. 328/1.

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C.C.S. 328/1

27 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

DIRECTIVE TO GENERAL EISENHOWER

Note by the Secretaries

Attached hereto is the directive sent to General Eisenhower as a result of the *QUADRANT* Conferences. The enclosures referred to contain complete extracts of all information, included in C.C.S. 319/5 and C.C.S. 329/2, pertaining to the European Theater. The enclosures were too voluminous for publication but are available in the files of the Secretariat.

J. R. DEANE,
R. D. COLERIDGE,
Combined Secretariat.

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

27 August 1943

General D. D. Eisenhower,
Supreme Commander,
Allied Force Headquarters,
Algiers.

Dear General Eisenhower:

Attached hereto are two documents which are referred to you for your guidance.

Enclosure "A" includes extracts, pertaining to the European Theater, of the Final Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which has been approved by the President and Prime Minister.

Enclosure "B" includes extracts, pertaining to the European Theater, from C.C.S. 329/2 (Title: Implementation of Assumed Basic Undertakings and Specific Operations for the Conduct of the War, 1943-1944). This document has been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

With reference to Section IV, paragraph 15, "Operations in Southern France," your appreciation and outline plan should be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by 1 November 1943. The plan will be based on resources allotted to the Mediterranean Theater, vide, paper number C.C.S. 329/2, extracts from which are given in Enclosure "B."

In preparing the plan you will arrange for close consultation with the Supreme Commander for cross-Channel Operations or his Chief of Staff so that your plan may be coordinated with the requirements of *OVERLORD*.

Sincerely yours,

For the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ J. R. DEANE,

/s/ R. D. COLERIDGE,

Combined Secretariat.

C.C.S. 329/2

IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSUMED BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC
OPERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR, 1943-44

Reference:

CCS 116th Meeting, Item (6)

C.C.S. 329, 24 August 1943, circulated the report of the Combined Staff Planners on this subject for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

C.C.S. 329/1 circulated certain comments on the Dry Cargo Shipping Position presented by Lord Leathers and Mr. L. W. Douglas.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 116th Meeting considered C.C.S. 329 and C.C.S. 329/1 and approved the report as amended in the course of discussion.

The final approved report was circulated as C.C.S. 329/2.

C.C.S. 329/2

26 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

**IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSUMED BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC
OPERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR, 1943-1944**

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosed report of the Combined Staff Planners has been approved, as amended, by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE

**IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSUMED BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC
OPERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 1943-1944**

**AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES TO MEET THE
REQUIREMENTS OF CRITICAL STRATEGY**

Report by the Combined Staff Planners

1. We have examined the available means of the United Nations with the object of assessing our ability to carry out the policy agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
2. A summary of this policy, which has been taken as a basis of our investigation, is attached as Annex I.
3. We would emphasize that the purpose of this investigation is to examine whether the operations decided on at *QUADRANT* are within our resources, and not to imply binding commitments or decisions on the part of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. The principle has been accepted that, for war against Japan, the forces to carry out operations from the East, including the Southwest Pacific, shall be provided by the United States, and for operations from the West by Great Britain, except for special types not available to Great Britain which will be provided by the United States, or vice versa. The employment of Dominion forces will be a matter of discussion between all governments concerned.

5. Our conclusions are set out below.

GROUND FORCES (ANNEX II)

6. The necessary ground forces for operations from the United Kingdom and in the Mediterranean and Pacific theaters, can be made available. Searching investigations are proceeding to determine if the forces required for operations in Northern Burma can be found by the target date of mid-February 1944.

NAVAL FORCES (ANNEX III)

7. Apart from *BULLFROG* the naval forces necessary for approved operations will be available, subject to a revision of the support forces required in the Mediterranean, if a decision is made to execute the Southern France operation. No such revision can be made until a plan is available. For *BULLFROG* the requirements provisionally estimated at *TRIDENT* were as follows:—

2 Fleet Carriers (CV)	6 Escort Carriers (CVE)
3 Old Battleships (BB)	40 Destroyers (DD)
4 Heavy Cruisers (CA)	32 Escorts (DE)
6 Light Cruisers (CL)	8 Minesweepers
2 A.A. Cruisers	14 Submarines

It is estimated that the British will not be able to meet these forces in full and that there will be the following deficiencies:—

1 Escort Carrier (CVE)	8 Escorts (DE)
21 Destroyers (DD)	6 Submarines, at most

Note: The possibility of conflict of the deployment for *BULLFROG* with *OVERLORD* and the South of France operation must be borne in mind.

No additional operational commitments for British naval personnel can be met in addition to those planned up to 1 May 1944, except at the expense of some other operation or undertaking.

AIR FORCES (ANNEX IV)

8. The air resources required to meet the operations specified in this paper are available subject to:—

(a) The possible deficiency of land based aircraft for operations in the Pacific (See Appendix D) which may arise unless the war with Germany has been concluded in time to release the additional resources required.

(b) The decision that the operations in the Mediterranean Theater (See Appendix B) shall be limited to the capabilities of the air resources specifically allocated.

9. The extent of operations in support of resistance groups will be related to the advantages to be gained and will be limited by the supply of heavy bomber aircraft. Large-scale diversions of heavy bombers from the Combined Bomber Offensive are not forecast.

10. The major factor now restricting the support of air and ground forces in China by air transport is the deficiency of base facilities in Assam Province of India and of transportation into Assam Province from Calcutta.

ASSAULT SHIPPING AND LANDING CRAFT (ANNEX V)

11. There will be sufficient landing ships and craft for approved operations in 1943 and until the summer of 1944. Landing ships and craft will, however, be the bottleneck limiting the full scope of assault in the approved operations, both in the *PACIFIC* and the *ATLANTIC*. Appendices "A" and "B" of Annex V are made out on the assumption that landing craft will be sent from the *MEDITERRANEAN* to *OVERLORD* so as to arrive by 15 December 1943, and assault ships by 1 March 1944.

12. To provide sufficient landing craft after the summer of 1944, an acceleration and increase in the present British and U.S. assault shipping and landing craft programs is necessary, probably at the expense of cargo ship and escort production and certain army items.

SUPPLY OF CRITICAL ITEMS (ANNEX VI)

13. In the absence of detailed plans of operations for each theater, it is not possible to give finalized requirements and estimated detailed shortages of critical items. A provisional estimate is, however, set out in Annex VI. Temporary shortages will exist for a few special items, (as set out in paragraph

1 b of Annex VI). It is anticipated that these deficiencies will be made up early in 1944, and they do not appear to be of great consequence.

SHIPPING (ANNEX VII)

14. Apart from a small deficit in the Pacific, which will be met by the end of the first quarter of 1944, there is sufficient personnel shipping capacity to meet our known requirements.

A careful operation of cargo shipping should enable us to meet all essential commitments.

The Shipping Annex (VII) takes no account of accommodation, depot and repair ships which will be required by the British Navy in the South-East Asia area for the satisfactory prosecution of the war against Japan.

OIL (ANNEX VIII)

15. An examination of the oil position has revealed that the critical item is 100 octane aviation gasoline, of which there will be a pronounced shortage through 1944. Steps are being taken to find a solution to this problem, not only by the substitution of lower grades of aviation gasoline for training and other purposes, but also by taking steps to expedite to the maximum extent possible the completion of the aviation gasoline manufacturing program.

16. In all theaters there is a very real need for smaller tankers, particularly where it is necessary to supply newly established beach-heads and bases. There appear to be sufficient large sea-going tankers, in existence and coming from new construction, to meet requirements for bulk movements of petroleum products.

ANNEX I

BASIS OF INVESTIGATION

The following operations and undertakings have been used as a basis for this investigation. They are not arranged in order of priority.

I — USE OF THE AZORES ISLANDS.

1. The British obtain the use of facilities in the Azores from 8th October 1943 for intensified sea and air operations against the U-Boat.

2. These facilities are extended to embrace operational and transit use by the United States.

II — OPERATIONS IN EUROPE.

GENERAL.

3. The combined bomber offensive from all convenient bases. This operation will continue to have the highest strategic priority.

4. Support resistance groups in Europe.

OPERATIONS IN NORTHWEST EUROPE.

5. *OVERLORD* takes place on 1st May 1944 in accordance with the approved plan which allows for employment of the following:—

Assault: 5 divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing craft).
2 divisions — follow-up.
2 airborne divisions.

Subsequent build-up: At least 20 divisions.

Total: At least 29 divisions of which 7 divisions will return to U.K. from the Mediterranean.

6. As between Operation *OVERLORD* and operations in the Mediterranean, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be distributed and employed with the main object of ensuring the success of *OVERLORD*.

OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

7. Operations in the Mediterranean will be carried out with the forces allotted at *TRIDENT*. In addition such French forces as may be re-equipped and fit for war will be used.

8. *First Phase.* The elimination of Italy as a belligerent and establishment of air bases in the Rome area and, if feasible, further north.

9. *Second Phase.* Seizure of Sardinia and Corsica.

10. *Third Phase.* The maintenance of unremitting pressure on the German forces in north Italy.

11. Offensive operations against southern France to establish a lodgment in the Toulon-Marseilles area and exploit northwards in order to create a diversion in connection with *OVERLORD*. The target date for planning purposes — 1st May 1944.

12. Minimum essential defensive garrison commitments.

***III — OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND
FAR EAST THEATER.***

OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

13. As the main effort, carry out operations for the capture of Upper Burma in order to improve the air route and establish overland communications with China. These operations to include the extensive use of long range penetration groups. Target date — mid-February 1944.

The extent of these operations to be dependent upon logistic considerations as affected by the recent floods.

14. To continue to build up and increase the air routes and air supplies to China, and the development of facilities, with a view to: —

- a. Keeping China in the war;
- b. Intensifying operations against the Japanese;
- c. Maintaining increased U.S. and Chinese air forces in China;
- d. Equipping Chinese ground forces.

15. To continue preparations for an amphibious operation in the spring of 1944, of the order of those contemplated at *TRIDENT* for the capture of Akyab and Ramree.

16. Preparation of the necessary bases for operations in the Southeast Asia Command.

OPERATIONS IN CHINA.

17. Air operations in and from China.

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC.

18. Operations to seize:

<i>Objective</i>	<i>Target date for planning.</i>
GILBERTS	15th November 1943
MARSHALLS	1st January 1944
WESTERN NEW GUINEA	1st February 1944
NEW IRELAND	1st May 1944
PONAPE	1st June 1944
ADMIRALTY ISLANDS	1st June 1944
TRUK	1st September 1944
PALAU or)	
MARIANAS — GUAM)	31st December 1944

IV — OTHER UNDERTAKINGS.

19. Maintain the security and war making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and British Isles.

20. Support and maintain the war making capacity of our forces in all areas.

21. Maintain vital overseas lines of communications, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-Boat menace.

22. Undertake such measures as may be necessary to provide China with a volume of supplies to keep China actively in the war against Japan.

23. To sustain the Soviet forces by the greatest volume of munitions that can be supplied and transported to Russia without militating against the attainment of the over-all objectives.

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24. Continue to supply such equipment to Turkey as we can spare and as the Turks, in the opinion of the Commander in Chief, Middle East, can absorb.*

25. To provide for the maintenance of prisoners of war.

26. To provide for the economic support of countries occupied by the United Nations.

27. To re-arm and re-equip eleven French Divisions and supporting troops in North Africa by 31st December, 1943, insofar as this does not interfere with operations scheduled previous to *QUADRANT*.

* See paragraph *d*, C.C.S. 322/1.

Annex "I"

ANNEX II
 LAND FORCES

SECTION I — MEDITERRANEAN

1. RESOURCES AVAILABLE.

After allowing for the return to the United Kingdom of four American and three British divisions, there will be the following forces available in the Mediterranean on 1 November 1943:

	DIVISIONS			
	BRITISH	U.S.	FRENCH (Native)	TOTAL
	19§ (including 2 Polish)	5	5‡	29

2. UNDERTAKINGS (GARRISON REQUIREMENTS).

	BRITISH	U.S.	FRENCH (Native)	TOTAL
Sicily and Southern Italy	1	—	—	1
Sardinia	—	—	1	1
Corsica	—	—	1	1
N. Africa, Palestine, Syria, Cyprus	2	—	—†	2
Italy	4	—	—	4
	7	—	2	9

† The garrison commitment in N. Africa will be filled by French Divisions in training.

‡ Includes one F.F. division.

3. The balance which will, therefore, be operationally available on 1 November 1943, will be as follows:

	BRITISH	U.S.	FRENCH (Native)	TOTAL
	12§	5	3	20

§ Includes one airborne division.

4. After 1 November 1943, six further French (Native), divisions will become operationally available, making a total of 11 divisions in June 1944. Of these six further divisions, four will be required for garrison duties in N. Africa, leaving two extra divisions available for operations.

5. By June 1944, there will, therefore, be available in the Mediterranean theater 22½ Allied Divisions.

6. The British divisions shown as available in paragraph 1 above are exclusive of some 14 Independent Brigades which are the equivalent of four and two-thirds divisions, but have no supporting troops. These Brigades will assist in the garrison commitments shown in paragraph 2 above.

SECTION II — UNITED KINGDOM

7. FORCES AVAILABLE.

The forces available in the United Kingdom on 1 May 1944, will be as follows:

<i>British:</i>	13 divisions 3 divisions from Mediterranean 1 airborne division
<i>American:</i>	14 ex U.S. (includes 2 now in U.K.) 4 divisions from Mediterranean 1 airborne division ex U.S.

36

8. Of the above, five American divisions, which will be in the United Kingdom or enroute, will not be operationally available on 1 May 1944. These five American divisions will, however, be operationally available two months from their date of arrival and can, therefore, be used in the build-up subsequent to the initial assaults. During May, June and July 1944, assuming operations start in May, reception and dispatch facilities in the United Kingdom will limit the build-up to two, one and one division respectively, making the total number of American divisions in the United Kingdom and on the Continent approximately 23 by August 1944. Thereafter it is assumed that direct despatch from the U.S. to the lodgment area may be commenced at the rate of three to five divisions per month.

9. *FORCES OPERATIONALLY AVAILABLE ON 1 MAY 1944.*

The total forces which will therefore be operationally available on 1 May 1944, are as follows:

<i>British:</i>	16 divisions (includes Canadians)
<i>American:</i>	13 divisions
<i>Airborne:</i>	2 divisions (one British and one American)
<i>Total:</i>	31 divisions

In addition to the above, five American divisions will be available for the subsequent build-up which should continue at the rate, if practicable, of three to five divisions per month, starting about August 1944, through ports made available on the Continent.

SECTION III — INDIA AND BURMA

10. *REQUIRED FOR OPERATIONS.*

<i>British:</i>	8 2/3 divisions** (including five assault and two follow-up brigades) 6 long range penetration groups 1 parachute brigade
<i>Chinese:</i>	13 divisions

11. *RESOURCES AVAILABLE.*

Existing formations will have to be converted to find the additional L.R.P. groups required, unless these are found from west African formations, and the necessary suitable divisions for land operations in Northern Burma.

This matter is now undergoing detailed investigation in India, and in the War Office, and the effect of the implications cannot yet be assessed. These forces are not readily available, and therefore every effort must be made without delay to provide them from resources now available in India. The British undertake to clarify data on available resources for inclusion in this paper as an addendum. Chinese forces available amount to 22 divisions (assuming 10,000 to a division). This will allow nine divisions in reserve.

SECTION IV — THE AZORES

12. No significant land forces are required, the necessary facilities in the Islands having been made available as a result of negotiations.

** 2 additional divisions as reserve will be held in India.

SECTION V — THE PACIFIC

13. RESOURCES AVAILABLE.

The following major United Nations ground forces are present in or projected for the area as of 1 January 1944:

<i>Central Pacific</i>	4 Infantry Divisions
<i>South Pacific</i>	5 Infantry Divisions
	2 Marine Divisions
	1 New Zealand Division
<i>Southwest Pacific</i>	4 Infantry Divisions
	1 Infantry Division (1st Cav. Div.)
	1 Marine Division
	11 Australian Divisions
<i>Total</i>	<u>29</u>

Note: Of the above eleven Australian divisions, three infantry divisions (6th, 7th and 9th) are available for offensive operations; the remaining six infantry divisions and two armored divisions are presently assigned for defense.

14. REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTEMPLATED OPERATIONS.

The following additional divisions are required for operations in the Pacific and will be made available from U.S. resources:

	6 Infantry divisions (amphibious)
	1 Marine division
	1 Airborne division
Total additional	— <u>8</u>
Already allotted	— <u>29</u>
Total available and to be made available	37

This estimate is based on reorganizing divisions after combat and recommitting them to subsequent operations. Interchange of divisions between theaters is also contemplated. As a result, the above estimate of requirements should be considered a minimum for planning purposes.

ANNEX III

PROVISION OF NAVAL FORCES

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS

CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATIONS (OVERLORD).

1. Sufficient British light forces will be made available to counter a probable German threat within the Channel, while the British Home Fleet will be of sufficient strength to counter any move by German heavy units. The remaining naval forces required have not yet been assessed, but it is the intention that these shall be found by the British, with some augmentation from the U.S.

U.S. — U.K. MOVEMENT.

2. Two U.S. escort groups previously assigned to the UGF convoys (which are being discontinued) will be available for other employment commencing in September, 1943.

OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

3. On the assumption that British and U.S. combatant forces at present allocated to the Mediterranean are not reduced, sufficient forces will be available to support approved post-*HUSKY* operations, but not specifically for the southern France operation for which planning is not yet complete. If decision is made to execute that operation, a revision of support forces in the Mediterranean will be required, especially in view of the carrier borne air support considered necessary. It is the intention that the British will provide these support forces.

4. There is a requirement of 135 escorts in the Mediterranean for operational and through Mediterranean convoys. This requirement is at present being met by 116 British escort vessels with some assistance from British and United States destroyers. Certain of the British escorts have been loaned from the Eastern Fleet and from U.K. coastal convoys, leaving deficiencies therein.

PACIFIC OPERATIONS.

5. U.S. ships now available and becoming available in 1943 and 1944 are adequate for the operation now approved for the Pacific areas.

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS FROM INDIA.

6. The British can provide forces as follows:

Assault Forces

4 cruisers (CL)
5 escort carriers (CVE)
2 AA cruisers
5 destroyers (DD)
24 escorts (DE)
8 minesweepers
8 submarines at least

Covering Forces

2 fleet carriers (CV)
3 battleships (OBB)
4 heavy cruisers (CA)
2 light cruisers (CL)
14 destroyers (DD)

Note: The possibility of conflict of the above deployment with *OVERLORD* and the South of France Operation must be borne in mind.

7. At *TRIDENT* it was estimated there would be needed from the United States for the Akyab-Ramree operation, set for December 1, 1943, the following naval forces:

Assault Forces

5 escort carriers (CVE)
21 destroyers (DD)
6 submarines (SS)

Tanker Force

8 escorts (DE)

Covering Forces

Two fleet carriers (CV)
Should Italy be out of the war, the British will be able to provide one of these.
VICTORIOUS is counted as a United States unit.

Since then four additional escort carriers have been transferred to Great Britain. Further, major operations in the Central Pacific involving extensive use of naval forces will probably prevent these forces from becoming available for Burma operations in February, 1944.

ESCORTS.

8. General requirements for the escorts for the specific strategic operations projected in this paper can be met from our combined resources without unduly weakening the convoy escorts and support groups required for the existing convoy system, except as noted in paragraph 4. Additional escorts required for the north Russian convoys, should they be resumed, and for any necessary adjustments in existing convoy cycles can, however, only be met from new construction and a reduction in the number of support groups employed.

NAVAL PERSONNEL — GENERAL.

9. The accepted general policy is that landing craft will be manned and maintained by personnel from the nation supplying the forces engaged in the operation unless specifically arranged otherwise.

NAVAL PERSONNEL — BRITISH.

10. On the assumption that the manpower proposals now before the War Cabinet are approved, the British naval personnel for the approved operations will be found, although, in order to meet the *OVERLORD* requirements, it will be necessary temporarily to close certain schools and establishments. Personnel due to be returned from the Mediterranean for *OVERLORD*, or to proceed to India, must do so and cannot be held for the offensive operations against Southern France, which requirement must be met from those remaining on the station.

11. No additional operational requirements for British naval personnel, over and above that at present planned up to 1 May 1944, can be met, except at the expense of some other operation or undertaking.

NAVAL PERSONNEL — AMERICAN

12. Personnel for approved operations and maintenance of craft therefor can be provided. This involves a commitment over and above those agreed to at *TRIDENT*, to provide for *OVERLORD* 135 officers and 1511 men to man certain support craft involved in the U.S. part of the operation.

ANNEX "IV"

PROVISION OF AIR FORCES

1. The following appendices show the resources available to us for the various operations:

Appendix "A" — Combined Bomber Offensive from U.K. and Cross-Channel Operation *OVERLORD*.

Appendix "B" — Operations from the *MEDITERRANEAN*.

Appendix "C" — Operations in Southeast Asia.

Appendix "D" — Operations in the Pacific.

Appendix "E" — Support of Resistance Groups in *EUROPE* and *BALKANS*.

Appendix "F" — Air Operations in and from *CHINA*.

2. The group or squadron strength as measured in terms of unit equipment (U.E.) does not provide an exact measure of air force strength. Ability to endure prolonged periods of heavy combat activity is measured by the adequacy of reserves of airplanes and crews. The reserve airplanes are not included in the strength data as the percentage held in reserve varies with intensity of activity and with other factors.

3. The tactical role formerly assigned to dive bombers has been largely taken over by the fighter-bomber in the land-based air forces. Since the fighter is readily transposable to the fighter-bomber, it has been necessary to combine day fighter and fighter-bomber strengths.

APPENDIX "A".

COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM U.K.
AND CROSS CHANNEL OPERATION "OVERLORD".

1. After allowing for the fighter defense requirements of the U.K. and Northern Ireland not covered by the *OVERLORD* Operation, which will amount to 18 SEF Squadrons and 13 TEF Night Fighter Squadrons, it is estimated the following air forces will be available in the U.K. by 1 May 1944: (*TRIDENT* figures shown in parentheses.)

	U.S.A.A.F.			R.A.F.	
	Groups	Aircraft	Squadrons	Aircraft	
		<i>U.E.</i>		<i>U.E.</i>	
Heavy Bombers	54	2,592 (2448)	90	1,620 (1600)	
Medium Bombers	9	576 (576)	19	342 (240)	
Light Bombers	2	128 (832)	8	144 (274)	
Fighter Bombers)	35	2,625 (2500)	51	918 (960)	
Day Fighters)					
Night Fighters	$\frac{3}{4}$	36	11	198 (150)	
Fighter Recon.	4	280	8	144 (231)	
Photo Recon.	1	48 (168)	11	184 (100)	
Air OP		(336)	9	144 (160)	
Air/Sea Rescue			8½	170 (170)	
Transport	9½	494 (442)	9	240 (190)	
Total	115¼	6,779 (7302)	224½	4,104 (4075)	

2. The forces authorized during *TRIDENT* for operation *POINTBLANK* and *OVERLORD* will be available with the following exception

	<i>Allocated by TRIDENT</i>	<i>Estimated Availability</i>	<i>Indicated deficit</i>
Light and Dive Bombers	1092	272	820
Observation and Reconnaissance	1177	800	377

Battle experience has proved that the types of airplanes previously contemplated for dive bombing, observation and reconnaissance missions are not suitable for use in the European theater. The numerical deficiencies noted above have been offset by the assignment of types of superior performance.

3. COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE

a. Of the above U.S. forces, the 54 heavy bomber groups and 10 of the fighter groups are provided for the Combined Bomber Offensive.

b. Of the above R.A.F. forces, 90 heavy bomber squadrons, 13 medium bomber squadrons and the balance of fighter squadrons not specifically attached to the Tactical Air Force will be available for use with the Combined Bomber Force.

c. It has been decided to prosecute the Combined Bomber Offensive from all convenient bases. For this purpose the following air forces based in the Mediterranean may in due course become available:

- (1) U.S.A.A.F. — 6 heavy bomber groups (24 squadrons)
- (2) R.A.F. — 4 heavy bomber squadrons
6 medium bomber squadrons (Wellington).

4. BUILD-UP FOR COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE

Estimated Bomber Strength in Aircraft (U.E.)

		1 Aug. '43	1 Dec. '43	1 May '44
U.K. Bases	U.S.	560	980	2,592
	British	1,227	1,656	1,854***
Med. Bases	U.S.	367*	262	288
	British	212**	152	184
		—————	—————	—————
Total	2,366	3,050	4,918

* Includes three B-24 groups (103 U.E.) on loan from U.K.

** Three Wellington squadrons (60 U.E.) on loan from U.K.

*** Excludes six medium day bomber squadrons.

Note: These data include only heavy bombers from the U.S.A.A.F. For the R.A.F. heavy and medium (Wellington) bombers are included.

5. CONCLUSION ON AVAILABILITY OF FORCES

There will be sufficient forces available for the Combined Bomber Offensive, and for *OVERLORD*, with the exception of 270 transport aircraft.

Consideration is being given to the transfer of four additional troop carrier groups (208 airplanes U.E.) from the Mediterranean to United Kingdom for Operation *OVERLORD*. If accomplished, this action will leave a deficit of 62 troop carrier transport aircraft against the requirement for 1,004 transports.

Appendix "A"
Annex IV

APPENDIX "B"

OPERATIONS FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN

1. The following Air Forces will be available in the Mediterranean area as of 1st October 1943: (*TRIDENT* figures shown in parantheses.)

	U.S.A.A.F.		R.A.F.	
	Groups	Aircraft U.E.	Squadrons	Aircraft U.E.
Heavy Bomber	6	262 (210)	2	32 (32)
Medium Bomber	7	399 (399)	7	136 (120)
Light Bomber (2)	1	57 (171)	8	128 (128)
Fighter Bomber)	14	1,028 (1,084)	50	800 (932)
Fighter, Day)				
Fighter, Night	1	48 (48)	8	128 (112)
Fighter, Recon.	1	48 (—)	—	— (—)
Photo. Recon.	2	96 (—)	3	36 (—)
Transport	7	364 (364)	5½	137 (48)
Totals	39	2,302 (2,276)	83½	1,397 (1,372)

2. Operations planned for the Mediterranean area after *HUSKY* are predicated upon the employment of the forces now available in the theater after garrison requirements are met.

3. The garrison forces required for the defense of the Mediterranean Area upon conclusion of operations after the collapse of Italy are estimated at 853 day and night fighter airplanes, leaving 1,151 day and night fighter airplanes to support further operations in Italy and the south of France.

4. After air bases have been secured in Central Italy, the heavy bombers and medium (Wellington) bombers of this force should in due course become available to complement the Combined Bomber Offensive effort from bases in U.K. (See Appendix "A," paragraph 3 c.).

5. Consideration is being given to the transfer of additional troop carrier groups to U.K. for Operation *OVERLORD*. (See Appendix "A," paragraph 5).

Appendix "B"
Annex IV

APPENDIX "C"
S.E. ASIA OPERATIONS
SQUADRONS AVAILABLE AS OF FEBRUARY, 1944

CLASS	TRIDENT COMMITMENT (In Squadrons)				AVAILABLE FEB., 1944 (In Squadrons)		SURPLUS OR DEFICIT
	N. BURMA	AKYAB AND RAMREE	DEFENSE INDIA & CEYLON	TOTAL	BRITISH	U. S.	
HEAVY BOMBER	5			5	3	4	+ 2
MEDIUM BOMBER	-			-	2	4	+ 6
LIGHT BOMBER (2)	4			4	5	-	+ 1
FIGHT-BOMBER)							
FIGHTER, DAY (1))	10	12	6	28	31	7	+ 5
FIGHTER, RECCO.	4	1	-	5	4	1	+ 1
FIGHTER, DAY (2)	4	-	-	4	2	1	+ 2
FIGHTER, NIGHT	-	-	1	1	2	3	+ 1
PHOTO RECCO.	3	1	-	4	2	3	+ 1
AIR O.P.	-	-	-	-	1	-	+ 1
COASTAL PATROL	2	-	-	2	4	-	+ 2
TORPEDO BOMBER)							
TORPEDO FIGHTER)	1	-	-	1	2	-	+ 1
TRANSPORTS	6*	-	-	6	5**	2**	+ 1
TOTAL	39	14	7	60	61	22	+ 23

* 150 Transport Aircraft.

** The 5 R.A.F. Squadrons and 2 U. S. Squadrons have a total U. E. of 151 transports.

APPENDIX "D"

AIR OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC

1. SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC.

a. Operations in the New Guinea — Bismarck — Admiralty Islands subsequent to *CARTWHEEL*.

(1) *Operation*. Seizure or neutralization of eastern New Guinea as far west as Wewak and including the Admiralty Islands and Bismarck Archipelago. Rabaul is to be neutralized rather than captured.

(2) Assumed period of operation 1 December, 1943 to 1 September, 1944.

(3) *Estimated Air Forces Required*.

Bomber (H)	144
Bomber (M)	192
Bomber (L & D)	171
Fighters	536
Reconnaissance	136
Patrol Bombers (MS)	48
Patrol Bombers (LS)	12
Transports (T/C)	234
Total	1,473

(4) *Availability*.

The 2,579 aircraft allocated to the South and South-west Pacific as of 1 January, 1944, including Army, Navy, R.A.A.F. and R.N.Z.A.F. will be sufficient to carry out the operation.

b. Operations in New Guinea subsequent to the Wewak-Kavieng operation.

(1) *Operation*. An advance along the north coast of New Guinea as far west as Vogelkop, step by step airborne — waterborne advances.

(2) Assumed period of operation 1 August, 1944 to 31 December, 1944.

(3) *Estimated Air Forces Required for each Successive Operation.*

	<i>Ftr.</i>							
	<i>B (H)</i>	<i>B (M)</i>	<i>B (L&D)</i>	<i>Ftr.</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>T/C</i>	<i>Rec.</i>	<i>Total</i>
Hollandia	196	256	256	400	39	208	24	1,379
Wakde Is.	196	256	128	200	39	208	24	1,051
Japan-Schouten Is.	384	320	256	500	52	520	24	2,056
Manokwari	196	256	256	600	52	520	24	1,904

(4) *Availability.*

Prospective deployment of aircraft in this theater, in addition to the 2,579 allocated as of 1 Jan., 1944, is dependent upon the situation in the European Theater. Unless Germany has been defeated in time to permit the deployment of some of the heavier types of aircraft, it is anticipated that there will be a deficiency at the period under review.

2. *CENTRAL PACIFIC.*

a. *Operations in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands.*

(1) *Operation.* Seizure and consolidation of these islands. Initial operations envisage seizing the center nucleus by simultaneous assault or a step by step advance from the Gilberts through Jaluit and Mille. Aircraft requirements are considered to be approximately the same for either method.

(2) Assumed period of operation, 15 November, 1943 to 15 March, 1944.

(3) *Estimated Air Forces required, exclusive of ship-based aircraft.*

Bomber (H)	104
Bomber (M)	64
Bomber (L & D)	288
Fighters	288
Photo. Recco.	12
Patrol Bombers (HL)	36
Patrol Bombers (ML)	24
Patrol Bombers (MS)	72
Patrol Bombers (LS)	24
Transports (T/C)	12
	<hr/>
Total	924

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

(4) *Availability* .

The addition of one heavy bomber group and one medium bomber group will be necessary to carry out this operation.

b. Ponape Operation.

(1) *Operation Capture of Ponape preparatory to the operation*




U. S. SECRET

BRITISH MOST SECRET

d. Palau Islands.

(1) *Operation.* Capture of the Palaus including Yap. The plan calls for the initial capture of Yap and other suitable islands in the neigh-



APPENDIX "E"

SUPPORT OF RESISTANCE GROUPS
IN
EUROPE AND BALKANS

1. The following British aircraft are allocated to the support of resistance groups in *EUROPE* and the *BALKANS*:

	<i>Heavy Bombers</i>	<i>Miscl. Aircraft</i>
U.K. Bases	22	14
Med. Bases	36	—

2. No further heavy bomber aircraft can be allocated for this purpose without retarding the rate of build-up of heavy bomber squadrons in British Bomber Command.

3. Priority for aircraft has recently been given to the support of resistance groups in Greece and the Balkans.

4. Further assistance can therefore only be given to resistance groups in Europe at the expense of the Bomber Offensive, or the support of guerrilla forces in Greece and the Balkans.

5. Due to their special role in the Combined Bomber Offensive the heavily armed high altitude day bomber types used by the U.S. Army Air Force are not suitable or available for night operations in support of guerrilla forces.

APPENDIX "F"

AIR OPERATIONS IN AND FROM CHINA

1. The 14th Air Force in *CHINA* has a strength, as of 23 August 1943, of one (1) heavy bomber group (35 U.E.), one (1) medium bomber squadron (13 U.E.) and five (5) fighter squadron (125 U.E.). If logistical considerations permit, the U.S. fighter force in *CHINA* will be expanded to thirteen squadron (325 U.E.) by March, 1944. The medium bomber strength will be augmented to one group (57 U.E.) by 1 January 1944.

2. The Chinese Air Force will have, by 1 January 1944, four medium bomber squadrons (40 U.E.) and 10 fighter squadrons (100 U.E.). The fighter force will be expanded in 1944 to 20 squadrons (200 U.E.).

3. The Air Transport Command has, as of 23 August 1943, available in *INDIA* sufficient aircraft to lift tonnage to *CHINA* at the rate of 7,000 tons per month.

4. The provision of base facilities and refueling facilities in Assam Province are at present the major factors restricting the flow of material to *CHINA*. It is anticipated that the monthly lift to *CHINA* will be increased to 10,000 tons per month by November, 1943. Further expansion of the Air Transport facilities into *CHINA* is under consideration.

ANNEX V

ASSAULT SHIPPING AND CRAFT

GENERAL SITUATION

1. See Appendix "A" for the allocations and estimated availability of British landing ships and craft to 1 January 1945, and Appendix "B" giving the same information for U.S. landing ships and craft. The quantity and rate of new production are shown in the Appendices. Appendix "C" contains the casualty rates and serviceability factors used for planning purposes.

2. The present position in landing ships and craft is such that there is everywhere a deficit of landing craft. Operations are limited in many cases solely by the lack of these vessels.

3. Studies are under way which it is hoped will increase the rate of U.S. landing craft production. However, the result of these studies at the present time indicates that such an acceleration cannot be felt before April 1944. Similar efforts should be made in the U.K. to improve the situation for *OVERLORD*, the Mediterranean and later to prosecute the war in the Far East. The British have indicated that there may be difficulty in manning amphibious craft in additional numbers.

FUTURE OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN CONNECTION WITH OVERLORD

4. The assault ships and craft now in the Mediterranean are all that can be provided for immediate post-*HUSKY* operations in that theater.

5. In accordance with the guiding principle that, "as between operation *OVERLORD* and operations in the Mediterranean, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be distributed and employed with the main object of insuring the success of *OVERLORD*," future operations in the Mediterranean should not be allowed to encroach upon the assault craft planned at *TRIDENT* to be withdrawn from the Mediterranean for *OVERLORD*. Production both in the U.S. and U.K. together with the necessities in other theaters will permit *OVERLORD* to be satisfactorily mounted by 1 May 1944 only if these Mediterranean ships and craft are used. The Tables of Appendices "A" and "B" indicate the numbers and types of the U.S. and British ships and craft so involved as well as the scheduling of their delivery to U.K. The

numbers are substantially the same as at *TRIDENT*. It may be necessary to move 15 additional LCT(5), or their equivalent LCT lift, from the Mediterranean to *OVERLORD*.

6. Bad weather likely to be encountered off the Bay of Biscay after November, together with the need for the early formation and training of the assault forces for *OVERLORD* makes it requisite that landing craft sent from the Mediterranean for *OVERLORD* be sent as soon as practicable and, in the case of British LCT types, not later than early November.

7. The combat loaders should be released as follows:

U.S. APA's and AKA's and AGC — as soon after immediate post-*HUSKY* operations as possible, and after a refit in U.S., to be utilized for training and participation in *OVERLORD*.

British LSI(L)'s — as soon after immediate post-*HUSKY* as possible for normal troop movements, principally to increase the *BOLERO* lift.

British LSH — as soon after immediate post-*HUSKY* operations as possible, for *OVERLORD*.

8. *a.* The nature of the assault on southern France in order to create a diversion in connection with *OVERLORD* is not known, as no definite plan has been formulated. The losses of landing ships and craft in *HUSKY* were much smaller than estimated at *TRIDENT*. Excluding planned withdrawals from the Mediterranean to *OVERLORD* and *BULLFROG*, it is estimated that there should be left available in the Mediterranean by 1 May 1944 sufficient assault ships and craft to mount approximately 27,000 troops and 1,500 vehicles. The ships and craft shown do not provide a balanced assault lift (See Appendices "A" and "B") and the lift is not great. However, any operations that may be planned are to be planned with the resources shown as available herein. Augmentation is not considered practicable without drawing from *OVERLORD*. The British LSI(L)'s available for operations against southern France should be on station by 1 March 1944.

b. In order to provide for carrying the small ship-borne landing craft which will be used in the Mediterranean the U.S. LST's to remain there should be the ones having davits.

OVERLORD

9. The assault shipping and craft indicated as available for *OVERLORD* in Appendices "A" and "B" are the same as at *TRIDENT* with very minor exceptions. Landing craft destined for *OVERLORD* will arrive in time for the operation, though the complete allotment of some types from the United States will not arrive as early as desired by *COSSAC*. This, however, cannot be improved.

BULLFROG

10. a. Three LSI(L) with their landing craft and one LSC have already been ordered to sail from the Mediterranean for India. One LSH, one LSI(H) and the remaining six LSI (L) with their landing craft, should be sailed so as to arrive in India by 15 November 1943. The ten U.S. and eight British LST for the operation are now on passage from the U.S. to India.

b. All the landing ships and craft requested by General Auchinlech for this operation will be available with the exception of 12 LCG(L) and 9 LCT(5).

c. The provision of LSP is dealt with in Annex VII.

d. The LSI(L) should be released immediately after the operation so as to be employed for trooping movements if not required for further operations.

PACIFIC OPERATIONS

11. Broad estimates of over-all requirements of assault shipping and landing craft for the campaign against Japan indicate deficiencies in certain types, particularly APA's, LST's, and LSD's.

12. The small U.S. APA's and AKA's now authorized and building by the Maritime Commission will be required in the early future and their completion is a matter of urgency. The Maritime Commission has been advised in this matter. In addition, others will be required to insure the speed of the advance across the Pacific toward Japan.

13. It is anticipated that the major British and U.S. landing ships and craft surviving *OVERLORD* can be made available to leave the European Theater in September 1944 for use in the Pacific and southeast Asia.

Annex V

CONCLUSIONS

14. *a.* There will be sufficient landing ships and craft for approved operations in 1943 and until the summer of 1944. Landing ships and craft will, however, be the bottleneck limiting the full scope of assault in the approved operations, both in the Pacific and the Atlantic.

Appendices "A" and "B" of Annex V are made out on the assumption that landing craft will be sent from the Mediterranean to *OVERLORD* so as to arrive by 15 December 1943, and assault ships by 1 March 1944.

b. In order to provide sufficient landing craft after the summer of 1944, an acceleration and increase in the present British and U.S. assault shipping and landing craft programs is necessary.

APPENDIX "A"

ALLOCATIONS AND ESTIMATED AVAILABILITY OF BRITISH
LANDING SHIPS AND CRAFT TO 1 JANUARY 1945

(Appendix "B" giving the same information for U.S. landing ships and craft follows Appendix "A.")

NOTE: The British Table indicates the delivery to the U.K. of 40 more LCM(3)'s than shown in the U.S. Table (Appendix "B," Table VII).

ALLOCATIONS AND AVAILABILITY OF BRITISH ASSAULT SHIPS AND LANDING CRAFT TO 1 JANUARY 1945

Present production and rate as indicated. Allocations will be varied to meet the needs of special operations.

(1)	L.S.I. (L)		L.S.I. (M)	L.S.I. (S)	L.S.I. (H) WHITE ENSIGN	L.S.H.	L.S.T.	L.S.G.	L.S.C.	L.S.E.	L.S.D.	L.C.T. (1) & (2)	L.C.T. (3) & (4)	L.C.T. (5) or (6)	L.C.T. (R)	L.C.I. (L)	L.C.I. (S)	L.C.G. (L)	L.C.G. (M)	L.C.F. (L)	L.C.S. (L) (1) & (2)	L.C.S. (M)	L.C.M. (1)	L.C.M. (3)	L.C.A.	L.C.A. Medg-row	L.C.P. (L)	L.C.P. (R)	L.C.P. (M)	L.C.V. (P)	L.C.V. (S)	L.C.V.	L.C.E.	
	WHITE ENSIGN	RED ENSIGN																																(2a)
1. Operational	1	-	-	-	4	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	60	61	-	2	27	-	-	11	11	22	65	98	99	-	197	87	14	95	138	43	6	
2. UNITED KINGDOM as at 1 Sept. 1943	1(a)	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	96(h)	34(b)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	4	-	1	-	-	7	-		
3. Training & X & D.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	29	45	40(d)	1	2	3	-	-	-	-	7	36	82	108	-	61	62	18	5	-	183	-	
4. Moved to theater by 1 Jan. 1944.	-	-	2	4	2	2	48	-	-	-	-	-	75(e)	-	4	44(f)	-	12(g)	-	10(g)	-	6	25	28	65	-	-	22	-	-	-	-		
5. Moved from theater by 1 Jan. 1944.	-	2(c)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
6. Total of lines 1, 2, 3 & 4 less line 5.	-	-	2	5	6	2	51	-	-	-	-	29	276	135	5	48	30	12	-	21	11	29	130	208	272	-	262	171	33	100	138	233	6	
7. Production from 1:9:43 to 1:1:44.	-	7(t)	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	2	2	-	112	7	16	18	10	13	-	6	4	30	60	63(i)	160	40	-	26	209	-	-	-	-	
8. Production from 1:1:44 to 1:5:44.	-	7(t)	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	87(j)	-	20	-	-	-	6	6	-	50	60	-	80	60	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
9. Total in U.K. on 1:5:44.	2	12(t)	4	5	6(s)	3	53	-	-	2	3	29	475	142	41	66	40	25	6	33	15	109	256	271	512	100	262	171	59	309	138	233	6	
10. Casualties estimated in OVERLORD.	1	3	1	2	1	1	24	-	-	-	-	-	172	57	19	29	18	12	3	15	7	53	98	87	198	50	99	43	-	130	-	-	3	
11. Remaining in U.K. after OVERLORD.	1	9	3	3	3	2	29	-	-	2	3	29	303	85	22	37	22	13	3	18	8	56	152	184	314	50	163	128	59	179	138	233	3	
12. Production from 1:5:44 to 1:1:45 incl. U.S. assignments already made.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	193(m)	-	-	-	-	-	47(m)	-	-	56	120	-	264	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
13. TOTAL disposable in U.K. on 1:1:45 less requirements in training i.e. lines 11 plus 12 less line 3.	1	9	3	3	3	2	29	-	-	2	6(n)	-	441(1)	69	21	35	19	13	50	18	8	105	236	102	470	50	102	66	41	174	138	50	3	
14. Monthly production rate	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30(m)	-	-	-	-	-	-	(m)	(m)	7	15	-	33	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
15. MEDITERRANEAN (Operational as at 1 Sept. 1943)	1	7	2	5	3	3	71	1	2	-	-	6	133	-	6	144	-	18	-	15	-	23	78	158	269	-	-	87	-	-	30	-	20	
16. Training	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27(o)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	18	65	68	-	26	70	-	-	36	-	-	
17. Lines 15 plus 16. Total in Med. on 1 Sept.	1	7	2	5	3	3	71	1	2	-	-	33	133	-	6	144	-	18	-	15	-	28	96	223	337	-	26	157	-	-	30	36	20	
18. Estimated losses in PRICELESS.	-	1	-	1	-	-	11	-	-	-	-	2	40	-	2	43	-	6	-	5	24	48	48	-	26	-	-	9	-	-	6	-	-	
19. Moved from theater (BULLFROG, OVERLORD)	1	6(u)	2	4	3	3	48	-	1	-	-	-	75	-	-	56	-	12	-	10	-	16	25	28	174	-	-	22	-	-	-	-		
20. Moved to theater	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
21. TOTAL available in Med. on 1 March, lines 17 plus 20 less lines 16 plus 18 plus 19.	1	2	-	-	-	-	12	3	1	-	-	4	18	-	4	45	-	-	-	-	-	2	29	82	47	-	-	39	-	-	21	-	14	
22. INDIA Operational	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	46	-	-	70	31	-	-	-	-	-	-	
23. Ancillary & Training	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	29	45	-	23	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
24. Lines 22 plus 23 Total in India on 1 Sept.	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	29	46	45	-	93	31	-	-	-	-	-	-	
25. Indian production to 1:1:44 and to arrive from U.S.A.	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	74	25(p)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
26. Moved to theater from U.K. & Med.	-	8(r)	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	-	-	109	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
27. Total available in India on 1 Jan. 1944.	1	8	-	-	1	1	8	-	1	-	-	-	-	5	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	17	-	120	134	-	70	31	-	-	-	-	-	
28. Indian production 1:1:44 to 1:1:45	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	155(p)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	

NOTES:

- (a) Refitting, completes December.
- (b) These 34 L.C.T.(5) are:- 6 now employed for boom defense, 15 at Scapa and 13 fitting for Scapa. The 6 employed on boom defense duties and the 13 fitting for Scapa are being returned for operational forces.
- (c) These need only be moved in time to arrive in Mediterranean by 1 March.
- (d) Of these 40 L.C.T.(5), 24 are to be returned to operational forces.
- (e) It is assumed that these will be returned for OVERLORD.
- (f) Assumes that only 18 out of a possible 42 L.C.I.(L) are assigned to the British. 24 extra, above the 20 shown in C.C.S. 244/1 have been shown as returning for OVERLORD.
- (g) See note (e) above. It is improbable that all of these will return.
- (h) These 96 include 49 engineless and 31 under major repair (chiefly stiffening) 14 at Scapa and 2 under conversion for Scapa, these latter 2 as well as those now engineless and those under major repair will come into operational forces.
- (i) Assumes that 40 are being assigned as replacements for those lost on passage.
- (j) Of these L.C.T. it is not expected that more than about 48 will be able to join their operational forces in time for OVERLORD.
- (k) Omitted.
- (l) An allowance has here been made for an extra 10 L.C.T.(3) or (4) to be used in training as 10 of the L.C.T.(1) or (2) now in use are old L.C.T.(1) and are practically falling to pieces.
- (m) The production of L.C.T., L.C.F.(L) and L.C.G.(M) has been shown as 30 per month between them. Any increase of production in L.C.G.(M) would, as at present planned, be at the expense of L.C.T.
- (n) These are from previous U.S. assignments.
- (o) These are all very old craft and barely fit for training.
- (p) 180 L.C.A. are being built in India, but the exact rate of production is hard to forecast, it is certainly slow.
- (q) Omitted.
- (r) 5 already approved, 3 more to be approved.
- (s) In addition there will be a further 11 Red Ensign L.S.I.(H).
- (t) These are 2 cargo hulls being converted in the U.K. and 13 C.1 B hulls assigned from U.S.A.
- (u) Released to troping. Not available for BULLFROG or OVERLORD.

GENERAL. No wastage rate has been allowed during the periods after operations.

APPENDIX "B"

1. This Appendix consists of eight tables showing allocations and availability of U.S. landing ships and craft.
2. Allocations will be varied to meet the needs of special operations.
3. Agreed estimates as to casualty rates and serviceability factors are indicated in the tables for planning purposes.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

TABLE I
ALLOCATIONS OF L.S.T.'s (As on completion of building and delivery.)

New production shown in parenthesis. No program exists beyond 1 Jan. 1945.
 New production herein allocated is estimated to arrive on station approximately 2 months after delivery.
 No losses have been considered. See Table II for estimated actual availabilities of L.S.T.'s.
 Allocations after 1 April 1944 are tentative only and are not to be considered as definite commitments.

ALLOCATED TO	1943				1944												1945
	AS of the 1st of each month				JAN.	FEB.	MAR.	APR.	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG.	SEPT.	OCT.	NOV.	DEC.	1 JAN.
	1 SEPT.	OCT.	NOV.	DEC.													
CENTRAL & NORTH PACIFIC	30	(18) (b) 48	(15) 63	(3) 66	66	66	(6) 72	(8) 80	(5) 85	(5) 90	(6) 96	(5) 100	(5) 105	(7) 112	(7) 119	(7) 126	(7) 133
SOUTH PACIFIC	40	(2) (b) 42	42	42	42	42	(6) 48	(6) 54	(5) 59	(5) 64	(5) 69	69	69	69	69	69	69
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC	36	36	36	36	36	36	(6) 42	(6) 48	(5) 53	(5) 58	(5) 63	(5) 68	(5) 73	(7) 80	(7) 87	(7) 94	(7) 101
BULLFROG & INDIAN OCEAN	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	(6) 16	(6) 22	(6) 28	(11) 39	(11) 50	(7) 57	(7) 64	(7) 71	(7) 78
TOTAL PACIFIC	116	136	151	154	154	154	172	192	213	234	255	276	297	318	339	360	381
DELIVERED U.K.	84 (c)	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84
HUSKY	76 (a)	76	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PLANNED FOR POST-HUSKY	see above	see above	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28
OVERLORD	0	0	(2) 50 (d)	(17) 67	(20) 87	(20) 107	(2) 110 (e)	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110
TOTAL ATLANTIC	160	160	162	179	199	219	222	222	222	222	222	222	222	222	222	222	222
AMPH. TRAINING U.S.	19	19	19	19	19	19	(2) 18 (e)	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
TOTALS	286	315	332	362	372	392	412	432	453	474	495	516	537	558	579	600	621

Notes:

- (a) No losses actual or estimated have been considered. This Table presents a picture as to where the original production has been or is planned to be allocated. (See Table II).
- (b) September production ready by 1 October.
- (c) 4 of these assigned to the Greeks but carried in this column for convenience.
- (d) 48 post-HUSKY survivors considered available for OVERLORD in C.C.S. 244/1 (TRIDENT) plus 2 assigned from new construction. Assume post-HUSKY survivors are sent U.K. in November.
- (e) 3 taken from amphibious U.S. training to fulfill C.C.S. 244/1 U.S. OVERLORD commitment.

TABLE II
ESTIMATED AVAILABILITY OF LST'S IN THEATERS

Based on allocations of Table I and time to reach theater and later, on loss rate of 10% for planned operations and an inoperative status of 40% of remaining vessels during the first month after an operation.

In areas where continuous operations are going on such as Solomons and S.W.Pacific a loss and wastage factor of 5% a month has been applied.

For operational purposes, it is considered that only 85% of LST's herein shown are serviceable at any one time.

Allocations in Table I after 1 April 1944 are tentative only and are not to be considered as definite commitments.

AVAILABILITY IN	1943				1944												1945		Attrition over a period of 19 months from these Estimates		
	1 SEPT.	OCT.	NOV.	DEC.	JAN.	FEB.	MAR.	APR.	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG.	SEPT.	OCT.	NOV.	DEC.	JAN.	FEB.		1 MAR.	
CENTRAL & NORTH PACIFIC	13 (a)	28 (b)	40 (c)	40 (d)	54 (e)	44 (f)	53 (g)	53	59	32 (h)	68 (i)	60	71	72	74	77	80	85	86	47 lost, 38%	
SOUTH PACIFIC (j)	26 (k)	36	36	36	34	32	31	30	35	39 (l)	42	45	48	46 (m)	48	46	46	46	46	46	25 lost, 53%
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC (n)	29 (o)	32	32	31	29	28	27	26	31	35 (p)	38	41	44	47	49	53	57	61	65	36 lost, 56%	
BULLFROG AND INDIAN OCEAN	10	10	10	5 (q)	9	8 (r)	8	8	8	8	14	20	25	27	48	56	37 (s)	50 (t)	65	23 lost, 36%	
TOTAL PACIFIC	77	106	118	112	126	113	120	118	134	114	160	175	189	202	217	231	220	240	252		
POST-HUSKY	73	40 (u)	20	16 (v)	17 (w)	15	15	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	11 lost, post-HUSKY, 15%
OVERLORD	-	-	48	48	48	67	87	110	110	80 (x)	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	50 lost, OVERLORD, 45%
TOTAL ATLANTIC	73	40	68	64	65	83	102	124	124	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	74		
AMPH. TRAINING U.S.	19	19	19	19	19	19	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	
TOTALS	169	165	206	195	210	215	240	260	278	206	252	267	281	294	309	323	312	332	344	All Theaters 56% attrition	

NOTES: (LST's available for Pacific amphibious training are taken from those in Central Pacific.)

- (a) Available after *COFFAGE* operation loss and damage.
- (b) Repaired damage from *COFFAGE* operation plus new deliveries.
- (c) LST from (b) above plus new deliveries.
- (d) Losses and wastage in operation *GALVANIC* in November plus new deliveries estimated to about balance each other.
- (e) Repaired damage plus new arrivals estimate available for *CATARACT* Operations.
- (f) Result of January loss and damage in *CATARACT*.
- (g) Repaired damage now available. Thus, of the original 66 allocated and on station by 1 March, the following total losses have been subtracted, *COFFAGE* 3, *GALVANIC* 4, *CATARACT* 5, total 13.
- (h) Available after deducting estimated loss and damage in *ROADMAKER* Operations in May.
- (i) *ROADMAKER* loss estimated as 6 which added to previous total of 13 makes total losses 19 for all operations considered which subtracted from original allocation, together with May allocation arriving leaves 66 available. Loss rate from here on estimated at 5% a month.
- (j) Loss rate calculated at 5% a month for continuing operations in *SOLOMONS*.
- (k) Only 27 are actually on station as of 1 Sept., 13 being delivered or enroute.
- (l) Estimate total loss of 16 up to June 1944 out of the original 54 allocated and arrived up to this time.
- (m) Loss rate not carried beyond this point because SOPAC operations should be about over.
- (n) Loss rate calculated at 5% a month for continuing operations in S.W. Pacific.
- (o) Only 29 are actually on station as of 1 Sept., 7 being delivered or enroute.
- (p) Estimate total loss of 13 up to June 1944 out of the original 48 allocated and arrived up to this time.
- (q) Estimate 1 lost in *BULLFROG*, 4 damaged in November, damaged craft back in service by 1 January.
- (r) Estimate 2 lost in *BULLFROG* and subsequent operations. No loss rate calculated until December 1944.
- (s) 10% lost, 40% damaged in December operations, Far East.
- (t) From repaired damage.
- (u) Result of loss and damage in September Operations in Mediterranean.
- (v) Result of loss and damage in October-November operations in Mediterranean.
- (w) Repaired damage brings total up to 17, attrition carried to April 1944 at 5% per month. Total loss post-*HUSKY* estimated 11.
- (x) *OVERLORD* plan estimates total loss as 45% by approximately 1 month after assault. Attrition not carried beyond this point.

TABLE III
ALLOCATION OF L.C.I.(L)'s (As on completion of building and delivery.)

New production shown in parenthesis. No program exists beyond 1 Jan. 1945.
New production herein allocated is estimated to arrive on station approximately 2 months after delivery.
No losses have been considered. See Table IV for estimated actual availabilities of L.C.I. (L)'s.
Allocations after 1 April 1944 are tentative only and are not to be considered as definite commitments.

ALLOCATED TO	1943				1944												1945
	As of the 1st of each month																
	1 SEPT.	OCT.	NOV.	DEC.	JAN.	FEB.	MAR.	APR.	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG.	SEPT.	OCT.	NOV.	DEC.	1 JAN.
CENTRAL AND NORTH PACIFIC		(9) (a)	(11)	(12)	(6)	(6)	(10)	(2)	(7)	(7)	(9)	(17)	(17)	(17)	(17)	(17)	(17)
	18	27	38	50	56	62	72	74	81	88	97	114	131	148	165	182	199
SOUTH PACIFIC		(2)		(2)				(6)	(6)	(7)	(8)						
	36	38	38	40	40	40	40	48	54	61	69	69	69	69	69	69	69
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC		(2)						(8)	(6)	(6)	(8)	(8)	(8)	(8)	(8)	(8)	(8)
	34	36	36	36	36	36	36	44	50	56	64	72	80	88	96	104	112
TOTAL PACIFIC	88	101	112	126	132	138	148	166	185	206	230	255	280	305	330	355	380
DELIVERED U.K.	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150
HUSKY	90	90	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PLANNED FOR POST-HUSKY	-	-	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66
OVERLORD	-	(2) 2	(5) (b) 31	(4) 35	(14) 49	(9) 58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58
TOTAL ATLANTIC	240	242	247	251	265	274	274	274	274	274	274	274	274	274	274	274	274
AMPH. TRAINING U.S.	15	(1) 16	16	16	16	(5) 21	(10) 31	(2) 33	(5) 38	(4) 42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42
TOTALS	343	359	375	383	413	433	453	473	497	521	546	571	596	621	646	671	696

Notes:

- (a) September production delivered by 1 October.
- (b) 24 post-HUSKY survivors considered available for OVERLORD in C.C.S. 244/1 (TRIDENT Estimate) plus the 7 previously assigned from new production. Assume post-HUSKY survivors are sent U.K. in November.

TABLE IV
ESTIMATED AVAILABILITY OF LCI(L)'s IN THEATERS

Based on allocations of Table III and time to reach Theater and later on loss rate of 10% for planned operations and on an inoperative status of 40% of remaining vessels during first month after an operation. In areas where continuous operations are going on, such as SoPac and S.W.Pac, an attrition factor of 5% a month has been applied.

For operational purposes, it is considered that only 80% of LCI(L)'s herein shown are serviceable at any one time.

Allocations after 1 April 1944 are tentative only and are not to be considered as definite commitments.

AVAILABILITY IN	1943				1944												1945			Attrition over a period of 10 months from these Estimates
	As of the 1st of each month.												JAN.	FEB.	MAR.					
	SEPT.	OCT.	NOV.	DEC.	JAN.	FEB.	MAR.	APR.	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG.				SEPT.	OCT.	NOV.	DEC.	
CENTRAL & NORTH PACIFIC	10 (a)	4 (b)	21 (c)	20 (d)	38 (e)	31 (f)	49	52	59	52 (g)	61 (h)	65	71	85	98	107	117	128	139	60 lost, 30%
SOUTH PACIFIC	28 (i)	31	35	38	31	25	30	29	29	25	39	44	50	48	46 (j)	46	46	46	46	23 lost, 55%
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC	28 (k)	29	32	33	32	31	30	29	28	25	39	45	49	55	60	65	67	71	76	34 lost, 55%
TOTAL PACIFIC	66	64	86	86	101	86	109	110	115	102	129	152	170	188	201	216	220	245	260	
POST-HUSKY	90	49 (l)	30 (m)	47	45	43	41	39	39	39 (n)	39	39	39	39	39	39	39	39	39	27 lost, post-HUSKY, 30%
OVERLORD	-	-	24 (o)	26	31	36	49	59	58	32 (p)	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	26 lost, OVERLORD, 45%
TOTAL ATLANTIC	90	49	54	73	76	79	90	97	97	71	71	71	71	71	71	71	71	71	71	
AMPH. TRAINING U.S.	15	15	15	15	15	21	31	35	38	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	
TOTALS	167	189	159	175	195	198	230	240	250	215	252	295	285	301	314	329	345	358	373	All Theaters 34% Attrition

NOTES: (LCI(L)'s needed for Pacific amphibious training are taken from Central Pacific allocation.)

- (a) 8 completed in August, not on station.
- (b) Result of *COFFAGE* loss and damage.
- (c) New arrivals plus repaired damage.
- (d) New arrivals about balance loss and damage in *GALFAC* operations.
- (e) Result of loss and damage in *CAPARACT* operations plus new arrivals.
- (f) Returned damage from *CAPARACT* plus new arrivals.
- (g) Available after deducting estimated loss and damage in *ROADMAKER* in May.
- (h) Returned damage from *ROADMAKER* plus new arrivals. From here on attrition calculated at 5% a month.
- (i) 28 on station, 10 being delivered or en route. Attrition figured at 5% a month.
- (j) Attrition not carried beyond this point because South Pacific operations should be about over, vessels will probably be reassigned.
- (k) 26 on station, 8 being delivered or en route. Attrition figured at 5% a month.
- (l) Result of loss and damage in September operations in Mediterranean.
- (m) Result of loss and damage in October-November post-HUSKY operations. Damage returned in December.
- (n) Result of all post-HUSKY losses and attrition to date, 27 LCI(L)'s, 30% attrition, not carried beyond 1 April 1944.
- (o) Assume these 24 LCI(L)'s will be transferred to OVERLORD in November from Mediterranean. Number is in accordance with C.C.S. 244/1.
- (p) OVERLORD plan estimates total loss at 45% by approximately one month after the assault. Attrition not carried beyond this point.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

TABLE V
ALLOCATION OF L.C.T.(5)'s (As on completion of building and delivery.)

New production shown in parenthesis. No program exists beyond 1 January 1945

New production herein allocated is estimated to arrive on station in European Theaters approximately 2 months after delivery and in Pacific Theaters approximately 3 months after delivery

No losses have been considered. See Table VI for estimated actual availabilities of L.C.T.'s. Allocations after 1 April 1944 are tentative only and are not to be considered as definite commitments.

ALLOCATED TO	1943				1944												1945
	As of the 1st of each month												1 JAN.				
	1 SEPT.	OCT.	NOV.	DEC.	JAN.	FEB.	MAR.	APR.	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG.		SEPT.	OCT.	NOV.	DEC.
CENTRAL & NORTH PACIFIC	44	(a) (8) 52	52	52	52	52	52	52	(11) 63	(12) 75	(11) 86	(23) 109	(23) 132	(23) 155	(23) 178	(23) 201	(23) 224
SOUTH PACIFIC	58	58	(4) 62	(4) 66	(8) 74	(10) 84	(8) 92	(5) 97	(11) 108	(11) 119	(11) 130	130	130	130	130	130	130
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC	55	55	55	(5) 60	(12) 72	(10) 82	(8) 90	(8) 96	(11) 107	(11) 118	(11) 129	(10) 139	(10) 149	(10) 159	(10) 169	(10) 179	(10) 189
TOTAL PACIFIC	157	165	169	178	198	218	234	245	278	312	345	378	411	444	477	510	543
DELIVERED U.K.	(b) 160	160	(2) (b) 162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162
HUSKY	101 (c)	101	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PLANNED FOR-POST-HUSKY	-	-	(c) 60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
OVERLORD	12	(6) (a) 18	(18) (d) 77	(19) 96	(8) (e) 115	(10) (f) 139	(7) 146	146	146	146	146	146	146	146	146	146	146
TOTAL ATLANTIC	275	279	299	318	338	361	368	368	368	368	368	368	368	368	368	368	368
AMPH. TRAINING U.S.	49	(4) (a) 53	(4) 57	(5) 62	(e) 50	(f) 37	(3) 40	(20) 60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
TOTALS	479	497	525	558	588	618	642	673	706	740	773	808	839	872	905	938	971

NOTES: (L.C.T.'s needed for Pacific amphibious training are taken from Central Pacific allocation.)

- (a) September production ready by 1 October.
- (b) 12 lost en route, have been or are being replaced to bring number for British to 150.
- (c) 10 sent from the Mediterranean to ANAKIN after HUSKY, carried in these columns for convenience. The effect of this deduction is shown in Table VI.
- (d) 41 post-HUSKY survivors considered available for OVERLORD in C.C.S. 244/1 (TRIDENT) plus 18 assigned from new construction. Assume post-HUSKY survivors are sent U.K. in November.
- (e) 12 withdrawn from amphibious training U.S. together with 8 new production to meet C.C.S. 244/1 OVERLORD requirements.
- (f) 13 withdrawn from amphibious training U.S. plus 10 from new production to meet C.C.S. 244/1 OVERLORD requirements.

TABLE VI
ESTIMATED AVAILABILITY OF LCT(5) & (6)'s IN THEATERS

Based on allocations of Table V and time to reach Theater and later, on loss rate of 20% for planned operations and on inoperative status of 40% of remaining vessels during first month after an operation. In areas where continuous operations are going on an attrition factor of 5% a month has been applied.

Allocations in Table V after 1 April 1944 are tentative only and do not represent definite commitments.

For operational purposes it is considered that only 75% of the LCT's herein shown are serviceable at any one time.

AVAILABILITY IN	1943				1944												1945				Attrition over a period of 19 months from these estimates
	As of the 1st of each month.				JAN.	FEB.	MAR.	APR.	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG.	SEPT.	OCT.	NOV.	DEC.	1 JAN.	FEB.	MAR.	APR.	
	1 SEPT.	OCT.	NOV.	DEC.																	
CENTRAL & NORTH PACIFIC	9 (b)	24 (c)	35	21 (d)	29 (e)	18 (f)	29 (g)	27	26	13 (h)	20 (i)	30	40	49	69	88	106	124	141	151	67 lost, 33%
SOUTH PACIFIC	46 (j)	46	49	51	48	49	50	55	62	67	68	75	82	89	85 (k)	85	85	85	85	85	45 lost, 25%
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC	48 (l)	50	48	46	44	42	45	55	62	67	70	78	85	92	97	102	107	112	116	120	66 lost, 26%
TOTAL PACIFIC	103	120	130	118	130	109	124	137	150	147	158	183	207	230	251	275	298	321	342	366	
POST-BUSKY	66 (m)	42 (n)	29 (o)	27	25	25	21	20 (p)	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	27 lost, Post-BUSKY 30%
OVERLORD	6	12	18	65 (q)	77	96	116	139	146	80 (r)	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	66 lost, OVERLORD 45%
TOTAL ATLANTIC	94	54	47	92	102	119	137	159	166	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
AMPH. TRAINING U.S.	49	53	57	62	50	37	40	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	
TOTALS	246	227	234	272	232	265	301	356	376	307	318	343	367	390	431	435	458	461	502	526	All theaters 46% attrition

NOTES:

- (a) LCT's available for Pacific amphibious training are taken from Central Pacific allocation.
- (b) 25 of the allocation of 44 not yet on station. Loss and damage to remainder in COFFAGE operation leaves 9 available.
- (c) Available after new arrivals plus repaired COFFAGE damage.
- (d) Available after loss and damage in GALVANIC operations plus new arrivals.
- (e) Available after returned damage from GALVANIC plus new arrivals.
- (f) Available after loss and damage in CAPARACT operations.
- (g) Available after returned damage from CAPARACT.
- (h) Available after ROADMAKER operational loss and damage in May.
- (i) Due to returned ROADMAKER damage. Attrition estimated at 5% a month from hereon.
- (j) 10 not on station. Attrition estimated at 5% a month for South Pacific operations.

- (k) Attrition not carried beyond this point because South Pacific operations should be about over. vessels will probably be reassigned.
- (l) Attrition estimated at 5% a month throughout.
- (m) 10 post-BUSKY survivors sent to ANAKIN, not carried beyond this point. Considered expended upon conclusions of final Indian Theater operations.
- (n) Result of loss and damage in September operations in Mediterranean.
- (o) Previous damage returned and 41 transferred to U.K. Attrition carried on until April at the rate of 5% a month in post-BUSKY operations.
- (p) Post-BUSKY attrition not carried beyond April, 1944. Estimate total post-BUSKY losses and wastage by this time as 27 LCT's or 30%.
- (q) 41 post-BUSKY survivors (C.C.S. 244/1) plus arrivals from U.S. bring total available for OVERLORD to 65 by this time. Assume post-BUSKY survivors are sent U.K. in November.
- (r) OVERLORD plan estimates total loss at 46% by approximately one month after the assault. Attrition not carried beyond this point.

TABLE VII
ALLOCATIONS OF LCM(3)'s AS DELIVERED
(New production and assignment in parentheses - cumulative totals in open figures)
Allocations after 1 January are tentative only and are not to be considered as definite commitments.
Casualty rates should be estimated at 30% for planned operations.
A survivability factor of 70% is estimated to apply to craft assigned.

As of 1st of each month	1943												1944			
	1 SEPT.	1 OCT.	1 NOV.	1 DEC.	1 JAN.	1 FEB.	1 MAR.	1 APR.	1 MAY	1 JUNE	1 JULY	1 AUG.	1 SEPT.	1 OCT.	1 NOV.	1 DEC.
1. CENTRAL AND NORTH PACIFIC	(47)a	(47)	(47)	(47)	(55)b	(55)	(53)	(75)c	(75)	(75)	(75)	(75)	(75)	(75)	(75)	(75)
2. SOUTH PACIFIC	428	475	522	569	624	679	734	809	884	959	1034	1109	1184	1259	1334	1394
3. SOUTHWEST PACIFIC	(40)a	(40)	(40)	(40)	(25)b	(25)	(25)	(25)	(25)	(25)	(25)	(25)c	(25)	(25)	(25)	(25)
4. SHIP-BORNE	242	362	422	462	487	512	537	562	587	612	637	662	687	712	737	757
5. PACIFIC POOL	(150)a	(150)	(150)	(150)	(150)	(150)	(150)	(150)	(150)	(150)	(150)	(150)	(150)	(150)	(150)	(150)
6. PACIFIC TOTAL	(156)	(182)	(222)	(262)	(289)	(389)	(469)	(609)	(749)	(889)	(1029)	(1169)	(1289)	(1389)	(1489)	(1584)
7. ATLANTIC	(15)a	(15)	(15)	(15)	(15)	(15)	(15)	(15)	(15)	(15)	(15)	(15)	(15)	(15)	(15)	(15)
8. DELIVERY TO U.K.	167	182	197	212	227	242	257	272	287	302	317	332	347	362	377	377
9. MEDITERRANEAN	674	674	674	674	674	674	674	674	674	674	674	674	674	674	674	674
10. OVERLORD	(112)a	(70)	(116)	(132)	(132)	(132)	(132)	(132)	(132)	(132)	(132)	(132)	(132)	(132)	(132)	(132)
11. SHIP-BORNE	24	24	42	74	106	138	170	202	202	202	202	202	202	202	202	202
12. LANT POOL	(10)a	(10)	(10)	(10)	(20)b	(20)	(20)	(20)	(20)	(20)	(20)	(20)	(20)	(20)	(20)	(20)
13. LANT TOTAL	(84)	(113)	(98)	(88)	(111)	(111)	(111)	(91)	(55)	(55)	(55)	(55)	(55)	(55)	(55)	(55)
14. MISCELLANEOUS & LOSSES TO DATE	443	443	443	443	443	443	443	443	443	443	443	443	443	443	443	443
15. GRAND TOTAL	(240)	(295)	(320)	(360)	(400)	(500)	(500)	(500)	(500)	(500)	(509)	(400)	(400)	(400)	(225)	(10)
16. PRODUCTION TOTAL	2834	3129	3449	3809	4209	4709	5209	5709	6209	6709	7218	7618	8018	8418	8834	8934

NOTES: All open figures are cumulative assignments from new construction, with no deductions made for attrition. The open figures under 1 September represent numbers on station that date as known from best data available. Allocations provide replacements estimated to maintain these numbers in stress, plus build-up in some instances indicated. In an area about 30% are distributed among bases for normal base maintenance. The rest may be assumed available for operations except for about 30% under repair at all times.

1. Allocation includes 10 for Pacific S.I.C. Units, 5 for Pacific training, 10 for replacement bases, etc., and 2 for Hawaiian training unit.

2. Allocation increased to allow for added Pacific bases.

3. Allocation includes 10 for combat replacements and build-up, plus 10 for bases.

4. Allocation reduced in accord COMSOPAC 2201020/201 stating base requirements filled by January 1944.

5. Allocation retained for planning, although South Pacific may merge with Southwest Pacific about July and allocation would then likewise merge.

6. Allocation includes Southwest Pacific Army and Navy requirements. It is built up to 150 and retained as that until total of 1,509 allocated. Thereafter reduced to 10 for replacement plus the possible 33 from 7 & after July 1944.

7. Allocation provides for new construction with fluctuations to go in and out of the pool under line 5.

8. Allocation fluid to absorb construction not otherwise allocated. Pool provides replacements to combat leaders and miscellaneous operations plus reserve for future operations.

9. Allocation includes 10 for Lane S.I.C. Units and 5 for Last Training.

10. After delivery of 27 to U.K. in August, no further deliveries now planned to U.K. except as provided in 10 for OVERLORD (to U.S. in U.K.).

11. Six transferred to OVERLORD plus 48 on assault craft from line 11. Those on assault craft are still ship-borne so are not indicated as transferred.

12. Allocation fluid to provide total of 186 from U.S. plus 6 from Mediterranean by 1 April 1944. Forty-eight additional from Mediterranean assault ships make total of 238.

13. Allocation provides for new construction, with any fluctuations to go in or out of pool under line 12.

14. Allocation fluid to absorb construction not otherwise allocated. Pool provides replacements for combat leaders, miscellaneous operations, and future operations. Allocation to last pool reduced after OVERLORD to provide maximum for Pacific operations.

15. Figure represents unaccounted difference between 1 September construction total and numbers known on station. Number carried across to make allocations and construction figures balance.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

TABLE VIII

APA and AKA deliveries and estimated availability after deducting estimated attrition for operations.

All ships are pooled in the Atlantic and Pacific assuming they will be moved to areas as required for operations.

APA'S	1943				1944												1945					
	As of the 1st of each month.																					
	SEPT.	OCT.	NOV.	DEC.	JAN.	FEB.	MAR.	APR.	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG.	SEPT.	OCT.	NOV.	DEC.	JAN.	FEB.	MAR.	APR.	MAY	
<u>ALL PACIFIC</u>	(c)									(d)			(e)									
Cum. on Sta.	22/2	23/2	25/2	30/2	30/2	33/2	35/2	38/2	40/2	40/2	42/2	44/2	50/2	53/8	54/10	55/14	57/18	58/22	59/26	60/30	61/34	
Est. Avail.	22/2	23/2	27/2	27/2	28/2	28/2	28/2	30/2	32/2	32/2	33/2	35/2	41/2	41/4	42/8	43/12	45/16	45/18	44/22	46/26	47/30	
<u>ALL ATLANTIC</u>			(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)				(i)	(j)		(k)				(l)					
Cum. on Sta.	10	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Est. Avail.	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	7	7	7	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
		(m)								(n)			(o)									
Cum. Tot. on Sta.	32/2	34/2	39/2	41/2	41/2	44/2	46/2	49/2	51/2	51/2	53/2	55/2	58/2	61/6	62/10	63/14	65/18	66/22	67/26	68/30	69/34	
Cum. Tot. Avail.	32/2	33/2	37/2	37/2	38/2	38/2	40/2	42/2	39/2	40/2	42/2	45/2	45/4	46/8	47/12	49/16	47/18	48/22	50/26	51/30		
AKA'S																						
<u>ALL PACIFIC</u>																						
Cum. on Sta.	9	10	11	11	12	13	13	13	13	13	17	19	23	24/4	24/8	26/12	27/16	27/20	28/24	28/28	29/32	
Est. Avail.	9	10	10	9	10	10	10	10	10	10	13	15	19	18/4	18/8	20/12	21/16	20/18	21/22	21/26	22/30	
<u>ALL ATLANTIC</u>			(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)					(i)		(k)				(l)					
Cum. on Sta.	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Est. Avail.	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	4	4	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
			(m)							(n)			(p)									
Cum. Tot. on Sta.	15	16	18	18	19	20	20	20	20	20	24	28	27	28/4	28/8	30/12	31/16	31/20	32/24	32/28	33/32	
Cum. Tot. Avail.	15	16	16	15	16	16	16	16	16	14	17	19	20	19/4	19/8	21/12	22/16	21/18	22/22	22/26	23/30	

NOTES:

- (a) All estimates are based on present estimates of deliveries which are subject to change monthly. 6 XAP's available in the Atlantic for emergency use as APA's are not included in the tables.
- (b) Left hand figures represent large APA's and AKA's, while right hand represents the small types, as Doyen, Peland, and the Maritime Commission program.
- (c) Initial distribution is 1 SW Pac, 8 So Pac and 13/2 in Central Pac. SW Pac has three old slow Australian ships converted to APA's for training purposes not shown in the table. 4 APA's and 1 AKA will also be required on the Pacific coast for training.
- (d) Present authorized program of large types completes by June 1944. Thereafter entries are based on a requested but not yet approved program. Estimates on small type Maritime deliveries starting in October 1944 are based on very limited information.
- (e) Available after loss of 1 APA and 1 AKA in *CARTWHEEL* (B).

- (f) Available after loss of 2 APA's and 1 AKA in *GALVANIC*.
- (g) Available after loss of 1 APA in *CARTWHEEL* (3).
- (h) Available after loss of 3 APA's and 1 AKA in *CATARACT*.
- (i) Available after loss of 1 APA in *LOCKJAW*.
- (j) Available after loss of 1 APA and 1 AKA in *WUDBANK*.
- (k) Available after loss of 3/2 APA's and 2 AKA's in *ROAD-MAKER*.
- (l) Available after loss of 3/2 APA's and 1/2 AKA's in *SPALDMATS*.
- (m) Available after loss of 1 APA and 1 AKA in Post-*HUSKY*.
- (n) Available after loss of 3 APA's and 2 AKA's in *OVERLORD*.
- (o) Transfer 3 to Pacific, leaving 4 in Atlantic for training.
- (p) Transfer 3 to Pacific, leaving 1 in Atlantic for training.

APPENDIX "C"

1. The following casualty rates and serviceability factors have been used in compiling Appendices "A" and "B."

CASUALTY RATES

	"OVERLORD" (As in "Over- lord" Plan)	Mediterranean (Post "HUSKY")	Indian Theater	Pacific U.S. Theaters	
LST	45%	15%	15%	10%	
LCT	45%	30%	30%	20%	} and 40% of remainder damaged for one month
LCI(L)	45%	30%	30%	10%	
Minor Landing Craft	50%	30%	30%	30%	

2. In theaters where continuous operations are in progress an attrition rate of 5% per month has been allowed.

SERVICEABILITY FACTOR

	"OVERLORD" as agreed at TRIDENT	Mediterranean (Post "HUSKY")	Indian Theater	Pacific U.S. Theaters
LST	90%	85%	85%	85%
LCT	85%	75%	70%	75%
LCI(L)	85%	80%	70%	80%
Minor Landing Craft	85%	70%	70%	70%

ANNEX VI

AVAILABILITY OF CRITICAL SUPPLY AND CONSTRUCTION ITEMS

GENERAL

In general, the United Nations will be able to provide the critical supply and construction items for the specific operations projected except as indicated hereafter. In the absence of detailed plans of operations and specific lists of equipment and supply requirements, a more definite statement is not justified.

a. Overall shortages of radar and radio equipment are rapidly being eliminated. Adequate distribution of these items to U.S. Army Air Forces will be made by the end of September, 1943. All requirements will be met by June, 1944.

b. Certain items of equipment, notably special Air Forces vehicles, heavy trucks, two and one-half ton amphibious trucks (DUKWs), landing vehicle tracked (L.V.T. II and L.V.T.(A)II) portable gasoline-driven generators, and cargo-handling equipment, are now short and must be expected to continue short for several months. Demands for these items are increasingly heavy and production is not yet sufficient to meet all requirements. The United States production of N.L. pontoon equipment may fall short of additional requirements and is, in any case, uneconomical of shipping. Urgent steps must therefore be taken to start production outside the United States.

I — USE OF THE AZORES ISLANDS

1. Requirements can be met, subject to the limitations indicated in general paragraphs above.

II — OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

OPERATION "POINTBLANK" AND OTHER AIR OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

1. Requirements are being met, subject to limitations indicated in the general paragraphs above.

SUPPORT OF RESISTANCE GROUPS IN EUROPE

2. Requirements can be met.

OPERATION "OVERLORD"

3. Requirements can be met. However, the low rate of troop movements to the U.K. during the spring and summer of 1943 has forced a high rate of movement during the fall and winter of 1943-1944. Limitations of cargo shipping and U.K. port capacity have necessitated preshipment of equipment for units scheduled to move from August 1943 to May 1944. A balance will be reached only about 1 May 1944. Preshipment has been accomplished by reducing certain equipment of units in training in the United States and depot stocks of these items to dangerously low levels. Should it become necessary to divert to some other theater U. S. air and ground units now destined for *OVERLORD*, part of the equipment for such units could only be made available by withdrawal from the United Kingdom.

4. Amphibious training facilities as required by the over-all plan are being provided to meet the arrival of landing craft.

5. The plans for establishment of the artificial harbors required by *OVERLORD* operations are being made the matter of thorough investigation and it is anticipated that means can be provided to meet the requirements. Consideration and all possible action is necessary to move pontoon drydocks and equipment in amounts comparable to landing craft transferred from the Mediterranean to *OVERLORD*.

OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

6. Since these operations are to be executed with the means now available in the Mediterranean, the only supply requirement (other than the completion of the equipment of the French forces) will be maintenance. Naval logistic requirements are either in the area or have been provided for.

III — OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST THEATER

OPERATIONS IN INDIA-BURMA-CHINA

1. Requirements insofar as they are known, can be met. Additional requirements are expected and it is probable that they can be met, subject to the limitations indicated in the general paragraphs, above.

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC

2. Requirements are being met.

IV — OTHER UNDERTAKINGS

GENERAL

1. Insofar as they are known, requirements can be met, subject to the limitations indicated in the general paragraphs, above.

REARMING AND REEQUIPPING OF FRENCH FORCES IN NORTH AFRICA

2. Equipment for 11 French divisions and the supporting troops in North Africa can be provided by 31 December 1943.

V — PROJECTED REQUIREMENTS FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

The range and speed of contemplated amphibious operations indicate heavy future requirements for amphibious vehicles and auxiliary servicing ships of all types. The provision of these vehicles and ships together with the development of new types requires urgent consideration. Such action has already been initiated as regards U.S. development and production of two and one-half ton amphibious trucks (DUKWs).

ANNEX VII

SHIPPING

PART I

BRITISH DRY CARGO SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS

1. British Military Cargo Shipping Requirements for the last four months of 1943 and the first half of 1944 have been reexamined in the light of the revised strategy, agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

These requirements are now as follows:

2. For the maintenance and build-up of British Forces overseas monthly sailings are required as follows:

(A) — 1943

<i>Theater Loading Area</i>	<i>September</i>		<i>October</i>		<i>November</i>		<i>December</i>	
	<i>U.K.</i>	<i>U.S.</i>	<i>U.K.</i>	<i>U.S.</i>	<i>U.K.</i>	<i>U.S.</i>	<i>U.K.</i>	<i>U.S.</i>
India & Ceylon	11	20	11	20	11	17	11	17
Mediterranean Theaters .	62	38	60	40	65	35	70	40
Russian Aid	10	—	10	—	10	—	10	—
Turkish Aid	2	3	2	3	2	3	2	3
Persian Gulf	2	4	2	4	2	4	2	4

(B) — 1944

<i>Theater Loading Area</i>	<i>January</i>		<i>February</i>		<i>March</i>		<i>April</i>		<i>May</i>		<i>June</i>	
	<i>U.K.</i>	<i>U.S.</i>	<i>U.K.</i>	<i>U.S.</i>	<i>U.K.</i>	<i>U.S.</i>	<i>U.K.</i>	<i>U.S.</i>	<i>U.K.</i>	<i>U.S.</i>	<i>U.K.</i>	<i>U.S.</i>
India & Ceylon	12	18	12	18	12	18	13	20	13	20	13	20
Mediterranean												
Theaters .	70	40	65	45	65	45	60	50	50	50	50	50
Russian Aid .	10	—	10	—	10	—	10	—	10	—	10	—
Turkish Aid .	2	3	2	3	2	3	2	3	2	3	2	3
Persian Gulf .	2	4	2	4	2	4	2	4	2	4	2	4

3. In addition shipping will be required for allied operational purposes as follows:

(A) *PRICELESS*. The shipping required for *AVALANCHE* now amounts to 126 vessels. It is probable that these will be required to be retained until

December, a smaller number, say 100, until February-March and thereafter about 50 for operations in the South of France and other Mediterranean movement. In addition, the Coaster Fleet in the Mediterranean will need to be retained indefinitely for internal maintenance.

(B) *OVERLORD*. Requirements in the initial stages will be 100 ocean-going ships and approximately 200 Coasters for the carriage of M.T. vehicles and a further 200 coasters for the carriage of stores.

Subsequently the majority of the Coasters will be progressively released but the stores lift will require tonnage of small ocean-going and large Coaster type up to a maximum of the order of 500,000 tons deadweight.

In addition, there may be a requirement for block ships for the construction of "Synthetic Ports" and it is possible that up to 50 vessels of some 450 feet length by 45 feet height keel to deck might be involved.

(C) *BULLFROG*. According to the present plan 21 M.T. ships will be required from January to April inclusive and thereafter approximately five ships monthly will require to be loaded within the Indian Ocean area on account of maintenance.

(D) *ALACRITY AND OATMEAL*. Operation *ALACRITY* will require three ships to sail towards the end of September but thereafter maintenance requirements will be extremely small. *OATMEAL* will require the sailing of 17 vessels for one voyage in September-October.

PART "II"

AVAILABILITY OF BRITISH CONTROLLED DRY CARGO TONNAGE
(1600 G.R.T. & OVER)

4. Total shipping available is estimated to be as shown below (million deadweight tons) :

<i>Date</i>	<i>Estimated losses (at rates approved by C.C.S.) during preceding quarter-year</i>	<i>Estimated new construction & transfers to British flag during preceding quarter-year</i>	<i>Estimated tonnage at date</i>
30 June 1943			18.6
30 Sept. 1943	.9	1.2	18.9
31 Dec. 1943	.9	1.3	19.3
31 March 1944	.8	1.3	19.8
30 June 1944	.9	1.2	20.1
	Average for the second half of 1943		18.9
	Average for the first half of 1944		19.8

5. The employment of this shipping is as follows (million deadweight tons) :

	<i>Second half of 1943</i>	<i>First half of 1944</i>
Estimated British-controlled tonnage .	18.90	19.80
Add "free" tonnage importing to U.K.	0.25	0.25
	<hr/> 19.15	<hr/> 20.05
Deduct average allowance for tonnage awaiting or undergoing repair . . .	2.40	2.50
	<hr/> 16.75	<hr/> 17.55
Deduct U.K. coastal tonnage	0.50	0.50
Tonnage permanently abroad .	2.25	2.25
	<hr/> 14.00	<hr/> 14.80

	<i>Second half of 1943</i>		<i>First half of 1944</i>	
<i>Deduct non-importing Naval & Military tonnage (including troopships) :</i>				
Naval Commissioned vessels	0.60		0.60	
Naval, Military & R.A.F. auxiliaries . .	0.65		0.65	
Miscellaneous Naval & Military Services (Northern Waters, Mediterranean & Indian Ocean areas)	0.60		0.60	
Troopships	1.25	3.10	1.25	3.10
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
		10.90		11.70
 <i>Tonnage required (expressed as an average over the half-year) :</i>				
I. for U.K. imports	8.75		8.25	
II. for Military commitments:				
Build-up & maintenance (after al- lowing for W.S.A. customary allo- cations and Bare Boats)	4.35		5.75	
Operations	0.90	14.0	0.90	14.90
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Deficit		3.10		3.20
		<hr/> <hr/>		<hr/> <hr/>

6. After allowing for imports in certain bare boat chartered ships and for 1,500 tons average in each scheduled *BOLERO* sailing, the deficits in tonnage shown above are equivalent to:

384 sailings in the last 4 months of 1943,
488 sailings in the first half of 1944.

These are allowed for in the U.S. statement in Part III.

7. No provision has been made for:

a. Shipment of coal to Italy. It is anticipated, however, that Italian shipping will contribute substantially towards this commitment.

b. Additional civil commitments to Portugal.

c. Possible provision of "blockships" for *OVERLORD*. This commitment is indefinite but is already the subject of urgent investigation under the direction of C.O.S.S.A.C.

PART III

U.S. CARGO SHIPPING POSITION

The requirements listed in the following summary include those expressed in paragraph 6 of Part II of this Annex, and in addition incorporate 50 ships for operation *PRICELESS* and 80 MT ships for operation *OVERLORD*, being the balance required after those to be provided from British controlled tonnage.

SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S. CARGO SHIPPING
 IN TERMS OF SAILINGS

<i>Requirement</i>	1943		1944	
	<i>Sept.</i>	<i>4th Qtr.</i>	<i>1st Qtr.</i>	<i>2d Qtr.</i>
(1) To maintain the war making capacity of <i>WESTERN HEMISPHERE</i>	44	134	136	136
(2) To maintain the war making capacity of <i>BRITISH EMPIRE</i>				
<i>a.</i> U.K. Import Program	75	309*	265	223
<i>b.</i> Regular Lend Lease Allocations	14	43	30	30
<i>c.</i> Ships bareboat chartered	17	52	58	35
(3) Lend Lease Allocations other than British				
<i>a.</i> Russian	21	56	64	75
<i>b.</i> French	4	12	12	12
<i>c.</i> China Defense	1	3	3	3
(4) Re-arm and re-equip <i>FRENCH</i> forces	Included in Mediterranean requirements.			
(5) Economic support of occupied countries (<i>Italy</i>)	The requirements for <i>Italy</i> are not included because they can not now be based on more than a rough guess and because Italian tonnage may be available to satisfy Italian requirements.			

* Includes 10 in compensation for British ships employed in Mediterranean operations.

<i>Requirement</i>	1943		1944	
	<i>Sept.</i>	<i>4th Qtr.</i>	<i>1st Qtr.</i>	<i>2d Qtr.</i>
(6) Supply of equipment to Turkey	Carried in British shipping.			
(7) Maintenance of prisoners of war	Included in Mediterranean requirements on basis of requisitions from theater.			
MILITARY OPERATIONS				
Support and maintenance of the war making capacity of U.S. forces in all areas.				
(8) Army and Navy requirements for minor areas	30	85	74	74
(9) U.K. (Army and Navy)	81	308	375	340
(10) MEDITERRANEAN (Army and Navy)	94	261	173	172
(11) CENTRAL PACIFIC Including Gilbert, Marshall and Caroline Islands.				
<i>Army</i>	12	46	46	57
<i>Navy</i>	35	79	77	90
(12) SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC — Including New Guinea-Bismarck-Admiralty Islands				
<i>Army</i>	29	127	143	159
<i>Navy</i>	30	95	83	58
(13) CHINA-BURMA-INDIA (Army only)	14	44	57	55
(14) ALASKA (Army and Navy)	40	114	88	87
(15) TOTAL REQUIREMENTS	541	1,768	1,684	1,606
(16) TOTAL AVAILABLE	549	1,731	1,905	1,982
(17) BALANCE	+8	-37	+221	+376

NOTE: a. The foregoing is based on the assumption that each BOLERO cargo ship will lift approximately 1,500 tons of British import cargo and on

the other hand the equivalent of 12 shiploads of measurement cargo on *BOLERO* account will be lifted monthly in U.K. import vessels.

b. See comments by Mr. L. W. Douglas and Lord Leathers below.

COMMENTS BY MR. L. W. DOUGLAS AND LORD LEATHERS
ON THE DRY CARGO SHIPPING POSITION

(Circulated as C.C.S. 329/1)

In May we pointed out that the deficiencies in shipping resources available to meet the estimated requirements during the last half of 1943 were susceptible of being satisfactorily managed. This appears to have been the case, though the last four months of this year indicate a tight position.

Now we believe that the suggested surpluses in the first half of 1944 do not reflect the real situation, first, because planned operations may impose heavier burdens on our resources than are now contemplated and, secondly, because the war requirements have not been fully submitted. This is emphasized by the fact that the estimated number of sailings required during each of the first and second quarters of 1944 is substantially less than during the last quarter of 1943.

We feel it necessary to add this comment lest the figures give rise to misleading interpretations.

/s/ L. W. DOUGLAS

/s/ LEATHERS

ANNEX VII

PART IV

PERSONNEL SHIPPING POSITION

BRITISH

1. In examining the British personnel shipping resources and determining their optimum deployment, the following assumptions have been made:—

a. That known operational requirements will be as in *a* of Table I attached and, for purposes of calculating the British aid to U.S. troop movements have been counted against British resources.

b. That British personnel will be required to carry out troop movements, other than operational, as scheduled in *b* of Table I attached.

c. That losses of escorted class of troopships during the period under consideration (September 1943-June 1944) will offset additions to the escorted troopship fleet, and that about seven percent of the escorted troopship fleet is permanently immobilized for repairs and refits. Losses of unescorted troopships cannot be made good by new construction, and the calculations have been made on a basis of no losses in this class.

d. That personnel movement to Mediterranean and Indian Ocean destinations and to South and East Africa is carried out through the Mediterranean on a monthly convoy cycle and that this and other troop convoy cycles remain as at present.

e. That the available British controlled personnel shipping in the Indian Ocean is capable of meeting local requirements (except for certain operational requirements) in that theater.

f. That troopships fitted for assault loading (LSI(L) and LSP) will be released to troop movement on conclusion of operations to which they are now assigned.

g. That the C.I.B. cargo ships which are being converted to LSI(L) in the U.S.A. will only be available for troop movement during their delivery voyage to the U.K. and thereafter will be used entirely on operations.

h. That the number of troopships in escorted *BOLERO-SICKLE* convoys may be increased to 30 ships if circumstances permit.

2. The *BOLERO-SICKLE* movement program during the period September 1943 to April 1944 makes demands on the fast unescorted class which are so exacting that there is no margin for contingencies.

3. Table II attached shows the extent of the assistance which it is estimated that British personnel shipping can provide towards the movement of U.S. troops on the following routes:—

U.S.A.	to United Kingdom (<i>BOLERO-SICKLE</i> movement)
Iceland	to United Kingdom (one division)
North Africa	to United Kingdom (equivalent of one division)
U.S.A.	to North Africa
U.S.A.	to India (transshipping in North Africa)
U.S.A.	to South or Southwest Pacific

Ship operating requirements may cause fluctuations in the movements scheduled for each month.

UNITED STATES

4. The deployment of U.S. personnel shipping, and of British personnel shipping which is estimated to be available for the movement of U.S. troops, is shown in Table III. It should be noted that Table III indicates capabilities under the distribution of troop lift assumed in this paper. A comparison of capabilities with forecast requirements shows the following general position:

a. Joint Army and Navy Requirements in Pacific.

Troop lift available in September will not eliminate the large backlog presently existing, but beginning in October, transport capacity will be available to meet monthly requirements and substantially to reduce this backlog. The tabulation below summarizes this situation.

Central, South and Southwest Pacific

	<i>September</i>	<i>4th Quarter</i>	<i>1st Quarter</i>	<i>2nd Quarter</i>
<i>Cumulative</i>	<i>1943</i>			<i>1944</i>
<i>Deficit</i>	56,500	24,900	14,400	700

b. Build-up of U.S. Forces in U.K.

(1) The requirement for a balanced force of approximately 1,416,000 U.S. Troops, including 19 divisions, in the U.K. by May 1944 can be met if the expectations over the period are realized. It is estimated that 14 U.S. divisions will be operationally available on 1 May 1944.

(2) The build-up of U.S. forces includes the transfer of 4 divisions from the Mediterranean area in November 1943, and of 1 division from Iceland in August 1943.

(3) The limitations on cargo reception in the U.K. during May, June and July 1944 will restrict build-up to two, one, and one divisions in the respective months. There is an indicated surplus of troop shipping in the Atlantic during the period between mounting date of *OVERLORD* and the date on which movements can be made direct into continental ports.

c. Mediterranean Requirements.

(1) Troop capacity to this area after August 1943 is based on replacement requirements.

(2) U.S. personnel shipping (2 XAP's) now in the Mediterranean is scheduled to augment the U.K. build-up program beginning in January 1944.

d. China-Burma-India.

The requirements for this area can be met.

e. Alaska.

The requirements for this area can be met.

f. Other Areas — Including Newfoundland, Greenland, Bermuda, Iceland, West and Central Africa, Caribbean and South Atlantic, Middle East and Persian Gulf.

Troop movements to these areas represent a very small proportion of the total and consist almost wholly of replacements. Total strengths show a gradual reduction.

GENERAL

5. Active examination is being made of measures to provide some margin for contingencies in this very tight program of United Nations troopship operation which the basic strategy during the period September 1943 — June 1944 demands.

6. It is pointed out that the early arrival of certain Port, Depot and Engineer units is essential if the maximum quantity of *BOLERO-SICKLE* cargo is to be handled, and high priority must be given to the dispatch of these troops in the *BOLERO-SICKLE* convoys.

TABLE I

a. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS COUNTING AGAINST BRITISH CONTROLLED TROOP SHIPPING FOR PLANNING PURPOSES

<i>Operation</i>	<i>Period Required</i>	<i>Capacity Required</i>	
1. Against Italy, Sardinia, Corsica	Sept. '43-Apr. '44	80,000	(including 10,000 in (U.S. assault ships to (be released not later (than 31 Dec. '43)
2. Southern France	May '44-June '44	25,000	
3. Burma (BULLFROG)	Aug. '43-Dec. '43) increasing to) Jan.-Apr. '44)	10,000 45,000	
4. Continental (OVERLORD)	Nov. '43-July '44	18,000	18,000 new LSI(L)

NOTE: The above figures include troopships which will have to be used as LSI (L) and LSP in the operations. In the case of OVERLORD the lift will be provided by cargo ships converted to LSI(L).

b. BRITISH TROOPING COMMITMENTS OTHER THAN OPERATIONAL

<i>Area</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
(i) Canada & North America to U.K.	10,500 per month	5000 Canadian Troops 5000 Air Force 500 Miscellaneous
(ii) U.K. to Gibraltar	1,400 per month)	Reinforcements and reliefs all via Mediterranean route.
U.K. to North Africa	10,000 per month)	
U.K. to Malta	1,100 per month)	
U.K. to Middle East	6,000 per month)	
U.K. to India & Persia	8,200 per month)	
U.K. to East Africa	800 per month)	
U.K. to South Africa	1,900 per month)	
	<u>29,400</u>	
(iii) U.K. to West Africa	1,700 per month	
(iv) West Africa to India	1,400 per month	Reliefs
	36,000 Sailing May-July 1944	82nd West African Division
(v) North Africa to U.K.	about 100,000 Nov. '43-Jan. '44 inclusive	One U.S. and three British divisions

Table I — Part — IV — Annex VII

ANNEX VII

TABLE II

ESTIMATE OF AVAILABILITY OF BRITISH PERSONNEL SHIPPING
FOR MOVEMENT OF U.S. TROOPS
AUGUST 1943 to JUNE 1944

<i>BOLERO-SICKLE</i>	<i>Aug.</i>	<i>Sept.</i>	<i>Oct.</i>	<i>Nov.</i>	<i>Dec.</i>	<i>Jan.</i>	<i>Feb.</i>	<i>Mar.</i>	<i>Apr.</i>	<i>May</i>	<i>June</i>
U.S.A.—U.K.	28,300	55,000	72,800	52,400	55,400	83,600	56,800	90,000	88,100	70,000	70,000
Iceland—U.K.	15,000	1,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
N. Africa—U.K.	—	—	—	25,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>MEDITERRANEAN</i>											
U.S.A.—N. Africa (a)	—	4,500	4,500	8,700	8,700	8,700	4,200	4,500	4,500	4,500	4,500
U.S.A.—India (b)	—	4,100	4,100	4,100	4,100	4,100	4,100	—	—	—	—
<i>PACIFIC</i>											
U.S.A.—S. Pacific	—	—	7,500	—	7,500	—	—	—	—	—	—

(a) To Casablanca
(b) Tranship in North Africa

Table II — Part IV — Annex VII

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

TABLE III
TO
PART IV OF ANNEX VII

ESTIMATED U. S. TROOP MOVEMENT CAPABILITY

Notes:

- (a) Movements include replacements.
 (b) Cumulative Strength reflects net build-up present or enroute

	1944											
	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	
1. Troop lift employed for movement of Marine Forces in Pacific including Alaska		51,800	55,500	54,800	55,700	50,100	56,900	36,100	37,400	39,300	37,400	
2. Troop movements to minor Areas. (Army & Navy) Cumulative Strength (Army only)	(261,300)	6,600	5,150	5,700	4,900	6,050	4,400	3,500	4,050	3,900	3,900	
3. U.K. Build-Up (Army Replacements)	4,000	6,300	9,500	9,300	10,700	18,200	29,500	19,000	20,000	25,000	25,000	
Troop Units from U. S. from Iceland from North Africa	36,900	78,900	167,700	46,800	156,000	177,700	90,800	143,200	190,000	92,000	66,000	
Cumulative Strength-End Month (222,000) Divisions	1	4	5	9	10	12	15	17	19	21	22	
4. Mediterranean (Army&Navy) Army Cumulative-End Month (525,800)	70,000	9,500	9,500	12,600	12,600	17,100	12,200	8,500	8,500	8,500	8,500	
5. Central Pacific (Army only) Cumulative-End Month (159,800)	1,400	25,500	15,300	13,900	13,700	21,500	14,600	28,600	20,600	19,200	30,600	
6. South & Southwest Pacific (Army only) Cumulative-End Month (373,700)	21,300	31,300	41,000	41,000	56,000	44,200	70,000	58,800	44,000	44,000	44,000	
7. China-Burma-India (Army only) Cumulative-End Month (50,100)	4,500	20,200	4,300	14,800	8,600	9,500	10,400	4,100	5,500	127,400	4,100	
8. Alaska (Army only) Cumulative-End Month (139,800)	34,000	2,700	2,500	2,500	2,500	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	
	171,800	154,800	152,800	149,800	145,800	142,800	142,800	142,800	142,800	142,800	142,800	

Navy movement provided for in addition to above figures.

Note: This table is based on a troopship capacity that allows for no unusual contingencies. Therefore, it should be interpreted as representing an optimum performance of all available troopships. Intra-area operating requirements may reduce troopship capability for short periods.

PART "V"

CONCLUSIONS

The presently estimated required troop lift in the Atlantic and India areas will be met within the prescribed period of time, but in the Pacific there is a deficiency which will be substantially reduced at the end of this year.

To achieve this result and to have a reserve against contingencies will impose a heavy strain on troop transports. After 1 May 1944 there appears to be, according to present calculations, an easing of this strain.

The combined cargo shipping position indicates a deficit of 29 sailings during the last four months of this year, and a surplus during the first half of 1944.

This deficit, if handled with full cooperation among the various demanders, can be covered, but even so, it indicates a tight position throughout the period.

ANNEX VIII

PETROLEUM

REQUIREMENTS

1. Estimates have been made of service demands of petroleum products to implement the specifically agreed *QUADRANT* decisions. While there has been no opportunity to make a combined final and detailed survey of refinery capacities and crude oil availability it is our judgment that adequate facilities exist, or are in process, or can be made ready in time to meet *QUADRANT* decisions requirements, with the exception of high grade aviation gasoline (100 octane or higher).

These estimates include essential civilian requirements.

100 OCTANE AVIATION GASOLINE

2. The critical petroleum item is 100 octane aviation gasoline. The total production of this grade of fuel is now being consumed and requests for allocations are far greater than can be met from production at the present time. Anticipated increase in production is offset by correspondingly increased requirements in the various theaters.

3. Based on current estimates there will be a daily world-wide shortage of 68,000 barrels during September 1943. This shortage decreases progressively until the first quarter 1944 when it is estimated that shortage will average 6,492 barrels per day. Requirements then increase over production until the end of 1944 when production fails to meet requirements by a total of 53,586 barrels per day.

4. The only apparent solution to this problem is priority of allocation to the theaters prescribed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and the substitution to the fullest degree of lower grades of aviation gasoline for training and other purposes until the new manufacturing program is more nearly in balance with requirements.

5. The Army and Navy Petroleum Board, acting through a staff of officers assigned to it by the U.S. Army and Navy, have taken steps to expedite to the maximum extent possible the completion of the aviation gasoline manufacturing program. The responsibility for this program rests with the Petroleum Administration for War and the joint service activities above mentioned are carried out in cooperation with that organization.

TANKERS

6. Existing large seagoing tankers plus conservative estimate of deliveries from new construction over the next several months will meet requirements for bulk movements of petroleum to areas of consumption.

7. In all theaters there is a very real need for smaller tankers, particularly where necessary to supply newly established beachheads and bases, as for operations in the Pacific, Southeast Asia, *OVERLORD* and the Mediterranean. They are particularly important for operations in the Pacific, and in addition are being requested in increasing numbers in the United Kingdom and the Mediterranean. Steps are now being taken to determine requirements. Such as cannot be supplied from present building programs will be requested in new construction.

PIPELINE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

8. The construction of the pipeline through Burma, and later into China, will greatly facilitate the delivery of petroleum products to allied forces in those areas. The ocean terminus of the pipeline will be served by an adequate battery of tanks to be erected, and these in turn will receive their deliveries from tankers, the supply for which is being planned.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

30 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 128

MESSAGES TO MARSHAL STALIN AND GENERALISSIMO CHIANG
KAI-SHEK, SENT AT THE CONCLUSION OF QUADRANT

Note by the Secretaries

Enclosed are messages sent by the President and the Prime Minister on 25 August to Marshal Stalin (Enclosure "A") and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (Enclosure "B").

H. REDMAN,

J. R. DEANE,

Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE "A"

August 25, 1943

From: Opnav

To: Alusna, Moscow

From Admiral Brown, Naval Aide to the President.

My immediately following message is most secret.

It should be seen only by Alusna, a decoder appointed by him and the Ambassador who is then requested to deliver it to the British Ambassador. If possible it should then be delivered by the British and American Ambassadors jointly to Marshal Stalin. Message should be carefully but closely paraphrased before delivery. Acknowledge receipt and delivery.

August 25, 1943

From: Opnav

To: Alusna, Moscow

Secret and personal to Marshal Stalin from the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

In our conference at Quebec, just concluded, we have arrived at the following decision as to military operations to be carried out during 1943 and 1944.

The bomber offensive against Germany will be continued on a rapidly increasing scale from bases in the United Kingdom and Italy. The objectives of this air attack will be to destroy the German air combat strength, to dislocate the German military, industrial, and economic system, and to prepare the way for a cross-channel invasion.

A large-scale build-up of American forces in the United Kingdom is now under way. It will provide an initial assault force of British and American divisions for cross-channel operations. A bridgehead in the Continent once secured will be reenforced steadily by additional American troops at the rate of from three to five divisions per month. This operation will be the primary British and American ground and air effort against the Axis.

The war in the Mediterranean is to be pressed vigorously. Our objectives in that area will be the elimination of Italy from the Axis alliance, and the occupation of that country as well as Sardinia and Corsica as bases for operations against Germany.

Our operations in the Balkans will be limited to the supply of Balkan Guerrillas by air and sea transport, to minor raids by Commandos, and to the bombing of strategic objectives.

We shall accelerate our operations against Japan in the Pacific and in Southeast Asia. Our purposes are to exhaust Japanese air, naval, and shipping resources, to cut the Japanese communications and to secure bases from which to bomb Japan proper.

ENCLOSURE "B"

August 25, 1943

From: Opanav

To: Alusna, Chungking

From Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President.

My immediately following message is most secret and should be seen only by Alusna, a decoder appointed by him, and the Ambassador who is then to deliver it to the British Ambassador upon receipt. If possible it should be delivered by the two Ambassadors at the same time to the Generalissimo. Message should be carefully but closely paraphrased before delivery. Acknowledge receipt and delivery.

August 25, 1943

From: Opanav

To: Alusna, Chungking

Secret and personal to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.

In order to vitalize operations in Burma, a command, separate from India, has been set up under Vice Admiral The Lord Louis Mountbatten to operate directly under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This, we think, will be an improvement in organization and further the concept of aggressive operations. Thus, we hope to obtain unity in our combined effort in the forthcoming Burma operations. Unity must be achieved if success is to be attained.

U. S. SECRET

BRITISH MOST SECRET

At the conclusion of the conference in Quebec, I hasten to bring to you certain proposals that have been advanced as to operations in your theaters and areas contiguous thereto.

First, to accelerate the build-up of the air freight route into China to provide greatly increased support for your air and ground forces.

Second, the heavy burden now imposed on the lines of communications from Calcutta to Assam requires immediate increase in their capacity. Instructions have been issued to provide additional river craft and rail transportation facilities which should result in an eventual lift of two hundred thousand tons a month into Assam.

Third, to carry out offensive operations in the coming dry season for the capture of Upper Burma with a view to increasing the capacity of the air route, and to making possible the reopening of an overland route to China. The security of these land and air routes is considered of vital importance to the build-up of an air offensive based in China. The operations as now proposed take the form of an attack from Assam into Burma via Imphal and Ledo, coordinated with an advance at the same time from Yunnan. These converging attacks are to be facilitated by the employment of long-range penetration groups in front of each column similar to those employed by Brigadier Wingate last spring. These columns are to be organized by Wingate. They will include British, American, and Indian contingents, all to be supported and supplied by air.

Fourth, preparations are underway for amphibious operations designed to contribute to the success of the North Burma campaign. At the same time steps are being taken to provide adequate naval forces to assure our naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean area and to interdict the enemy's sea communications into Rangoon. The precise objective for the amphibian attacks is still under investigation. The decision will not be made until Lord Mountbatten has had an opportunity to consider the various factors on the ground.

**MINUTES
OF
MEETINGS**

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

QUADRANT CONFERENCE

MINUTES

1ST MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER
WITH THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF HELD AT 1730,
19 AUGUST, AT THE CITADEL, ABRAHAM.

PRESENT

British

The Prime Minister
Mr. Anthony Eden
General Sir Alan F. Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
 Sir Dudley Pound
Air Chief Marshal
 Sir Charles F. A. Portal
Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Vice Admiral
 Lord Louis Mountbatten
Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay

U. S.

The President
Admiral William D. Leahy
General George C. Marshall
Admiral Ernest J. King
General Henry H. Arnold
Mr. Harry Hopkins

SECRETARIES

Brigadier General J. R. Deane
Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob

After welcoming the Combined Chiefs of Staff the President and Prime Minister agreed that they should read through the Report of Progress which had been submitted to them. (Note: The amendments to the report that were directed by the President and Prime Minister have been included in a revised copy of the report and have been published as C.C.S. 319.)

MR. HOPKINS raised the question as to whether *POINTBLANK* included air operations from Italy.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that it did not but it was anticipated that it might include such operations in the future. He said that one of the chief objectives of the *POINTBLANK* operation (in its first stage) was to destroy German fighter factories. Some of these can be better attacked from Italy.

GENERAL ARNOLD agreed and said it was contemplated that part of the *POINTBLANK* forces would eventually move so as to operate from Italian bases when they became available.

THE PRESIDENT asked if the operation included attacks on Ploesti.

GENERAL ARNOLD replied that the oil industry was one of the major objectives in the third phase of the plan and attacks on Ploesti, if not specifically mentioned in the plan, could be included in that phase provided suitable bases had become available.

THE PRESIDENT indicated that if we could reach bases as far north as Ancona in Italy they would be within striking distance of Ploesti.

It was then agreed that the plan for the combined bomber offensive should include attacks from all convenient bases.

THE PRIME MINISTER discussed the paragraph pertaining to *OVERLORD*. He indicated that he was in favor of the plan but that it must be understood that its implementation depends on certain conditions being fulfilled regarding relative strengths. One of these was that there should not be more than 12 mobile German divisions in Northern France at the time the operation was mounted and that the Germans should not be capable of a build-up of more than 15 divisions in the succeeding 2 months. If the German strength proved to be considerably greater than this, the plan should be subject to revision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

MR. HOPKINS said he did not feel that the Allies should take a rigid view of these limitations. He suggested that there might be 13 German divisions, or even 15 German divisions at two-thirds strength. Also it would

be difficult to assess what the German fighter strength would be at that time. In this regard, he felt that General Morgan's report was inelastic.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that there should be elasticity in judgment in deciding as to whether or not the operation should be mounted. He wished to emphasize that he strongly favored *OVERLORD* for 1944. He was not in favor of *SLEDGEHAMMER* in 1942 or *ROUNDUP* in 1943. However, the objections which he had had to those operations have been removed. He said that every effort should be made to add at least twenty-five per cent strength to the initial assault. This would mean an increase in the landing craft necessary but there are nine months available before the target date and much can be done in that time. The beaches selected are good but it would be better if at the same time a landing were to be made on the inside beaches of the Cotentin Peninsula. The initial lodgment must be strong as it so largely affects later operations.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that an increase in initial assault would greatly strengthen the *OVERLORD* operation.

THE PRESIDENT said that he would like to have the time of arrival of U.S. troops in England stepped up, and *GENERAL MARSHALL* indicated that a study with respect to this was now being made. He wished to emphasize that the shortage of landing craft places the greatest limitation on all of our operations. He cited the case of the Mediterranean, at the present time, and indicated that we could have made an entry into Italy before this, had landing craft been available.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that Mr. Lewis Douglas, Mr. Averill Harriman, and Lord Leathers had made an intensive study on the shipping situation which indicates that a large increase will be available as a result of our success in anti-U-boat warfare.

ADMIRAL KING said that the prospects are excellent that there will be more landing craft available than we had previously anticipated.

THE PRESIDENT said that a study is now being carried on looking toward the possibility of converting excess dry cargo ships into troop carriers. Such conversion takes about six months, but he felt that it should be carried out to the extent necessary to bring the cargo lift and troop lift into balance.

GENERAL MARSHALL reported that General Somervell is optimistic over the prospects of making up our present backlog in troop lift.

In discussing the paragraph pertaining to Italy *The PRESIDENT* asked if it was contemplated sending French troops to Sardinia and Corsica. He thought it desirable to use them in an operation against Corsica but considered it best not to use them in an operation against Sardinia.

SIR ALAN BROOKE expressed the thought that an attack against Sardinia depends entirely on what the Germans do with the forces they now have on that island. There is a possibility in the case of a collapse of Italy that the German force will be withdrawn entirely. In that case Sardinia will fall with Italy and a military operation to obtain it will not be necessary.

THE PRIME MINISTER wanted it to be definitely understood that he was not committed to an advance into Northern Italy beyond the Ancona-Pisa Line.

SIR ALAN BROOKE doubted whether we should have enough troops to go beyond this line, but it was not yet possible to say.

THE PRESIDENT asked if it was necessary to go further into Northern Italy in order to reach Germany with our aircraft.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL replied that it was not necessary but there was a distinct disadvantage in permitting the Germans to occupy the airfields in Northern Italy south of the Alps. This had a particularly bad effect in improving the warning service for all raids into Germany. Additionally, the airfields in Northern Italy have greater capacity than those in Central Italy. These need considerable work done on them before they can accommodate our big bombers.

In discussing the paragraph pertaining to a diversion in Southern France *The PRIME MINISTER* indicated that he would be hesitant in putting our good divisions into that area to meet the resistance which might be anticipated, and he doubted therefore if French divisions would be capable of an operation of the kind suggested.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that such a diversion would, of course, depend on what the German reactions had been and that troops would only be landed in Southern France if the Germans had been forced to withdraw a number of their divisions from that area. There are two routes by which it might be accomplished: from West Italy if our forces in Italy had been able to advance that far north; otherwise the landing in Southern France would have to be an amphibious operation.

MR. EDEN asked if there would be adequate air cover for an amphibious operation against Southern France.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL replied that the air cover would not be good.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that it would be well to consider, as an alternate plan, the possibility of flying supplies in for guerrillas who might be operating in the mountains thirty miles from the coast. This mountain area would constitute an excellent rendezvous point for Frenchmen who objected to being sent into Germany and who might take refuge there. He described such an operation as "air-nourished guerrilla warfare."

It was agreed that the possibilities of this proposal should be explored.

With reference to the Balkans, *The PRESIDENT* asked if plans were being prepared as to the action we should take in the event that the Germans withdrew from the Balkans to the line of the Danube.

SIR ALAN BROOKE replied that of course any such action would depend on the forces available. He did not think there would be any surplus from our main operation.

THE PRESIDENT said that he was most anxious to have the Balkans divisions which we have trained, particularly the Greeks and Yugoslavs, operate in their own countries. He thought it would be advantageous if they could follow up, maintain contact, and harass the withdrawal of the Germans if they should elect to withdraw to the Danube.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that Commando forces could also operate in support of the guerrillas on the Dalmatian coast.

THE PRESIDENT then referred to a suggestion made by the Netherlands Government that 1,500 potential officers should be trained in the U.S.A. with a view to organizing, if the Germans withdrew, formations in Holland to take part in the struggle against Germany.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that this would present no difficulty.

The discussion then turned to the garrison requirements and security of lines of communication in the Mediterranean.

It was generally agreed that there would be about forty-seven divisions available for operations in that area. These include the French, Greeks, Yugoslavs, and Poles in addition to the divisions of the U.S. and U.K. Seven of the latter were due to be brought back to the U.K. for *OVERLORD*.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that there are several British divisions that have to be reconstituted and that every effort is being made to do this as soon as possible. One expedient is the sending of nine independent battalions to North Africa to take over the guard duty now being performed by active formations.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the operations now envisaged made use of all the divisions that will be available. This, of course, is subject to fluctuation depending upon the enemy's reactions. He estimated, however, that seventeen to twenty divisions would be required in Italy, one in Corsica and Sardinia, and these, together with garrison troops in Cyprus and North Africa, would limit those available for other offensive operations. There was also a shortage of anti-aircraft artillery. So long as the Germans occupy Crete and Sardinia maintenance of anti-aircraft defense will be necessary in North Africa. However, every effort was being made to remedy this deficiency.

THE PRESIDENT reiterated his desire to use the Yugoslav and Greek divisions in the Balkans if the opportunity arose.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he believed that, barring the necessity to retain the oil output in the Balkans, it would be to the Germans' advantage to withdraw from that area.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that there were other raw materials, particularly bauxite, which the Germans secured from the Balkans that would cause them to hesitate to withdraw.

The discussion then turned to the occupation of the Azores.

THE PRESIDENT suggested that within a week or ten days after the British occupation of the Azores, he would send the Prime Minister a notice that a British and American convoy and some British and American air units were proceeding to the Azores and would expect to use the facilities of those islands. The British could then say to the Portuguese "that they were frightfully sorry that their cousins from overseas had descended upon them but that, having done so, there was little that they could do about it."

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed to this plan. He pointed out that the British were not at fault in failing to obtain the immediate use of these facilities for the United States. He had kept the President informed of events. He said the British have not given President Salazar any assurance as to what forces would be sent to help Portugal in case of attack. The British had only committed themselves to declare war on Spain in the event that she attacked

Portugal, and to afford such help to Portugal as was in their power against an attack by the Germans. He said that, if on the 8th of October, the British have entered the islands and no attack against Portugal had resulted, President Salazar would feel much better about permitting United States use of the Azores' facilities. Immediately upon occupancy, the British will make every effort by diplomacy to obtain the permit for United States entry.

MR. EDEN said that it had always been visualized that this would be done. He suggested that the proposed American-British convoy might sail in about a fortnight after the British entry. He thought that timing was an extremely important factor but he felt confident that the situation could be handled to everyone's satisfaction.

In discussing the command situation in Southeast Asia, *The PRIME MINISTER* pointed out that the setup agreed upon did not exactly coincide with the MacArthur model. He asked General Marshall if it might not be possible to have a British liaison officer appointed to General MacArthur's Staff.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that arrangements to accomplish this were under way at the present time, and, in addition, he was taking the necessary steps to see that the situation in the Southwest Pacific was adequately reported to the Prime Minister at frequent intervals.

When an examination of the final report had been concluded, *The PRIME MINISTER* referred to the long term plan for the defeat of Japan, on which he understood work had been proceeding ceaselessly since the last Conference. This plan was both strategical and technical. It would deal with such things as the best method of gaining access to China, the securing of airfields from which to bomb Japan, and the provision of synthetic harbors and *HABBAKUKS*. There was no doubt that the combined resources of the United States and the British Empire could produce whatever special equipment might be required to permit of the concentration of the enormous air forces which would be released to attack Japan after the defeat of Germany. But apart from such considerations, there were many political factors to be taken into account. Great Britain would be faced with difficulties in moving her veterans, many of whom would have been on continuous service for several years, forward into a new campaign. It might prove somewhat easier to arrange matters in the Navy and the Air Force, and in the war against Japan it would be the air which would be of vital importance. These difficulties would, of course, be overcome. Nevertheless he hoped that the work of the Planning Staffs would only be taken as foundation data. With their comparatively

circumscribed viewpoint, the Planners could not be expected to produce final solutions to the problems confronting our two nations. He hoped the Combined Chiefs of Staff would not think themselves limited by the results of the Planners' study of the war against Japan.

ADMIRAL KING said that the Chiefs of Staff never felt themselves so limited.

Continuing, The *PRIME MINISTER* said that he did not view with favor the idea that a great expedition should be launched to retake Singapore in 1945. He was most anxious not to set an aim for that year which would paralyze action in 1944. The campaign of 1942-43 had been most ineffective, and he felt ashamed that results in this theater had not been better. It was now proposed in the coming winter to extend the operation of the long-range penetration groups in Northern Burma, and he thought this should be supplemented by the seizure of the tip of Sumatra. If a strong air force could be lodged there, the Japanese could be brought to action, their shipping could be bombed, and they would be forced to gather resources to react against our initiative. Options would be kept open for subsequent action in either direction. Whatever happened, we must not let an ultimate objective paralyze intervening action, and he earnestly hoped that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would examine the possibilities in the Southeast Asian Theater, with the object of doing the utmost possible to engage all forces against the Japanese. Only in this way would our overwhelming superiority achieve rapid results against the waning strength of the enemy.

THE PRESIDENT said that he looked at the problem from a rather different angle. The position occupied by the Japanese might be compared to a slice of pie, with Japan at the apex, and with the island barrier forming the outside crust. One side of the piece of pie passed through Burma, the other led down to the Solomons. He quite saw the advantage of an attack on Sumatra, but he doubted whether there were sufficient resources to allow of both the opening of the Burma Road and the attack on Sumatra. He would rather see all resources concentrated on the Burma Road, which represented the shortest line through China to Japan. He favored attacks which would aim at hitting the edge of the pie as near to the apex as possible, rather than attacks which nibbled at the crust. Thus, provided Yunnan could be securely held, an air force could be built up through Burma in China, which would carry out damaging attacks on Japanese shipping. At the same time the attack through the Gilberts and Marshalls to Truk would strike the opposite edge of the slice of pie. If one might judge by the operations in the Solomon Islands, it would take many years to reach Japan, but the other side of the picture was the heavy attrition to which the Japanese forces were subjected in these operations.

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed his agreement with the President's simile, but inquired whether the conquest of Southern Burma was really necessary. The problem in Burma was not so much the finding of forces to deploy, but rather of overcoming the difficulties of an exiguous line of communication, and of a monsoon which limited operations to six months in the year. Burma was the worst possible place in which to fight, and operations could only be carried on by a comparatively small number of high class troops. There were large forces in the Southeast Asia Command, and it was for this reason that he hoped to see an attack on the Sumatran tip. An attack on Akyab could hardly be regarded as profitable.

THE PRESIDENT said that he also had never thought much of the idea of taking Akyab or Rangoon. The Generalissimo had favored the attack on Rangoon, because he thought that it would interfere with the Japanese communications, but these probably now ran across land from Bangkok, and the Japanese were in any event not so dependent on their line of communication as the Allied troops.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he favored the extension of Wingate's operations in Northern Burma, and the supporting advances; but he wished to emphasize his conviction that the attack on Sumatra was the great strategic blow which should be struck in 1944. *CULVERIN* would be the *TORCH* of the Indian Ocean. In his opinion, it would not be beyond the compass of our resources. We should be striking and seizing a point of our own choice, against which the Japanese would have to beat themselves if they wished to end the severe drain which would be imposed upon their shipping by the air forces from Sumatra.

THE PRESIDENT suggested that the Sumatra operation would be heading away from the main direction of our advance to Japan.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that nevertheless it would greatly facilitate the direct advances. The alternative would be to waste the entire year, with nothing to show for it but Akyab and the future right to toil through the swamps of Southern Burma. He earnestly hoped that careful and sympathetic study would be given to this, the Sumatra project, which he was convinced was strategically of the highest importance. He would compare it, in its promise of decisive consequences, with the Dardanelles operation of 1915.

THE PRIME MINISTER then read to the meeting a telegram recently received from General Auchinlech, reporting the opinion of Admiral Somerville that greater resources than had hitherto been deemed necessary would be required for the operations at Akyab.

THE PRIME MINISTER observed that Akyab, the importance of which had apparently been overlooked in the retreat from Burma, and which we had failed to take last winter, had now been turned into a kind of Plevna. It was against this that we proposed to employ the whole of our amphibious resources in the Indian Ocean in 1943-44. He could not believe that this was right.

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether the possession of Akyab was essential for an attack on Rangoon.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that it would certainly be useful in improving the scale of air attack which could be brought to bear on Rangoon, and possibly on Bangkok, but he doubted whether it was essential.

ADMIRAL KING said that he had always understood that Akyab was required in order that attacks might be made against the Japanese line of communication northward from Rangoon.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the principal importance of Akyab was as a stepping-stone to the conquest of Southern Burma.

Reference was then made to the air route to China, and *GENERAL ARNOLD* reported that the figure of 7,000 tons was almost certain to be reached in August.

THE PRESIDENT then inquired what would be the relationship between the Generalissimo and the new Allied Commander in Chief of the Southeast Asia Command.

He was informed that their relationship would be that of two neighboring Commanders in Chief. Liaison would be insured by the fact that General Stilwell would be the Deputy Commander in Chief, Southeast Asia Command, and also Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo. The arrangements made for the new command guarded against the diversion of resources destined for China, unless agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE PRESIDENT then suggested that it would be necessary to include in the final report a carefully considered paragraph relating to our action in support of Russia.

He was informed that this was under consideration, and an appropriate paragraph would be included.

THE MEETING then adjourned.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

QUADRANT CONFERENCE

MINUTES

2ND MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER
WITH THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF HELD AT 1730,
23 AUGUST, AT THE CITADEL, ABRAHAM.

PRESENT

British

The Prime Minister
General Sir Alan F. Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles F. A. Portal
Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Vice Admiral
Lord Louis Mountbatten
Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay

U. S.

The President
Admiral William D. Leahy
General George C. Marshall
Admiral Ernest J. King
General Henry H. Arnold
Mr. Harry Hopkins
Rear Admiral Wilson Brown

SECRETARIES

Brigadier General J. R. Deane
Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob

At the request of the Prime Minister, *BRIGADIER JACOB* read C.C.S. 319/3, a draft of the Final Report from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister containing the conclusions of the Quadrant Conferences.

There was no comment on Sections I, II, and III.

1. *FACILITIES IN THE AZORES ISLANDS*

With reference to Section IV, paragraph 1 *b*, *The PRIME MINISTER* asked if any measures had been taken as yet to prepare a combined British-U.S. convoy including escorts and air support to move to the Azores about two weeks after the original British occupation on 8 October.

ADMIRAL KING said that arrangements would be made for such a convoy to leave the United States on or about 20 October.

2. *EMERGENCY OPERATION TO ENTER THE CONTINENT*

THE PRESIDENT asked if a study was being made regarding an emergency entrance of the Continent and indicated that he desired United Nations troops to be ready to get to Berlin as soon as did the Russians.

GENERAL BROOKE replied that General Morgan's staff had prepared plans for such an entry and that they were based on several contingencies. These include a weakening of German resistance, a withdrawal of the German forces from France, or a complete German collapse.

3. *OPERATION "OVERLORD"*

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that he wished it definitely understood that British acceptance of the planning for Operation *OVERLORD* included the proviso that the operation could only be carried out in the event that certain conditions regarding German strength were met. These included the number of German divisions to be in France and a definite superiority over the German fighter force at the time of the initial assault. Further, that if it developed that the German ground or air fighter strength proved to be greater than that upon which success of the plan was premised, the question as to whether or not the operations should be launched would be subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In this connection he suggested that the United Nations have a "second string to their bow" in the form of a prepared plan to undertake Operation *JUPITER*. He did not in any way wish to imply that he was not wholeheartedly in favor of *OVERLORD*, but, at the same time,

he wished to emphasize that its launching was dependent upon certain conditions which would give it a reasonable chance for success.

It was decided that the Final Report to the President and Prime Minister should include a paragraph which would provide for continued planning for the launching of Operation *JUPITER* in the event that *OVERLORD* should have to be abandoned.

THE PRIME MINISTER also discussed the question of moving seven trained divisions from the Mediterranean to England. He agreed that at this time the decision to return the seven divisions to England was firm but that it was subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff if the strategic situation seemed to make such review advisable. He asked General Brooke if that was definitely understood.

GENERAL BROOKE said that at the present time it was planned that the seven trained divisions would return from the Mediterranean to England to participate in *OVERLORD* unless the situation forced the Combined Chiefs of Staff to reconsider this decision. This decision of course would be dependent upon the enemy situation at the time. It might be necessary to keep one or two of these trained divisions in the Mediterranean in order to create a more favorable situation for the success of *OVERLORD* or to avoid a setback in Italy.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that if it becomes necessary to make an interchange of divisions between England and the Mediterranean, it might be done without prejudice to the move of the seven divisions by exchanging others. For example, it might be necessary to send out a second Canadian division to complete a Canadian Corps and bring home a British division in its place. Meanwhile, he stated he had heard Brigadier MacLean give a presentation of the *OVERLORD* plan and that it seemed sound, but should be strengthened.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed to this and pointed out that actually there would be four and one-half divisions in the initial assault rather than a force of three divisions which had been suggested at the last conference with the President and the Prime Minister.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked if this would include an attack on the inside of the Cotentin Peninsula.

GENERAL MARSHALL said the present plans would not provide for such an operation but that if more landing craft could be made available there was a possibility that this landing would be included in the initial assault.

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed some surprise that the Commander in Chief, Portsmouth, had been designated as Naval Commander and he indicated that he had always thought of this officer as having administrative rather than outstanding tactical ability. He agreed with the choice of Air Commander in Chief.

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that he felt that the Commander in Chief, Portsmouth was the logical person to be given this command, particularly at this time. During the preliminary phases much of the naval planning and operations had to be accomplished between adjoining naval commands in Great Britain and he was the logical person to coordinate it. He said that if later events indicated the desirability, there would be no difficulty in designating a new commander.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had thought of giving this position to Admiral Ramsey who had been in command of the British naval operations in the attack on Sicily under the Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean. He would accept the present arrangement only if it were subject to review on the appointment of the Supreme Commander.

In discussing the transport of troops across the channel, the President recalled that in 1917 two light American passenger vessels, the *HARVARD* and the *YALE*, had been sent to England and had been utilized very successfully in transporting troops across the channel. He suggested that the world should be combed to see if vessels of this type could not be made available and thus increase the troop lift from England to France.

ADMIRAL KING said that the United States had been pretty well explored in this connection but he would see what else could be done.

THE PRIME MINISTER indicated the possibility of asking Canada to help out in this respect.

4. OPERATIONS IN ITALY AND SOUTHERN FRANCE

THE PRIME MINISTER said that there had recently been rumors that the Germans were planning to defend the Ravenna-Genoa Line in Italy, which is about 50 or 60 miles north of the Ancona-Pisa Line. He thought that our forces should proceed as far beyond their objective as possible with the troops allocated for the purpose.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt the Germans must defend on the forward or southern slope of the Apennines, in which case they would be somewhat south of the Ravenna-Genoa Line.

ADMIRAL KING agreed with this and thought that the terrain dictated a German defense on the Leghorn-Ancona position.

THE PRIME MINISTER felt that the further north in Italy the United Nations were able to progress, the easier would become the supply of guerrillas who might be assembled in the Maritime Alps. In this connection he said he was glad to see that steps had already been taken to investigate the possibility of intensifying fifth column activities in Sardinia. He thought that organizations such as the O. S. S. and the British S. O. E. should certainly enter Sardinia at this time. However, he suggested that if Italy capitulates, Sardinia would probably come into our hands without a struggle.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that there were conflicting reports in this regard. One was that the Germans would attempt to hold Sardinia and another was that they were assembling landing craft between Sardinia and Corsica for the purpose of effecting an evacuation.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that if an advance into Southern France appeared to be likely he thought that General Giraud and General DeGaulle should be brought into consultation by General Eisenhower and that French forces should be fully utilized.

THE PRESIDENT indicated that he felt guerrilla operations could be initiated in south central France as well as in the Maritime Alps.

5. *THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN*

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was glad to see that the Chiefs of Staff included provision that plans should be made for the defeat of Japan within 12 months after the collapse of Germany; this at least would be a target towards which we should work and it discouraged planning on the basis of a prolonged war of attrition.

The paragraphs concerning operations in the Central Pacific were read and *The PRIME MINISTER* suggested that these should result in bringing on a naval battle with the Japanese Fleet.

ADMIRAL KING said that was one of their main purposes but he did not feel that a large battle would develop until our forces had reached the Marianas.

6. *OPERATIONS IN THE INDIA-BURMA-CHINA THEATER*

THE PRIME MINISTER then asked for an explanation of what was meant by the directive to the Commanding General of the Southeast Asia

Command that he should give priority to operations in Northern Burma but at the same time keep in mind the long-term necessities for improving the lines of communication.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that priority must be set between operations and the maintenance of the lines of communications. This directive to the Commanding General, Southeast Asia Command, had been put forward to emphasize the importance of the Burma operations and, at the same time, to caution him to take a long-range view of the necessity for building up his lines of communication, without which no communications would be possible.

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out to the President that in giving priority to the operations in Northern Burma, the delivery of supplies into China might be reduced. He said he did not disagree with the decision but he had been charged with the responsibility for the delivery of supplies to China and he wished to point out that giving first priority to the reconquest of Northern Burma might make it impossible for him completely to fulfill his responsibility.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that this would be largely a matter of judgment for the commander on the ground. He cited the necessity of sending some 2,000 men to Yunnan as part of General Wingate's force to cover the Chinese advance from Yunnan. This would be an instance in which the delivery of supplies to China would be temporarily but justifiably interfered with.

THE PRESIDENT said that he wished to establish some proviso which would prevent commanders on the supply lines in China confiscating supplies intended for China for use in their own theaters.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that he thought that situation had been pretty well taken care of. However, he said that it was necessary for someone on the ground to have authority to make decisions regarding priorities. He said that if, for example, it was arbitrarily decided to use the entire capacity of the air transport route to supply General Chennault with gasoline, this very decision might jeopardize the success of the Burma operations which in themselves were essential to keeping China in the war.

THE PRIME MINISTER then referred to studies that were directed in the report submitted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He said that as far as he was concerned he had no objection to a study being made regarding the capture of Singapore but he was very much opposed to such an operation being adopted for 1945 if action in 1944 was thereby curtailed.

He would personally be quite unable to agree to an operation for the capture of Akyab and Ramree as the main amphibious operation for the Indian Ocean in 1944. At the Trident Conference, the capture of Akyab had been spoken of as a preliminary to operations in Southern Burma for the capture of Rangoon. Rangoon had then been dropped out for 1943-44, but Akyab had been retained, mainly to please Chiang Kai-shek. Later developments showed that the capture of Akyab would be a dangerous, sterile and costly operation directed against a point where the Japanese would be expecting attack. If we undertook it, we would hamstring operations in the Indian Ocean area to little purpose. He was quite prepared for a study of the operation to be made, and it might well prove right to carry it out as a sequel to some more profitable operation elsewhere; but he would not himself be able to subscribe to it as our main amphibious operation in the coming year.

THE PRESIDENT said General Wingate had informed him that the capture of Rangoon would not cut the Japanese line of communications since they were now largely supplied overland from French Indo China and Thailand.

7. SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

THE PRESIDENT asked if Thailand was included in the Chinese Theater.

ADMIRAL LEAHY replied that both French Indo China and Thailand had been included in the Chinese Theater. At the beginning of the discussion on the Southeast Asia Command, it had been intended that French Indo China should be included in it. However, any operations in this area were so far in the future that it was not necessary to include French Indo China in the new command at this time. The situation with regard to Thailand, however, was quite different. Operations to be undertaken by the Southeast Asia Command might well envisage a conquest of Thailand. Forces of the Southeast Asia Command were in a position to carry out such an operation if it appeared to be desirable, whereas, Chinese forces could do nothing as far as this area is concerned. He therefore felt that regardless of what the commitments to the Generalissimo might have been, Thailand should definitely be included in the area of the Southeast Asia Command.

ADMIRAL KING indicated that a check was to be made to see if French Indo China and Thailand had not been removed from the Chinese Theater in a more recent definition of bounds.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was anxious to make a public announcement regarding the formation of the Southeast Asia Command and also to indicate who the commander was to be. He thought that such a public announcement would indicate that much of the discussions at the *QUADRANT* Conferences had been concerned with the war against Japan which would set forth a sufficient reason as to why Russia had not been included in the deliberations. He asked General Ismay to make up a short statement for release to the press.

THE PRESIDENT said that the statement should make it clear that the Generalissimo still retains command of the Chinese Theater.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the announcement should be written in such a way as not to mention the use of Chinese troops in the Southeast Asia Command or give any indication of General Stilwell's place in the command setup. He said that General Stilwell is still the Generalissimo's Chief of Staff and that it would be offensive to the Generalissimo if he were not to be consulted before Stilwell was assigned his additional position. Moreover, he might expect that a Chinese deputy would be appointed. Actually, General Stilwell is being made Deputy Supreme Commander for the purpose of protecting Chinese interests and also to try and insure that Chinese forces would carry out their share of the plans devised by the Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia Command.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the mere announcement of the formation of the Southeast Asia Command would indicate General Stilwell's status at once. He thought that any announcement should be delayed until after the Generalissimo had been informed of the decisions.

MR. HOPKINS said that Dr. Soong had said that he had just had a telegram from the Generalissimo saying that the Supreme Allied Commander should be appointed forthwith.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that any difficulty could be overcome by making the announcement to the press extremely brief. He suggested, for example, that it might be as follows:

"It has been decided to establish a combined separate Southeast Asia Command. The Supreme Commander will be (here give the officer designated by name)."

He felt that the shorter the announcement the better it would be. General agreement was expressed with this proposal.

THE PRIME MINISTER then asked General Marshall if it would not be wise to place a paragraph in the Final Report to the President and Prime Minister providing for the designation of a British liaison officer as a member of General MacArthur's staff.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that he did not feel it would be necessary to include such a statement in the paper, but that he would see that the suggestion was carried out immediately.

8. *SPAIN*

THE PRIME MINISTER asked if the Chiefs of Staff's recommendations regarding Spain had been submitted to the Foreign Office.

GENERAL ISMAY informed him that the suggestions had been sent to the Foreign Office but no comments had as yet been received.

THE PRIME MINISTER indicated then that before committing himself on these recommendations he would like to have the advice of his government. He said that personally he did not favor putting "economic screws" on Spain at this time. The situation was still too critical. For instance, there were the negotiations with Portugal which should be settled before a new attitude regarding Spain is adopted. He said, however, that in any event even though the recommendations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff were approved, the timing as to their execution would have to be determined by the governments.

9. *TURKEY*

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed disagreement with the proposal to have the Commander in Chief of the Middle East empowered to determine what amount of supplies Turkey could absorb. He felt that this decision should be retained by the British Government. He said that the time has now come to ask Turkey for something in return for the aid which the United Nations have been giving her. He thought the Turks would be considerably relieved if they were only asked to carry out the recommendations submitted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff rather than being asked to give up their neutrality and enter the war.

It was decided to delete any reference to the Commander in Chief, Middle East's being allowed to determine the amount of supplies to be given Turkey.

10. *MEETING OF DR. SOONG WITH THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF*

After a brief discussion, it was decided that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would ask Dr. Soong to meet with them on Tuesday, 24 August.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

C.C.S. 106th Meeting

QUADRANT CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN ROOM 2208 CHATEAU FRONTENAC
ON SATURDAY, 14 AUGUST 1943, AT 1030.

PRESENT

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN
General G. C. Marshall, USA
Admiral E. J. King, USN
General H. H. Arnold, USA

General Sir Alan Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles Portal

ALSO PRESENT

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA
Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN
Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN
Rear Adm. O. C. Badger, USN
Maj. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA
Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA
Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA
Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA
Comander W. L. Freseman, USN
Commander V. D. Long, USN

Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Vice Admiral
Lord Louis Mountbatten
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay
Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster
Admiral Sir Percy Noble
Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready
Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh
Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN
Brigadier W. Porter
Air Commodore W. Elliot
Brigadier M. W. M. Macleod

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier H. Redman
Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA
Captain F. B. Royal, USN
Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, RN

1. *CONDUCT OF THE CONFERENCE*

With reference to the Conduct of the Conference,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed:

- a. That the meetings should be daily at 1430.
- b. That there should be morning meetings when necessary.
- c. That the numbers attending should be limited to about 12 on each side. Closed sessions will be held as may be found desirable.
- d. That it should be understood that attendance of the Planners is not mandatory as they would often have other work demanding their attention, in which case they might be represented by one of their members.
- e. That in general the procedure should follow the lines of the *TRIDENT* Conference, with specific reference to recording of decisions, approval of minutes, reports to the President and Prime Minister and the form of the Final Report.
- f. That they would meet tomorrow.

2. *SECTIONS I, II AND III, C.C.S. 242/6*

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note:

That Sections I, II and III of C.C.S. 242/6 (*TRIDENT* Conference Report to the President and Prime Minister) had been accepted for the *QUADRANT* Conference, it being understood that courses of action were not thereby excluded from consideration which might appear likely to facilitate or accelerate the attainment of the over-all objectives. The Sections to be reaffirmed at the conclusion of the *QUADRANT* Conference.

3. *AGENDA*

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the sequence put forth in the suggested agenda presented by

the British Chiefs of Staff and directed the Secretaries to incorporate those items proposed by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and to issue a revised agenda (subsequently published as C.C.S. 288/3).

4. *THE EUROPEAN THEATER*

SIR ALAN BROOKE gave a resume of the present situation in the European Theater. He proposed to start with the situation in Russia since it was on that front that the main land forces in Europe were concentrated. Earlier in the year German forces had massed for an attack on this front but had delayed the attack largely, he believed, due to the situation in the Mediterranean. They launched their offensive against Kursk with the object of straightening their line and possibly exploiting their success, as well as producing the required political results in Germany. The Russians had succeeded in holding them by defense in depth. Some 16 panzer divisions had been used, in addition to infantry. The Russians had waited until they were sure they were holding this offensive and had then themselves attacked, not only pushing back the Germans on the Kursk salient and capturing Orel, but also threatening Briansk. The attack in the neighborhood of Kharkov seemed to be succeeding and it was to be hoped that the fate of that town was now sealed. Further offensives had now started in the Smolensk area.

Though the number of German divisions remained almost constant, it was believed that their strength, both in personnel and equipment, was only some 60 percent of their authorized strength. The manpower of Germany was now stretched to its limit. The Germans had been further weakened by the withdrawal of Italians and certain other satellite forces from the Eastern Front, and this tendency for the satellites to withdraw would increase with the present situation in Italy. Further, the Italians had some 30 divisions in the Balkans and five in Southern France. Some of the former had already made overtures with a view to surrender, and Germany would be faced with the necessity for replacing all these troops.

It seemed probable that while the Italians had wished the Germans to defend Southern Italy, the latter had refused and would concentrate on the defense of the northern plains where the vital airdromes threatening Southern Germany were situated and which provided doorways to the east and west. At present Germany had approximately five divisions in Italy though there were signs that she was reinforcing in the North.

In France there were signs of German divisions being moved to the South of France to replace Italians and to the Russian Front, though it was not known if these would be replaced by training divisions from Germany.

In the British view there was at present no German threat to Spain. The necessary forces were not available, nor could they be made available unless Germany shortened her line in the East. In this connection, there were two possible lines to which the German forces might withdraw, one to the East and one to the West of the Pripet marshes. It was estimated that withdrawal to these lines might save the Germans some 30 and 70 divisions, respectively. There was a further possibility that Germany might decide to withdraw from France to the Rhine-Siegfried line. Whether Germany would decide to withdraw in the East or the West was a matter for conjecture. A withdrawal from the East would bring Eastern Germany and the Rumanian oilfields within easy bombing range and a withdrawal from the West would help us to intensify our air attacks on Germany. Since if the U-boat campaign failed completely Germany would have no further use for French bases, and since the Germans were likely to fear a Russian land advance into the country more than one carried out by Anglo-American forces, it seemed probable that, on balance, Germany would be more likely to choose a withdrawal from the West.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he had read the U. S. Chiefs of Staff appreciation of the war in Europe which, from the air point of view, accorded very largely with his own views.

The German air force was now completely on the defensive. Their bomber force had deteriorated greatly in the last year, largely from lack of training and a proper training organization. They had relied on a series of victorious land campaigns to be supported by the air and between which the air forces could rest and reorganize. The situation was now very different.

Their fighter forces, on the other hand, were growing fast and had achieved the remarkable increase of 22 percent during the year 1943. All this increase had been absorbed on the Western Front. In spite of this they still did not consider themselves strong enough to combat the daylight operations of the 8th Air Force and had withdrawn units both from the Russian and the Mediterranean Fronts, in spite of the defeats they were suffering in these areas.

The United Nations Air Forces, on the other hand, were everywhere on the strategic offensive. The shorter range aircraft were being used for attacks on communications, transport centers, locomotives and airfields. The night offensive was steadily increasing. Radio aids to navigation had proved immensely effective. Certain steps were now being taken to baffle the defenses which had resulted in a decrease in casualties from five to six percent to only three percent.

Finally, the daylight bombing — the most important phase of all — was being extraordinarily effective. The first object of *POINTBLANK* was to knock

out the fighter factories and to destroy fighter planes in the air in order to achieve complete mastery in the air over Germany. The forces available to the 8th Air Force had done remarkable work but the program was behind schedule for reasons, however, which were quite understandable. The targets were being hit, the enemy aircraft were being shot down and a high percentage of the aircraft were returning safely, but it was a great battle which hung in the balance and it was vitally important to sustain and give every support to our forces in order that they could achieve superiority over the enemy.

In the Mediterranean the mixed U. S. Army Air Force and R.A.F. units were working as one team and were giving a wonderfully good account of themselves.

The key to the situation from the air point of view, would be the placing of strong offensive air forces in Northern Italy. From there all South Germany would be within comfortable range and above all two of the largest German aircraft factories which between them produced nearly 60 percent of the German fighters. The bombing of Ploesti, in his opinion perhaps the most brilliant and outstanding single air operation of the war, had shown what could be achieved even at a range of 1,000 miles. This target could be attacked at much shorter range from the heel of Italy, but to get a decisive effect against the German Air Force it would be necessary to go to the North. If we could base a strong force of Heavy and Medium Bombers there in the near future, Germany would be faced with a problem that seemed insoluble. It was estimated that to protect their Southern Front against a similar scale of attack to that being made from the U.K. they would require half the fighter forces now on the Western Front. The Alps would render the German radio warning system relatively ineffective. He regarded the position of North Italy as the key to the situation.

On the Russian front some 2,000 German aircraft were opposed to 4,000 Russians. The Russian training was, however, bad, and until recently the Germans had held their own. Now, however, the tide was turning and the withdrawal of German forces to the west and particularly the withdrawal of experienced leaders was making itself felt.

SIR DUDLEY POUND briefly discussed certain aspects of the war at sea. At Casablanca it had been agreed that Russian convoys should not be run if the loss was likely to be prohibitive. Since German forces were concentrated in the north of Norway, this route was still closed. There was no sign at present that the German surface forces intended to break out into the Atlantic, and he believed that this was now less likely, since it would probably only be considered worthwhile if by so doing the Germans could achieve the final coup de grace terminating a successful U-boat campaign in the North Atlantic.

The battle of the convoys had been fought in May, and since then the U-boats had suffered heavy losses, whilst on the other hand there had been no sinkings in the North Atlantic. It was essential, however, to be ready for a return of the U-boat concentrations to that area, and our dispositions of escorting forces must be designed to meet this menace. Thus it was impossible to send additional escorts to the Azores or the Cape, though hunting groups were being used to reinforce the aerial bay offensive. The bay offensive, with additional United States help in the air, was proving very effective. Groups of submarines were now endeavoring to fight their way in and out of the bay on the surface, and it had become a battle of the U-boat versus the aircraft. Recently, fewer German submarines had come out of the Baltic, and this was believed to be because many of them were refitting with additional radar aids and anti-aircraft guns.

The bombing of the Biscay submarine bases had proved disappointing since the Germans had taken very adequate steps to protect their submarines in these ports. It was now felt that continuous bombing of these ports did not justify a great diversion from the essential bombing offensive against German fighter factories. German submarines were at present disposed largely in the outer seas, where they were achieving some successes, but only in the North Atlantic could they find sufficient targets to render their campaign a real success.

In the Mediterranean the Commander in Chief was anxious to retain his six battleships until after the Italian fleet had been eliminated. Our ability to reinforce the Indian Ocean was dependent therefore on the collapse of Italy. The loan of the aircraft carrier "Ranger" to the Home Fleet was much appreciated, and enabled sufficient aircraft carriers to be provided for Mediterranean operations.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked for the views of the British Chiefs of Staff with regard to the occupation of Sardinia and Corsica.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he was in agreement with the United States paper on this point. It would not pay us to attack these islands at this stage. There were indications, as yet inconclusive, of German withdrawals from Sardinia, and he did not believe that if Italy collapsed Germany would continue to defend these islands which were largely garrisoned by Italian troops.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that prior to the occupation of Sicily, it had been considered inadvisable to filter agents into the island. If, however, immediate attacks on Sardinia and Corsica were unlikely, it might be advisable to send agents to those islands.

In reply to a question from General Marshall as to the value of France as an air base in the event of the Germans withdrawing, SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the basing of heavy bombers in France would prove a lengthy and difficult logistic problem. He therefore considered that while the heavy bombers should continue to operate from the United Kingdom, medium and light bombers as well as fighters would use advance bases in France. They would then be within easy range of the Ruhr and the Upper Rhine towns. In addition, the fighter cover which could be provided from advance bases in France would be of immense value to the daylight bombing operations.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that it was difficult to confine a discussion on the war in the air to Europe since available resources must be spread between all theaters. Early estimates, based on British experience, of the replacements of men and machines had proved too low in the case of the operations of the 8th Air Force. In addition, there was the problem of the "war-weary" crews. General Eaker at present had some 800 aircraft, but only 400 crews. No new units would be sent until September, but 200 aircraft would be sent in July and 239 in August. By January 1944 it was hoped to have 1,900 aircraft, with two crews for each aircraft. Finally, he questioned the possibility of obtaining the maximum use of heavy bombers in England during the winter months. In this connection North Italian bases would prove valuable.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he appreciated the difficulty which General Arnold had mentioned in foreseeing exactly replacement requirements. He agreed with General Arnold's view as to the importance of Northern Italy. Heavy bombers based in England could use Northern Italy, if the necessary ground crews and facilities were provided, as an alternative taking-off point during bad weather in the United Kingdom.

The battle against the German fighter forces was a vital battle. It must be watched, not only with hope and enthusiasm, but with the determination of providing reinforcements from wherever possible. If German fighter strength was not checked in the next three months, the battle might be lost, since it was impossible to judge the strength which the German fighter forces might attain by next spring if our attack was not pressed home.

ADMIRAL KING said that a possible German move to Spain would be aimed at cutting our vital lines of communication through the Straits of Gibraltar. The Germans might be held back until the United Nations were further committed in the Mediterranean and then they would flood the approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar with U-boats. The value of this line of communication was second only to the North Atlantic route and its value would increase as our commitments in the Mediterranean grew.

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The naval situation must be considered globally, and any forces which could be spared from the European theater were urgently required in the war against Japan.

He was surprised to learn that the bombing of U-boat bases in France had been stopped or slowed down. He was convinced that a large number of U-boats were being refitted with a view to renewing the offensive and that the U-boat campaign had not yet been won, though it was now under control, as he had predicted.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

C.C.S. 107th Meeting

QUADRANT CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN ROOM 2008, CHATEAU FRONTENAC,
ON SATURDAY, 14 AUGUST 1943 AT 1630.

PRESENT

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN
General G. C. Marshall, USA
Admiral E. J. King, USN
General H. H. Arnold, USA

General Sir Alan Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles Portal

ALSO PRESENT

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA
Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN
Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN
Rear Adm. O. C. Badger, USN
Maj. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA
Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA
Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA
Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA
Commander W. L. Freseman, USN
Commander V. D. Long, USN

Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Vice Admiral
Lord Louis Mountbatten
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay
Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster
Admiral Sir Percy Noble
Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready
Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh
Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN
Brigadier W. Porter
Air Commodore W. Elliot
Brigadier M. W. M. Macleod

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier H. Redman
Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA
Captain F. B. Royal, USN
Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, RN
Col. A. T. Cornwall-Jones

THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

ADMIRAL KING said the principal operations against Japan at present taking place were those directed on Rabaul. These were being delayed by lack of means. He had said at Casablanca, and he must now repeat, that lack of means was in his opinion caused by failure to consider the war against all three Axis Powers as a whole. If some 15 per cent of resources of the United Nations were now deployed against Japan, then an increase of only five per cent would increase by one-third the resources available whereas a decrease of five per cent of the forces deployed against the Axis in Europe would only mean a reduction of six per cent. Air power was lacking, and at present all naval air forces not required for the U-boat campaign were being sent to the Pacific. Consequent on the *TRIDENT* decisions, operations against the Mandates had been planned and would begin on 15 November against the Gilberts. This particular line of advance had certain disadvantages, but had been necessary, firstly, since it would protect Samoa, the weak spot on the line of communications to Australia; secondly, there were air facilities available in the Ellis Islands; and, thirdly, the relative proximity of this line of advance toward the operations in Rabaul would enable forces to be shifted from one to the other. The United States Chiefs of Staff memorandum set out their proposals for the war against Japan in the relatively near future. In general, these envisaged an advance headed on Luzon by two routes, one from New Guinea, and the other through the Mandates. This plan would have the advantage of obviating the necessity for fighting for the Dutch East Indies which, if the Philippines were captured, would automatically fall to us.

In the North Pacific the attack on Kiska was planned for tomorrow. There were indications that at least a partial evacuation might already have taken place there, but the operation had been planned on the supposition that the original scale of defense still existed. There was a third possible line of approach which was through the Kuriles via Paramushiru.

It was, in his opinion, most important to plan how best the preponderance of forces now employed against the Axis in Europe could be transferred and brought to bear against Japan. It would appear that the air power which would be available could not be fully used in an advance through the Islands and therefore the use of China as a base for air action against Japan became very important.

ADMIRAL LEAHY stressed that the campaigns in Alaska, against Rabaul, in the Central Pacific, and in Burma all formed part of the complete campaign against Japan. The defeat of Japan must be accomplished at the

earliest possible date by the use of the maximum possible effort. The requirements for the plan, the forces which could be made available, both immediately and on the defeat of Germany, and the method by which those forces now employed against Germany could be diverted to Japan must all be studied. Every effort was now being made with the insufficient forces available to wear down Japanese resources, and her resistance was becoming less effective, but an immediate assessment of the availability of resources as soon as Germany had collapsed must be made.

GENERAL MARSHALL said it was important to decide on the bases required to exploit our available means. In the Pacific, adequate shipping had proved a bottleneck since heavy demands were made on account of the necessity for transferring troops to recuperate after long service in difficult and unhealthy country. Every effort was being made to render bases, particularly air bases, more healthy. The same problem of transferring troops, owing to bad climate, existed in the Aleutians.

An interesting factor in the present campaign against Japan was the heavy air losses which she was sustaining, not only in the air but in cargo and troop-carrying vessels. All operations in the Pacific were related to those in Burma. There were two matters on which differences of opinion existed — firstly, the importance of China as a base, and, secondly, the possibilities with regard to the use of Chinese manpower. General Stilwell's view, which he shared, was that properly led, the Chinese troops were an important military factor.

GENERAL MARSHALL then read out a telegram he had received from General Stilwell, giving the details of the equipment and efficiency of the Chinese troops now in Ramgarh and Yunnan and outlining possible employment for these forces. General Stilwell stressed the importance of an early campaign to reopen the Burma Road.

There was an alternative route to China via Sumatra, Singapore and Camranh Bay, though this would entail a heavy shipping commitment. There was a project, which will be further explained by General Somervell, to lay a pipeline for gasoline from Calcutta into China. There seemed to be four issues which must be decided. Firstly, what was the value of Chinese troops; secondly, could we afford to take so little action with regard to China that the present government would fall; thirdly, if we employed only air forces from China, would not the Japanese reactions be so strong as to cut the line of communication to them, and, fourthly, in an operation through China was it essential to capture a port for heavy build-up of supplies and thus link up with the naval operations across the Pacific.

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He regretted immensely that there was no air communication between Australia and Ceylon. The interests of the two commands were mutual, and the psychological factor of a gap of 10,000 miles, which was not bridged, was serious. In his view it was important to find the speediest method of bringing pressure to bear on Japan itself and it might well be that operations through China would produce the result faster than fighting our way through the Islands.

It was essential to link Pacific and European strategy. Movements of ships from the Mediterranean must take place in the next few days if operations from India were not to be delayed, and a decision must be taken. It was important that no time should be lost in agreeing on a general plan for the defeat of Japan since the collapse of Germany would impose the problem of partial demobilization and a growing impatience would ensue throughout the United States for the rapid defeat of Japan.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that in the early days of the war with Japan a holding policy had been adopted. Now superiority was being achieved. In the air, over the last six months, the Japanese known losses had been four times the combat and operational losses of the U. S. Air Forces opposed to them.

In the Pacific, airfields would not be available in which to base the air forces which would be released after the defeat of Germany. Only China provided the necessary facilities. At present the number of units which could be deployed depended directly on the capacity of the air route. This route had achieved 4,000 tons in July and this would, he felt sure, increase, but a 4,000 ton capacity was sufficient only to enable General Chennault's 223 aircraft to undertake 10 operations each per month. The heavy bomber group now operating in China against Hanoi, Hong Kong and Shanghai was forced to do three trips into Assam for every one operational sortie. In order to release tonnage on the air route a plan had been worked out to run a pipe line capable of taking six million gallons per month (approximately 20,000 tons) into China. Even this amount would only enable five hundred heavy bombers to undertake 10 missions per month, and an additional one thousand tons of gasoline would be required to provide for the necessary fighter protection.

The opening of the Burma Road was, from the air point of view, essential, together, if possible, with a port on the east coast of China through which the air forces could be adequately supplied.

The northern air line of approach to Japan via the Kuriles was hampered by the worst weather in the world and lack of bases. At a maximum, only one or two groups could be employed from this area. Island facilities now available

could only accommodate some 20 groups, whereas if Germany were defeated some 50 groups of heavy bombers would be released from the U.K., alone, in addition to those from the Mediterranean area. The situation, however, was hopeful. Japanese aircraft production was estimated at only 600 aircraft per month. He was convinced that heavy bombing of their homeland would defeat the Japanese, "who could not take it."

At the request of General Arnold, *GENERAL SOMERVELL* outlined the plan for the pipeline into China. It would lead from Calcutta to Ledo and between these places would be a six inch line in order to take the load off the bad communications from Assam. From there on it would be a three inch line running through Fort Hertz to Kunming. The building of the line was not dependent on further operations in Burma though this would probably be necessary to insure its security. The line could be completed in seven months and would require only 15,000 tons of supplies. The necessary piping and installations were already available in the United States and all the necessary plans had been prepared.

SIR ALAN BROOKE asked that a paper giving a brief outline of the plan might be submitted for study by the British Chiefs of Staff. He was in entire agreement as to the necessity for the earliest possible completion of a general plan for the war with Japan.

It was essential to decide on a policy for the employment of our forces and to allocate tasks to be undertaken either separately or jointly. The British were faced with the problem of partial demobilization after the defeat of Germany. Many of the British troops had been abroad for over seven years and a scheme was being worked out to insure that those troops who were best trained were retained, without inflicting unnecessary individual hardships. If major operations were to be undertaken from India, that country must be developed as a base. Its capabilities were at present small and its communications bad. Airfields, ports and communications must all be developed, and the extent of this development was dependent on the plan decided on.

The relative advantages of the opening of the original Burma Road or the seizure of a port in China must be examined, together with the time factor, in relation to the working of the Burma Road at its maximum capacity. Plans had been worked out for advances from Imphal, Ledo and Yunnan into Burma, together with landings on the Arakan Coast. The British Chiefs of Staff had considered proposals put forward by Brigadier Wingate for the increased employment of long range penetration groups in conjunction with the main advances. These groups relied on the Japanese out-flanking tactics but whereas the Japanese outflanking movements consisted of four or five mile sweeps, Wingate's

method used 40 or 50 miles sweeps and used units of the size of a brigade group. These groups took pack transport and wireless and could, when necessary, be maintained from the air. They would reach far into the area of the Japanese lines of communication in conjunction with the main advances. A second brigade group was already being formed and it was hoped to form a third, one of which could operate with the Chinese forces from Yunnan by cutting Japanese communications with Mandalay. Another would operate between the Ledo and Imphal advances, and a third to the west of the Imphal Road. He felt that the United States Chiefs of Staff might wish to hear from Brigadier Wingate his views on the use of long-range penetration groups.

The British Chiefs of Staff had only recently learned, however, of the very serious results of the floods in Assam, which would have very serious effects on future operations in Burma. These results had not yet been assessed and he suggested that a small committee consisting of General Somervell, General Riddell-Webster and an officer from the Commander in Chief's Staff in India should examine and report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the effects of the floods in Assam on future operations in Burma.

In addition to the plans for Burma a study had been made of an alternative operation on the northern tip of Sumatra. This might either be an operation in itself, aimed at forming a base from which Japanese forces and lines of communication could be attacked, or it might be the first step to an attack on the Malaya Peninsula in the neighborhood of Penang with an advance on Singapore. In the former case some two to four divisions would be required, but in the latter case the forces required would render the operation impossible of achievement until after the defeat of Germany. If, however, only the tip of Sumatra was attacked, though it would result in the diversion of important Japanese forces in reaction to it, it would have the disadvantage of giving prior warning to the Japanese that an attack on Malaya was possible and they would therefore increase their defense in that area. Before, however, further examining the Sumatra plan he suggested that operations in Burma should be examined, possibly based on a later date than originally envisaged.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he strongly endorsed the view that an early decision on the plan for the defeat of Japan must be taken. Air forces would be piling up as soon as Germany was defeated. British production of heavy bombers alone would amount to some five to six hundred a month, with four hundred crews. He was interested in the statement that adequate island bases could not be found in the Pacific to deploy large air forces since in Malta, which was a very small island, some 500 aircraft had been operating. After the defeat of Germany sufficient shipping should be available to maintain these island air bases.

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GENERAL ARNOLD explained that most of the islands in the Mandated area were atolls, with very limited land area available and complicated topographical features.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that a small committee should be formed which would include General Riddell-Webster, Major General Mallaby, General Somervell, and Admiral Badger, to examine and report on the effect of the recent floods in India on the projected Burma campaign.

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

C.C.S. 108th Meeting

QUADRANT CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN ROOM 2208, CHATEAU FRONTENAC,
ON SUNDAY, 15 AUGUST 1943, AT 1430.

PRESENT

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN
General G. C. Marshall, USA
Admiral E. J. King, USN
General H. H. Arnold, USA

General Sir Alan Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles Portal

ALSO PRESENT

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA
Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN
Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN
Rear Adm. O. C. Badger, USN
Maj. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA
Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA
Maj. Gen. R. W. Barker, USA
(For Items 4 and 5 only)
Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA
Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA
Commander W. L. Freseman, USN
Commander V. D. Long, USN

Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Vice Admiral
Lord Louis Mountbatten
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay
Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster
Admiral Sir Percy Noble
Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready
Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh
Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN
Brigadier W. Porter
Air Commodore W. Elliot
Brigadier M. W. M. Macleod
Brigadier K. G. MacLean
(For Items 4 and 5 only)

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier H. Redman
Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA
Capt. F. B. Royal, USN
Comdr. R. D. Coleridge

1. *CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETINGS*

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 106th and 107th meetings. The detailed record of the meetings was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.

2. *ROME — AN OPEN CITY*
(C.C.S. 306)

SIR ALAN BROOKE referred to the FAN message which had been sent to General Eisenhower yesterday telling him to make no further attacks on Rome nor any statements from Allied Force Headquarters pending clarification and further instructions regarding the Press reports indicating that the Italian Government had declared Rome an open city. He felt it was now necessary for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to take a new decision in the matter.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he felt that it would be impossible to reach a decision until the matter had been discussed with the President and suggested that no action should be taken until his views had been obtained.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt it the duty of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to express the military point of view to the Chiefs of Government for them to make whatever decisions might be necessary politically.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that it appeared that Rome had unilaterally been declared an open city by the Italians. He felt that General Eisenhower should be allowed to retain his freedom of decision until the Combined Chiefs of Staff were restrained from this by political action. He said that the British Chiefs of Staff had advised their Government that acceptance of open city status for Rome was fraught with much difficulty for the Allies in the future. It might be preferable that we had Rome in our possession to use its communications and to risk German bombing.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that no disadvantage would be suffered by refraining from bombing.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that it might be desirable from the military point of view to bomb and that a signal should be sent to General Eisenhower from the Combined Chiefs of Staff revoking yesterday's decision and giving him a free hand.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the only reports that he had received regarding the latest bombing effort on Rome were that it had achieved success against its targets and that there had been little or no damage caused to non-military targets.

ADMIRAL KING referred to the French declaration of Paris as an open city at the time of their collapse. Then the Germans moved into Paris and used it as a base. Did this establish a precedent for the Allies in relation to Rome?

SIR ALAN BROOKE drew attention to the danger of political pressure later if the Allies were to agree indeed to Rome being considered an open city.

ADMIRAL KING agreed that if we were in any way a party now to its being declared an open city our hands would be tied.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he understood that the U.S. and British Governments had agreed to take no action regarding any request for Rome to be made an open city.

ADMIRAL KING suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should encourage the two Governments to make no reply and that this would leave us free to bomb. He also referred to the possibility of the danger of political capital being made regarding this whole question in the future.

GENERAL MARSHALL affirmed that the political complications in the U.S. would tend to be so serious that clearance from the President must be obtained before yesterday's message was cancelled. He agreed that it should be reaffirmed that the Allies should in no way commit themselves to agreeing regarding the reported declaration of Rome as an open city and that an early recommendation to this effect should be made to the two Governments.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that the President and Prime Minister should be informed at once:

- a. Of yesterday's "stand still" order regarding the bombing of Rome and that they should be advised that from the military point of view the recommendation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was that the order should be revoked;
- b. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered that the two Governments should in no way commit themselves on the subject of Rome being declared an open city.

3. *STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE*
(C.C.S. 303)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he would first like to say, on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff, that after reading C.C.S. 303 they believed that there was a great similarity of outlook between themselves and the U.S. Chiefs of

Staff on the strategic concept for the defeat of the Axis in Europe. Such divergencies as there were did not appear to be fundamental. The British Chiefs of Staff were in entire agreement that *OVERLORD* should constitute the major offensive for 1944 and that Italian operations should be planned with this conception as a background.

The plan for *OVERLORD* was based on three main conditions being created in order to give it reasonable prospect of success. Firstly, reduction in German fighter strength; secondly, German strength in France and the Low Countries and her ability to reinforce during the first two months must be kept at specified limits; and thirdly, the problem of beach maintenance must be solved. He believed that the *OVERLORD* plan envisaged too rapid a rate of advance and too small a margin of superiority, bearing in mind our experience in fighting German forces. It was essential, therefore, to insure that the Germans had available to them the minimum possible number of divisions in France and that their rate of reinforcement should be as slow as possible.

Operations in Italy, therefore, must have as their main object the creation of a situation favorable to a successful *OVERLORD*. This could be achieved by holding German reserves and by reducing German fighter strength by bombing fighter factories in Southern Germany from Italian airdromes.

He considered, therefore, that the statement (C.C.S. 303, para. 4b (3)) in the U.S. Chiefs of Staff memorandum that as between *OVERLORD* and operations in the Mediterranean, when there is a shortage of resources, *OVERLORD* will have an overriding priority, was too binding. Sufficient forces must be used in Italy in order to make *OVERLORD* a possibility.

There were two further points in the U.S. Chiefs of Staff paper which he would like elucidated. How far north was it proposed our forces in Italy should go, and what strength was it estimated would be required to hold that line? He understood that the line proposed was the "Apennine" line across the neck of Italy. He believed that this should be regarded as the first stage only, and that if possible the northwestern plains should also be seized. Fighter factories in Southern Germany could be bombed from Central Italy but far greater results could be achieved by the use of those airdromes in the Milan-Turin area. Whether or not this area could be seized would depend on the amount of resistance met and could not be decided now, since the number of German divisions which would be deployed against us could not, at this stage, be assessed. Some 20 divisions might be required to hold the neck of Italy which might entail retaining three of the seven divisions earmarked for *OVERLORD*. If the Milan-Turin area were taken, then all seven might be required, but a decision

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should be deferred until it could be seen what forces were required to attain the desired result, i.e., the production of the situation requisite for a successful *OVERLORD*.

He agreed, however, that trained "battle experienced" troops were required for *OVERLORD* and therefore it would be necessary to exchange those of the extra divisions required with others from the U.S. or the U.K.

SIR ALAN BROOKE then explained, with the aid of a map, the possible lines which might be held in Italy. He pointed out that the occupation of the northwestern part of Italy would afford a gateway into Southern France through which troops, possibly French, might attack in conjunction with the amphibious operations suggested by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. He asked finally that certain details of the Appendices might be revised by the Combined Staff Planners.

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that the desired targets in Germany could be reached by heavy bombers based in the Florence area, which would lie within the line across the neck of Italy. He felt that the advantage of having these northern fields was outweighed by the disadvantage of the additional forces required to gain and hold them.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the advantages of the Turin-Milan area were considerable. There were many excellent airfields in the Turin-Milan area, capable of operating within a reasonably short period a thousand heavy and a thousand medium bombers, whereas fields in the south would have to be extended and improved and the rate of build-up would therefore be slower. Further, the Germans would make good use of the northern airfields and would not have the barrier of the Alps between them and our bases.

ADMIRAL KING said that as he understood it, the British Chiefs of Staff had serious doubts as to the possibility of accomplishing *OVERLORD*.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British view was that *OVERLORD* would be a success if the three conditions laid down in General Morgan's paper were brought about, and it was essential to take the necessary steps to insure the achievement of these conditions.

ADMIRAL KING said he did not believe that the achievement of the necessary conditions was dependent solely on operations in Italy. The necessary conditions might be produced by many other factors, such as, operations in Russia, the result of those already taking place in Sicily, and the air offensive from the United Kingdom.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it seemed to him that the essence of the problem was whether or not the required conditions for a successful *OVERLORD* could only be made possible by an increase in the strength in the Mediterranean. Only by giving an operation overriding priority could success be insured. *TORCH* was a perfect example of this concept. He agreed that if resistance was weak we should seize as much of Italy as possible. It would be better if we, and not the Germans, held the northern airfields, though almost as much could be achieved from the Florence area. On the other hand, unless a decision were taken to remove the seven divisions from the Mediterranean, and unless overriding priority was given to *OVERLORD*, he believed that *OVERLORD* would become only a subsidiary operation. A delay in the decision would have serious repercussions on our ability to build up for *OVERLORD* and any exchange of troops, as had been suggested would absorb shipping and complicate logistic considerations of supply as far back as the Mississippi River. Recently in North Africa an additional unexpected requirement for 60,000 service troops had arisen. This requirement had been met but with very serious results for planned expansion and movement to other theatres. Not only would the *OVERLORD* build-up be hampered, but operations in the Pacific would also suffer.

If *OVERLORD* was not given overriding priority, then in his opinion the operation was doomed and our whole strategic concept would have to be recast and the United States forces in Britain might well be reduced to the reinforced army corps necessary for an opportunist cross-Channel operation.

General Barker had submitted a paper with regard to the required conditions. This note (the main points of which General Marshall read to the Combined Chiefs of Staff) pointed out that in the view of the Combined COS-SAC Staff, the required condition concerning the German build-up did not imply that the operation became impracticable if the conditions were not achieved but rather that more extensive use would have to be made of available means to reduce the enemy's ability to concentrate his forces.

To sum up, he felt that unless *OVERLORD* were given overriding priority it would become a minor operation, in which case we should be depending for the defeat of Germany on air bombing alone. This had achieved great results, but its final result was still speculative. We must make a plan and bring our strength against Germany in such a way as to force Germany to feel it. An "opportunist" operation would be cheaper in lives but was speculative. If we relied on this we were opening a new concept which in his view weakened our chances of an early victory and rendered necessary a reexamination of our basic strategy, with a possible readjustment towards the Pacific.

In the course of discussion the following points were made:

a. In the British view, successful operations in France necessitated a preponderance of force. It was essential to achieve this preponderance in order to avoid a catastrophe, which might seriously delay our ultimate victory. Success depended not on the absolute strength of the United forces available for *OVERLORD*, but on the relative strength of those forces vis-a-vis the Germans opposed to them. This relative strength could best be achieved by operations in Italy, aimed at containing the maximum German forces, and by air action from the best possible Italian bases to reduce the German fighter forces. By agreeing now to the withdrawal of seven divisions from the Mediterranean, risks might be run in that theatre which would not only prejudice the success of *OVERLORD*, but might make it impossible of successful achievement.

In the British view *OVERLORD* was the main operation and all operations in Italy must be aimed at assisting *OVERLORD*.

b. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff felt that unless overriding priority were given to *OVERLORD* the operation would never materialize. In every previous operation, requirements had arisen additional to those originally envisaged. These requirements might also arise in Italy and must not be met by unilateral action. The Combined Chiefs of Staff should now take a decision that Operation *OVERLORD* should have overriding priority and maintain this decision in order that the success of the operation could be insured. Any departure from this concept must entail a reconsideration of our basic strategy.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

- a.* Agreed to give further consideration to C.C.S. 303 at their next meeting;
- b.* Instructed the Combined Staff Planners to examine the Appendices and amend as necessary.

**4. OPERATION "OVERLORD"—OUTLINE PLAN
(C.C.S. 304)**

**"SYNTHETIC" HARBORS
(C.C.S. 307)**

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed a note (C.C.S. 304) by the British Chiefs of Staff on the outline plan for Operation *OVERLORD*.

In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, *LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN* outlined the various methods by which the problem of beach maintenance could be overcome.

GENERAL BARKER and *BRIGADIER MACLEAN* of the *COSSAC* Staff explained the main features of the outline plan for Operation *OVERLORD*.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the outline plan of General Morgan for Operation *OVERLORD*, as set out in British Chiefs of Staff paper, C.O.S. (43) 416 (0), and endorsed the action taken by the British Chiefs of Staff in authorizing him to proceed with the detailed planning and with full preparations.

5. *AIR AND NAVAL COMMAND—OPERATION “OVERLORD”*

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he would like to have an opportunity to discuss with General Arnold the question of an Air Commander for *OVERLORD*. At present Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory was giving the necessary decisions but the Air Commander should be selected as soon as possible.

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that consideration had been given to the problem of naval command for *OVERLORD*. The majority of the forces to be employed would be trained, organized and operate under the Commander in Chief, Portsmouth. He had been given a special Chief of Staff to assist him in this matter. The Commander in Chief, Portsmouth, could be given control over adjacent commands as might be necessary. He asked that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should endorse the appointment of the Commander in Chief, Portsmouth, as Naval Commander in Chief.

ADMIRAL KING said he would like to consider this suggestion.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note:

- a. That the British Chief of the Air Staff and General Arnold would examine the question of the appointment of an Air Commander for *OVERLORD* and would put up their recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff before the end of *QUADRANT*.
- b. Of the proposals by the British Admiralty that the Commander in Chief, Portsmouth, should carry out the duties of Naval Commander for *OVERLORD*, with authority over the Naval Commanders, Plymouth and Dover, for this purpose; and deferred a decision on this matter.

U. S. SECRET

BRITISH MOST SECRET

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

C.C.S. 109th Meeting

QUADRANT CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN ROOM 2208, CHATEAU FRONTENAC,
ON MONDAY, 16 AUGUST 1943, AT 1430.

PRESENT

Admiral W.D. Leahy, USN
General G. C. Marshall, USA
Admiral E. J. King, USN
General H. H. Arnold, USA

General Sir Alan Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles Portal

ALSO PRESENT

Field Marshal Sir John Dill

PRESENT FOR ITEMS 2 AND 3 ONLY

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA
Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN
Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr. USN
Rear Adm. O. C. Badger, USN
Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA
Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA
Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA
Commander W. L. Freseman, USN
Commander V. D. Long, USN

Vice Admiral
Lord Louis Mountbatten
Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster
Admiral Sir Percy Noble
Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready
Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh
Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN
Brigadier W. Porter
Air Commodore W. Elliot

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier H. Redman
Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA
Capt. F. B. Royal, USN
Comdr. R. D. Coleridge

1. *STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE*

(C.C.S. 303-303/1)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed in closed session the strategic concept for the defeat of the Axis in Europe.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to give further consideration to this subject at their next meeting.

2. *CONCLUSIONS OF 108TH MEETING*

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 108th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.

3. *"POINTBLANK"*

(C.C.S. 309 and C.C.S. 252/2)

SIR CHARLES PORTAL gave certain figures with regard to the progress of the combined bomber offensive. Since the beginning of the war the Royal Air Force had dropped 136,000 tons of bombs on Germany, 73,000 tons of which had been dropped within the last seven months. In the first quarter of 1943 17,000 tons had been dropped by night and in the second quarter as much as 35,000 tons.

The damage caused by the air offensive was difficult to assess in precise terms, but he would like to draw attention to certain points in the report by the Joint Intelligence Committee which had been circulated to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

Only one-third of the German industry had been under heavy attack for three months. The effect of these attacks had fallen mainly on the basic industries in the Ruhr. Hence, the effect of the attack on the forces in the field was not immediate and results on these forces would increase as time went on. A further result of the attacks was the forcing on Germany of a defensive air strategy. In addition, they produced a serious drain on Germany's manpower.

With regard to the submarine war, it was estimated that no less than 30 U-boats less than the planned program had been produced between June 1942

and June 1943. As a result of damage already inflicted an additional loss in U-boat construction would result, amounting to some 12 or 13 boats over the next six months.

Morale had also been seriously affected. Casualties were heavy and great destruction of industrial homes had occurred. It was estimated that some 422,000 workers had been rendered homeless and an additional 1,800,000 had suffered damage to their homes which was irreparable, since the necessary consumer goods to replace those destroyed were not available. The report stated that the bombing had affected the outlook of the population with regard to the regime, the war effort as a whole and willingness to hold out.

Damage to Krupps Works had decreased output from 50 to 75 percent and this was in addition to damage to other similar industries. The U.S. Air Force attack on the synthetic rubber plant had reduced the total rubber supply by 15 per cent. Transportation was also dislocated and Germany's plan for an expansion of locomotive production had been nullified by the destruction of locomotives and their manufacturing and repair facilities.

He had felt it right that he should put forward a memorandum on the air offensive in view of the task of coordination given him by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Casablanca. Further, the day and night offensives were complementary and a heavy scale of daylight bombing rendered the task of the night bombers easier, since the Germans were being forced to use night fighters against daylight attacks.

The present situation had both good and bad features. On the one hand, German fighter strength was stretched almost to breaking point, and in spite of their precarious situation on the Russian and Mediterranean fronts, they had found it necessary to reinforce their fighter forces on the Western Front from these sources. On the other hand, the expansion of German fighter strength was continuing and had increased 13 percent during this year. It had been hoped that this expansion would by now have been stopped. The 8th Air Force, who were achieving a great task with their existing resources, believed that they could achieve even greater successes if their strength was increased.

He asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff to take action to make a victory in the battle of the air as certain as possible before the autumn. If this was not done, the Germans, by a conservation of their strength and by the development of new methods of defense, might be in an unassailable position by the spring.

U. S. SECRET

BRITISH MOST SECRET

To achieve our object diversions from the 8th Air Force should be stopped, loans of aircraft from the 8th Air Force to other theaters must be returned, and the bomber command of the 8th Air Force must be built up and reinforced to the maximum possible. Such steps would, he was convinced, be amply justified.

With regard to the employment of the aircraft used for *TIDALWAVE*, he considered that whether employed from the Mediterranean or from England, they should be under the command of the 8th Air Force and devoted to attacks on fighter factories. They should, in fact, revert to a part of the *POINTBLANK* forces and not be left under the control of General Eisenhower, whose air forces were already considerable.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had examined Sir Charles Portal's paper, and that they were in full accord with the views expressed and wished to reaffirm that every resource within United States capabilities was being strained to provide the maximum reinforcement of *POINTBLANK*.

ADMIRAL KING referred to a directive to General Eisenhower (FAN 172), in which he was instructed that follow-up attacks on Ploesti were to follow attacks on fighter factories. He was not clear as to how far the missions referred to in this telegram had been accomplished. It might now be necessary to modify the instructions with regard to follow-up attacks on Ploesti.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said he believed that at *TRIDENT* only one attack on Ploesti had been decided on. A second attack would have serious results on *POINTBLANK*.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that General Eisenhower's latest signal (C.C.S. 252/2) requested the use of the B-24's against Italian targets after the completion of their attacks on the fighter factories. General Eisenhower visualized further attacks on Ploesti being carried out after the aircraft were established in Italy.

GENERAL ARNOLD outlined the losses suffered in the Ploesti raid; of the 178 aircraft dispatched, 54, including 51 crews, had been lost. The results had been excellent, with eight out of the nine targets hit and five of them almost totally destroyed. The casualties had, at least in part, been caused by the loss of the leader of the formation at the outset. This had necessitated reorganization and an attack which was not completely coordinated. It might be impossible to ask crews to sustain a loss of 33 percent in more than one operation.

With regard to *POINTBLANK*, *GENERAL ARNOLD* said that in the month of July 25 attacks had been made, with a loss rate of 7.4 percent per mission, as compared with an average loss rate throughout the period of their operations of 6.7 percent. 3,400 tons of bombs had been dropped in July.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

- a. Took note of C.C.S. 309 and of the following comment submitted by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff:

“The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff are in full accord with the views of the British Chiefs of Staff that the maximum reinforcement of *POINTBLANK*, particularly over the period of intense combat with the German Fighter Air Force immediately ahead, is a subject of the most critical importance, and wish to reaffirm that every resource within U.S. capabilities is being strained to bring this about.”

- b. Agreed to defer action on C.C.S. 252/2.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

C.C.S. 110th Meeting

QUADRANT CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN ROOM 2208, CHATEAU FRONTENAC,
ON TUESDAY, 17 AUGUST 1943, AT 1430.

PRESENT

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN	General Sir Alan Brooke
General G. C. Marshall, USA	Admiral of the Fleet
Admiral E. J. King, USN	Sir Dudley Pound
General H. H. Arnold, USA	Air Chief Marshal
	Sir Charles Portal

ALSO PRESENT

Field Marshal Sir John Dill

PRESENT FOR ITEMS 3, 4 AND 5

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA	Vice Admiral
Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN	Lord Louis Mountbatten
Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN	Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay
Rear Adm. O. C. Badger, USN	Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster
Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA	Admiral Sir Percy Noble
Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA	Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready
Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA	Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh
Commander W. L. Freseman, USN	Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN
Commander V. D. Long, USN	Brigadier W. Porter
	Air Commodore W. Elliot
	Brigadier M. W. M. Macleod
	Brigadier O. C. Wingate
	(For item 5 only)

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier H. Redman
Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA
Capt. F. B. Royal, USN
Comdr. R. D. Coleridge

1. *STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE*
(C.C.S. 303 and 303/2)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed in closed session the strategic concept for the defeat of the Axis in Europe.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

- a. Accepted the extract from C.C.S. 303 which is set forth in C.C.S. 303/2 as a brief and concise statement of their agreed strategic concept for operations in the European Theater in 1943-44.
- b. Directed the Secretariat to put C.C.S. 303/2 in proper form with a view to its being submitted to the President and Prime Minister. (Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 303/3.)

2. *ITALIAN PEACE FEELERS*

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF considered a draft memorandum for the President and Prime Minister prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

- a. Approved with certain amendments, for submission to the President and Prime Minister, a paper setting out the action suggested on the Italian peace feelers. (Subsequently published as C.C.S. 311.)
- b. Directed that a signal should be sent at once to General Eisenhower warning him to hold two staff officers in readiness to proceed to Lisbon. (Message sent as *FAN 195*.)

3. *CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING*

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 109th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.

4. *SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST 1943-1944*
(C.C.S. 301)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a memorandum by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff outlining their views on operations to be undertaken in 1943-1944 in the Pacific and Far East.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had read this memorandum with great interest. There were certain points he would like to raise. Was not the assumption that Russia would remain at peace unnecessarily pessimistic? Was an actual invasion of Japan necessarily essential; might we not obtain the collapse of Japan without invasion?

In a discussion on these two subjects it was pointed out that while Russia had everything to gain by attacking Japan, it might well be that she would wait to do so until the defeat of Japan had been almost completely accomplished.

It was also generally agreed that while blockade and air bombardment might produce the collapse of Japan without invasion, it was necessary to plan on the assumption that the country itself would have to be attacked by land forces.

In reply to a question by Sir Alan Brooke as to the forces required to obtain the objectives outlined in C.C.S. 301, *ADMIRAL COOKE* explained that an estimate of the forces required for the various operations had been prepared and was being handed over to the British Planning Staff.

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should return to a further consideration of C.C.S. 301 and to the plan for operations from India after a review of the report by the Combined Planning Staff on the strategic concept for the defeat of Japan. Each set of operations could then be considered in relation to the whole war against Japan and to the forces required.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF were informed that it was hoped that the report by the Combined Staff Planners would be ready on the following day.

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that it was essential for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to take decisions with regard to the specific operations in 1943-1944 during the Conference.

In a further discussion of C.C.S. 301, *SIR ALAN BROOKE* asked whether it was considered essential, in order to retain the initiative, that both the advance into the Mandated Islands and New Guinea should be pressed forward with vigor. Might this not prove too costly, and a better course be to restrict operations in New Guinea, thus possibly releasing resources for Operation *OVERLORD*?

ADMIRAL KING said that he considered that if forces were so released, they should be concentrated on the Island thrust in the Pacific. However, he believed that both advances were complementary and equally essential. The western advance through Truk, could, after the capture of that base, be swung either north or continue to the westward. Thus the two thrusts would either converge on the Philippines, or one would be directed to the Marianas.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the troops to be employed in New Guinea were either already there or in transit. Thus, no saving could be made, and the only decision with regard to the troops was whether or not we could afford to take the heavy casualties which might be incurred. Supplies in the New Guinea area, owing to Japanese air action, were maintained almost entirely by 150-foot vessels, and thus no saving in cargo ships or combat loaders would be effected by limiting these operations. Landing craft might be saved, but not tank landing craft. With regard to air, though a small saving might be achieved, all the heavy bombers required for the operations had already been deployed in the area.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that it was not considered that operations in New Guinea should be discontinued, but rather that they should be limited to a holding role. The Island advance would cut across the Japanese lines of approach to the south.

ADMIRAL KING explained that the landing craft used in the Kiska operation were required for operations in the Central Pacific. For this reason it had been essential not to delay the operations in the Aleutians.

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that certain landing craft were still being sent to the Southwest Pacific to meet attrition. He believed that the New Guinea operations were causing very important losses to the Japanese, particularly in aircraft.

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that C.C.S. 301 should include a reference to the air route through Burma into China.

It was generally agreed that a reference to the air route should be inserted, since it was the only existing line of supply into China and must also be considered in relation to the limited capacity of the lines of communication through Assam.

With regard to the value of Chinese troops, *GENERAL MARSHALL* said that there were some 60 or 70 thousand at Ramgarh and about 200,000 in Yunnan. He believed that they might have great value in the land operations in China provided that they were properly trained and led. He did not visualize a vast Chinese Army being built up.

These troops would have to be led by U. S. officers even though the nominal control of the army, for "face saving" purposes, would be in Chinese hands. They must also be provided with adequate air and artillery support. He believed that if these conditions were met, and if their first operations were crowned with success, they would be of considerable value.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

- a. Directed the Secretariat to draft a subparagraph for inclusion in paragraph 8 of C.C.S. 301 on the subject of the development of the air route into China.
- b. Agreed to defer action on this paper until after consideration of the long-term plan for the defeat of Japan.

5. *OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN FROM INDIA, 1943-1944*

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that though the recent floods might force us to change our strategy in this area, he would suggest that the discussion should start on the basis of our present plans. The British Chiefs of Staff had been examining the possibilities of the use of long-range penetration groups which, operating well ahead of the main advances, would by long outflanking movements cut the enemy's supply lines. They themselves would be largely maintained by air. It was proposed to expand the number of these units now available to some six brigade groups. He suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff might ask Brigadier Wingate to explain his recent operation with a long-range penetration group and to set out his views on their future employment. After this the Combined Chiefs of Staff would wish to hear the report of General Somervell and General Riddell-Webster on the repercussions on planned operations of the recent floods.

BRIGADIER WINGATE explained the tactical employment of long-range penetration groups and the reason for their introduction. He then outlined the course of the operations of the 77th Indian Infantry Brigade and put forward his views with regard to the future employment of long-range penetration groups in conjunction with main advances aimed at the recapture of Northern Burma.

In summing up, *BRIGADIER WINGATE* pointed out that there were two main features in the employment of these groups; firstly, their whole object must be to prepare the way for the follow-up of the main advance and their employment, based on the object of dislocating enemy communications, must fit into the main plan; secondly, plans for the use of these groups must be elastic and open to alteration in the light of enemy reactions.

U. S. SECRET

BRITISH MOST SECRET

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had decided to form six long-range brigade groups and to this end a comb-out of suitable personnel from the Indian Army would be undertaken. One of the difficulties was the lack of trained officers who had served with native troops and could speak their language. The operations outlined by Brigadier Wingate would enable us to seize sufficient of North Burma to open a road to China. These operations must continue until the break of the monsoon in order to avoid a Japanese reaction before the rains started. It was possible that in the second phase, long-range penetration groups might be used, operating from the coast through to the Mandalay-Rangoon line of communication. He suggested that on the following day General Somervell and General Riddell-Webster's report on the effect of the flood should be studied, together with operations against Akyab or Sumatra, which latter might prove necessary were it found that the floods would seriously hamper operations in Burma.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to defer action until after consideration of the long-term plan for the defeat of Japan.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

C.C.S. 111th Meeting

QUADRANT CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN ROOM 2208, CHATEAU FRONTENAC,
ON WEDNESDAY, 18 AUGUST 1943, AT 1500.

PRESENT

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN
General G. C. Marshall, USA
Admiral E. J. King, USN
General H. H. Arnold, USA

General Sir Alan Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles Portal

ALSO PRESENT

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA
Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN
Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN
Rear Adm. O. C. Badger, USN
Maj. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA
Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA
Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA
Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA
Commander W. L. Freseman, USN
Commander V D. Long, USN

Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Vice Admiral
Lord Louis Mountbatten
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay
Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster
Admiral Sir Percy Noble
Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready
Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh
Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN
Air Commodore W. Elliot
Brig. J. K. McNair
Capt. R. B. Tollemache

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier H. Redman
Brig. Gen J. R. Deane, USA
Capt. F. B. Royal, USN
Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, RN

1. *CONCLUSIONS OF PREVIOUS MEETING*

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 110th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.

2. *ITALIAN PEACE FEELERS*

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Representative at the Vatican had received a signed document from Marshal Badoglio informing him that General Castellano was authorized to speak on his behalf.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of the above statement.

3. *OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN FROM INDIA, 1943-1944*
(C.C.S. 305/1)

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that it appeared from the memorandum (C.C.S. 305/1) prepared by the special committee that from the figures available, the Ledo or Imphal advances might have to be abandoned as a result of the floods. A telegram had, however, been dispatched to the Commander in Chief, India, offering him certain assistance to improve the capacity of the line of communication. He proposed that further consideration of operations from India should be deferred pending a reply from the Commander in Chief, India.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of the interim report of the ad hoc committee, set out in C.C.S. 305/1.

4. *PRODUCTION OF LANDING CRAFT*

ADMIRAL KING informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that he was examining the possibility of increasing the production of landing craft by stopping production of 110 foot submarine-chasers and slowing up production of destroyer escorts. The steps he was examining might produce an increase of 25 percent in the landing craft program, but this must not, however, be taken as a firm figure.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note with interest of Admiral King's statement.

5. *SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND*
(C.C.S. 308)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF were in general agreement with the concepts laid down in Part I of C.C.S. 308.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that there were certain specific points which he would like to discuss with regard to Part II. It had been found difficult to cut the Southeast Asia Command from India, since the former was dependent on India as its main base. However, there were constitutional difficulties in linking the two. The logistic and administrative side of the command set up was most important and a new post of Chief Administrative Officer to the Commander in Chief, India had been set up in order that the Chief Administrative Officer of the Southeast Asia Command should have only one individual to deal with in logistic and administrative matters.

With regard to the Deputy Supreme Commander, the British Chiefs of Staff were distressed by the multitude of functions which this officer would have to carry out, necessitating his presence in many widely separated places.

In the course of discussion the following points were made:

(1) It would be difficult for one officer to combine the functions of Deputy Supreme Commander, Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo and Commander of the U. S. and Chinese forces in the area.

(2) The Deputy Commander's main task must be to insure that the Chinese forces play their part in operations into Burma. This would be no easy task and to insure it, it was essential that General Stilwell, who must control the Chinese forces, should have the standing of Deputy Commander.

(3) The command arrangements might be expected to follow the same pattern as in the North African theater, i.e., there would be ground, air and naval commanders. If General Stilwell commanded the ground forces, difficulties would arise since it was essential that control of all ground forces should be centralized in one commander. Only thus could the various operations be effectively controlled and coordinated. On the other hand, it was highly unlikely that the Chinese forces could be under the direct control of a British officer, and it was, therefore, necessary that General Stilwell should, at least, nominally control these forces and that all orders to these forces should pass through him.

(4) *GENERAL MARSHALL* said that he visualized this necessarily abnormal organization working on the following lines: General Stilwell's function as Deputy Supreme Commander would be limited, since his other functions would occupy the majority of his time. It must be his major task, and that not an easy one, to insure not only that the Chinese forces played their part in the operations, but also that, to the maximum extent possible, the 14th Air Force should cooperate in operations in Burma. It must be remembered that politically, all U. S. forces in China, or in the Southeast Asia Command, were regarded as being there for the sole purpose of supporting China, and therefore a system must be evolved whereby, while retaining this political principle, the maximum support could be obtained for operations into Burma.

(5) *SIR CHARLES PORTAL* said that he appreciated that while the 10th Air Force was regarded as a source of reinforcement to the 14th Air Force, it also had possibilities for offensive action in the Burma theater. Its operations in Burma must, however, be coordinated with those of the Royal Air Force by the Air Commander, Southeast Asia Command. It was therefore essential that these two commanders should occupy the same headquarters.

(6) *GENERAL ARNOLD* pointed out a further complication in that the operation of the air ferry route into China was under a separate command. It was not controlled either by General Chennault, by the commander of the 10th Air Force, or by General Stilwell, though the latter decided what supplies were flown into China.

(7) It would seem to be necessary, once operations were in progress, for General Stilwell or his representative to be situated at the Army Commander's headquarters with United States officers attached to each Chinese force through whom he could issue instructions to the Chinese forces concerned, in accordance with the policy of the army commander.

(8) Finally it was pointed out that the proposals for the employment of Chinese forces and the command arrangements would still have to be negotiated with the Generalissimo.

GENERAL ARNOLD and *SIR CHARLES PORTAL* then presented draft proposals covering the command arrangements on the lines discussed. Certain amendments put forward by Admiral Leahy to paragraph 8 (b) were discussed and agreed to.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Directed the Combined Staff Planners to revise paragraph 8 (a) and

paragraph 8 (b) of Part II of the paper, on the basis of the suggestions put forward during the course of the meeting.

6. *DECEPTION PLAN FOR THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN*
(C.C.S. 284/3/D)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that C.C.S. 284/3/D set up the machinery for deception planning for the war against Japan. It remained to prepare plans. The responsibility for the formulation, for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, of overall deception plans for the war against Japan had been accepted by the United States Chiefs of Staff.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Staff was now engaged on this matter. They felt, however, that plans could not be finalized until the decisions taken at the present Conference were known. It was hoped that the plan would be ready for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff by 15 September.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note that the U. S. Planners were engaged in preparation of an overall deception plan for the defeat of Japan but that it would have to be premised to some extent in the *QUADRANT* decisions and therefore would not be ready for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff prior to 15 September.

7. *THE U-BOAT WAR*
(C.C.S. 272/1)

SIR DUDLEY POUND referred to a report by the Anti-Submarine Survey Board, putting forward certain recommendations with regard to the mobility of air units. He was in general agreement with the proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff, though he would like to examine further the detailed proposals put forward in the report itself.

ADMIRAL KING gave a brief resume of the present position with regard to the anti-submarine war. His latest information went to show that 429 U-boats were operating, of which 166, including 23 in far northern waters, were in the Atlantic. Of the original 12 refueling U-boats, 10 had been sunk and one or two were working up in the Baltic, but there were undoubtedly others under construction. The United States was now operating five auxiliary carriers. To meet new U-boat tactics of fighting it out on the surface, aircraft were being equipped with heavier forward mountings. The United States Army Air Corps

had recently made a much appreciated loan of B-25's fitted with 75-millimeter cannon. It might be found that the best weapon was the 37-millimeter cannon, which could carry more rounds. There were a very large number of anti-submarine weapons and projects in the course of experiment and development.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL mentioned the rocket weapon which could fire eight projectiles in one salvo, and which was particularly effective.

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that at present U-boats were operating largely in the Central Atlantic, off the Cape, and in the Indian Ocean. It was possible to divert escort vessels from the North Atlantic only as far as the Bay of Biscay since it was essential that any craft diverted should be capable of rapidly reinforcing the North Atlantic route should the Germans decide to concentrate in that area. He believed that the U-boats now in the Baltic were refitting with new anti-aircraft weapons and radar equipment and that the Germans might, when these were ready revert to pack attacks in the North Atlantic, having fought their way out of the Bay on the surface in groups, using their new and heavier anti-aircraft weapons.

SIR DUDLEY POUND then outlined the steps which were being taken to reinforce the escorts in the Cape of Good Hope area.

In reply to a question by Sir Dudley Pound, *ADMIRAL KING* said that the proposals, to which he had earlier referred, with regard to increasing the output of landing craft would not have any material effect on the production of anti-submarine craft. It was not proposed to stop the building of any anti-submarine craft except for the 110 foot submarine-chasers. Destroyer escorts already laid down would be completed and only a proportion of new construction foregone to allow for stepping up the production of landing craft. Thus no effect on important anti-submarine craft output would be felt for at least six months.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the recommendations of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff contained in C.C.S. 272/1.

8. *OPERATION "ALACRITY"*
C.C.S. 270/5-270/6)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had only received the United States Chiefs of Staff's views as set out in C.C.S. 270/6 after their arrival at *QUADRANT*. Negotiations undertaken by the Foreign Office in

consultation as necessary with the British Chiefs of Staff were then almost reaching a conclusion. The British Cabinet had given a ruling that the facilities required must, if possible, be obtained on the basis of our treaty with Portugal (our oldest Ally) and not by force. Negotiations had been very protracted. Portugal's main fear was an attack by Spain. They asked for assistance and guarantees for their defense against such an attack and had suggested that a Portuguese Staff should proceed to London to discuss these terms. This would obviously have taken too long. The Portuguese had felt strongly that our initial entry into the Islands in too great strength would produce reactions from the Spaniards and that it must therefore be on a small scale. It had been felt possible to give the guarantee required by the Portuguese since the risk of invasion of that country appeared to be remote. The Portuguese had now agreed to the entry of a small British force into the Azores on the 8th of October. The Prime Minister had informed him that the President had agreed to this arrangement. As soon as the British were in the Islands the policy would be to build up and arrange for the necessary facilities for United States forces.

GENERAL ARNOLD stressed the importance of the ferry route through the Azores, particularly during the coming winter months when weather conditions will greatly restrict ferrying operations over the northern route, forcing a transfer of these operations to the South Atlantic crossing — 5,400 miles longer to the U.K. than the Azores route would be. It was expected that by early 1944 some 1,800 aircraft per month would be ferried across the Atlantic. During 1944 it is estimated that air transport Atlantic crossings will reach 3,500 per month. The use of the Azores for these operations would effect a monthly saving of approximately 15,000,000 gallons of gasoline, and substantially expedite the movement of aircraft and air cargo to the European-Mediterranean, Middle East and Far Eastern areas. Grave inconvenience will be caused if this ferry route is not available by the winter. Negotiations by Pan-American Airways had almost achieved the desired result but had been discontinued when British negotiations got under way.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the original decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to obtain the use of the Azores had been based on their value in the anti-submarine war. The air facilities available were limited and he believed that anti-submarine requirements must take priority. He fully appreciated, however, the value of these Islands as a staging point in the air ferry route. A clause in the agreement allowed for further development and General Arnold could be assured that every effort would be made, and pressure put upon the Portuguese, to afford the use of all facilities to the United States as soon as possible.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he felt that once an entry had been effected, the required facilities for United States aircraft might be made available with-

out reference to the Portuguese, but it was generally felt by the British Chiefs of Staff that some reference would be necessary.

After further discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note:

- a. That the negotiations with the Portuguese regarding the use of the Azores had been brought to a successful conclusion as regards their use by the British, with effect from October 8th.
- b. That the President had agreed that the negotiations between the British and Portuguese Governments with regard to the use of facilities in the Azores should not be prejudiced by insisting that the facilities be made immediately available to the United States.
- c. That the British Chiefs of Staff gave an assurance that everything would be done by the British as soon as possible after entry had been gained into the Azores, to make arrangements for their operational and transit use by U.S. aircraft.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

C.C.S. 112th Meeting

QUADRANT CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN ROOM 2208, CHATEAU FRONTENAC
ON THURSDAY, 19 AUGUST 1943, AT 1430.

PRESENT

General G. C. Marshall, USA
Admiral E. J. King, USN
General H. H. Arnold, USA

General Sir Alan Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles Portal

ALSO PRESENT

Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN
Rear Adm. O. C. Badger, USN
Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA
Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA
Commander V. D. Long, USN

Vice Admiral
Lord Louis Mountbatten
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay
Brigadier W. Porter
Brigadier M. W. M. Macleod
Captain L. E. Porter, R.N.
Air Commodore B. Warburton
Professor Bernal
(For part of Item 3)

PRESENT FOR ITEMS 5, 6 AND 7

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA
Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN
Maj. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA
Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA

Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster
Admiral Sir Percy Noble
Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready
Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier H. Redman
Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA
Capt. F. B. Royal, USN
Comdr. R. D. Coleridge

1. *CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING*

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 111th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.

2. *PROGRESS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER*

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a draft progress report to the President and Prime Minister.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the Progress Report to the President and Prime Minister.

3. *"HABBAKUKS"*
(C.C.S. 315-315/1)

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN said that *HABBAKUKS* might be regarded as floating seadromes or giant aircraft carriers. They could be used as floating advance landing grounds and could form a staging base for air attacks. They might ultimately be used for four-engined heavy bombers. He outlined the principal characteristics of the three types. He then referred to pykrete, the material from which it was proposed to construct *HABBAKUK II*. This might prove a strategic material of which there was an abundant supply. It was formed of a frozen mixture of diluted pulp and water, the latest type of which contained 94 per cent water. He gave details of the characteristics and strength of this material. A thousand ton model had been built and had spent the summer in Lake Jasper, refrigeration being maintained by means of an engine of only 15 horsepower. He wished to emphasize that a *HABBAKUK II*, constructed of pykrete, had no limit to its size. Four-engined bombers could use them if they were built of sufficient dimensions or if adequate arrester gear and assisted take-off could be arranged.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the British Chiefs of Staff regarded *HABBAKUK II* as essentially a Pacific project. General Arnold had mentioned the difficulty of providing adequate bases in the Islands for the deployment of air forces for the bombardment of Japan. It would be a long time before the supply route to China allowed the maintenance of large air forces in that country and therefore the *HABBAKUKS* might be regarded as strategic bases or staging points for air attacks against Japan and would thus fill a gap in our facilities. They could be provided without impinging on other programs.

ADMIRAL KING said that he would agree to accept the recommendations contained in paragraph 8 *b* of C.C.S. 315.

In reply to a question by General Arnold, *LORD LOUIS MOUNT-BATTEN* said that it was proposed that experiments and construction of pykrete sections for *HABBAKUK II* should proceed during the coming winter. If these experiments proved successful, construction could start in the spring of 1944 and the completed *HABBAKUK* be ready by the spring of 1945. In the meanwhile no delay must occur in the preparation of plans and construction of sites for the building of the *HABBAKUKS*. He asked that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should also approve the setting up of a U.S.-British-Canadian Board to press on with the whole matter, not only with regard to the winter experiments and the preparation of sites, but also with the preparation of drawings for the completed *HABBAKUK*. This Board should, in order to insure results, be asked to report monthly to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

PROFESSOR BERNAL demonstrated with the aid of samples of pykrete the various qualities of this material.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

- a.* Took note of paragraphs *a*, *b*, and *c*, of C.C.S. 315/1.
- b.* Agreed to the construction of a section of *HABBAKUK II*, the continuation of design, and the study of the construction and of the facilities necessary for a full-size ship. This agreement to be incorporated as paragraph *d* in C.C.S. 315/1.
- c.* Agreed that the appropriate United States, British and Canadian authorities should be invited to set up a Board forthwith to press on with the action agreed in *b* above, and to report progress monthly to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. *LANDING CRAFT*

- a. Manning of Landing Craft*
(C.C.S. 286/3)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to the modified proposal put forward by the British Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 286/3.

- b. Allocation of Landing Craft — Operation OVERLORD — Vehicle Lift*
(C.C.S. 314)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed with the proposal of the British Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 4 of C.C.S. 314 that the possibility of arranging an increase in the number of LCT(6) available for *OVERLORD* from American sources should be explored.

***c. Allocation of Landing Ships and Craft — American Production
(C.C.S. 314/1-314/2)***

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN explained that under the present ruling the Combined Munitions Assignments Board would feel themselves bound to allocate landing craft only to specifically projected operations. In order that the British should be able to play their part in operations in the Pacific, it was necessary for them to enter and train adequate personnel to man landing craft. If the present ruling were followed landing craft could be only allocated for specifically agreed operations which at present did not exist in the Pacific Theater. The British assault force which was in fact available and used for Operations *TORCH* and *HUSKY* had of necessity been built up before these actual operations were decided on. He felt that the allocation of landing craft should be based on agreed strategy rather than on agreed operations.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the present position was such that there was everywhere a deficit of landing craft. Our operations were limited in many cases solely by the lack of these vessels. In view of this over-all deficiency, he felt it essential to retain the ruling that landing craft should be allocated only to specifically agreed operations.

ADMIRAL KING said he would like to know the future construction program for landing craft in the United Kingdom. He appreciated the necessity for the provision of landing craft for training purposes.

ADMIRAL KING then suggested a modification to proposal 3b, in C.C.S. 314/1, designed to meet Lord Louis Mountbatten's point.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved paragraph 3b of the enclosure to C.C.S. 314/1 modified to read as follows:

“That the British should now work out their training requirements and submit requests for a corresponding share of U.S. production in 1944-45.”

5. *USE OF "PLOUGH" FORCE*
(C.C.S. 316)

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff agreed with the proposal that the capabilities of the *PLOUGH* force should be communicated to General Eisenhower and General Morgan who should be asked to report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff whether these forces could be usefully employed in their theaters. This force had already been ordered to withdraw from Kiska.

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN suggested that it would assist the two commanders if a United States officer from *PLOUGH* force could proceed to the two theaters to give details of the capabilities of the force. He himself could also send an officer.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

- a. Took note that Admiral Nimitz and General DeWitt had been directed to return the *PLOUGH* force to the United States on the first available transportation.
- b. Concurred in the proposal presented in paragraph 4 of the enclosure to C.C.S. 316.

6. *EQUIPPING ALLIES, LIBERATED FORCES AND FRIENDLY NEUTRALS*
(C.C.S. 317)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had not yet had time to consider this paper.

GENERAL MARSHALL put forward certain amendments to the paper, which were suggested by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

- a. Took note of certain amendments presented by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.
- b. Agreed to defer action on the paper until the next meeting.

7. *SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN SARDINIA*

GENERAL MARSHALL said that though he had no reports from the theater commander on the matter, General Donovan had informed him of the

excellent work accomplished by O.S.S. personnel in Sicily. He had felt that even better results could have been obtained if they had been allowed to land prior to the operation, or at least in the first wave. He (General Marshall) believed that since no immediate military operations were planned against Sardinia, it would be well worthwhile to allow O.S.S. and S.O.E. to operate freely in this island. They might succeed in enabling an unopposed landing to be achieved or to seize airfields or other strategic points and hold them as centers of resistance. He had not, of course, as yet discussed this matter with General Donovan.

GENERAL MARSHALL then presented a draft telegram to General Eisenhower suggesting that O.S.S. and S.O.E. should be given a free hand to operate in the island of Sardinia.

SIR ALAN BROOKE asked for time to consider this proposal.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of a proposal submitted by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that General Eisenhower be requested to comment on a suggestion to gain an unopposed occupation of Sardinia by fifth column activities.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

C.C.S. 113th Meeting

QUADRANT CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN ROOM 2208, CHATEAU FRONTENAC,
ON FRIDAY, 20 AUGUST 1943, AT 1430.

PRESENT

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN	General Sir Alan Brooke
General G. C. Marshall, USA	Admiral of the Fleet
Admiral E. J. King, USN	Sir Dudley Pound
General H. H. Arnold, USA	Air Chief Marshal
	Sir Charles Portal

ALSO PRESENT

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA	Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN	Vice Admiral
Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN	Lord Louis Mountbatten
Rear Adm. O. C. Badger, USN	Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay
Maj. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA	Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster
Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA	Admiral Sir Percy Noble
Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA	Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready
Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA	Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh
Commander W. L. Freseman, USN	Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN
Commander V. D. Long, USN	Brigadier W. Porter
	Air Commodore W. Elliot
	Brigadier M. W. M. Macleod
	Captain A. W. Buzzard, RN

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier H. Redman
Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA
Capt. F. B. Royal, USN
Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, RN
Col. A. T. Cornwall-Jones

1. *CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING*

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 112th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.

2. *NAVAL AND AIR COMMANDERS FOR OPERATION "OVERLORD"*

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to the following British suggestion for Air and Naval Commanders for *OVERLORD*:

Naval Commander — Commander in Chief Portsmouth (Admiral Sir Charles Little)

Air Commander — Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Fighter Command (Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory)

3. *EQUIPPING ALLIES, LIBERATED FORCES AND FRIENDLY NEUTRALS*
(C.C.S. 317)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he would like to have time to refer this matter to London where the officers most qualified to advise were situated. It might be necessary to handle it at a later date through the Joint Staff Mission.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to defer action on this paper.

4. *SARDINIA — FIFTH COLUMN ACTIVITIES*
(C.C.S. 318/1)

Previous Reference: C.C.S. 112th Mtg. Min., Item 7.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft telegram to General Eisenhower on the subject of the use of O.S.S. and S.O.E. organizations in Sardinia.

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested certain amendments to this telegram, including a reference to operations in Corsica.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed, with certain amendments, to the dispatch to General Eisenhower of the signal contained in C.C.S. 318/1 (Subsequently dispatched as *FAN 198.*).

5. *APPRECIATION AND PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN*
(C.C.S. 313)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had not had sufficient time to arrive at a definite conclusion with regard to the plan and would like to hear the views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. The early action required by U.S. forces in the Pacific appeared to be generally agreed by the Combined Staff Planners, except for differing views as to the emphasis to be laid on operations in New Guinea. It was with regard to operations of British forces that the various alternatives existed.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff were in agreement with the recommendations put forward by the U.S. Planners with certain amendments which he outlined.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that, in his opinion, it would be necessary to undertake the recapture of the whole of Burma; only thus could the main road to China be reopened. Akyab and Ramree must be taken before the next monsoon. Operations further south, i.e., against Sumatra, would, he considered, be a diversion from the main effort which must be concentrated with a view to clearing Burma.

SIR ALAN BROOKE then outlined the various operations which could be undertaken from India.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that there seemed to be two alternatives. In both cases the first step would be the recapture of North Burma. After that, it would be possible either to press on with the reconquest of the whole of Burma and later attack Singapore or, alternatively, to recapture Singapore and afterwards clear Southern Burma. The extent of the operations this season was dependent on the reply from the Commander in Chief, India, with regard to the lines of communications through Assam. The capture of Akyab was a necessary preliminary to an attack on Rangoon, since it provided the necessary air base. The Prime Minister had suggested an alternative operation, the capture of the northern tip of Sumatra. It was not possible to undertake in 1944 both the capture of Akyab and that of Northern Sumatra. The Akyab operation could take place in March and the Sumatra operation, which was not depen-

dent on the monsoon, could take place in May. The North Sumatra operation was being examined and necessitated a force of some four divisions. This was only a slightly larger force than that required for Akyab.

From an examination of the courses of action put forward by the Planners, it appeared that the opening of a port in China could be accomplished at approximately the same time, whether this was done by an overland advance through China after opening the main Burma road, or, whether it was done by sea-borne attacks from Singapore after opening the Malacca Straits.

It was, in any event, essential to develop to the maximum the air route into China. It was the only method of supplying that country. On the defeat of Germany a great number of aircraft should be available. In addition to this it was necessary to decide on the main line of advance, either overland or by sea from Singapore. In each case the Ledo road would first be opened and then either Akyab captured as a preliminary to an attack on Rangoon, or Northern Sumatra captured as a preliminary for an attack on Singapore. Whatever course of action was adopted, great developments would have to be undertaken with regard to base facilities in India.

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked if an attack on the Kra Isthmus, as an alternative to the attack on Northern Sumatra, had been examined.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that though this line of advance had certain advantages, the difficulty was the lack of any ports on that coast.

ADMIRAL KING said that he had always considered Bangkok as the most valuable prize. If this town could be captured, it would be unnecessary to assault Rangoon, since all Japanese lines of communication to it could be effectively cut, and it would fall into our lap.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that on the assumption that the war against Germany was completed by the autumn of 1944, he believed that the air route to China could be vastly increased. According to the plan, no substantial amount of supplies could get into China by any road before 1946. The United Nations would have a tremendous production of heavy bombers, transports and air crews which, when the drain of active operations against Germany ceased, would rapidly build up into vast numbers. Similarly, the other requirements for the air route, such as radio aids, would be plentiful.

To achieve results, however, from these vast forces it would be necessary at once to start building up the necessary facilities and to make preparations for deploying and employing the aircraft. Numbers would be so large that, if

necessary, unserviceable aircraft could be scrapped rather than large repair depots should be set up. Maximum efforts must be made, if necessary at the expense of operations to open the southern road. By 1945 it could be possible for the air supply route to reach such magnitude that delivery by the Ledo and even the main Burma roads would be insignificant in proportion. He realized that there were great difficulties in the construction of airfields particularly in China. Myitkyina, Bhamo and Lashio could be used which would increase the load. Air forces could develop a direct air offensive on Japan and ground forces could be thrown in to stiffen the Chinese troops required to safeguard the base area. Japanese opposition everywhere would be weakened and their morale lowered. Operations on these lines would be, he felt, more profitable than tedious land operations to open the main land route. As he visualized it, it would, by the methods he had outlined, be possible to continue attacks on the periphery of the wheel to achieve attrition, to attack the heart of Japan (the center of the wheel) by air, with devastating results on her industry and morale, while at the same time the westerly drive in the Pacific would cut the spokes of the wheel. Thus he believed the earliest collapse of Japan could be achieved, but a greater effort must be made to build up the air route. A study of the logistic possibilities should be made at once, after which the route must be built up, if necessary at the expense of ground operations.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he felt it important that in view of the immense difficulties of ground operations in the area concerned, that the most effective application of our air superiority should be considered and that we should capitalize on the effects of this superiority.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he was very strongly in agreement with General Marshall and had himself been thinking on the same lines. He had been impressed by the small number of aircraft (22) required to maintain three of Brigadier Wingate's groups. The air could be directed by these groups onto vital enemy points. Penetration by these methods with lightly armed forces assisted and supplied by the air, could, he felt, produce quicker results than the laborious advances of land forces, accompanied by the necessary building of road communications. With regard to the seizure by air action of potential air bases, he believed that while this, in certain cases, could be achieved, it must be remembered that troops and anti-aircraft weapons were essential in the initial stages and that the bases could not be held by air action alone until the enemy had been driven back to a certain distance from them.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he considered that further use could be made of the vast number of fighters and light bombers which would later be available for direct action against the Japanese all over Burma. They could attack railroads, bridges and troops and vehicles on the march.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL agreed that this had great possibilities but pointed out the risk of delaying the air operations out of China by building up too heavy a force of lighter aircraft for operations in Burma.

Both *GENERAL MARSHALL* and *SIR ALAN BROOKE* agreed that the tactical conception of operations in Burma employing air reinforcement and air support and supply to long-range penetration groups should be studied as a matter of urgency.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that to attack Japan it would be necessary to base forces far into China. The Chinese forces required to hold the essential bases would require considerable supplies which would effect a reduction in the air effort itself. In addition to the development to the maximum of the air route, the Ledo road, with pipelines for gasoline, and then a sea route into China, must be developed. Operations to clear Lower Burma by means of long-range penetration groups in conjunction with air support or operations against either the Kra Isthmus or Singapore could be undertaken. He would be interested to know which it was believed would most assist the United States thrust in the Pacific, particularly with regard to the synchronization of these operations with corresponding operations in the Islands.

ADMIRAL KING said that in view of the nature of the country he did not believe that an attack on Rangoon would divert many Japanese forces. Operations, however, against the vital center of Bangkok or into China to develop the air offensive would, he thought, both produce strong Japanese reactions. The Japanese, however, had no shortage of troops. Their major deficiencies were in aircraft and shipping. Shipping was their main bottleneck since this was required to support all their operations throughout a wide area, including their air operations. This being the case, he believed that the initial main effort of the air forces based in China should be against shipping and port facilities.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he agreed with Admiral King's conception of the vital importance of striking at Japanese shipping from the air.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had had a most valuable discussion. He would like to have the subject further considered on the following day. It was important to get the background as to possibilities by the various methods which had been discussed and to decide on a long-range plan and to relate immediate operations to this general policy.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to defer action on this paper.

6. *IMMEDIATE OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN*

Reference: C.C.S. Memo for Information No. 132.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a memorandum setting out the main points in the various signals which had recently been exchanged between the Combined Chiefs of Staff and General Eisenhower.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the latest information seemed to show that the Germans had some 16 divisions in Italy. The majority of these appeared to be in the north and there was a tendency to move the headquarters of units in the south into the Naples area.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of C.C.S. Memo for Information No. 132.

7. *MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS IN RELATION TO SPAIN*
(C.C.S. 321)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that there had been no time to refer the British paper with regard to policy in relation to Spain to the Foreign Office but it set out the military considerations involved.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved this paper.

8. *MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS IN RELATION TO TURKEY*
(C.C.S. 322)

GENERAL MARSHALL said it seemed that the present scale of equipment to Turkey was too high and might be reduced.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed with this view. The Turks were not absorbing all the equipment now being provided. Their training and repair facilities were inadequate. He believed that supplies should be slowed down to a "trickle" and they should not be given more than they could usefully absorb and employ.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved this paper.

9. MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS IN RELATION TO RUSSIA

SIR ALAN BROOKE outlined the present position in Russia. In general, the Russians were in a stronger position than ever before. He believed that they had reserves available for further offensives in the autumn. Hungary was understood to be seeking to negotiate a separate peace and neither Rumania nor Finland were desirous of remaining in the war. The Germans would, he thought, be forced to hold all their existing divisions on the Russian front or even to reinforce them. This would facilitate our operations in Italy and *OVERLORD*. He did not believe that there was any chance of the Germans achieving a negotiated peace with the Russians who had too much to wipe off the slate.

GENERAL MARSHALL referred to the forming of a "Free Germany" movement within Russia. From reports he had received, it appeared that Russia was turning an increasingly hostile eye on the capitalistic world, of whom they were becoming increasingly contemptuous. Their recent "Second Front" announcement, no longer borne of despair, was indicative of this attitude. He would be interested to know the British Chiefs of Staff's views on the possible results of the situation in Russia with regard to the deployment of Allied forces—for example, in the event of an overwhelming Russian success, would the Germans be likely to facilitate our entry into the country to repel the Russians?

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he had in the past often considered the danger of the Russians seizing the opportunity of the war to further their ideals of international communism. They might try to profit by the chaos and misery existing at the end of hostilities. He had, however, recently raised this point with Dr. Benes, who had forecast the Russian order to international communist organizations to damp down their activities. Dr. Benes' view had been that since Russia would be terribly weakened after the war, she would require a period of recovery, and to speed up this recovery would require a peaceful Europe in which she could take advantage of the markets for her exports.

There would, however, *SIR ALAN BROOKE* considered, be Russian demands for a part of Poland, at least part of the Baltic States, and possibly concessions in the Balkans. If she obtained these territories, she would be anxious to assist us in maintaining the peace of Europe.

With regard to Russia's air power, *SIR CHARLES PORTAL* said that in view of her superiority on the Eastern Front, the results achieved were disappointing. This, he believed, was largely due to lack of adequate training and handling.

U. S. SECRET

BRITISH MOST SECRET

In discussing the possibility of the Germans releasing forces from the Eastern Front for operations elsewhere by the shortening of their line, *ADMIRAL KING* said that he was doubtful whether the shortening of a line would in fact allow Germany to divert divisions elsewhere. The shortening of the line would enable the Russians to intensify their dispositions on this shorter front.

10. *SYNTHETIC HARBORS*

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN reported that certain experts with regard to synthetic harbors were now on their way to Quebec to discuss the matter with the appropriate United States officers.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

C.C.S. 114th Meeting

QUADRANT CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN ROOM 2208, CHATEAU FRONTENAC,
ON SATURDAY, 21 AUGUST 1943, AT 1430.

PRESENT

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN
General G. C. Marshall, USA
Admiral E. J. King, USN
General H. H. Arnold, USA

General Sir Alan Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles Portal

ALSO PRESENT

Field Marshal Sir John Dill

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier H. Redman
Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA

1. *CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING*

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 113th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.

2. *PROGRESS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER*
(C.C.S. 319/1)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved C.C.S. 319/1, as amended in the course of the discussion. (Amended version subsequently published as C.C.S. 319/2.)

3. *SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND*
(C.C.S. 308, 308/1, 308/2)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Approved C. C. S. 308, excluding paragraph 8.

b. Approved the amendments to paragraphs 8 a and b set forth in C.C.S. 308/1.

c. Approved the amendment to paragraph 8 c set forth in C.C.S. 308/2. (The amended paper subsequently published as C.C.S. 308/3.)

4. *SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST 1943-1944*
(C.C.S. 301, 301/1, 301/2)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the new subparagraph eight (i) "Air Route into China", set forth by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 301/2.

5. *SUPPLY ROUTES IN NORTHEAST INDIA*
(C.C.S. 325)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the recommendations contained in the paper.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

6. *AIR PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN*
(C.C.S. 323)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that this paper should be referred to the Combined Staff Planners for study and the submission of an appropriate report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff not later than 15 September 1943.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

C.C.S. 115th Meeting

QUADRANT CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN ROOM 2208, CHATEAU FRONTENAC,
ON MONDAY, 23 AUGUST 1943, AT 1430.

PRESENT

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN
General G. C. Marshall, USA
Admiral E. J. King, USN
General H. H. Arnold, USA

General Sir Alan Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles Portal

ALSO PRESENT

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA
Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN
Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN
Rear Adm. O. C. Badger, USN
Maj. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA
Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA
Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA
Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA
Commander W. L. Freseman, USN
Commander V. D. Long, USN

Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Vice Admiral
Lord Louis Mountbatten
(Items 1 to 7, incl.)
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay
Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster
Admiral Sir Percy Noble
Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready
Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh
Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN
Brigadier W. Porter
Air Commodore W. Elliot
Capt. R. B. Tollemache

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier H. Redman
Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA
Capt. F. B. Royal, USN
Comdr. R. D. Coleridge

1. *CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING*

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 114th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, subject to the understanding that, with regard to Item 2 of these conclusions, certain amendments made to C.C.S. 319/3 would necessitate consequential amendments in C.C.S. 319/2.

2. *DRAFT FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER (C.C.S. 319/3)*

Certain amendments were agreed to the draft report to the President and Prime Minister contained in C.C.S. 319/3.

Later in the meeting, certain additional amendments were put forward consequent to decisions taken on Items 4 and 5 below.

In the course of discussion, GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that there might be some method whereby the Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia Command should have at least some control over the lines of communication through Assam.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that it had originally been thought that it might be possible to put the Commander in Chief India, under the Commander of the Southeast Asia area, since India formed the base for the latter's operations. There were, however, constitutional difficulties which had prevented this plan being implemented.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he fully appreciated these constitutional difficulties, but had hoped that some system similar to the French "zones des armees" might be instituted.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that this point had also been considered and an Eastern Command, India, had been formed comprising the whole area covering the lines of communication through Assam. This command had been placed under the Commander of the Southeast Asia area.

GENERAL ARNOLD suggested that with regard to the examination of future operations in the India-Burma-China Theater, it might be well to insert a reference to a study and report on operations against the Andaman Islands, since the possession of these islands would be of great value to operations in this Theater.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that the Planning Staff would certainly consider the Andaman Islands in connection with certain of the operations which they had been instructed to examine.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the draft final report to the President and Prime Minister as amended in the course of discussion (subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 319/4), and agreed to present it at the meeting to be held that evening at the Citadel.

3. *JAPANESE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS*

GENERAL MARSHALL read to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a brief memorandum on the treatment of U. S. and Filipino prisoners by the Japanese. This memorandum was a report from a Major in the Air Corps of the U.S. Army who had recently escaped after one year in captivity. The Japanese treatment of the prisoners had been inhuman and barbaric in the extreme.

4. *PIPELINE FROM INDIA TO CHINA*
(C.C.S. 312; 312/1)

It was pointed out that an unqualified approval of the proposals contained in C.C.S. 312 might result in a further decrease in the scale of our military operations in Northern Burma.

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that the U.S. craft sent to India for the pipeline could be used for other more urgent purposes if the Supreme Commander so desired.

After a full discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved, subject to prior requirements of military operations in Burma, the construction of a four-inch pipeline from Assam to Kunming and a six-inch pipeline from Calcutta to Assam to facilitate air operations in China and to ease congestion on the existing lines of supply.

5. *OPERATIONS FROM INDIA*
(C.C.S. 327)

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that there were three possible courses open to us in North Burma in the dry season of 1943-44, and that it seemed

clear that the existing capacity of the lines of communication would not allow of the full accomplishment of more than one of these.

GENERAL SOMERVELL pointed out that operations in North Burma would not start until mid-February. He said that he believed the movement of supplies into the area should be based on the most optimistic forecast of the capacity of the lines of communication.

After a full discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed:

- a. That the main effort should be put into offensive operations, with the object of establishing land communications with China and improving and securing the air route.
- b. That priorities cannot be rigid and that therefore the Supreme Commander should be instructed that in formulating his proposals he should regard the decision in *a* above as a guide and bear in mind the importance of the longer term development of the lines of communication.

6. *MOVEMENT OF THE "QUEENS"*
(C.C.S. 246/1)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that the "*QUEENS*" should revert to running on a 21 day cycle.

7. *AMPHIBIANS FOR "OVERLORD"*
(C.C.S. 326)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to defer consideration of C.C.S. 326 until after the *QUADRANT* conference.

8. *EQUIPPING ALLIES, LIBERATED FORCES AND FRIENDLY NEUTRALS*
C.C.S. 317/1-317/2-317/3)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed:

- a. That the supplies and equipment necessary to carry out the program recommended by the Commanding General of the North African

Theater of Operations (Cable W7177-CM-IN-BOSCO 21, 13 August 1943) be authorized for shipment during the period 1 September — 31 December 1943, insofar as this does not interfere with operations scheduled previous to *QUADRANT*.

- b. That the rearmament of French Army units be limited to the obligations of the Casablanca Conference, i.e., 11 divisions as modified by General Eisenhower's radio (W7177) of 13 August 1943.

9. *OPERATION "RANKIN"*
(C.C.S. 320)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff felt that the Allied forces employed were too large and that it was hoped that fewer forces could be used for occupation purposes. An insufficient emphasis had been laid on the value of air power to quell the population.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff agreed with this view. They suggested that the plan should be approved in principle and kept under continuous review with particular reference to the premises of air superiority and the number of troops necessary to insure the success of this operation.

SIR ALAN BROOKE drew attention to the recommendation, contained in Paragraph 20 *b*, that the provision in the United Kingdom of a Commanding General, Staff and Headquarters for the U.S. Army Group was of urgent importance and should be undertaken forthwith.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

- a. Approved in principle the digest of the plan for Operation *RANKIN* contained in C.C.S. 320, but directed that this plan be kept under continuous review with particular reference to the premises of air superiority and the number of troops necessary to insure the success of this operation.
- b. Took note that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff would give early consideration to the appointment of a Commanding General, Staff and Headquarters for the U.S. Army Group in the United Kingdom.

10. *REHABILITATION OF OCCUPIED AND LIBERATED TERRITORIES*
(C.C.S. 324/1)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the recommendations contained in Paragraph 5 of C.C.S. 324/1.

11. *FUTURE CONVOY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ATLANTIC*
(C.C.S. 222/2)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to defer consideration of this paper.

12. *MEETING WITH MAJOR GENERAL ROOKS AND MAJOR GENERAL WHITELEY*

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to discuss operations in the Mediterranean with Major General Rooks and Major General Whiteley at their meeting the following day.

13. *FUTURE MEETINGS*

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to meet at 1030 on Tuesday, 24 August.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

C.C.S. 116th Meeting

QUADRANT CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN ROOM 2208, CHATEAU FRONTENAC,
ON TUESDAY, 24 AUGUST 1943, AT 1030.

PRESENT

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN	General Sir Alan Brooke
General G. C. Marshall, USA	Admiral of the Fleet
Admiral E. J. King, USN	Sir Dudley Pound
General H. H. Arnold, USA	Air Chief Marshal
	Sir Charles Portal

ALSO PRESENT

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA	Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN	Vice Admiral
Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN	Lord Louis Mountbatten
Rear Adm. O. C. Badger, USN	Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay
Maj. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA	Gen. Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster
Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA	Admiral Sir Percy Noble
Maj. Gen. L. W. Rooks, USA	Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready
(for Item 3 only)	Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh
Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA	Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN
Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA	Brigadier J. K. McNair
Commander W. L. Freseman, USN	Air Commodore W. Elliot
Commander V. D. Long, USN	Brigadier M. W. M. Macleod
	General J. F. M. Whiteley
	(for Item 3 only)
	Air Commodore R. Foster
	Captain T. M. Brownrigg, RN

PRESENT FOR ITEM 5

Dr. T. V. Soong
Major General Shih-Ming Chu

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier H. Redman
Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA
Captain F. B. Royal, USN
Commander R. D. Coleridge

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 115th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.

2. FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER (C.C.S. 319/4)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a draft cover note for the final report and certain amendments arising out of the Second *QUADRANT* Meeting between the President and Prime Minister.

Later in the meeting *SIR ALAN BROOKE* informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the Prime Minister considered that the names of the naval and air commanders for *OVERLORD* should not be mentioned in the final report.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the cover note and certain amendments to the final report (subsequently circulated as 319/5).

3. MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS

a. Directive to General Eisenhower (C.C.S. 328)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners covering a draft directive to General Eisenhower based on the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at *QUADRANT*. In the course of discussion, it was agreed that General Eisenhower should be sent only those parts of the final report to the Prime Minister and President (C.C.S. 319/5), and of the paper relating available resources to plans (C.C.S. 329), that dealt with the European Theater.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that those extracts from the Final Report of the *QUADRANT* Conference (C.C.S. 319/5) and from the Implementation of Assumed Basic Undertakings (C.C.S. 329) dealing with the European Theater should be sent to General Eisenhower with the cover note contained as an enclosure to C.C.S. 328.

b. Discussion with Generals Whiteley and Rooks

GENERAL WHITELEY outlined the position with regard to forthcoming operations in the Mediterranean. His statement follows:

1. Forthcoming operations in Italy comprise two amphibious assaults —
 - a. Across the Straits of Messina (**BAYTOWN**);
 - b. Into Salerno Bay (**AVALANCHE**). These assaults will be under the command of General Alexander, and have as their object the securing of the Rome airfields and the clearing of the enemy from Southern Italy.
2. The **BAYTOWN** assault is being carried out by the 13th Corps, with two divisions in the assault and one in reserve. The assaulting divisions are the 5th and the Canadian. The object of the **BAYTOWN** assault is to contain German divisions and to open the Straits of Messina for ships carrying cargoes to Naples.
3. The **AVALANCHE** assault is under the command of the 5th U.S. Army. The assault will be carried out by the 10th British Corps, comprising 46th, 56th and 7th Armored Divisions. The 6th U.S. Corps is the immediate follow-up, and later follow-ups may include a French Corps and the 5th British Corps. The immediate object of **AVALANCHE** is to secure the port of Naples.
4. We expect to find 16 German divisions in Italy. The German intention seems to be to deny us the Po Valley by holding a position Pisa-Rimini. It looks as if they intend to withdraw their divisions from Southern Italy to the North. The four divisions in the extreme south are, we think, withdrawing, covered by two German divisions in the Naples-Salerno area. Two more German divisions are in the Rome area disciplining the Italian Government.
5. The **BAYTOWN** assault will take place between September 2 - 4. General Eisenhower was anxious to have a ten day gap between **BAYTOWN** and **AVALANCHE** so that some of the **BAYTOWN** landing craft could be used for **AVALANCHE**. The limiting factors for the **AVALANCHE** assault are that it cannot be launched before September 7; that, for reasons of moon, it cannot be launched between September 11 and 21. The **AVALANCHE** assault will probably, therefore, take place September 9 - 11.
6. It looks, therefore, as if the **BAYTOWN** assault may not meet very strong opposition. On the other hand, the Germans had large numbers of

antiaircraft dual-purpose guns on the Straits, and some of these may still be in position. Even if we do not meet with much opposition, our progress is likely to be slowed down by the physical difficulties of the country and enemy demolitions. We hope, however, to pass six divisions through Calabria by 1st December.

7. There is, of necessity, some anxiety about the *AVALANCHE* operation. The assault may be opposed within a few hours by comparable German forces. If and when the Germans realize that our assault is not in very great strength they may move divisions to the sound of the guns and attack us with up to six divisions some time during September. On the other hand, communications in Italy are poor and it may not be easy for the Germans to alter their withdrawal plans and concentrate divisions against our *AVANLANCHE* assault. However, General Eisenhower must naturally be anxious to protect the *AVALANCHE* assault with the maximum aircraft, and to build it up just as quickly as is humanly possible. Algiers estimates that, apart from air-borne divisions, six divisions and tactical air force will be ashore in the Naples area by 1st December.

8. The strategical air force cannot be moved in until we have secured the Rome airfields. It is not possible to estimate at this stage how many divisions will be required to do this — probably of the order of 16. The maintenance commitment of the strategical air force is the equivalent of approximately four divisions so considerable development will be necessary before it can be operating at full strength. This will probably include the provision of pipelines.

9. For any advance north of the Pisa line, we will require ports north of Naples. Civitavecchia is a good port and can be used even if the German is in occupation of Corsica and Sardinia. We must, however, deal with those two islands before we can use Leghorn and Genoa. General Eisenhower's intention prior to the receipt of any instructions resulting from this conference, was to continue to hit the Germans whenever and wherever possible.

10. As regards operations against Southern France, the main limiting factor is likely to be landing craft. If we can only assault with approximately two divisions, we want to create diversions as much as possible from other directions. Naturally, therefore, we would like to be in possession of the Italian coast right up to the French frontier. Whether or not it will be possible to do an amphibious operation in Southern France if we are not appreciably further north than the Pisa line has not yet been examined.

11. We are faced with a very difficult movement and maintenance problem in the Mediterranean. For several months we will have to be manning ports in North Africa and in Italy. Moreover, the North African ports will be working at extreme pressure. They will not only have to accept U.S. and U.K. convoys, discharge these cargoes and reload them for Italian destinations, but also they will be loading divisions for Italy at top pressure. Moreover, owing to poor communications in North Africa, we cannot always move divisions to the most desirable ports of embarkation; we have to load them where they are situated.

12. On paper, General Eisenhower has a large number of divisions available. On the other hand, it is questionable whether we will be able to provide the personnel and equipment necessary to maintain these divisions on an operational scale. There is not only the problem of shipping equipment, but of dealing with it through our bases during this period of high pressure. Moreover, many of these divisions are of foreign nationalities and this leads to less elasticity and increased maintenance commitments.

13. Plans for Operation *BACKBONE* have been prepared. Until the end of the year there are likely to be some British divisions in North Africa which could be made available. After the New Year we will probably have to rely on the French to provide the insurance for *BACKBONE*. Our first step would have to be to move air forces from Italy to the Spanish Moroccan area to operate from fields already prepared or earmarked. We would also have to forestall the Germans in the Balearics with a view to interfering with their coastal traffic from Marseilles. If we could deny them this coastal traffic, we could interfere appreciably with their rate of build-up.

14. To sum up, I think that General Eisenhower's main concerns are:

a. The anxious period during and immediately after the *AVANLANCHE* assault;

b. Port congestion and the difficulties of movement in the Mediterranean;

c. Whether we will be able to maintain sufficient divisions on an operational scale.

GENERAL ROOKS explained that the *AVANLANCHE* attack would be under command of the 5th U.S. Army and would consist of two corps, one British and one American. The possibility of a German effort to sever the lines of communication through the Straits of Gibraltar was continually kept under

review. Plans had been prepared by the Fifth Army, which had now been turned over to AFHQ, who would use such forces as were available to them. At present some two to four United States and British divisions were available for this purpose, though later it might be necessary to depend to some extent on French troops.

AIR COMMODORE FOSTER said that already all the tactical fighter and most of the tactical bomber force was situated in Sicily. Air cover for the assault in the Salerno area would be provided by fighters based initially in Sicily. The single-engined fighters would operate from six to eight strips laid to the eastward of Messina and with their extra tanks could operate for between 15 and 20 minutes over the assault. The twin-engined fighters based on Catania and in Western Sicily, having a greater range, could remain longer over the area. In addition, A-26 units were also based on Catania, and the Fleet air arm would provide air cover with Seafires from four escort and one Fleet carrier. It was estimated that it would be possible to maintain 30 fighters continuously over the assault during the hours of daylight. The tactical bomber force would be used on an arc designed to stop enemy reinforcements while the strategical bomber force would concentrate on communications and airdromes. Since the enemy had good airdromes on the eastern coast of Italy opposite the assault area, it would not be possible to harry the enemy aircraft to the same extent as had been achieved in *HUSKY*. It was for this reason that the Commander in Chief had asked to retain the B-24's which had been used for the Ploesti raid.

CAPTAIN BROWNRIGG explained the naval command arrangements. The *AVALANCHE* assault would all be under the command of Admiral Hewitt. Under him would be Admiral Hall, commanding the combat loaders carrying the 6th Corps; Admiral Connelly commanding the United States landing craft; and Commodore Oliver, the British landing craft. Admiral Hewitt would have a force of cruisers and destroyers operating under his orders and Admiral Vian would command the carrier force. Cover to the northward would be provided by a battleship force. There would be a further covering force operating to the south of the Toe in the unlikely event of the Italian ships in Taranto endeavoring to break out. The Naval Commander in Chief was not worried on the assault phase of the operation but realized the difficulties of safeguarding the long lines of sea communication and the various routes on which convoys would have to run. It would be impossible to divert convoys to avoid submarines and air attack and they would therefore have to fight their way through. For this reason there was, of course, a large demand for escort vessels.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note with interest of the above statements.

4. *FUTURE CONVOY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ATLANTIC*
(C.C.S. 222/3)

SIR DUDLEY POUND explained that a Combined ad hoc committee had put forward the proposals contained in the enclosure to C.C.S. 222/3 since the present arrangement of three UGS convoys per month, with a limit of 80 ships per convoy, did not provide for all the ships presenting themselves. The suggestion that four convoys per month should be established would require further investigation since the running of additional UGS convoys would necessitate consequential adjustments to other Atlantic convoys. With regard to paragraph 5 of the memorandum, he suggested the words "unless otherwise agreed" should be added after the words "following priority" in order to give a greater degree of flexibility.

ADMIRAL KING said that he fully appreciated that the cycle could not be changed to four convoys a month except after consultation and in relation to other convoys. He suggested that it should be agreed that the United States Navy should fix the earliest practicable date for a program of four UGS convoys a month, "with due regard to the general setup of convoys in the Atlantic."

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed,

- a. That the U.S. Navy should fix the earliest practicable date when a program of four UGS convoys per month could be established, with due regard to the general setup of convoys in the Atlantic.
- b. To delegate executive authority to the Combined Military Transportation Committee to act on similar problems in the future with regard to UGS convoys in accordance with the following priority unless otherwise agreed:
 - (1) U.S. and British ships destined for forces commanded by the Allied Commander in Chief in Mediterranean.
 - (2) U.S. and British ships destined for India.
 - (3) U.S. and British ships destined for Allied forces in Middle East.
 - (4) U.S. and British ships carrying civil supplies for occupied territories in Mediterranean.
 - (5) Ships destined for Persian Gulf.

(6) Lend-Lease to Turkey.

(7) Miscellaneous.

5. *MEETING WITH DR. T. V. SOONG*

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he understood that Dr. T. V. Soong had been informed of the progress of discussions at Quebec by the President and Prime Minister. He felt it would be very useful to have Dr. Soong's reactions to the points made by the President and Prime Minister.

DR. SOONG said that the President and Prime Minister had given him only a general outline and had suggested that he should obtain full information about actual plans from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He was most happy to know that so much consideration had been given at *QUADRANT* to the war with Japan. To achieve greater security he proposed to send General Chu to the Generalissimo to inform him of the decisions taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In reply to a question by Dr. Soong, *GENERAL SOMERVELL* explained the layout of the proposed pipeline to China which would carry 18,000 tons of gasoline per month. It was hoped by 1945-46 to achieve a lift of 65,000 tons of supplies by road. Some small amounts could, he hoped, be got over the road about three months after the opening.

DR. SOONG then asked for details with regard to the Chinese share of proposed operations. Was he right in assuming that the original plan was being adhered to and that Chinese forces at Ramgarh would operate from Ledo in conjunction with an advance by the forces from Yunnan?

GENERAL MARSHALL confirmed that in general this was the case.

In reply to a question by Dr. Soong, *SIR ALAN BROOKE* said that the size of the British forces to be employed had not yet been settled, since the full effect of the floods on the lines of communication through Assam was not yet known. These lines of communication had to carry not only supplies to be flown by air into China and those required for the forces to operate from Ledo and Imphal, but also the supplies required for the expansion of the air route and the building up of the lines of communications themselves.

DR. SOONG asked to be informed of the date on which it was proposed these operations should commence.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that it was now proposed that they should start later than originally envisaged, since it was believed better that they should carry on into the early part of the monsoon, thus assisting us to consolidate our position. The actual date was, however, not settled, nor was it possible to disclose it.

Referring to amphibian operations, *DR. SOONG* said that the Generalissimo had always understood that they would be carried out in Burma.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he was not in a position to disclose the selected area for the amphibious assault, but it was to take place from India and would have a direct bearing on operations in Burma and Western China.

DR. SOONG pointed out that the Generalissimo feared the Japanese capacity to attack since they had the advantage of superior lines of communication which would be hard to combat.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the position was improving since the Japanese no longer had the same power as hitherto, and attrition against air and shipping was being forced upon them by the ever increasing efforts of the United Nations. In Burma it was hoped that the employment of long-range penetration groups on the principle of Brigadier Wingate's columns, would seriously interfere with Japanese lines of communications.

DR. SOONG said that he felt that it would be of no value for him, as a civilian, to express his own views on the situation.

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that the success of operations in Burma was largely dependent on the confident cooperation of the Chinese forces. With this, success could be expected, but unless this collaboration was forthcoming they could not be undertaken.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out the colossal effort required to build up and maintain communications with China. The pipeline was only a small part, though that in itself necessitated the shipping of much equipment and many technicians over a vast distance. The air line was also an immense undertaking. Last week it had achieved a rate of 7,000 tons per month. It would soon achieve 10,000 tons a month and would increase from even that figure. To make this prodigious effort worthwhile, security of the lines of communication was essential.

In the Mediterranean, by a magnificent unity of effort, a great victory had been achieved. In the Far East the position was infinitely more difficult.

Unity of effort and unity of action in Burma, in India and in China *must* be achieved. A Supreme Commander had been proposed by the British and accepted delightedly by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. This Commander in Chief was faced with an extremely difficult problem and his operations could never succeed unless he was assured of complete unity of action and of cooperation by China.

(At this point General Marshall left the meeting with Dr. Soong in order to inform him of a certain decision taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.)

On his return *GENERAL MARSHALL* informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the lines of his discussion with Dr. Soong. He had once more emphasized to him that he, Dr. Soong, must ensure unity of action from China on behalf of the united effort and that this unity of action must be accompanied by no holding back or reluctance. Only thus could success be achieved and without it all our efforts would be futile.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note with warm approval of the statement made by General Marshall.

6. *RELATION OF RESOURCES TO PLANS*
(C.C.S. 329; 329/1).

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners on the implementation of assumed basic undertakings and specific operations for the conduct of the war, 1943-44, together with certain amendments, subsequently put forward by the Combined Staff Planners. These amendments, together with certain others put forward at the meeting, were discussed in detail.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

- a. Agreed to certain amendments to the paper including that in 329/1 (amended paper subsequently published as C.C.S. 329/2).
- b. Approved the report by the Combined Staff Planners in the enclosure to the paper.
- c. Instructed the Secretaries to prepare a suitable paragraph on the subject for insertion in the Final Report.

7. *SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND*

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them the terms of an announcement to be made with regard to the appointment of Vice Admiral the Lord Louis Mountbatten as Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia Command.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note with approval of the proposed announcement.

8. *PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE* (C.C.S. 310)

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the British Chiefs of Staff were not in a position to take action at present on this paper. He understood that it was being discussed by the British Minister of Information on a political level. He fully appreciated the importance of resolving the problem presented and would make every effort to insure that a solution was found as rapidly as possible.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he realized that the suggestion that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be charged with the implementation of the policy was questionable. He felt, however, that an early solution was important, particularly from the United States Chiefs of Staff point of view, since they had a particular responsibility in the matter.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

- a. Agreed as to the necessity from the military point of view of adequate machinery for the coordination of propaganda.
- b. Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would ascertain the result of the recent negotiations by the British authorities concerned.
- c. Agreed that further action in this matter should be taken up by the Joint Staff Mission as early as possible.

9. *MESSAGE TO STALIN*

GENERAL MARSHALL read out a draft message to Mr. Stalin, which he suggested might be put forward to the President and Prime Minister as the basis of the communication to the Soviet Government. Certain minor amendments to this draft were suggested.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the draft message to be put forward to the President and Prime Minister.

10. *CONCLUDING REMARKS*

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he felt that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would like to place on record their appreciation of the work done by the Planning Staffs, by General Riddell-Webster, General Somervell and Admiral Badger, who, by their industry and long hours of toil, had contributed much to the success of the conference.

ADMIRAL KING felt that special mention of the labors of the Secretariat should also be expressed.

ADMIRAL LEAHY expressed, on behalf of the United States Chiefs of Staff, his appreciation for the consideration which had been shown by the British Chiefs of Staff for the United States point of view. This had contributed largely to the success of the conference and the easy reconciliation of ideas. He believed that the conference had been of great value and that further conferences should be held at short intervals.

SIR ALAN BROOKE, on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff, expressed his gratitude for the patience and consideration shown by the United States Chiefs of Staff to the British points of view. He believed that each meeting was a step forward to a full appreciation by each of the other's point of view, and agreements were therefore more quickly reached. Now that we held the initiative, the tempo of the war was faster and meetings should, he believed, be held more frequently than hitherto.

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